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Zvenyslava Opeida, S.J.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2017 
 
 The World Trade Organization (WTO) has become one of the most important dispute 
resolution bodies in international law. It applies rules which both limit the use of subsidies that 
might distort international trade and control the unilateral responses to such subsidies by 
governments. The WTO jurisprudence, however, demonstrates that the effectiveness and 
predictability of the subsidy regime require a clearer definition of that regime’s object and 
purpose. The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM Agreement), however, 
does not contain any express statement of the object and purpose of the WTO subsidy regime, 
which raises difficulties for both interpreting the current provisions and proposing changes to the 
Agreement in a coherent manner. 
 I propose that the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement should be identified as 
protecting competition in the market as a means of ensuring economic efficiency. Having 
defined the object and purpose of the WTO subsidy regime, I identify the parts of the SCM 
Agreement that are most inconsistent with the proposed objectives and propose changes to the 
SCM Agreement in order to bring it in line with the proposed object and purpose. First, to better 
serve the objective of protection of the process of competition, I propose changing the causality 
requirement for establishing injury to domestic industry. In particular, I recommend to require 
that injury to the domestic industry is caused by subsidization rather than subsidized imports. 
Second, to better serve the objective of promoting economic efficiency and increasing total 
v 
welfare, I propose to reinstate the category of non-actionable subsidies. This would enable WTO 
Members to grant subsidies that correct market distortions, such as environmental subsidies, 
research and development subsidies and regional aid subsidies. Finally, to ensure that measures 
used to counteract subsidies do not themselves create market distortions and reduce welfare, I 
propose to limit the unilateral use of countervailing duties by WTO Members by imposing 
mandatory public interest and lesser duty requirements. 
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I. OVERVIEW 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) has become one of the most important dispute resolution 
bodies in international law. It applies rules which both limit the use of subsidies that might 
distort international trade and control the unilateral responses to such subsidies by governments. 
The WTO jurisprudence, however, demonstrates that the effectiveness and predictability of the 
subsidy regime require a clearer definition of that regime’s object and purpose.1 The Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM Agreement), however, does not contain any 
express statement of the object and purpose of the WTO subsidy regime, which raises difficulties 
for both interpreting the current provisions and proposing changes to the Agreement in a 
coherent manner. 
 Subsidies granted by a state to an industry within that state (or within a region in that 
state) can distort trade and thus are one of the non-tariff barriers addressed by the international 
trade regime administered by the WTO. With the substantial reduction of tariffs on a global basis 
accomplished in the early rounds of GATT (pre-WTO) negotiations, the need to address non-
tariff barriers has become more important.2 The resulting structure developed to address 
                                                 
1 The terms of an international treaty must be interpreted “in the light of its object and purpose.” Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(1) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. This ensures 
that a treaty’s text is interpreted to reflect the goals embodied in the document as a whole and that all articles are 
read together in a coherent and consistent manner. 
2 While the first six GATT trade negotiating rounds focused exclusively on negotiations for the reduction of tariffs, 
the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) was predominantly concerned with non-tariff measures and the Uruguay Round 
(1986-1994) continued detailed work on many non-tariff measures, including subsidies. See JOHN H. JACKSON, 
WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, JR., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 
2 
subsidies includes both rules for state-to-state negotiation and dispute resolution and rules for 
unilateral response within a state to subsidies granted by other states.3 The Doha Round 
negotiations include discussion of both of these tracks for responding to and administering 
subsidy disputes.4 Those negotiations on the subsidy regime have floundered, however, because 
of differences regarding the proper approach to disciplining the grant of subsidies by states and 
to existing trade remedies that may be applied in a state to respond to subsidies by other states. 
 The Uruguay Round SCM Agreement was undoubtedly an important step forward, and 
provided significant improvements in the regulation of subsidies.5 Nevertheless, the Doha Round 
negotiations make clear that subsidy discipline weaknesses remain which should be reduced or 
eliminated. 182 proposals for amendments to the Agreement have been submitted by WTO 
Members in the Doha Round negotiations on subsidies and countervailing measures.6 
 This study will emphasize the importance of multilateral rules on subsidies and propose 
improvements to and clarification of these rules. To make the SCM Agreement more workable, it 
is necessary to clarify the object and purpose of the WTO subsidy regulation and to modify the 
SCM Agreement in order bring it in line with the overall objectives of such regulation. 
 In addressing these issues, I will review the history of subsidies regulation and will 
analyze the current WTO rules on subsidies and countervailing duties. I will also use the 
differences in the EU and U.S. approaches to subsidies and countervailing duties in order to 
                                                                                                                                                             
ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 248-49 (6th ed. 
2013). 
3 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 275 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
4 John R. Magnus, World Trade Organization Subsidy Discipline: Is this the “Retrenchment Round”?, 38 J. WORLD 
TRADE 985, 1002-47 (2004). 
5 SCM Agreement, supra note 3. 
6 Magnus, supra note 4, at 990. 
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demonstrate the existing problems resulting from a lack of clear object and purpose and from the 
need to adjust existing rules. Finally, I will propose outcomes I believe should be adopted in 
order to make improvements to the existing regime for subsidies discipline. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Subsidies have become an important instrument of trade policy. Governments have granted 
subsidies in various forms and for various reasons, including efforts to increase the 
competitiveness of national producers. Normally, subsidies which negatively affect only 
producers (consumers benefit from the lower price), are not considered as trade distorting as are 
other classic trade instruments, such as tariffs or quantitative restrictions which negatively affect 
both producers and consumers.7 At the same time, the effect of subsidies and the responses to 
them are controversial.8 Due to the complexity of the subject, there has been great difficulty in 
reaching a consensus on a common approach to the problem of regulation of subsidies at the 
international level. 
 Only two provisions of the GATT of 1947 contained provisions regarding the regulation 
of subsidies and hardly included any obligations concerning subsides at all: Articles, VI and 
XVI. Article XVI merely provides that a contracting party to the GATT should notify other 
contracting parties of any subsidies that have an effect on trade and, if they cause serious damage 
                                                 
7 MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: 
LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 332 (Oxford University Press 2006). 
8 See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The economics of the WTO rules on subsidies and countervailing measures, John M. Olin 
Program in Law & Economics Working Papers, No. 186, University of Chicago 1, 1-36 (2003). 
4 
to interests of other contracting parties, should be prepared to discuss limiting such subsidies.9 
Article VI deals with the imposition of countervailing duties, and most experts regard its rules as 
being neither clear nor comprehensive.10 
 In 1955, additional obligations on subsidies were included in the GATT, addressing the 
issue of export subsidies. Export subsidies for non-primary products are totally prohibited,11 
while contracting parties have an obligation to “seek to avoid” the use of subsidies on primary 
products.12 
 The Tokyo Round (1974-1979) resulted in the adoption of an Agreement on 
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT (the “Subsidies 
Code”).13 The Subsidies Code was divided into two Tracks. Track I outlined the procedure that 
contracting parties must follow in order to adopt countervailing duties under national rules.14 It 
specifies that countries may impose countervailing duties only after having determined that the 
subsidized imports have caused injury to the domestic industry.15 Track II provided for an 
interpretation of the different provisions of GATT Article XVI on the multilateral level.16 The 
Subsidies Code did not clarify all of the obligations contained in the GATT. Moreover, only 24 
contracting parties ratified the Code, with exceptions and reservations.17 
                                                 
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1947, 61 Stat. 173, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, art. XVI 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
10 See, e.g., GUSTAVO E. LUENGO HERNANDEZ DE MADRID, REGULATION OF SUBSIDIES AND STATE AIDS IN WTO 
AND EC LAW 125 ( 2007). 
11 GATT, supra note 9, art. XVI:4. 
12 Id., art. XVI:3. 
13Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (MTN/NTM/W/236, 5 April 1979) [hereinafter Subsidies Code]. 
14 Id., arts. 1-6. 
15 Id., arts. 2.1 
16 Id., arts. 7-19. 
17 See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 290 (1997). 
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 The Uruguay Round produced significant improvements in the regulation of subsidies 
with the SCM Agreement adding two mechanisms to limit the use of subsidies and 
countervailing duties.18 The first improvement was the traffic-light framework, placing subsidies 
into one of three categories. Subsidies in the red-light category are prohibited; subsidies in the 
yellow-light category are actionable; and subsidies in the green-light category are non-
actionable.19 The second improvement came in limitations on the use of countervailing duties 
resulting from the imposition of required objective standards for an actionable subsidy: 
specificity and financial contribution.20 
 There is no doubt that the SCM Agreement is a step forward toward providing additional 
clarity in the area of subsidies. It is also obvious, however, that there is room for improvement. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION 
The general structure of this dissertation is as follows: 
Table 1. Structure of the Dissertation 
CHAPTER CONTENTS 
Chapter 1 Basic overview of the dissertation: historical background and organization 
of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 Economic Analysis of Subsidies: brief introduction to the concept of 
subsidy in economic theory, effect of export and domestic subsidies on 
international trade, economic effect of countervailing duties; rationale for 
disciplining subsidies  
Chapter 3 Global Regulation of Subsidies in pre-WTO Era: focus on the evolution of 
subsidies disciplines from the GATT to the WTO  
                                                 
18 SCM Agreement, supra note 3. 
19 Id., arts. 3-9. 
20 Id., arts. 1-2. 
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CHAPTER CONTENTS 
Chapter 4 Regulation of Subsidies in the WTO: focus on the provisions of the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (including the 
definition of subsidy, classification of subsidies, multilateral dispute 
settlement and remedies, and the use of domestic countervail measures), as 
well as the subsidy-related provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture 
(including the commitments on export and domestic subsidies; and 
remedies) 
Chapter 5 EU Rules on Subsidies: focus on the concept of “state aid” and comparison 
with the WTO definition of “subsidy;” EU external regime relating to 
subsidies 
Chapter 6 US Rules on Subsidies: brief introduction to the historical background, the 
evolution of the rules on subsidies since before WTO; focus on the 
influence of WTO rules on the US regime, including the definition of 
subsidy and conditions for imposing countervailing duties 
Chapter 7 Comparison of the US and EU approaches to subsidies, reasons for 
differences between the US and the EU 
Chapter 8 Identification of the object and purpose of the WTO subsidy regime, and 
proposed changes to the SCM Agreement in order to bring it in line with the 
proposed object and purpose 
 
1. Introduction to Subsidies 
This dissertation contains eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides historical background on the 
regulation of subsidies in international trade and an overview of the structure of the dissertation. 
In Chapter 2 I provide an economic analysis of subsidies in order to understand the effect that 
subsidies granted by a state have on international trade. One of the fundamental issues of 
international subsidies regulation is how to distinguish between protectionist and non-
protectionist subsidies.21 To create a regulatory framework that addresses the problem subsidies 
may cause to other states, without limiting the ability of a government to use subsidies for other 
legitimate policy goals, it is important to understand which subsidies have a trade-distorting 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., SIMON LESTER, BRYAN MERCURIO & ARWEL DAVIES, WORLD TRADE LAW: TEXT, MATERIALS AND 
COMMENTARY 422 (2012). 
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effect. I examine the effect of export subsidies and domestic subsidies in the market. In 
addressing the issue of subsidies, another important question is how a country should respond to 
foreign subsidies. In Chapter 2 I also focus on the effect of the adoption of countervailing duties, 
in order to determine in which case the use of countervailing duties serves to neutralize the effect 
of a subsidy. Once these questions are examined, I move on to the importance of regulating 
subsidies and the problem of how far-reaching disciplines on subsidies should be. Analysis of 
these issues facilitates the analysis and recommendations to be offered in Chapters 8 and 9. 
2. GATT/WTO Regulation of Subsidies 
In Chapter 3 I explore the evolution of the regulation of subsidies in international trade, in order 
to better understand the current obligations within the WTO system. The attitude of the world 
trading system has not always been the same throughout the last seventy years. It is thus 
important to understand what problems have arisen from such regulation and what kinds of 
solutions were supplied during each time period. Chapter 3 provides a thorough review of all the 
relevant stages in the evolution of the regulation of subsidies in international trade. 
 I begin this review of subsidies regulation with the first draft of the Havana Charter, 
which, although never adopted, constitutes the first multilateral attempt to regulate subsidies. I 
then proceed with the GATT 1947, which included the first rules on subsidies in international 
trade to be applied in practice. I then cover the reforms introduced in 1955. I move on to examine 
the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code of 1979, and the problems resulting from its application. 
Finally, I describe the negotiations on subsides in the Uruguay Round that resulted in the SCM 
Agreement, which forms part of Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement and contains the primary 
current rules on the use of subsidies and countervailing duties. The SCM Agreement is usually 
8 
described as an uneasy compromise between different perspectives on subsidies, utilizing 
categories and concepts that may not have any obvious economic or policy rationale, but instead 
reflecting a difficult and, in some respects, incoherent political bargain.22 In Chapter 3 I analyze 
different concerns identified and positions adopted by negotiating countries. Numerous concerns 
could be summarized by the minutes of the meeting: 
Several delegations considered that the international disciplines over the use of 
subsidies in world trade had faded and that there was little or no consensus over 
the meaning of vital provisions of the GATT and the Subsidies Code . . . It was 
also said that in certain instances, the GATT and the Agreement drew distinctions 
between permitted and prohibited subsidies that appeared to have little basis in 
sound economic policy . . . Several delegations pointed out that a number of 
problems existed also in the area of countervailing measures where loopholes in 
the existing rules permitted unilateral practices and interpretations, resulting in 
considerable arbitrariness, uncertainty and harassment of exporters.23 
 I describe the different positions adopted by states when negotiating the regulation of 
subsidies, and how the parties reached agreement on such issues as the definition of “subsidy,” 
the classification of subsidies, the authorization process for the adoption of countervailing duties, 
and how to treat subsidies for primary products. 
 In Chapter 4 I provide an introduction to the SCM Agreement which resulted from the 
Uruguay Round. The main purpose of the SCM Agreement is to find the right balance between 
allowing states to grant subsidies for legitimate policy goals, on the one hand, and restricting 
their use when trade-distorting effects become too great, on the other.24 
 I review the rules that identify which subsidies are subject to the SCM Agreement and 
examine the three constituent elements of the concept of ‘subsidy’: a financial contribution, a 
financial contribution by a government or any public body, and a financial contribution 
                                                 
22 PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, PATRICK A. MESSERLIN & JASPER M. WAUTERS, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN THE WTO 298 (2008). 
23 NGSCM: Meeting of 16-17 March 1987, Note by the Secretariat, MTN.GNG/NG10/1, para. 5 (March 27, 1987). 
24 LESTER, MERCURIO & DAVIES, supra note 21, at 422. 
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conferring a benefit. I also discuss the concept of “specificity.” I then move on to classification 
of subsidies into three categories and will examine prohibited subsidies, actionable subsidies, and 
non-actionable subsidies. Special attention is paid to trade remedies established in the SCM 
Agreement at both multilateral and national levels. I discuss the differences in procedure and 
remedies available for prohibited and actionable subsidies at the multilateral level. I also review 
the rules (substantive and procedural requirements) regulating the unilateral imposition of 
countervailing duties against subsidized imports. In addition I examine the relationship of the 
SCM Agreement to provisions on subsidies in other WTO agreements, particularly the 
Agricultural Agreement. The analysis of the provisions of the SCM Agreement takes into 
account the interpretations made by Panels and the Appellate Body. 
3. Comparative Analysis 
Because the GATT and the SCM Agreement bind all WTO Members, they have had a profound 
effect on the domestic legislation of those Members. At the same time, as Professor Alan O. 
Sykes has demonstrated, different legal systems have responded very differently to the issues 
raised by subsidies, from the largely laissez-fare approach of the United States to the elaborate 
“state aid” rules of the European Union.25 The United States and the EU represent the two largest 
economic trading blocks in the world, and have very different market philosophies and, 
consequently, very different ways of implementing the WTO rules. 
 In Chapter 5 I provide an overview of the EU law on subsidies. I first focus on the EU 
State Aid rules, which are vital to achieving an internal market. On the other hand, since the EU 
                                                 
25 Alan O. Sykes, The Questionable Case For Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 473, 473 (2010). 
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is a WTO Member,26 its State Aid rules must conform to the WTO rules on subsidies. However, 
as the principles on which the WTO and the EU are based are different, the EU may allow 
granting subsidies in more cases than is permitted under the WTO. For example, there are cases 
where the European Commission has authorized State aids which are prohibited export subsidies 
under the WTO rules.27 Therefore, it is important to identify possible conflicts between the EU 
and WTO systems. In Chapter 5 I examine the four elements of a State Aid: an aid in any form 
whatsoever; which is granted by a Member State or through State resources; which distorts or 
threatens to distort competition, by favoring certain firms or the production of certain goods; and 
which affects trade between EU Member States.28 I then proceed to compare the EU and WTO 
systems, in order to show the differences between the WTO and the EU systems when regulating 
subsidies, and to explain the reasons for such differences. 
 Secondly, I provide an overview of the EU anti-subsidy legislation which was amended 
significantly as a result of the SCM Agreement. I examine the three basic substantive 
requirements for imposing countervailing duties with respect to subsidized imports under 
Regulation 597/2009: the existence of a “subsidy” that is “countervailable;” the existence of 
“injury;” and the existence of a Union interest’ calling for intervention.29 Special attention is 
paid to the third element where it must be determined that a “Union interest called for 
intervention.” European Union institutions are given discretion as to the methods for analyzing 
                                                 
26 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm. 
27 LUENGO, supra note 10, at 12. 
28 Id. at 98. 
29 Council Regulation 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not 
members of the European Community, 2009 O.J. L 188/93. This Regulation replaced Council Regulation 2026/97 of 
6 October 2007 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Community, 
1997 O.J. L 288/1. 
11 
the various interests for the purpose of imposing countervailing duties. According to Art. 21 
(1) of the Regulation: 
[A] determination as to whether the community interest calls for intervention shall 
be based on an appreciation of all the various interests taken as a whole, including 
the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumers, and a 
determination pursuant to this Article shall only be made where all parties have 
been given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to para. 2.30 
 The Union interest requirement is analyzed while taking into account the relationship 
between the EU and the EU Members States as the interests of the Union is not necessarily the 
same as the interests of each Member State. A polarization is possible when, for example, 
producers are concentrated in one country and users are concentrated in other countries.31 
 Finally, in Chapter 5 I examines the procedural requirements for imposing countervailing 
duties. 
 In Chapter 6 I give a general overview of the U.S. rules on subsidies. After providing a 
brief historical background, I move on to examine the influence of GATT/WTO rules on the U.S. 
regime, on the one hand, and the impact of the US concepts and ideas on multilateral 
negotiations, on the other hand. Firstly, I provide an overview of the U.S. countervailing duty 
law after the Tokyo Round, particularly the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. The concepts of 
domestic subsidies, specificity (the idea of benefit to the recipient as opposed to that of a charge 
on the public account), and material injury to a domestic industry will be discussed in greater 
detail. I also discuss the impact of prior U.S. countervailing duty laws relating to such important 
subsidy elements as benefit, financial contribution and specificity on the WTO rules. 
                                                 
30 Id., art. 21.1. 
31 CLIVE STANBROOK & PHILIP BENTLEY, DUMPING AND SUBSIDIES: THE LAW AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE 
IMPOSITION OF ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 143 (1996). 
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 I also analyze the implementation of the WTO rules after the Uruguay Round, embodied 
in amendments to the Tariff Act of 1930. This analysis of provisions of U.S. countervailing law 
takes into account the interpretations provided by statutory rules, interpretative statements, and 
administrative regulations. Special attention is given to the definition of subsidy (benefit, 
financial contribution, and specificity test) and conditions for imposing countervailing duties 
(injury, domestic industry of the like product, causal link). 
 In Chapter 7 I compare the U.S. and EU approaches to subsidies and discuss the reasons 
for existing differences. 
4. Analysis and Conclusions 
In Chapter 8 I discuss the need to identify the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement. Any 
changes to the current WTO subsidy regime must be based on a clear understanding of the 
ultimate purpose of that regime. Likewise, understanding the object and purpose of the SCM 
Agreement is necessary for interpreting the current provisions of the Agreement in a coherent 
and consistent manner. 
 The SCM Agreement, however, does not contain any express statement of its object and 
purpose. The WTO jurisprudence offers a very general and vague definition of the purpose of the 
WTO subsidy discipline. In Brazil – Aircraft, the Panel stated that “[t]he object and purpose of 
the SCM Agreement is to impose multilateral disciplines on subsidies which distort international 
trade.”32 In US – Carbon Steel, the Appellate Body concluded that “[t]aken as a whole, the main 
                                                 
32 Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, 
para. 7.26. 
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object and purpose of the SCM Agreement is to increase and improve GATT disciplines relating 
to the use of both subsidies and countervailing measures.”33 
 It could be concluded, therefore, that the main purpose of the WTO subsidy regime is 
(1) to prevent WTO Members from granting subsidies that distort international trade, and (2) to 
control the unilateral responses to such subsidies by imposing CVDs, ensuring that they are 
justified and proportionate – thus, their distorting effect on international trade is limited. 
Although it is obvious that the WTO subsidies rules are meant to ensure that WTO Members do 
not grant subsidies and impose CVDs in such a way that might harm another country, the 
question remains what kind of harm these rules are supposed to prevent. Different interpretations 
of the word “harm” could result in different understandings of the ultimate purpose of the WTO 
subsidy regime. 
 An analysis of the text of the SCM Agreement leads to the conclusion that the current 
WTO subsidies regime considers subsidies primarily as obstacles to international trade, and thus 
has as its goal the protection of market access, relevant tariff commitments and trade 
opportunities of WTO Members. I argue that this approach suffers from two significant 
problems. First, subsidies may also distort competition in other WTO Members by allowing 
inefficient firms to survive artificially to the detriment of more efficient competitors. Second, 
subsidies may affect the total welfare of the importing country, i.e. the sum of consumer welfare 
and producer welfare. Economic theory shows that state intervention may, in fact, improve the 
functioning of markets when market mechanisms left alone fail to achieve the best outcome for 
the economy. Under such circumstances, subsidies may increase welfare by offsetting the 
                                                 
33 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from Germany, WT/DS213/AB/R, adopted 19 December 2002, para. 73. 
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consequences of market failures.34 It is important, therefore, to ensure that WTO Members are 
free to grant subsidies that produce this kind of positive effect. I propose that the object and 
purpose of the SCM Agreement should be identified as protecting competition in the market as a 
means of ensuring economic efficiency. 
 Having defined the object and purpose of the WTO subsidy regime, I identify the parts of 
the SCM Agreement that are most inconsistent with the proposed objectives and propose 
changes to the SCM Agreement in order to bring it in line with the proposed object and purpose. 
First, to better serve the objective of protection of the process of competition, I propose changing 
the causality requirement for establishing injury to domestic industry. In particular, I recommend 
to require that injury to the domestic industry is caused by subsidization rather than subsidized 
imports. Second, to better serve the objective of promoting economic efficiency and increasing 
total welfare, I propose to reinstate the category of non-actionable subsidies. This would enable 
WTO Members to grant subsidies that correct market distortions, such as environmental 
subsidies, research and development subsidies and regional aid subsidies. Finally, to ensure that 
measures used to counteract subsidies do not themselves create market distortions and reduce 
welfare, I propose to limit the unilateral use of countervailing duties by WTO Members by 
imposing mandatory public interest and lesser duty requirements. 
                                                 
34 PAUL R. KRUGMAN, MAURICE OBSTFELD & MARC J. MELITZ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 
226-27 (9th ed. 2012); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 77 (3d ed. 2000); HANS W. 
FRIEDERISZICK, LARS-HENDRIK RŐLLER & VINCENT VEROUDEN, European State Aid Control: An Economic 
Framework, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 625, 632-34 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2007). 
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II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SUBSIDIES 
A. THE DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY 
Although the term “subsidy” is commonly used in economic literature, it lacks a universally 
agreed upon definition. A variety of government actions can be described as reallocations of 
resources to the private sector. The difficulty comes in distinguishing between government 
actions that are to be considered subsidies and other types of government assistance. 
 The word subsidy derives from the Latin word subsidius, meaning assistance, help, or 
support.1 Thus, the word subsidy suggests the idea of some kind of a government support to the 
private sector. However, as there has been no general agreement regarding the recipients, forms, 
objectives, and effects of such government support, economic scholarship has produced 
numerous definitions for this term. 
 Professor Earl Rolph makes the important observation that a subsidy is a one-way income 
transfer for which a government gets nothing in return.2 He also limits the forms of subsidies to 
cash payments and the provision of goods and services “which directly benefit particular 
                                                 
1 OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 1849 (Oxford University Press 1976). 
2 EARL R. ROLPH, THE THEORY OF FISCAL ECONOMICS 66-67 (Berkeley: University of California Press 1956). 
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persons.”3 At the same time, Rolph expands the notion of a subsidy to include assistance to both 
producers and consumers (including unemployment, veteran, old-age benefits, etc.).4 
 Robert Hubbell points out that “special tax concessions which reduce expenses for 
particular kinds of enterprises may have results similar to direct payments.”5 Thus, according to 
Hubbell, subsidies may take the form of cash payments, the provision of goods and services at 
less than their market price, and “lower taxes which are exceptions to general tax rates.”6 He also 
confines the term “subsidy” to benefits that support commercial activities. By doing so, he 
excludes unemployment, veteran, and other payments not contingent upon recipient 
performance.7 
 Professor Carl Kaysen proposes a broader understanding of a “subsidy”: 
In general analytical terms a subsidy to an enterprise can be defined as an increase 
in the demand for its output, or a decrease in the costs which it must bear to 
produce its output, which are not the result of market forces or “natural” changes 
in consumer tastes, techniques of production, or availabilities of natural resources; 
but rather result from the deliberate action of the subsidy giver (government). The 
reader can supply the appropriate changes which would be needed to make the 
definition applicable to a subsidy to a household, either as a consumer or as 
supplier of factors.8 
 This broad interpretation suggests that a subsidy is a regulatory rather than a financial 
device. Calamai and De Moor, too, view a subsidy as “any measure that keeps prices for 
consumers below the market level or keeps prices for producers above the market level, or that 
                                                 
3 Id. at 22, 66-67. 
4 Id. at 66-67 (in his view, “a person obtains a subsidy does so because he conforms to the requirements set down in 
the subsidy legislation, such as having been a member of the Armed Forces, producing certain commodities for sale, 
or being unemployed”). 
5 Robert L. Hubbell, Concealed Subsides in the Federal Budget, X:3 NAT’L TAX J. 214, 215 (1957). 
6 Id. at 215. 
7 Id. at 214-15. 
8 Carl Kaysen, On Defining a Subsidy, in vol. IV PUBLIC POLICY, YEARBOOK OF THE HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL 
OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 5 (C.J. Friedrich & J.K. Galbraith eds., 1953). 
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reduces costs for consumers and producers by giving direct or indirect support.”9 Likewise, 
Schrank and Keithly define a subsidy as “any government program that potentially permits the 
firm to increase its profits, beyond what they would have been in the absence of the government 
program.”10 Schwartz and Clements follow Kaysen in identifying subsidies, arguing that it is 
necessary “to capture both explicit and implicit subsidy elements that are contained in different 
forms of government intervention.”11 They add a classification system for subsidies based on 
seven categories: (1) cash subsidies (direct government payments to producers or consumers); 
(2) credit subsidies (government guarantees, interest subsidies to enterprises, etc.); (3) tax 
subsidies (reduction of specific tax liabilities); (4) equity subsidies (government equity 
participations); (5) in-kind subsidies (government provision of goods and services at below-
market prices); (6) procurement subsidies (government purchases of goods and services at 
above-market prices); and (7) regulatory subsidies (implicit payments through government 
regulatory actions that alter market prices or access).12 
 These are fairly broad categories of government actions; however, the definition 
proposed by Kaysen indicates two requirements for a subsidy. First, only government measures 
that affect prices or costs of production should be regarded as a subsidy. Second, this particular 
effect must be the result of deliberate governmental action.13 The second requirement (intent) has 
not been widely accepted in the economic literature. Many scholars do not focus on government 
                                                 
9 ANDRÉ DE MOOR & PETER CALAMAI, SUBSIDIZING UNSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT – UNDERMINING THE EARTH 
WITH PUBLIC FUNDS 1 (Geneva: Earth Council 1997) (emphasis added). 
10 W.E. Schrank & W.R. Keithly, Jr., The Concept of Subsidies, XIV MAR. RESOUR. ECON. 151, 156 (1999) 
(emphasis added). 
11 Gerd Schwartz & Benedict Clements, Government Subsidies, 13(2) J. ECON. SURV. 119, 120 (1999). 
12 Id. at 120-21. 
13 Kaysen, supra note 8, at 9 (arguing that “[a] subsidy can conveniently be defined in this terminology as intended 
subsidy effect, which legislature (or other policy promulgating authority) foresaw and desired when it authorized the 
particular Government activity giving rise to the subsidy effect in question”). 
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intent as an indicator of a subsidy at all. Some find government motivation as the final test of 
what constitutes a “subsidy” problematic because “intent is always ambiguous.”14 
 The first requirement, however, is very important. Indeed, despite the fact that virtually 
any sort of government assistance to the private sector could be folded into a general definition 
of subsidies, it is the effect rather than the form of a transfer that is important. A subsidy arises 
only if a government program benefits private actors, compared to what a private actor would 
receive under normal market conditions without government intervention. As Professor Alan 
Sykes explains, to economists a natural benchmark for identifying subsidization is a hypothetical 
market equilibrium without the presence of government. When a government enters the picture 
through taxes or other programs, it alters equilibrium prices and output. Thus, activities for 
which net returns are enhanced may be viewed as “subsidized.”15 
 In sum, economists’ definitions of subsides, despite considerable diversity – which stems 
from the fact that different scholars emphasize different elements of subsidies – have tended to 
increase in scope and to become extremely broad. By contrast, in a legal context, the definitions 
of a subsidy have tended to be more narrow, though they too vary widely from country to 
country, and even throughout different areas of the law within the same country.16 These 
                                                 
14 Warren C. Robinson, What is a Government Subsidy?, XX:1 NAT’L TAX J. 86, 89 (1967); William E. Schrank, 
Subsidies for Fisheries: A Review of Concepts, in FAO PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE EXPERT CONSULTATION ON 
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND RESPONSIBLE FISHERIES 11-40 (Rome 2000) (also arguing that subsidies must be 
judged in terms of their impacts, rather than upon the intent). 
15 Alan O. Sykes, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, vol. II, 83, 85 (Patrick F.J. Macrory, Arthur E. Appleton & Michael G. 
Plummer eds., 2005). 
16 For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce used the following subsidy definition to account for certain 
government cash payments: “Subsidies are monetary payments provided by Government to private resident 
business, including farms. Subsidies are excluded from Government purchases of goods and services because they 
are not payment for any output, and they appear nowhere else in gross national product” (Office of Business 
Economics, Department of Commerce, June 1971). Whereas the Trade Agreements Act describes a subsidy (for the 
purpose of imposing countervailing duties) as any financial contribution, any form of price or income support as 
defined in the GATT (19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) B). The Act clarifies the term “subsidy” further by referring to the 
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
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differences in economic and legal definitions of a subsidy are hardly surprising. Economists need 
a definition in order to ascertain the nature of a subsidy, to further analyze the economic effects 
of subsidies in the market, and to identify which subsidies have negative effects and which may 
correct market failures or pursue other legitimate objectives of social policy that the market 
would not achieve otherwise. On the other hand, legal definitions of a subsidy are more context-
specific; the same country may adopt a variety of definitions for different purposes. Indeed, any 
legal definition is not a fact but an artificial construct of a given legal system with a given 
practical purpose.17 As Professor Luka Rubini puts it, “the legal system, with its material 
provisions, procedural rules and remedies, and ultimately its objectives, does influence the actual 
definition of subsidy in that ‘legal system.’”18 
B. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SUBSIDIES 
Disciplining subsidies in an international context is a difficult and delicate issue that requires an 
understanding of the economic effects that subsidies granted by a country have on international 
trade. Before examining how subsides can affect international trade, we must first gain a better 
understanding of the theories that justify international trade and lay down the foundations for the 
world trading system. 
                                                                                                                                                             
which provides twelve examples of subsidies that are countervailable, the list is non-exhaustive (19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677(5) A). 
17 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 Q. REV. 37-60 (1954). 
18 LUCA RUBINI, THE DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY AND STATE AID: WTO AND EC LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
17 (Oxford University Press 2009). 
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1. Analysis of International Trade 
Economic liberalism has been the dominant theoretical perspective on international trade since 
the nineteenth century. This school of thought was first articulated by Adam Smith in his classic 
book, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), and was further 
advanced by David Ricardo who, in his book, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 
(1817), developed the theory of “comparative advantage.” The classical Smith-Ricardo model 
suggests that each country should specialize in the production of goods in which it has an 
advantage relative to other countries (absolute advantage), or which are more profitable to 
produce than other products, even if all the products could be produced more cheaply in other 
countries (comparative advantage). Liberal economic theorists maintain that in a free trade 
environment the country that produces certain goods more efficiently than other goods will 
allocate its resources to the production of the goods it produces more efficiently. It will buy other 
products it needs from countries with a comparative advantage in the production of those other 
products. Accordingly, each country will direct its resources to activities that yield the greatest 
return; the efficient allocation of factors of production will thus result in an increase in national 
and world welfare. Under this view, the global economy and each nation will be better off when 
free trade permits consumers to buy the cheapest products and producers to invest resources in 
the most productive way. Therefore, it is argued that governments should refrain from interfering 
with private entrepreneurs and free markets in international trade.19 
 The classical theories of absolute and comparative advantage were further developed by 
neoclassical economists who criticized classical theory for only focusing on one factor of 
                                                 
19 See R.A. JOHNS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORIES AND THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 149-62 
(1985); RAZEEN SALLY, CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: STUDIES IN THEORY AND 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 13-65 (1998); BRUCE E. MOON, DILEMMAS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 51-57 (2000). 
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production (labor), which precludes the analysis of other issues. The foundations for the 
neoclassical model were laid by Eli Hecksher and Bertill Ohlin. Ohlin argued that: 
All prices . . . are ultimately, in each region, at any given moment, determined by 
the demand for goods and the possibilities of producing them. Behind the former 
lie two circumstances to be considered as known data in the problem of pricing: 
(1) the wants and desires of consumers, and (2) the conditions of ownership of the 
factors of production, which affect individual incomes and thus demand. The 
supply of goods, on the other hand, depends ultimately on (3) the supply of 
productive factors, and (4) the physical conditions of production.20 
 This observation brings us to the factor abundance theory, or the neoclassical theory of 
international trade, which provides valuable economic explanations for the most important forces 
playing a role in production and consumption decisions.21 Yet all of these theories lead to 
essentially the same conclusion: opening trade across borders increases national and world 
welfare. Consequently, the theory of comparative advantage still remains the most powerful 
argument in favor of free trade. 
 Opponents of the “invisible hand” – the notion that markets and the pursuit of self-
interest will lead to economic efficiency – have their own arguments, the most common of which 
are the following: 
(1) Government Intervention May be Necessary to Address Domestic Distortion: Free trade 
theory rests on the assumption that domestic economies function properly. Many economists 
have made a case against free trade based on the counterargument that sometimes domestic 
economies do not function properly (in poor nations market imperfections are in fact very 
common). Therefore, the argument goes, in the case of a domestic distortion the first-best 
                                                 
20 W.R. ALLEN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY: HUME TO OHLIN 173 (New York 1965). 
21 See P.A. Samuelson, International Trade and the Equalization of Factor Prices, 58 ECON. J. 163-84 (1948); W. 
Stolper & P. Samuelson, Protection and Real Wages, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 58-73 (1941); T.M. Rybczynski, Factor 
Endowments and Relative Commodity Prices, 22 ECONOMICA 336-41 (1955); B. OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Cambridge 1933). 
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optimal results of free trade are no longer available. Instead, government intervention (second-
best option) may increase welfare by offsetting the consequences of market failures.22 
 Advocates of free trade have two points in response to the market failure arguments. 
First, domestic market failure requires domestic policy changes, not international trade policies. 
Professors Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc Melitz observe that it is always 
preferable to deal with market failures “as directly as possible, because indirect policy responses 
lead to unintended distortions of incentives elsewhere in the economy.”23 Generally, trade 
intervention, by introducing two distortions rather than one, may succeed in solving one problem 
but only at the same time that it causes another.24 Second, the market failure argument may be 
valid only if the distortions are correctly identified. However, because market failures are usually 
hard to diagnose correctly, it is difficult to be sure about the appropriate policy response.25 
(2) Not all Benefits of Free Trade are Evenly Distributed: Comparative advantage theory 
suggests that free trade will increase the wealth of every nation. However, this does not mean 
that every person will be better off; some individuals and groups gain from free trade while 
others lose. Therefore, there is a need to introduce appropriate distributional mechanisms, where 
the total gains could be redistributed so that the losers are fully compensated for their losses. 
Governments can redistribute resources through the tax system, social programs, and the like. 
                                                 
22 PAUL R. KRUGMAN, MAURICE OBSTFELD & MARC J. MELITZ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 
226-27 (9th ed. 2012). 
23 Id. at 228 (arguing that “a tariff might raise welfare, despite the production and consumption distortion it causes, 
because it leads to additional production that yields social benefits. If the same production increase were achieved 
via a production subsidy rather than a tariff, however, the price to consumers would not increase and the 
consumption loss would be avoided. In other words, by targeting directly the particular activity we want to 
encourage, a production subsidy would avoid some of the side costs associated with a tariff.”). 
24 Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, Current Issues in US Trade Policies: An Overview, in U.S. TRADE 
POLICIES IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 15, 38-40 (Robert M. Stern ed., 1987). 
25 KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supra note 22, at 228-29. 
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Generally, all of these strategies should address the distributional problem directly so that they 
do not create other distortions.26 
 Although such redistribution can, theoretically, compensate the losers, it does not often 
take place in practice. Governments redistribute costs and benefits from one sector of the 
economy to another, from one region to another, between consumers and producers, between the 
rich and the poor, and these sorts of decisions are inevitably politicized. As a result, as Professor 
Bruce Moon puts it, “whichever trade policy the government chooses, it will harm some 
group.”27 In fact, there is evidence that there are many losers in both developing and developed 
countries.28 Today, according to Professor Joseph Stiglitz, the concern is that globalization might 
be creating “rich countries with poor people.”29 
(3) Infant Industries May Require Protection: Unlike the distribution argument, which suggests 
the protection of losers, the infant industry argument supports protection that increases the 
wealth of the state. The core of this argument is that a state has a potential comparative 
advantage in some product or production method. Thus, an industry that has the potential to 
become competitive needs government protection against international competition until it 
becomes mature and stable. Many economists believe that this kind of protectionism is the only 
way to minimize income gaps and substantial inequity between developed and developing 
countries. The economic literature has developed certain additional conditions that must be met 
in order to justify protection: (1) protection should be granted in cases where the industry does 
                                                 
26 ANDREW T. GUZMAN, JOOST H. B. PAUWELYN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 22 (2009). 
27 MOON, supra note 19, at 22. 
28 The World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization, established by the International Labor 
Organization, surveyed seventy three countries around the world and found that in all regions (except U.S., EU and 
South Asia) unemployment rates actually increased between 1990 and 2002; the Commission also found that 59% of 
the world’s people were living in countries with growing inequality, with only 5% in countries with declining 
inequality. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 8 (New York 2006). 
29 Id. at 9. 
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have the potential to become competitive; (2) protection must be temporary; once the industry is 
stable enough to compete internationally, all protective measures should be withdrawn; 
(3) protection must generate higher cumulative benefits than costs; and (4) policy makers must 
choose the optimal policy instruments for protection (it is argued that protection provided by 
subsidies is preferable to that provided by tariffs or quotas, as the latter additionally distort 
consumption).30 
 However, these relatively straightforward recommendations are hard to apply in practice. 
The principal concern is whether a government will make wise decisions about which industries 
to support, due to political pressure, incompetence, corruption, or lack of information.31 Another 
difficulty is that both the benefits and the costs of protection change over time. Finally, choosing 
the optimal instrument for protection (tariffs, quotas, or subsidies) can also be complicated by 
practical considerations.32 
(4) Government Policy May Attempt to Shift Access Profits in an Oligopolistic International 
Markets towards the Home Market Firms (Strategic Trade Theory): Strategic trade policy may 
be defined as trade policy that conditions or alters a strategic relationship between firms. Where 
“strategic relations” are mutually recognized strategic interdependence between firms, meaning 
that profits of one firm are directly affected by strategic choices of other firms. This concept 
implies that strategic trade policy requires the presence of oligopoly, and may not arise under 
                                                 
30 See John Stuart Mill, The Principles of Political Economy, in III COLLECTED WORK OF JOHN STUART MILL 918-
19 (University of Toronto Press 1848); C.F. BASTABLE, THE COMMERCE OF NATIONS 140-43 (10th ed. 1921); W.M. 
CORDEN, TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE ch. 8 (2d ed. 1997); M.C. Kemp, The Mill-Bastable Infant 
Industry Dogma, 68 J. POLIT. ECON. 65-67 (1960); A. Deardorff, Why do Governments Prefer Nontariff Barriers, in 
26 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONFERENCE SERIES ON PUBLIC POLICY 191-216 (1987); M. Melitz, When and How 
Should Infant Industries be Protected, 66 J. INT. ECON. 177-96 (2005). 
31 GUZMAN & PAUWELYN, supra note 26, at 24. 
32 Melitz, supra note 30, at 193-94 (suggesting that quotas induce higher welfare level than tariffs and that, in some 
specific cases, the quota may even be preferred to a subsidy). 
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perfect competition or monopoly.33 Under such circumstances, the argument goes, a government, 
by supporting its firms in international competition, can raise national welfare at the expense of 
firms in another country.34 A government can use a variety of instruments to shift profits from 
foreign to domestic firms, including export subsidies and subsidies for research and development 
(R&D). 
 Although, in practice, interventionist policies in countries like the United States, France, 
Japan, and South Korea have had an important effect in allowing industries in those countries to 
develop strong international presence,35 many economists are skeptical about government 
intervention in trade. The key concern is the ability of a government to formulate interventions 
that do more good than harm. Furthermore, a country that introduces a strategic trade policy may 
provoke retaliation. As a result, a trade war between two interventionist governments may leave 
both countries worse off than if a laissez-faire approach were adopted by both.36 
 In sum, comparative advantage theory provides a strong argument for how free trade can 
increase national welfare. However, as Professors Paul Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld, and Marc 
Melitz point out, “economic theory does not provide a dogmatic defense of free trade.”37 There 
is an ongoing debate on many important issues in trade (including the role of subsidies) and 
about the appropriate balance to be found between economic benefits and a variety of other 
interests (including ethical principles and social values). In the international context, too, the 
world trading system is based on the theory of comparative advantages. Yet, as Professor Bruce 
                                                 
33 J. Brandner, Strategic Trade Policy, in NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES 1 (Cambridge 1995). 
34 Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passé?, 1:2 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 131, 141 (1987). 
35 For example, US high technology production and export are to a large extent due to substantial R&D subsidies to 
many industries through heavily subsidized university research sectors, subsidies to defense and space exploration 
sectors, as well as direct export subsidies provided by the Export-Import Bank of the United States to high 
technology industries, including aircraft production. See Brandner, supra note 33, at 64-65. 
36 Krugman, supra note 34, at 141-42. 
37 KRUGMAN, OBSTFELD & MELITZ, supra note 22, at 229. 
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Moon puts it, “the ultimate goals of GATT/WTO are classically liberal . . . but the means used to 
accomplish them reveals an underlying philosophy that contains both liberal and mercantilist 
assumptions.”38 
2. Effects of Subsidies on International Trade 
The substantial reduction of barriers to trade is the key instrument of the WTO to achieve its 
overall objectives. At the time when the GATT of 1947 was drafted, tariffs and quotas were 
considered to be the primary obstacles to international trade. Consequently, the GATT sets out a 
general prohibition on quantitative restrictions.39 Tariffs are not prohibited; however, as a result 
of the eight GATT Rounds tariff duties were substantially reduced.40 This removal of tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions is only valuable if “the parties do not turn around and impose new non-
tariff barriers.”41 In fact, the reduction of trade barriers at the border has led to a rise in non-tariff 
barriers. Cameron’s studies have found that the openness of the economy is a major factor in the 
expansion of the public economy.42 Likewise, examining evidence from members of the OECD, 
Blais argues that, as the rates of tariffs have decreased in the industrialized world, governments 
have chosen to increase disbursement of production subsidies. Overall, the study finds that, all 
else being equal, a reduction of 3 percentage points in tariffs leads to an increase of 1 percentage 
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point in public subsidies.43 This has led the WTO to focus on non-tariff trade policies and 
domestic policies with an impact on trade.44 
 Subsidies are a form of non-tariff barrier. The effects of subsidies are different from those 
of tariffs. First, in contrast to tariffs and quotas, which result in higher prices, subsidies lead to 
lower prices, thereby favoring the consumer. Second, whereas tariffs involve imposing duties on 
imports, and thereby raise revenue for the government, subsidies in many instances include 
economic transfers from the government to firms. Consequently, governments are interested in 
granting subsidies only if they can offset the loss with revenue in some other way. Professor 
Nikolaos Zahariadis observes that subsidies are distributed taking into account economic and 
revenue trade-offs in ways that are not considered in setting tariffs.45 Finally, subsidies are less 
visible and transparent than tariffs and other non-tariff barriers. As subsidies involve only 
governments and domestic producers, they are more difficult for outsiders to detect. In fact, we 
still do not have clear and accurate information about the extent of subsidization around the 
world.46 Such a lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess the extent to which subsidies 
actually affect international trade. 
 From an economic perspective, the main purpose of subsidies is to reallocate resources 
and thereby alter economic activity and behavior in order to achieve an outcome that is “more 
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desirable” from what would occur otherwise.47 Government subsidies often are justified by 
arguing that they offset various domestic market failures, protect infant industries, change the 
distribution of income, increase employment, or meet other social objectives. Indeed, economic 
theory shows that, under certain circumstances, market mechanisms left alone fail to achieve the 
best outcome for the economy. Government intervention could, therefore, be useful to correct 
such failures.48 Moreover, some economists suggest that subsidies should be a preferred form of 
government involvement in trade matters, taking the place of tariffs, quotas, and other nontariff 
barriers.49 In practice, however, the use of subsidies is not based on purely economic grounds. In 
many cases, subsidies are a result of complicated interactions between societal demands for 
subsidies and the institutional ability of politicians to supply them. 
 On the demand side, groups affected by global trade (such as industry groups and labor 
unions) compete with one another to access politicians in support of subsidies in order to 
compensate their losses. They form lobby groups and confront policymakers with contributions 
that affect the latter’s chances for reelection. Governments never have enough resources to 
address all the issues before them; thus, the willingness of policymakers to listen to affected 
groups is dependent upon the ability of those groups to put pressure on politicians. Cox observes 
that when subsidies are given in order to alleviate damage caused by trade, “the amount of the 
policy concession (subsidy) is more a function of the influence of the pressure groups than the 
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amount of harm that might be incurred.”50 Therefore, governments are more likely to respond to 
demands from more politically powerful groups. The political power of groups, in turn, depends 
upon their size and ability to organize. Larger groups have more members and, therefore, a 
greater likelihood to contribute more and to deliver more votes.51 For example, Kindleberger has 
found that the larger numbers of farmers was partly the reason why France and Germany 
imposed tariffs in the 1880s but the UK did not.52 Additionally, producers and labor groups must 
have the ability to organize in order to put effective political pressure on the government, to 
create “coalitions which operate, albeit not exclusively, outside electoral politics.”53 Professor 
Nikolaos Zahariadis argues that demands for subsidies, and by consequence the level of 
subsidies, are likely to be more successful in more corporatist systems54 where institutions 
provide forums for the articulation of demands and the making of compensatory deals.55 
Professor Peter Katzenstein also observes that in small European countries, which are rule-takers 
rather than rule-makers, unions and industries have developed more coordinated ways to cope 
with the pressures of the global economy.56 
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 On the supply side, policymakers choose to grant subsidies based on an objective 
function that takes into account both their own chances for reelection and the voters’ welfare.57 
Thus, on the one hand, politicians have to listen to constituents who are important for their 
reelection; on the other hand, however, policymakers have preferences of their own and may 
choose not to adhere to societal demands. For example, because of rising U.S. hegemony, 
policymakers have been able to overcome industry objections and impose their own preferences 
on trade policy.58 Blais’s studies have found that the political composition of the government 
may also influence the supply of governmental intervention, and public subsidies are likely to be 
more substantial in those countries where the government is controlled by a left-wing party.59 
Furthermore, formal political institutions have an effect on the distribution of subsidies as they 
regulate access and control the process. The likelihood of subsidies increases in systems where 
power is more diffused among parties and branches of government because, under these 
conditions, compromises will include satisfying a higher number of groups than would otherwise 
be the case.60 Accordingly, subsidies are expected to be higher in countries with multiparty 
coalition governments, proportional representation systems, bicameral legislatures, federal 
systems, and the like. At the same time, the ability to demand subsidies is likely to be weaker in 
countries with more independent central banks that are not elected bodies; thus, lobbying 
contributions will have a limited impact on central bankers.61 
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 In general, the ultimate problem with studying subsidies is that, in many cases, they are 
more a political than an economic issue, and as such they are less suitable to economic analysis. 
The relationship between politics and economics explains why subsidies that are granted are not 
always economically justifiable; and yet, it also explains the resistance to their removal in the 
domestic and international context. 
 According to classical free trade theory, subsidies are thought to lower the producers’ 
costs of production, which may lead recipients to reduce prices and expand output. Thus, if they 
are imposed on a competitive market, they may distort comparative advantage and produce a less 
efficient global division of labor, which will result in lower economic welfare.62 As was 
mentioned above, economists do not offer general objections to the use of subsidies. In analyzing 
the distinction between desirable and undesirable subsidies, Professor Alan Sykes identifies three 
groups of subsidies that are not necessarily harmful. First, some subsidies have no impact on the 
output of recipients and, therefore, do not distort resource allocation. Second, even where a 
subsidy confers a benefit on the recipient, governments can use them to remedy “market 
failures.” Third, even when obvious market failures are absent, governments may still grant 
subsidies to the private sector in order to achieve a socially desirable effect.63 
 In the international context, it is thus important to define potentially troublesome 
subsidies. If a subsidy does lead a recipient to reduce price and expand output, this may attract 
customers away from unsubsidized firms. Consequently, subsidies can be used to protect 
domestic firms from foreign competitors. Professor John Jackson describes three possible effects 
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of such subsidies.64 First, subsidies of country A can enhance export potential of products into 
importing country B, in which case country B may respond with countervailing duties. Second, 
subsidies from country A can enhance the exportation of its products to country C, where they 
compete with similar products that are exported from country B. In this case, country B does not 
have a resource to respond other than that which is provided by an international forum like the 
WTO. Third, if country A subsidizes products that are sold in its home market, it is harder for 
countries B and C to export similar goods to country A. Under this scenario, the effects of a 
subsidy are similar to that of a tariff. Once again, countries B and C can only deal with this 
through international mechanisms. In general, subsidies to exporting firms may divert business 
away from more efficient competitors and even trigger subsidy wars; and subsidies to import-
competing firms provide an alternative to traditional border instruments for purposes of trade 
protection and they may thereby undermine market access commitments. 
 In analyzing the effects of subsidies on international trade, economists make a clear 
distinction between export and domestic production subsidies. Thus, it is helpful to consider each 
of these categories separately. 
a. Effects of Export Subsidies Export subsidies are government incentive programs that favor 
export sales over domestic sales. A government can provide an export subsidy either as a specific 
amount per unit exported or as a percent of the value of the exported goods. The objective of this 
support is to enable domestic producer to “win” sales in other countries by undercutting the 
prices charged by foreign producers. When a government grants an export subsidy to a domestic 
producer, the producer will export the subsidized products up to the point where the domestic 
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price for the exported goods exceeds the sum of the international price plus the amount of the 
subsidy. As soon as the domestic price is greater than the sum of the international price plus the 
subsidy, the producer will again sell the products in the domestic market.65 
 Export subsidies have an overall negative net welfare impact on the subsidizing country. 
In general, they result in: consumer loss (the withdrawal of supply from the domestic market 
causes domestic prices to rise); government and taxpayer loss (a subsidy raises costs to the 
government equal to the total value of the subsidy); and producers gain (since they receive a 
higher price in the domestic market and in the country where the products are exported by adding 
the subsidy). Additionally, although economic theory suggests that, under certain circumstances, 
government intervention can offset the consequences of market failures,66 it is difficult to 
imagine a market failure that is best addressed with an export subsidy. 
 A country that receives subsidized goods may benefit from subsidies given to foreign 
exporters because its consumers can purchase products at a more competitive price which may, 
in turn, improve the conditions of trade in the country (the domestic producers hurt by lower 
prices can economize on their losses by shifting productive resources to activities with higher 
returns). As a result, some economists suggest that, instead of imposing countervailing duties, 
governments affected by foreign subsidies should be sending a “thank you” note to the 
subsidizing government. As Professor Donald Boudreaux put it, if the Chinese government taxes 
the Chinese people in order to artificially reduce the prices that Europeans and Americans pay 
for Chinese exports, why should Europeans and Americans complain?67 However, it should also 
be taken into account that, although consumers in the importing country may enjoy lower prices 
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in the short-run, this situation can change in the medium – or long-run. As Gustavo Luengo 
rightly points out, if the prices of the subsidized products were very low, competitors in the 
market to which the products are exported would not be able to remain in the market. This may 
result in a monopoly situation in that market and in a subsequent increase in prices that harms 
consumers.68 Thus, export subsidies can have a negative effect on both the country that grants 
the subsidies and the country that receives the subsidized products. 
 From a global perspective, export subsidies are also generally undesirable. First, they can 
upset expectations of competing exporters pursuant to negotiated trade agreements by 
diminishing their market access opportunities. Second, even if they do not frustrate the market 
access expectations, they are a source of economic distortion. By inducing the expansion of 
higher cost exporters at the expense of lower cost exporters, they lead to the inefficient allocation 
of resources and factors of production because exported goods are no longer produced at the 
lowest possible cost. Moreover, collecting funds to subsidize exports entails taxing other sectors 
and activities, which creates further economic distortions.69 In sum, an export subsidy generally 
leads to costs that exceed its benefits. 
b. The Effects of Domestic Subsidies Domestic production subsidies are granted for the 
production of goods manufactured domestically, irrespective of whether the final product is 
exported. This type of subsidy is usually rationalized for domestic reasons and is linked to the 
economic and social policies of the country. Although these measures can distort competition in 
the market, they can also correct market failures or promote social values that the market would 
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not achieve otherwise. Consequently, economic analysis has a much more nuanced approach to 
domestic production subsidies. 
 A domestic production subsidy has two effects on the domestic market: reducing costs 
for the producer and/or reducing the price of the product for the consumer. Unlike export 
subsides, domestic production subsidies avoid the increase in price to consumers and thus the 
associated distortions. However, under perfect competition, they may lead to an inefficient 
allocation of resources: the firms receiving subsidies are likely to maintain or increase their 
market share, whereas other more efficient firms may become excluded from that market. 
Additionally, the taxes used to finance the subsidy will cause additional economic distortions. 
On the other hand, the subsidy may be appropriate if it is used for repairing market imperfections 
or pursuing socially valuable objectives. Moreover, some economists suggest that domestic 
subsidies are the best instrument governments can use to address domestic distortions.70 
 From an international perspective, domestic subsidies may have two economic effects. 
One effect of a subsidy may be the substitution of domestic products for imported goods in the 
subsidizing country. Foreign competitors that do not receive subsidies from their governments 
may not be able to afford to sell the goods they export to a subsidizing country at prices that are 
lower than their cost of production. As a result, higher-priced imports will no longer be 
competitive, thereby impeding foreign competitors’ access to the subsidizing country’s market.71 
Thus, subsidies can be used as a form of protectionism,72 and they may thereby undermine the 
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market access commitments of importing nations. Second, artificially lowered costs of 
production allow firms that receive subsidies to market their goods in non-subsidizing countries 
at prices below those of local competitors. Local producers would, therefore, not be able to be 
competitive, even though they may be much more efficient in production. Additionally, the 
benefits to other exporters of market access commitments may also be threatened. In either case, 
the lower costs of subsidized products cause a misallocation of output between foreign and 
domestic markets, whereby resources are diverted to less efficient producers.73 This results in a 
less efficient global division of labor, which leads to lower global economic welfare. 
 It should be emphasized, however, that these conclusions are based on the assumption 
that the free market produces a better allocation of resources, meaning that resources are 
allocated in accordance with the desires of the consumers who generate market demand.74 In 
practice, allocative and distributive decisions are made by a multitude of actors not only for 
economic, but also for political, social, or moral reasons.75 Thus, subsidies do not always create 
greater distortions in the international economy. As Professor Rambod Behboodi put it, 
“distortion of an otherwise distorted market may in fact lead to efficiencies.”76 Indeed, in some 
cases they offset the effects of other distortions. In others, the economic effect of a subsidy, as 
one deviation from free market principles, may be hard to evaluate when surrounded by other 
deviations. Thus, for both domestic and international markets, the economic effects of domestic 
production subsidies are generally viewed as less distortional and harmful than subsidies for 
exports. 
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C. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 
Countervailing duties (CVDs) are additional customs duties imposed by an importing country in 
order to offset the effect of subsidies granted by an exporting country to its exporter. The 
objective of a CVD is to bring the imported price to its true market price and, thus, provide a 
level playing field between domestic producers of a product and foreign producers of the same 
product who can afford to sell it at a lower price because of the subsidy they receive from their 
government. 
 The economic effects of CVDs are similar to tariffs as they artificially increase the price 
of subsidized products in the market. However, unlike tariffs, which are imposed on products 
imported from any country, CVDs are only imposed on products coming from the country that 
granted the subsidy.77 Therefore, although consumers have to pay more for subsidized imported 
products, the purpose of the CVD is to allow domestic like products and like products imported 
from other countries to continue competing in that market.78 
 Scholarship on subsidies indicates two possible goals that support countervailability: 
deterrence and neutralization. The first rests on the assumption that subsidies interfere with the 
efficient allocation of productive resources and the purpose of CVD laws is, therefore, to 
preclude this inefficiency by discouraging subsidy practices and to, in turn, enhance global 
welfare. Under a deterrence analysis, CVDs seek “to nullify the foreign program of subsidization 
prospectively by inducing foreign firms not to participate in it.”79 This rationale, however, is not 
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conceptually sound. Because of the requirement of “injury to domestic industry” as a 
precondition for CVDs, only a limited number of countries can impose them in response to a 
subsidy practice. In practice, they have been used infrequently and by only a few nations (the 
United States has been the only major trading nation to use CVDs extensively).80 Thus, 
according to Professor Sykes, using CVDs sporadically and in an uncoordinated fashion may 
simply divert subsidized goods to markets that do not employ CVDs rather than discourage 
subsidies as such.81 Furthermore, existing national CVD laws do not distinguish between 
efficient and inefficient subsidies and, thus, it is questionable whether they serve the purpose of 
increasing global welfare by discouraging market-distorting subsidy practices. Even if an 
international consensus regarding market-distorting subsidy practices could be reached in the 
future, unilateral and uncoordinated imposition of CVDs by some countries and not others is 
likely to have “little systematic deterrent effect.”82 Additionally, producers that receive subsidies 
benefit from them until the country importing the subsidized product decides to impose CVDs. 
Thus, even if the subsidizing country knows that such protective measures can be adopted, this 
does not necessarily deter the granting of the subsidy.83 Finally, the deterrence rationale is 
inconsistent with the current WTO agreements, which prohibit only certain categories of 
subsidies.84 As Professor Diamond has written, adopting this logic is inconsistent with “any 
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national position which is hostile to all subsidies or which unilaterally attempts to deter their 
use.”85 
 Under the alternative neutralization approach, it is not the purpose of CVD law per se to 
evaluate or affect foreign subsidies, instead the use of countervailing duties has the objective of 
neutralizing the effects that the subsidy causes in the country importing subsidized goods. 
Professor Goetz, Mr. Granet, and Professor Schwartz suggest an “entitlement model” of CVD 
policy, which has been further developed by Professor Diamond: 
We assume that American firms are entitled to that domestic market outcome 
which would have resulted from a ‘fair’, competitive process, by which is meant 
one which has not been ‘manipulated’ by foreign government subsidization. The 
idea then is to restore the competition in the American market to its ‘but for’ state 
by neutralizing the effect of the subsidy.86 
 Unlike a deterrence-based CVD law, which is based on the benefit a subsidy confers on 
an exporting firm and sets duty rates sufficiently high to offset that benefit, the entitlement 
approach focuses on the effect of a subsidy on the cost of the recipient firm’s exports and sets 
duty rates at the level that offsets any reduction in the marginal costs of exports to the importing 
country, since that reduction represents the only aspect of a subsidy that can adversely affect the 
importing country’s producers.87 
 The neutralization approach also seems to be more consistent with current WTO 
agreements than are other interpretations. The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement requires that countervailing measures be imposed only following a determination that 
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the subsidies materially injure producers in the particular export market.88 Therefore, as 
Professor Cass points out, “if remedies are available only where they have certain effects, it is 
more consistent to interpret the remedial structure as intended to offset those effects than to 
preclude entirely the underlying practices.”89 
 On the other hand, however, the neutralization theory fails to explain why domestic 
producers should be entitled to CVDs offsetting injury imposed on them even in situations where 
foreign subsidization is globally and national-welfare improving. 
 Some scholars have questioned whether existing national CVD laws are justifiable at 
all.90 In particular, Professor Sykes has expressed deep skepticism of U.S. CVD law and 
suggested that abolishing it might best serve the national economic interests. He argues that the 
central features of existing law, such as the specificity test, and the injury test, have no 
convincing efficiency rationale. Professor Sykes maintains that, despite the fact that competition 
from abroad can disadvantage domestic producers, it is still desirable for “its ability to promote 
efficient resource allocation” as it encourages each country “to specialize in the production of 
goods and services that it can supply relatively more efficiently than other nations.”91 Although 
competition with subsidized imports may result in lost profits and economic hardship for 
workers and their families, these difficulties are no different from hardships that can result from 
competition with unsubsidized imports or from competition with domestic producers. Therefore, 
the argument goes, “individuals dislocated by import competition, ‘subsidized’ or not, arguably 
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should enjoy no greater entitlement to government assistance than the victims of other 
competition.”92 Professor Sykes argues that the best way to address this problem is through 
retraining programs, public employment agencies, and the like, as such programs can reduce the 
hardships of economic dislocation at a lower cost to the economy than protectionist measures. 
These programs create fewer short run allocative inefficiencies than CVDs; moreover, they 
encourage the movement of resources to higher valued uses in the long run.93 
 From an international perspective, too, Professor Sykes maintains that the existing U.S. 
CVD laws cannot be justified as part of a larger international system to enforce multilateral 
constrains on welfare-reducing subsidies. The unilateral imposition of CVDs by a single country 
will deter subsidization by other governments “only haphazardly.”94 In Professor Sykes’s words: 
the two systematic benefits to countries that participate in an international 
agreement to restrict subsidy practices – the constraints on the ability of each 
government to engage in wasteful subsidization expenditures itself and the 
elimination of subsidized competition in each country’s export markets – arise 
only if other countries are willing to use countervailing duties systematically 
against prohibited subsidy practices.95 
 The United States has been the only major trading nation to use CVDs extensively, while 
other countries impose them only infrequently.96 Therefore, unless the duties are imposed 
multilaterally, they are unlikely to be a useful tool of enforcement. 
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thirds of the 111 measures then in place for WTO members. From 1995-2007, 117 new measures were notified. Of 
that total, 47 were imposed by the United States, 23 by the EU, 11 by Canada, and 36 by a group of 11 other 
countries. From 2008 to mid-2012, 51 measures were imposed – 27 by the US, 8 by Canada, 6 by the EU and 4 by 
China. See JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 44, at 1026. 
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D. THE RATIONALE FOR DISCIPLINING SUBSIDIES 
It is hardly surprising that subsidies are one of the most controversial issues in international trade 
regulation. There is an inevitable tension between the regulation of subsidies at the international 
level and the sovereignty of states. On the one hand, governments are free to adopt policies, 
including the use of subsidies, that they deem to be necessary to achieve their goals, and the 
reluctance of some states to abandon their sovereignty on certain matters makes it difficult to 
discipline subsidies at the international level. On the other hand, however, subsidies imply 
distortions and, thus, reductions in the gains of national as well as international economies. 
Therefore, while governments “have a collective interest in co-operating to limit the adverse 
effects on trade, they also have a legitimate interest in seeking to influence economic activity 
within their jurisdiction.”97 
 There is also a growing concern with the use of subsidies as an alternative form of 
protection. One of the lessons of the Great Depression is that protectionist policies can quickly 
and destructively spread from nation to nation. Thus, in the absence of internationally accepted 
rules on subsidies, governments may be “caught up in a wasteful spiral of escalating 
emulation.”98 As U.S. Congressman David R. Obey put it: 
As much as I detest the idea of export subsidies, I guess we have no choice but to 
participate in the stupidity. Given the general economic collapse, we have to grab 
at whatever life preservers are around when the ship is going down.99 
                                                 
97 Terry Collins-Williams, A Negotiator’s Perspective on Enhancing Subsidies’ Discipline, in WHAT SHAPES THE 
LAW? REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SUBSIDY 
DISCIPLINES 57, 57 (Luca Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins eds., 2016). 
98 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JOANNA SHELTON-ERB, SUBSIDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 8 (MIT Press 1984). 
99 Murray A., Special Report: Export Subsidies, 357 CONG. Q., Feb. 19, 1983. 
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 The regulation of subsidies at the international level contributes to maximizing the 
benefits derived from the increasing interdependency of states. At the same time, economists are 
cautious about over-disciplining subsidies. In particular, Professors Bagwell and Staiger maintain 
that subsidy disciplines tend to deter tariff concessions, rather than protect them.100 In their view, 
the reduction of “policy space” following stricter subsidy disciplines makes countries more 
reluctant to make tariff commitments in the first place.101 Indeed, the international regulation of 
subsidies leads to more liberal states, since regulation reduces the level of intervention in their 
economies. However, a significant strengthening of multilateral discipline on subsidies may 
ultimately undermine the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding 
market access. 
 Disciplining subsidies is a delicate exercise. Unlike tariffs, whose strong negative effects 
on trade clearly outweigh other policy considerations, subsidies can be used for a variety of 
important social and economic purposes. Therefore, in creating rules for subsidies, one cannot 
simply call for their reduction, as has been the approach to tariffs. Instead, there is a need to 
create a more nuanced regulatory framework that addresses the problems subsidies may cause 
without limiting the ability of governments to use subsidies for important goals. Thus, creating 
international rules on subsidies requires: 
 (1) defining the principles and objectives that the regulation of subsidies should promote; 
 (2) defining the concept of “subsidy” applied in the context of international regulation in 
order to limit the regulatory effect to “bad” subsidies; 
                                                 
100 K. Bagwell & R.W. Staiger, Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?, 96 AM. 
ECON. REV. 877, 877-95 (2006). 
101 Id. at 891 (noting that “an SCM challenge of the home subsidy is worth less to the foreign government if the 
home government has not bound its tariff, because the home government is then free to adjust its tariff in response to 
the loss of its subsidy. But this raises the possibility that the home government might be able to avoid an SCM 
challenge by refusing to bind its tariff in . . . negotiations.”). 
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 (3) defining “good” and “bad” subsidies by distinguishing between subsidies with which 
governments can accomplish legitimate policy objectives from subsidies that create a distortion 
in the markets and cause an inefficient allocation of resources; and 
 (4) defining an adequate response to “bad” subsidies. 
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III. GLOBAL REGULATION OF SUBSIDIES IN THE PRE-WTO ERA 
For most of history, governments were free to grant subsidies in any form and for any reason. 
The earliest attempts to control such conduct involved clauses in bilateral trade treaties in which 
states pledged not to grant various kinds of subsidies.1 The first treaty to contain such a pledge 
was signed between France and the German Zollverein (the German Customs Union) in 1862.2 
 Such treaties were “wholly ineffective in suppressing the practice against which they 
were directed” though,3 which led to the enactment by many countries of countervailing duty 
(CVD) laws. The first CVD laws were adopted by the United States in 18904 (a law which 
applied only to certain grades of sugar) and Belgium in 1892.5 The latter was the first general 
CVD law that authorized a government to impose on any imports which had received an export 
subsidy an additional duty equal to the amount of the subsidy. In a 1927 study for the League of 
Nations, Trendelenburg reported that, despite the relatively widespread existence of CVD laws, 
                                                 
1 Professor Jacob Viner identified twenty-nine treaties containing such pledges, mainly between European countries. 
See JACOB VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 166 (University of Chicago Press 1923). 
2 British and Foreign State Papers (1864-1865), vol. LV 298, 301 (London 1870), 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.hj12n9;view=1up;seq=7 (in this treaty, however, the pledge was unilateral, 
being given only by France). 
3 VINER, supra note 1, at 168 (noting that “France, Germany, and Austria, countries which frequently pledged 
themselves not grant export bounties, were during the life of the treaties containing these pledges the outstanding 
examples of countries granting export bounties. None of the treaties contained any provision for the enforcement by 
penalty duties or otherwise of the pledge against bounties.”). 
4 Tariff Act of 1890, Ch. 1244, § 26 Stat. 567, § 237. 
5 VINER, supra note 1, at 169 (quoting MIHAIL N. COSOIU, DIE BELGISCHE HANDELSPOLITIK DER LETZTEN 40 JAHRE 
29 (Stuttgart 1914)). 
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they were rarely used in practice, if at all.6 It was only in the 1940s that countries made the first 
attempt to establish obligations in the field of subsidies in a multilateral framework. In general, 
the questions for international law were to what extent countries should be allowed to grant, or 
should be restrained from granting, subsidies, and, on the other hand, to what extent should 
countries be allowed to take measures to counteract such subsidies. 
A. SUBSIDIES AND THE HAVANA CHARTER 
1. General Introduction 
The initiatives towards the founding international organization for trade began during World War 
II and were taken principally by the United States, in cooperation with its allies, particularly 
Great Britain.7 The Bretton Woods conference of 1944, which established the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, also recognized 
the need for a comparable international institution for trade to complement them.8 In 1945, 
multilateral trade negotiations started within the framework of the UN Economic and Social 
                                                 
6 Ernst Trendelenburg, Memorandum on the Legislation of Different States for the Prevention of Dumping, with 
Special Reference to Exchange Dumping, Geneva: League of Nations, 1927, at 7. 
7 JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON 
TARIFFS AND TRADE 36-38 (1969) (Professor Jackson observes that these initiatives “stemmed from two strands of 
American economic policy.” The first strand was the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act that enabled the U.S. 
President to negotiate mutual reductions of tariffs. By 1945, the United States had entered into 32 bilateral 
agreements reducing tariffs. Weaknesses of the bilateral approach became apparent, however, and a multilateral 
approach was needed. The second strand of American policy was “the development of ideas during World War II 
that recognized the need for international economic institutions to prevent the type of “beggar-my-neighbor” 
policies . . . which, in the minds of many leaders, were responsible to a great degree for World War II itself.”). 
8 UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE (Bretton Woods, N.H., July 1-22, 1944), 
PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS 941 (U.S. Dep’t of State Pub. No. 2866, 1948) (The conference recognized that 
“complete attainment of . . . the purposes and objectives . . . cannot be achieved through the instrumentality of the 
fund alone”, the conference therefore recommended that governments seek to reach agreement to “reduce obstacles 
to international trade and in other ways promote mutually advantageous international commercial relations.”). 
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Council, which adopted a resolution in favor of forming an International Trade Organization 
(ITO) in 1946.9 During this time the United States prepared a Suggested Charter for an 
International Trade Organization of the United Nations,10 which was partly the result of the U.S. 
and British discussions.11 This Suggested Charter formed the basis for negotiations leading 
finally to the ITO Charter.12 
 Negotiations over the ITO and the international trading system were held in three 
separate forums. One part of the negotiations focused on drafting the Charter for the ITO 
institution itself; the second part concentrated on an agreement to reduce tariffs; and the third 
part focused on drafting the general provisions relating to the tariff obligations. The two latter 
parts were eventually separated out of the more complete Charter, and came into being as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).13 The idea was that the GATT would be a 
specific trade agreement within the broader institutional context of the ITO Charter and that the 
ITO would provide the organizational support for the GATT.14 After several rounds of 
                                                 
9 1 U.N. ECOSOC Res. 13, U.N. Doc. E/22 (1946). 
10 U.S. Suggested Charter, Dep’t of State Pub. No. 2598 (1946). 
11 RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 145-61, 269-71 (1956) (The Suggested Charter was 
largely based on the Proposals for Consideration by an International Conference on Trade and Employment drafted 
by the British and U.S. negotiators in the fall of 1945. In Professor Gardner’s word, “[w]ithout agreement between 
these two counties, progress on the Charter would be impossible.”). 
12 JACKSON, supra note 7, at 41. 
13 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 
1947]. 
14 JACKSON, supra note 7, at 43; see also William Diebold, Reflections on the International Trade Organization, 14 
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 335, 336 (1993-1994) (stating that “the best way of fitting together GATT and the ITO is to think 
of the GATT agreement as the chapter of the ITO Charter dealing with traditional trade restrictions.”). 
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negotiations,15 fifty-three countries participating in the Havana Conference completed work on 
the ITO Charter.16 The Havana Charter was signed on March 24, 1948.17 
 The Havana Charter never entered into force. In the U.S. election of 1948, the 
Republicans won control of the U.S. Congress and it soon became clear that Congress would not 
ratify the agreement. In 1950, President Truman eventually decided that he would no longer seek 
congressional approval for the ITO. Since ITO membership by the United States, the world’s 
leading economy and trading nation at the time, was crucial, the remaining countries abandoned 
the effort, and the ITO was never formed.18  
 Although never adopted, the Charter was the most comprehensive economic agreement 
for the times. It dealt with a large number of segments of international trade not usually covered 
in previous trade negotiations, such as foreign investment,19 labor standards,20 employment,21 
and economic development.22 For the first time in an international agreement, the Charter 
recognized the dependence of free trade upon the maintenance of stability and the importance of 
                                                 
15 Four conferences were held to draft the GATT and the ITO Charter: London (1946), New York (1947), Geneva 
(1947) and Havana (1947-1948). 
16 Those countries were Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, the Union of Burma, Canada, 
Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Lebanon, Liberia, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zeeland, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippine, 
Portugal, Southern Rhodesia, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Transjordan, the Union of South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
17 Final Act of the UN Conference on Trade and Employment (U.N. Doc. ICITO/1/4, April 1948) [hereinafter 
Havana Charter]. 
18 William Diebold also argued that one of the factors leading to the demise of the ITO was that “the ITO promised 
mainly longrun gains; any shortrun gains in opening the American market and liberating trade in the rest of the 
world to help European recovery would have to come largely through GATT and the Marshall Plan.” See Diebold, 
supra note 14, at 341.  
19 Havana Charter, supra note 17, art. 12. 
20 Id., art. 7. 
21 Id., arts. 2, 3. 
22 Id., Ch. III. 
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maintaining stability through measures that do not restrain trade.23 Furthermore, it was 
recognized that trade liberalization cannot be achieved only by means of traditional trade 
negotiations; there was the need for establishing international rules that related to the domestic 
policies of diverse countries. In the words of William Diebold, “it was necessary to break new 
ground in international economic relations and also to permit international agreements to 
influence domestic economic measures to an unprecedented degree.”24 Unlike many previous 
agreements, the Charter did not “confine itself to resolutions and recommendations, but set[] 
forth a series of series of specific commitments with binding force on governments.”25 In sum, 
the Charter contained significant commitments that were more extensive than those assumed in 
any previous international economic agreement.26 
2. Regulation of Subsidies in the Havana Charter 
Although the ITO Charter never came into force, its provisions on subsidies constitute the first 
multilateral attempt to regulate this area. More importantly, the ITO Charter greatly influenced 
the GATT since most of the provisions introduced in Article XVI of the GATT originated from 
                                                 
23 Clair Wilcox, The Promise of the World Trade Charter, 27(3) FOREIGN AFFAIRS 486, 491 (1949). 
24 Diebold, supra note 14, at 336. 
25 Wilcox, supra note 23, at 487. 
26 Professor Robert Hudec, nevertheless, expressed the view that  
[governments were unable to accept any serious change in existing policy, or even close 
supervision . . . Judging by their conduct, the governments were of the view that the Charter had 
almost no chance of prevailing over any important domestic interest which was then receiving 
more protection than a desired rule would have allowed. On the other hand, these governments did 
accept quite detailed legal obligations where those obligations did not require any major changes 
in existing law or practice.] 
See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 21 (2d ed. 1990). 
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this Charter.27 Thus, it is helpful to explore in more details the provisions of the Charter dealing 
with subsidies. 
 In general, the ITO Charter reflects a balanced approach to any kind of government 
assistance, stating that such assistance is “justified” if it is granted “to promote the establishment, 
development or reconstruction of particular industries or braches of agriculture”28 in the Member 
states. Yet, at the same time, “an unwise use of such measures would impose undue burdens on 
their own economies and unwarranted restriction on international trade, and might increase 
unnecessarily the difficulties of adjustment for the economies of other countries.”29 
 Chapter IV of the Charter (Commercial policy) contains four articles dealing with 
subsidies (Section C).30 The Charter provides a fairly broad understanding of a subsidy, as “any 
form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to maintain or increase 
exports of any product from, or to reduce, or prevent an increase in, imports of any product into, 
its territory.”31 Domestic subsidies are not prohibited. Article 25, however, imposes a general 
obligation on the Members to notify the ITO of any subsidies and their possible effect.32 The 
obligation to discuss with other Members the possibility of limiting the subsidization is only 
established for cases where a subsidy caused or threatened to cause serious prejudice to the 
interests of other Members.33 
 Export subsidies, on the other hand, are prohibited when they result in the sale of a 
product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like product to 
                                                 
27 See infra Section B. 
28 Havana Charter, supra note 17, art. 13.1.  
29 Id. 
30 Id., arts. 25-28. 
31 Id., art. 25. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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buyers in the domestic market.34 There are three exceptions to the general rule for export 
subsidies. First, the use of export subsidies is allowed in order to offset a subsidy granted by a 
country that is not a Member of the ITO.35 Second, a system for the stabilization of the domestic 
price of a primary commodity,36 which results at times in the sale of the commodity for export at 
a price lower than the comparable prices charged for the like commodity to buyers in the 
domestic market, are not considered export subsidies.37 Finally, Article 28 prohibits any ITO 
Member from granting any form of subsidy, which operates directly or indirectly to maintain or 
increase the export of any primary commodity from its territory in such a way as to have the 
effect of maintaining or acquiring for that Member more than an equitable share of world trade in 
that commodity.38 Therefore, as for export subsidies for primary products, it seems that they are 
not prohibited as long as they are not employed for the purpose of sustaining or increasing share 
of the world’s trade. As Professor Clair Wilcox, vice-chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the 
Havana Conference, observed in 1949, “the wording adopted at Havana is so broad that it will 
probably permit any country to subsidize the exportation of primary commodities.”39 
                                                 
34 Id., art. 26.1. (Members had to comply with this obligation after the Charter would have been in force two years, a 
period which may be extended, upon request, by the ITO (art. 26.3)). 
35 Id., art. 26.4. (In order to neutralize the injury that a subsidy of one Member caused in another Member’s territory, 
it is only allowed to impose countervailing duties (art. 34.4)). 
36 Primary commodity is “any product of farm, forest or fishery or any mineral, in its natural form or which has 
undergone such processing as is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in 
international trade.” Id., art. 56. 
37 Id., art. 27.1 (In order to fall under this exception to the general prohibition of export subsidies, such price 
stabilization system has to (1) be designed as to result in the sale of the commodity for export at a price higher than 
the comparable price charged for the like commodity to buyers in the domestic market, and (2) operate in such a 
way that they neither stimulate exports unduly nor cause serious prejudice to the interests of other members.) 
38 Id., art. 28.1. 
39 CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 127-28 (New York 1949). 
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B. SUBSIDIES IN THE GATT OF 1947 
In the absence of the ITO, the GATT filled this void and assumed the role that had been assigned 
to the ITO.40 However, since this agreement originally had been designed to record the results of 
tariff negotiations, the GATT did not include either the Charter’s organizational provisions or 
most of its substantive chapters. Basically, only the chapter on “Commercial Policy” was 
transferred to the GATT, and even there some provisions were altered. 
 The substantial reduction of tariffs is, together with the elimination of discrimination, the 
key instrument of the GATT for achieving its overall objectives. In fact, the GATT was very 
successful in reducing tariffs on trade in goods, in particular on industrial goods.41 Nevertheless, 
with respect to the reduction of non-tariff barriers, it was notably less successful. In particular, 
there has been great difficulty in obtaining a consensus on any common approach to regulating 
subsidies. According to Professor Jackson, the difficulty in reaching such a consensus reflected a 
view that subsidies were a preferable means of protection, as compared with tariffs or quotas: 
subsidies can promote and expand international trade because they lower the price of a product, 
which will encourage consumption.42 Thus, initially the provisions on subsidies in the GATT 
                                                 
40 Contracting parties agreed upon the provisional application of the GATT by signing a Protocol of Provisional 
Application. 
41 In the late 1940s, before the creation of the GATT, the average duty on industrial products imposed by developed 
countries was about 40 percent ad valorem. After the tariff negotiations, this average has been reduced to about 3.9 
percent ad valorem. 
42 JACKSON, supra note 7, at 367-69 (stating that it was the U.S. view at the preparatory meetings in London (1946), 
though it proposed to distinguish domestic subsidies that should be allowed, but requiring notification and 
consultation, from export subsidies that should be prohibited. However, a group of less-developed and primary 
product-exporting countries opposed this view arguing that “both production and export subsidies could effectively 
result in oversupply on the world market and unfairly restrict some countries’ exports”; in particular, the Australian 
delegation argued that “export and production subsidies should be treated in the same manner, both being prohibited 
when there were harmful effects, both being allowed where no harmful effect occurred,” Brazil went even further 
suggesting that all subsidies should be prohibited.). 
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were extremely limited, further efforts to increase the obligations on subsidies led to 
amendments of the GATT in 1955. 
1. Regulation of Subsidies in the GATT 
Article XVI of the GATT, which sets out the basic rules to discipline subsidies, is based on a 
much shortened version the Havana Charter’s provisions on subsidies. The Charter contained 
two sets of rules regarding subsidies: general obligations to notify subsidies and to discuss the 
possibility of their limiting (Article 25 of the Charter) and the prohibition of export subsidies 
(Articles 26-28 of the Charter). Only the former survived in the original version of GATT. 
Article XVI of the GATT initially consisted of one paragraph, containing simply a requirement 
that any contracting party that maintains a subsidy must notify the GATT Contracting Parties “of 
the extent and nature of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization . . . and of 
the circumstances making the subsidization necessary,”43 and be prepared to discuss the 
possibility of limiting the subsidization with affected contracting parties.44 Such limited 
provisions could be explained by the fact that the GATT provisions should have been 
“temporary” until the adoption of the Havana Charter. Professor Jackson also points out that the 
important reason why the export subsidy prohibition was not carried into the GATT was the U.S. 
                                                 
43 In practice, the Contracting Parties have made periodic requests for complete notifications of all subsidies 
currently in effect. This is done in the form of a questionnaire that is sent out by the Secretariat. The first request for 
notifications came in March of 1950. However, governments were reluctant to notify their subsidies since they were 
afraid that such notification would encourage other country to adopt countervailing measures. See Jackson, supra 
note 7, at 388-89. 
44 GATT 1947, supra note 13, art. XVI:1. 
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position that the executive authority of the U.S. government did not permit an undertaking with 
regard to export subsidies.45 
 The precise scope of GATT Article XVI is also not entirely clear because there is no 
general definition of the term “subsidy” in the GATT.46 Just as the Havana Charter did, Article 
XVI contains two characteristics of the concept of “subsidy.” First, it suggests the broad use of 
the word “subsidy” that includes “any form of income or price support.” Second, such a measure 
must have the effect of directly or indirectly increasing exports of any product from the 
Contracting Party’s territory or reducing imports of any product into its territory.47 Although it 
seems that the language of the Article suggests that it only applies to subsidies that increase 
exports or reduce imports, a GATT panel concluded that it is not sufficient “to consider 
increased exports or reduced imports only in a historical sense.”48 The panel report further noted 
that the phrase “increased exports” was intended “to include the concept of maintaining exports 
at a level higher than would otherwise exist in the absence of the subsidy.”49 Thus, in assessing 
whether exports were increased or imports were reduced, the criterion is what would happen in 
the absence of a subsidy.  
 Article VI of the GATT authorizes Contracting Parties to countervail against domestic 
and export subsidies. At the same time, the GATT imposes two important limitations on this 
unilateral defense mechanism. First, countervailing measures may only be imposed when a 
                                                 
45 JACKSON, supra note 7, at 370. 
46 Nevertheless, a GATT panel later concluded that “the lack of a precise definition had not, in practice, interfered 
with the operation of Article XVI.” See GATT, 10th Supp. BISD 201, para. 23, at 208 (1962); as Collins-Williams 
and Salembier quipped “[i]t was possible for the best minds of the day to proceed on a basis that might be described 
as ‘I know one when I see one.’” See Terry Collins-Williams & Gerry Salembier, International Disciplines on 
Subsidies: The GATT, the WTO and the Future Agenda, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 6 (1996). 
47 GATT 1947, supra note 13, art. XVI.  
48 GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 188, 191 (1961).  
49 Id. at 191, quoted from GATT, 2 BISD 44 (1952). 
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subsidy causes or threatens to cause material injury to the domestic industry.50 Second, the 
maximum amount of such CVD could not exceed the amount of “estimated bounty or subsidy 
determined to have been granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export 
of such product.”51 The former requirement was intended to reduce the possibility that CVDs 
would be imposed at will on any product as a protectionist tool. However, the United States, the 
only country that actively used these measures, was exempted from using the injury test,52 which 
obviously reduced the effectiveness of Article VI. Article VI does not contain a definition of a 
subsidy. In the view of Professor Barceló, “GATT’s failure to link countervailing duties to the 
direct regulation of subsidies in Article XVI compounds the unboundedness of the Article VI 
language.”53 In fact, a country may impose countervailing measures even if the subsidy involved 
does not violate Article XVI.54  
 In sum, the GATT initially allowed Contracting Parties to offset the effect of subsides 
only unilaterally by imposing CVDs (applying their own definition of a subsidy) and did not 
impose any direct restraints on the subsidizing government’s practices (countries were only 
obliged to notify their subsidies and to discuss, upon request, the possibility of limiting the 
subsidy).55 In the words of Collins-Williams and Salembier, at this stage, the problem of 
                                                 
50 GATT 1947, supra note 13, art. VI:6. 
51 Id., art. VI:3. 
52 ROBERT O’BRIEN, SUBSIDY REGULATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION IN NORTH AMERICA, THE GATT AND THE 
EU 107 (1997) (noting that “[t]hey successfully argued that since their law predated the GATT and did not contain 
an injury measure, the GATT provisions were not applicable”). See also Protocol of the Provisional Application of 
the 1947 GATT (Part II of the GATT applied only “to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation.”) 
(UNTS 308, BISD IV/77, TIAS 1700). 
53 John J. Barceló III, A History of GATT Unfair Trade Remedy Law: Confusion of Purposes, 517 CORNELL LAW 
FACULTY PUBLICATIONS 311, 324 (1991). 
54 Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, 
Report of the Group of Experts 20-21 (1961). 
55 There is no record of any country ever having limited a subsidizing practice as a result of consultation under Art. 
XVI. 
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subsidies “was given a simple solution: countervailing duties up to the amount of the 
subsidization.”56 
2. The Reforms of 1955 
As it was evident that Article XVI in its original version was insufficient, in 1955 the 
Contracting Parties decided to increase the obligations on subsidies and amended Article XVI by 
adding Section B, which consists of paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5. They also added Interpretive Notes 
to Article XVI, in Annex I of the GATT. Most of the modifications originated from the Havana 
Charter’s provisions on export subsidies.57 
 Section B distinguishes export subsidies on non-primary products that are totally 
prohibited from export subsidies on primary products that, in many cases, are permitted. This 
asymmetry in the treatment of subsidies on primary and non-primary products reflected the 
interests of the United States and Europe, where agriculture traditionally had been heavily 
protected.58 Likewise, developing countries were unwilling to limit their ability to grant 
subsidies for primary products, especially when tariffs for manufactured products had been 
substantially removed, while tariffs for agricultural products (which were the main products 
exported by these countries) experienced only an insignificant reduction.59 
                                                 
56 Collins-Williams & Salembier, supra note 46, at 6. 
57 Havana Charter, supra note 17, arts. 26, 27 and 28. 
58 O’BRIEN, supra note 52, at 106-07. 
59 GUSTAVO E. LUENGO HERNÁNDEZ DE MADRID, REGULATION OF SUBSIDIES AND STATE AIDS IN WTO AND EC 
LAW: CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 48 (2007). 
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a. Non-Primary Products Under GATT Article XVI:4, which basically echoes the provisions of 
Article 26 of the Havana Charter, all export subsidies for non-primary products, which result in 
“the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the 
like product to buyers in the domestic market,”60 should have been abolished by 1 January 
1958.61 The second sentence of this paragraph contained a “standstill” provision: an obligation 
not to introduce new or to extend existing subsides until 31 December 195762; since it was 
anticipated that by that time GATT members would have reached the agreement on the 
prohibition of all export subsidies on non-primary products.63 
 The agreement was not reached by 1958. In 1960, under French leadership the 
Contracting Parties were finally able to agree on the text of a Declaration Giving Effect to the 
Provisions of Article XVI, Paragraph 464 that also elaborated a non-exhaustive list of measures 
considered to be export subsidies.65 The Declaration, and the prohibition, were to become 
effective on the date on which the more developed European countries, the United States, and 
Canada all accepted the Declaration. As Kenneth Dam pointed out, developed countries were 
                                                 
60 GATT panel later concluded that “from an economic point of view, there was a presumption that an export 
subsidy would lead to any or a combination of the following consequences in the export sector: (a) lowering of 
prices, (b) increase of sales effort, and (c) increase of profits per unit.” See Panel Report, Tax Legislation – Income 
Tax Practices Maintained By France, L/4423, adopted December 7-8, 1981, BISD 23S/114; Panel Report, Tax 
Legislation – Income Tax Practices Maintained By Belgium, L/4424, adopted December 7-8, 1981, BISD 23S/127; 
Panel Report, Tax Legislation – Income Tax Practices Maintained By The Netherlands, L/4425, adopted 
December 7-8, 1981, BISD 23S/137. 
61 GATT 1947, supra note 13, art. XVI:4. 
62 Id.  
63 Interpretative Note, Ad art. XVI, para. 4. 
64 Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XV:4 of the GATT, 1960 (Agreement No. 69 in App. C); 
GATT, 9th Supp. BISD 32 (1961). 
65 This list was the precursor to the illustrative List of Export Subsidies, contained in Annex to the WTO SCM 
Agreement. 
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prepared to agree to prohibit export subsidies, but only in a concerted move.66 Ultimately, only 
17 countries accepted the Declaration,67 which came into force for them on 14 November 1962. 
Accordingly, the first sentence of Article XVI:4 (obligation to abolish all subsidies on non-
primary products) was only in force for the seventeen contracting parties; the standstill clause 
contained in the second sentence of Article XVI:4 (obligation not to introduce new subsidies), 
which had been extended by a series of declarations beginning in 1957, expired on 31 December 
1967. 
b. Primary Products Article XVI:3 of the GATT generally follows the language of Article 28 
of the Havana Charter. While not prohibiting export subsidies on primary goods, it sets out a 
trade effects test in an attempt to limit the use of such subsidies. Contracting Parties should “seek 
to avoid” the use of subsidies on the export of primary products; if, however, they use “any form 
of subsidy,” they are not to apply such subsidies so as to get “more than an equitable share of 
world export trade in that product.”68 The language of this Article, where the first part of the 
provision refers to “export subsidies,” while the second part relates to “any form of subsidy” that 
has the effect of increasing exports of a primary product, seems to suggest that it covers not only 
export subsidies but also any domestic subsidies that lead to this effect.69 
 This Article has been a subject of substantial criticism, mainly from the primary goods-
exporting countries, not only because there is no economic logic in the different treatment of 
                                                 
66 KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 145 (1970) (stating that 
“this was one of the first times that . . . the Contracting Parties formally recognized that developing countries should 
be treated differently from developed countries.”). 
67 Those countries are Austria (with reservations), Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Southern Rhodesia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom (with reservations), and the United States (with reservations). 
68 GATT 1947, supra note 13, art. XVI:3. 
69 JACKSON, supra note 7, at 393. 
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subsidies on primary and non-primary goods, but because the concept of “equitable share” refers 
to share in “world” export trade of a particular product and not to trade in that product in an 
individual market.70 In particular, Australia argued that: 
by referring to equitable” shares of world trade” and not “individual markets” the 
Article sought to solve the problem of primary product for the wrong end, since 
the danger of export subsidies was greatest in individual markets. It was possible 
to argue that notwithstanding damage being done by subsidization in individual 
markets a country’s total share of world exports was not being increased.71 
 This provision clearly generates problems of interpretations. The phrase “more than an 
equitable share of world export trade” has been described by Professor Jackson as “the most 
difficult interpretive problem of paragraph 3.”72 Professor Colin Phegan, too, points to the 
problem of the shift “from prohibition of export subsidies as such, defined in relatively simple 
and concrete terms, to prohibition of export subsidies having a certain trade effect, measured 
only by a criterion which is exceptionally flexible and uncertain.”73 In particular, he questions 
whether any increase in a country’s share of world export trade is “equitable.” He also fears that 
it would be difficult to establish a causal connection between the subsidy and the increase in the 
share of world export trade in practice.74 For example, in the EEC-Refunds on Exports of Sugar 
case, where Brazil and Australia argued that refunds on sugar exports applied by the European 
Community were inconsistent with Article XVI:3, the Panel could not reach a definite 
conclusion that the increased share had resulted in the EC “having more than equitable share of 
                                                 
70 The French delegation, supported by Australia, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, Canada, and Italy argued that 
the words “world markets” should be construed as meaning “individual markets.” However, the United States 
delegation refused to accept the “individual market” concept and the wording remained as it is. See JACKSON, supra 
note 7, at 394-95. 
71 GATT Doc. SR. 9/41, at 3 (1955). 
72 JACKSON, supra note 7, at 393. 
73 Colin Phegan, GATT Article XVI.3: Export Subsidies and “Equitable Shares,” 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 251, 255 
(1982). 
74 Id. at 255-61. 
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world trade in that production.”75 Although the Panels concluded that the EC enjoyed a 
significant increase in share of world trade while Australia and Brazil suffered a decline, these 
may have been explained by factors other than the effect of EC refunds on export.76 
 In sum, after the reforms of 1955 Article XVI of GATT established the subsidy discipline 
initially foreseen in the Havana Charter: (1) general obligations to notify subsidies and to 
discuss, upon request, the possibility of their limiting; (2) the prohibition of export subsidies for 
non-primary products, provided that the subsidy results in a lower price in the export market than 
in the domestic market (only in force for certain, mostly developed countries); and (3) subsidies 
for primary products are permitted except where the subsidy results in the subsidizing country 
having more than an equitable share of world export trade. Dominic Coppens observes that these 
amendments introduced three types of bifurcation that were already present during the 
GATT/ITO negotiations.77 First, given that export subsidies are more distortional and harmful 
than domestic subsidies, countries disciplined export subsidies first, and only at a later stage (and 
to a lesser extent) disciplined domestic subsidies. Second, because of the negotiating power of 
subsidizing developed countries, disciplines on agricultural subsidies are less severe than those 
on industrial subsidies. Finally, the disciplines were first concluded among developed countries 
and only later were gradually extended to developing countries. Coppens notes that “all three 
                                                 
75 EEC-Refunds on Exports of Sugar: Australia’s Complaint, Panel’s report adopted on 6 November 1979 (L/4833), 
at 319(f). 
76 Id. (Australia and Brazil were parties to the International Sugar Convention, which imposed an obligation to limit 
export of sugar to their minimum levels. The EC did not join the Convention and, therefore, were under no such 
constraints.). 
77 DOMINIC COPPENS, WTO DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES: BALANCING POLICY 
SPACE AND LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 26-27 (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
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types of asymmetries would gradually contract over the next decades, although they are still 
present today.”78 
C. TOKYO ROUND SUBSIDIES CODE OF 1979 
Unlike the first six GATT negotiating rounds, which were focused almost exclusively on 
reducing tariffs,79 the purpose of the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) expanded to non-tariff measures 
and systemic issues.80 The Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, which entered into force in 1980, was 
a significant outcome of the negotiations.81 In essence, the Subsidies Code constituted an uneasy 
compromise between the United States and the EC. 
 The United States sought to strengthen international rules on the use of subsidies during 
the Tokyo Round.82 While the United States was, in general, opposed to subsidization, most of 
                                                 
78 Id. at 27. 
79 Geneva (1947), Annecy (1949), Torquay (1951), Geneva (1956), Dillon (1960-1961), and Kennedy Round (1964-
1967). 
80 The Tokyo Round negotiations were officially opened in 1973 (BISD, 20th Supp. 1973). They developed the 
Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade, Government Procurement, Interpretation and Application of Articles 
VI, XVI and XXIII (Subsidies), Arrangement Regarding Bovine Meat, International Dairy Arrangement, 
Implementation of Article VII (Custom Valuation), Import Licensing Procedures, Trade in Civil Aircraft, and 
Implementation of Article VI (Anti-Dumping Duties), as well as Understandings on Differential and More 
Favorable Treatment of Developing Countries, Declaration on Trade Measures Taken for Balance-of-Payment 
Purposes, Safeguard Action for Development Purposes, and Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, 
Dispute Settlement and Surveillance. 
81 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (MTN/NTM/W/236, 5 April 1979) [hereinafter Subsidies Code]. 
82 The report of the Senate Finance Committee on the 1974 Act set the goal: 
In the long run, United States interests will be best served by an international agreement to 
eliminate subsidies which distort world trade patterns and discriminate against United States sales 
both at home and abroad. Central to the forthcoming multilateral negotiations should be the 
establishment of acceptable international rules governing the use of subsidies. 
S. REP. NO. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 183 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7186, 7318. 
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its trading partners viewed subsidy programs as important tools of national policy.83 At the 
beginning of the Tokyo Round the U.S. position was that the issue of limiting subsidies in all 
their aspects (export, domestic and agriculture) was more important than the issue of adopting 
countervailing measures against them. In their view, if countries eliminated offensive subsidy 
practices, there would be no need for CVDs at all.84 
 In contrast, the EC, as well as developing countries, were unconcerned about 
subsidization. They instead insisted on disciplining the extensive use of CVDs by the United 
States. Under U.S. law, CVDs could be imposed merely upon determination of a subsidy, 
without assessing the injury to the domestic industry caused by the subsidized imports.85 Thus, 
the EC wanted the United States to commit itself to an injury standard in accordance with GATT 
Article VI, and to include a test for material injury caused by a subsidy as a prerequisite to 
adopting CVDs. 
 Eventually, the United States and the EC achieved what Professor Andreas Lowenfeld 
described as two compromises.86 First, in return for a prohibition on export subsidies, the United 
States agreed to apply the injury test. Second, in exchange for a more permissive attitude on 
domestic subsidies, the determination relevant to imposition of CVDs was left, as before, to the 
authorities of the importing country. As soon as the United States and the EC reached the 
                                                 
83 Richard R. Rivers & John D. Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: 
Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1447, 1452-53 (1979) (noting that “[i]n key 
European countries such as France, Great Britain and Italy, government aid to industry, in various forms, had 
become routine. In the agricultural sector, the Europeans had gone so far as to institutionalize export subsidies . . . . 
A number of developing countries, in particular, had planned their development around export-led growth. In order 
to encourage export sales, they had developed various . . . forms of government incentives.”). 
84 O’BRIEN, supra note 52, at 110-11. 
85 The U.S. countervailing duty law (1897) dated from before GATT 1947 and was therefore grandfathered from 
Article VI of the GATT. 
86 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 209-10 (Oxford University Press 2002). 
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agreement, other states such as Canada and Japan were included in negotiations. Later 
negotiations brought in the developing countries. 
 The United States ratified the Code on a conditional most-favored-nation basis, affording 
the injury test only to the Subsidies Code signatories.87 This resulted in a series of bilateral 
negotiations between the United States and a number of countries, mostly developing ones, 
wherein the United States agreed to provisionally apply the Code and the injury test to those 
countries in exchange for their accession to the Code and commitment to reduce certain subsidy 
practices. Consequently, about a dozen developing countries (including Brazil and India) were 
“encouraged” to join the Code.88 Ultimately, the Subsidies Code only applied to the twenty-four 
countries that signed and ratified it. 
1. Track I – Countervailing Duties 
Reflecting the compromise between the United States and the EC, the Subsidies Code is divided 
into two Tracks: Track I deals with the adoption of CVDs and Track II focuses on obligations on 
subsidies. Under Article 2 of the Subsidies Code, CVDs could be imposed only pursuant to an 
investigation by authorities of importing country, which should determine: (1) the existence of a 
subsidy; (2) material injury to the domestic industry; and (3) a causal link between the subsidized 
imports and the injury.89 
                                                 
87 SCM/M/3, 27 June 1980, at 3-9; SCM/W/116, 5 September 1986; MTN.GNG/NG10/W/4, 28 April 1987, at 87-
93. U.S. legislation therefore specified that only selected countries could benefit from the injury test provision. 
These selected countries (known as “covered by the Agreement”) included signatories of the Subsidies Code, but 
only on the following conditions: the President of the United States had to determine that these signatories 
“accorded adequate benefits, including substantially equal competitive opportunities for the commerce of the United 
States.” (19 U.S.C. § 2503(b)). 
88 Andrew L. Stoler, The Evolution of Subsidies Disciplines in GATT and the WTO, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 797, 802 
(2012); R.E. IN THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 83-89 (1987). 
89 Subsidies Code, supra note 81, art. 2.1. 
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 Although the Code elaborated significantly on the provisions of GATT Article VI, it did 
not contain a definition of subsidy. The lack of such a definition gave countries certain flexibility 
when establishing the existence of a subsidy for adopting CVDs. As Professor Barceló pointed 
out, as there is nothing in the Code that specifically links the Track II subsidy definition 
language to Track I, an importing country can apply its own unilateral definition of a subsidy.90 
The absence of an explicit link between Track I and Track II also raises questions whether 
countervailing duties may be levied against both export and domestic subsidies without 
distinction, and whether they may be imposed against subsidies that are consistent with the 
GATT. The position of the EC was that Track II definitions should be read into Track I, and 
domestic subsidies should be countervailed only if they represent disguised export subsidies.91 
The U.S. investigative authorities, on the other hand, took the position that they are authorized to 
impose CVDs even against subsidies that are expressly permitted by the Code as long as they 
cause material injury to the U.S. domestic industry.92 
 According to Article 6.1 of the Subsidies Code, a determination of injury should involve 
an examination of both (a) the volume of subsidized imports and their effect on prices in the 
domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on domestic 
producer of such products.93 As for the causal link, negotiators rejected the initial proposal to 
borrow the language from the Antidumping Code (1967), according to which dumped imports 
must be “demonstrably the principal cause” of material injury to a domestic industry,94 on the 
                                                 
90 Barceló, supra note 53, at 327. 
91 Id. at 329 and n.53. 
92 David Simon, Can GATT Export Subsidy Standards Be Ignored by the United States in Imposing Countervailing 
Duties?, 5 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 183, 197-204 (1983). 
93 Subsidies Code, supra note 81, art. 6.1. 
94 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, June 30, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431, art. 3(a). 
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ground that this standard is difficult to meet.95 Eventually, the parties agreed to a Canadian 
formula: “[i]t must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are through the effects of the 
subsidy, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement.”96 Although the Subsidies Code 
does not require that the subsidized imports are the principal cause of the injury, Article 6.4 also 
contains a non-attribution requirement. According to this requirement, investigating authorities 
must examine any known factors other than the subsidized imports that are injuring the domestic 
industry at the same time and they must not attribute the injury caused by these other factors to 
the subsidized imports.97 
 Under the Code, CVDs may not be in excess of the amount of the subsidy.98 It is, 
however, desirable that the level of CVDs be less than the total amount of the subsidy if such 
lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.99 Nevertheless, the 
United States rejected this suggestion. Its statute provided that “there shall be imposed . . . a 
countervailing duty . . . equal to the amount of subsidy.”100 The EC, on the other hand, provided 
that “[t]he amount of countervailing duties shall not exceed . . . the amount of the subsidy . . . 
established; it should be less if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury.”101 
                                                 
95 Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 83, at 1484. 
96 Subsidies Code, supra note 81, art. 6.4 
97 Id. 
98 Id., art. 4.2. 
99 Id., art. 4.1. 
100 Trade Agreement Act of 1979, § 701(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) 
101 Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2176/84 of 23 July 1984, 27 OJ L 201/1, art. 13(3) (1984). 
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2. Track II – Obligations on Subsidies 
Track II of the Subsidies Code provides for an interpretation of the provisions of GATT Article 
XVI. In general, signatories agreed that subsidies are widely used by governments to promote 
social and economic policy objectives,102 but, on the demand of the U.S., they also 
acknowledged that they could adversely affect other signatories.103 
a. Export Subsidies The most significant improvements in the area of export subsidies were 
those dealing with non-primary products. Subsidies still were not defined; however, an Annex 
provided a comprehensive list of illustrations of what is meant by export subsidies on non-
primary products.104 This illustrative list, built on the 1960 Declaration,105 is the beginning of 
what would later be the red category of prohibited subsidies. 
 The GATT prohibits subsidies granted on non-primary products, provided that the export 
subsidy results in dual pricing: a lower price in the export market than in the domestic market.106 
This emphasis on price discrimination was subject to criticism because it made little economic 
sense and was difficult to prove. Trade distortions could result from export subsidies without 
price effect being evident.107 The Code does not repeat the price comparison criterion.108 It 
                                                 
102 Subsidies Code, supra note 81, art. 8.1. 
103 Id. 
104 Subsidies Code, supra note 81, art. 9.2 and Annex “Illustrative list of Export Subsidies.” 
105 Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XV:4 of the GATT, supra note 64. 
106 GATT 1947, supra note 13, art. XVI:4. 
107 John J. Barceló III, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties – Analysis and a Proposal 9 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS., 
779, 784 (1977) (for example, “if . . . the subsidy proceeds were channeled to greater advertising efforts, 
improvements in services, or more extensive product guarantees”). 
108 Subsidies Code, supra note 81, art. 9.1 (“Signatories shall not grant export subsidies on products other than 
certain primary products”). 
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therefore prohibits all the subsidies set out in the illustrative list without regard to the price 
impact of those subsidies.109 
 The improvements for primary product subsidies were more cosmetic. The scope of the 
Article 10 of the Code is limited to “certain primary products,” and excludes minerals, leaving 
only products of farm, forest, or fishery.110 In general, this article reiterated the existing 
disciplines found in GATT Article XVI:3, but elaborated on certain concepts, such as “an 
equitable share of world trade,” which, as noted earlier, created some problems in interpretation. 
Initially, the United States tried to tighten the rule of Article XVI:3 by proposing that “an 
inequitable share of the world market” should be found to exist whenever a country increased its 
share of any national market of a certain product. However, this approach did not find the 
support of the EC.111 Eventually, the parties agree to focus on two factors: displacement of 
nonsubsidized exports by subsidized exports112 and price undercutting.113 Although this 
clarification did not solve all the problems of interpretation, the displacement and price 
undercutting concepts were substantial improvements over the “equitable share” concept, which 
was “felt with ease but proven with difficulty.”114 
                                                 
109 Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 83, at 1475-76; JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND 
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 288-289 (2d ed. 1997); COPPENS, supra note 77, at 28. 
110 Subsidies Code, supra note 81 n.29. 
111 Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 83, at 1477 (stating that “[i]t would have effectively frozen international market 
shares, even in markets where neither the United States nor other exporters had a major interest.”). 
112 Subsidies Code, supra note 81, art. 10.2 (“For purpose of Article XVI:3 of the General Agreement and paragraph 
1 above: (a) ‘more than an equitable share of world export trade’ shall include any case in which the effect of an 
export subsidy granted by a signatory is to displace the exports of another signatories bearing in mind the 
development on world markets”). 
113 Id., art. 10.3 (“Signatories further agree not to grant export subsidies on exports of certain primary products to a 
particular market in a manner which results in prices materially below those of other suppliers to the same market.”) 
114 Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 83, at 1478. 
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b. Domestic Subsidies The main novelty of the Code was the introduction of rules regarding 
domestic subsidies. This was probably the most sensitive issue raised in the Tokyo Round 
negotiations. The EC and many developing countries viewed any attempt at stringent 
international regulation of domestic subsidies as intolerable interference in internal policy 
matters. The United States, on the other hand, insisted on developing rules governing their 
use.115 
 The compromise character of disciplines for domestic subsidies becomes clear in Article 
11. On the one hand, signatories recognize that domestic subsidies “are wildly used as important 
instruments for the promotion of economic and social policy objectives and do not intend to 
restrict the right of signatories to use such subsidies to achieve these and other important policy 
objectives.”116 On the other hand, however, signatories recognize that domestic subsidies may 
(1) cause or threaten to cause injury to a domestic industry of another signatory or (2) serious 
prejudice to the interests of another signatory or (3) nullify or impair benefits accruing to another 
signatory under the General Agreement.117 Therefore, parties shall “seek to avoid” causing such 
effects through the use of subsidies.118 Despite the weak “seek to avoid” language, the Code, for 
the first time under the GATT, provided the right to take action against domestic subsidies 
causing serious prejudice to the interests of another party.119 
                                                 
115 Id. at 1470-71. 
116 Subsidies Code, supra note 81, art. 11.1 
117 Id., art. 11.2. 
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 Professor Jackson describes Article 11 as “the first general multilateral treaty discipline 
on government use of domestic subsidies which have an impact on international trade.”120 Its 
deliberate ambiguity, however, reflected the lack of agreement among the negotiating countries 
and, therefore, provided “a temporary, but ultimately unsatisfactory solution to the subsidy 
issue.”121 
c. Dispute Settlement Mechanism under Track II Given that countervailing duties may only 
be applied to subsidies that cause injury to the domestic industry, and cannot address subsidies 
that have adverse effects on the interests of other signatories, the Code introduced special 
multilateral dispute settlement proceedings. Articles 12 and 13 embody the compromise between 
the EC and Japan on one side, who insisted on a less-adjudicative solution and maximum 
political flexibility, and the United States, Canada and developing countries, who advocated for a 
more adjudicative model.122 
 According to Article 12, consultations may be requested with any signatory believed to 
be granting or maintaining an export subsidy or a domestic subsidy that causes any of the effects 
provided by Article 11.2.123 If such consultations fail to resolve the dispute, the dispute may be 
referred to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (a permanent body 
composed of representatives from each of the signatories to the Code124) for conciliations.125 The 
Committee, through its good offices, should encourage the signatories involved to develop “a 
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121 O’BRIEN, supra note 52, at 114. 
122 Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 83, at 1488. 
123 Subsidies Code, supra note 81, art. 12. 
124 Id., art. 16. 
125 Id., art. 13.1 & 13.2 
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mutually accepted solution.”126 If the matter remains unresolved, the dispute may be referred to a 
dispute settlement panel for adjudication.127 The panel should submit a report to the Committee, 
which – like the GATT Council in cases brought under Article XXIII – shall “make such 
recommendations to the parties as may be appropriate to resolve the issue.”128 If the 
recommendations are not followed, the Committee may authorize “appropriate 
countermeasures.”129 Thus, while the Code sets up a formal complaint procedure, at the same 
time it strongly encourages a negotiated settlement through consultations and conciliations. 
d. Developing Countries Developing countries demanded “special and differential treatment” in 
the area of subsidies. At the early stages of negotiations, they took a quite extreme position: a 
prohibition against countervailing duties to offset subsidies on developing countries’ exports, and 
no discipline whatsoever regarding the use of subsidies by developing countries.130 The 
resolution was one of compromise. There is no special treatment with regard to countervailing 
duties in the Code. Likewise, the rules on the use of export subsidies on primary products apply 
equally to exports from developed and developing countries.  
 The only significant special treatment granted to developing countries was with regard to 
export subsidies on non-primary products. The provisions of Article 9 of the Code, which 
prohibit such subsidies, do not apply do developing countries.131 At the same time, developing 
countries agree that “export subsidies on their industrial products shall not be used in a manner 
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130 Rivers & Greenwald, supra note 83, at 1480. 
131 Subsidies Code, supra note 81, art. 14.2. 
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which causes serious prejudice to the trade or production of another signatory.”132 Additionally, 
they agree to “endeavour to enter into” commitments “to reduce or eliminate export subsidies 
when the use of such export subsidies is inconsistent with [their] competitive and development 
needs.”133 In the words of Richard Rivers and John Greenwald, the U.S. negotiators of the 
Subsidies Code, it was “the heart of the deal” with the developing countries on export subsidies 
on non-primary products.134 
 In sum, the Subsidies Code represents a significant step forward in disciplining subsidies. 
As Professor Lowenfeld noted, the Code “introduced more law into the question of subsides than 
had existed before.”135 The most important changes are: (1) more elaborated substantive and 
procedural rules on imposing CVDs; most importantly, the imposition of CVDs is made subject 
to a material injury test, which was lacking in U.S. CVD law; (2) the prohibition of export 
subsidies for non-primary products without regard to the price impact of those subsidies; (3) the 
introduction of rules regarding domestic subsidies that provide a right to take action against 
domestic subsidies causing serious prejudice to the interests of another party; and (4) the 
introduction of special multilateral dispute settlement proceedings. Yet, at the same time, the 
Code “made extremely limited progress in addressing the basic issues of disagreement”136 which 
led to further negotiations in the Uruguay Round. 
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135 LOWENFELD, supra note 86, at 217. 
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D. THE NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBSIDIES IN THE URUGUAY ROUND 
1. General Introduction 
The Uruguay Round (1986-1994) is widely viewed as the most complex and ambitious 
negotiations undertaken by GATT. One of the biggest achievements of the Uruguay Round is the 
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which, unlike the GATT, is an international 
organization with full legal personality and legal capacity.137 The WTO was formally established 
and became operational on 1 January 1995.138 
 Negotiations in the traditional area of trade in goods resulted in adopting a number of 
multilateral agreements (including the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
and the Agreement on Agriculture that contains specific rules on domestic support and export 
subsidies in the agricultural sector) which provide for rules that are more detailed than the rules 
contained in the GATT. Moreover, for the first time, trade in services and intellectual property 
rights were included in the GATT/WTO system through the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services139 and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.140 In 
fact, such an extension of the institutional structure to services and intellectual property was a 
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TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 284 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. 
140 TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
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result of the Grand Bargain by which the United States, the EC and other developed countries 
gained better market access for services and improved intellectual property protection in 
exchange for more open agricultural markets and an end to global textile and apparel quotas.141 
 The result of the Uruguay Round was the package of multilateral trade agreements 
annexed to a single document, the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization.142 Through this “ingenious device,”143 all agreements annexed to the WTO 
Agreement, unlike the previous Tokyo Round Codes, become equally binding on all Members as 
a single body of law.144 
 Another important negotiating success of the Uruguay Round is the reform of dispute 
settlement procedures.145 The current WTO dispute system with its compulsory jurisdiction, 
strict time-frames, the possibility of appellate review and detailed mechanism to ensure 
compliance is unique among international dispute settlement system.146 One of the most 
important innovations is the quasi-automatic adoption of panel reports. Under the previous 
GATT dispute settlement procedure, the adoption of a panel report required consensus.147 Thus, 
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147 In the early years of GATT, disputes were resolved by working parties, set up pursuant to Article XXIII:2 of the 
GATT. These working parties included representative of all interested Contracting Parties, including the parties to 
the dispute, and made their decisions on the basis of consensus. As of 1952, disputes were heard by “panels” 
composed of three or five independent experts. The reports of the panel had to be adopted by the GATT Council, 
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the losing party could delay or block this decision. Furthermore, the fact that the losing party 
could prevent the adoption of a panel report meant that panels were often tempted to arrive at a 
conclusion that would be acceptable to all parties, regardless of whether that conclusion was 
legally sound.148 The Uruguay Round fundamentally changed this procedure: the report is 
adopted unless the Dispute Settlement Body decides by consensus not to adopt the report which 
eliminates the possibility of blockage.149 This is a move away from a system of negotiation, a 
system that encouraged delay by favoring unanimity of acceptance which was preferred by the 
EC to one of adjudication, supported by the United States.150 
2. Negotiations on Subsidies 
The Tokyo Subsidies Code made limited progress in addressing the basic issues of 
disagreement.151 The economic recession of the 1980s increased the pressure on governments to 
support national producers, especially in the steel industry152 and agriculture. Thus, as a result of 
                                                                                                                                                             
consisting of all Contracting Parties, by consensus. Since the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, the dispute settlement 
procedures have been codified and supplemented by a number of understandings. In particular, under Paragraph 6(i) 
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compromise in the formulation of the Working Party’s report.” (Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 217 
(1980)). See BOSSCHE, supra note 146, at 176-80; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and the 
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GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 5, 33-36 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997). 
148 BOSSCHE, supra note 146, at 180. 
149 DSU, supra note 145, arts. 16.4, 17.14. 
150 MATSUSHITA, SCHOENBAUM, MAVRODIS & HAHN, supra note 143, at 86. 
151 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text. 
152 In the 1970s and early 1980s the US and the EC steel industry suffered a significant decline. The EC opted for a 
modernization policy through subsidies to make its steel industry more competitive. Between 1980 and 1985, the EC 
reported over $35 billion in government subsidies to steel manufactures. The United States, in contrast, responded 
with a wave of countervailing duty investigations. For example, in 1982, of the 131 countervailing duty 
investigations brought by the developed countries, 124 were initiated by the United States, most on steel products. 
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the Tokyo negotiations round, the United States did not achieve limiting subsidies by their 
trading partners, while other countries witnessed an increase in the use of countervailing duties 
by the United States. Moreover, the disputes between Contracting Parties regarding subsidies 
remained unresolved due to the lack of adoption of the reports by the losing party and the lack of 
agreement between the contracting parties on the interpretation or application of the Subsidies 
Code.153 
 At the beginning of the Uruguay Round, the positions adopted by the contracting parties 
were similar to those adopted during the Tokyo Round negotiations. The United States advocated 
for stronger and more effective subsidy discipline, while most of the other negotiating 
participants, including the EC, insisted on further disciplining the use of countervailing duties 
and defining a “subsidy” which, in their view, would limit the use of countervailing duties by the 
United States.154 Yet, at the same time, a compromise was facilitated by a growing shared 
understanding among most governments of the burden which subsidies placed on their national 
budgets and taxpayers and the risk that any subsidy introduced to give a competitive advantage 
would be matched by other countries’ subsidization.155 Therefore, negotiating countries expected 
that an agreement would provide, as John Croome put it, “a mutual disarmament treaty for 
subsidies” which would serve the interests of all.156 
                                                                                                                                                             
(THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992), at 822-25 (Terence P. Stewart, Esq. ed., vol. 
I 1993). 
153 Before the completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
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 Negotiations resulted in the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM 
Agreement) which, unlike the previous Tokyo Subsidies Code, binds all WTO members.157 It 
restates certain provisions of the Code but departs from the sharp distinction between export and 
domestic subsidies. Instead, it defines a “subsidy”158 and divides subsidies into three categories 
(prohibited, actionable, and non-actionable).159 The key to reaching agreement on subsidies in 
general was the decision to write agriculture out of the SCM Agreement. The negotiations on 
subsidies for agriculture products took place separately, and resulted in the Agreement on 
Agriculture, which provides for special rules on agricultural subsidies. 
a. Defining Subsidy The SCM Agreement contains, for the first time in any multilateral trade 
agreement, a definition of the concept of subsidy.160 As the Panel stated in US-FSC: “the 
inclusion of this detailed and comprehensive definition of the term ‘subsidy’ is generally 
considered to represent one of the most important achievements of the Uruguay Round in the 
area of subsidy discipline.”161 Indeed, this definition is a key to the entire Agreement, as it 
defines which measures are subject to the WTO subsidy discipline, including unilateral 
countervailing duties. 
 The main obstacle to reaching an agreement on the definition of a subsidy was the 
fundamental difference in approach to the issue between the United States and the EC. The 
United States proposed to define a subsidy as “any government action or combination of 
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[hereinafter theSCM Agreement]. 
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government actions which confers a benefit on the recipient firm(s).”162 Under this view, a 
subsidy exists only if a beneficiary of the government action has obtained an advantage which it 
could not obtain in the market place.163 What matters, therefore, is not the form of government 
action, but its effect (a benefit to the recipient). The United States suggested that the amount of 
the countervailing duties should be sufficient to counteract the benefit granted by a subsidy.164 It 
should also be emphasized that the United States did not press for a general definition of subsidy; 
the proposed definition referred specifically to actionable subsidy, i.e. subsidies that are not 
prohibited but actionable. 
 In contrast, the EC proposed to define a subsidy as “a financial charge . . . incurred by a 
government or administrative authority on behalf of a beneficiary.”165 The EC understood a 
subsidy as a financial contribution that only involves a cost or charge on public accounts,166 
focusing, therefore, on the form of government action. In the view of the EC, for a subsidy to 
exist there needed to be a charge on the public account, from which a benefit flowed to an 
industry.167 
                                                 
162 Elements of the Framework for Negotiations, Submission by the United States, GATT Doc. No. 
MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29, at 2 (Nov. 22, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Framework Proposal from the United States]. 
163 Uruguay Round. Negotiating Group on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. Meeting of 19-20 October 1989, 
GATT Doc. No. MTN/GNG/NG10/14, at 5 (Nov. 15, 1989). 
164 Id. (“. . . the proper method of the calculation of the amount of a subsidy was the ‘benefit to the recipient’ 
approach . . . the injurious subsidization had to be looked at from the perspective of the industry in the importing 
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165 Communication from the EEC, GATT Doc. No. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/7, at 3 (June 11, 1987). 
166 As it was established by the decisions of the European Court of Justice, the criterion of “charge on public 
account” includes (1) all government actions involving a financial burden which is reflected in the public budget as 
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etc.). See Case 187/85 Fediol, ECR [1988] 4155, at para. 9 and 11; C-72 and 73/91, Sloman Neptun, ECR [1993] I-
903, at para. 21; C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, [2001] ECR I-2099, at para. 62. 
167 Meeting of 19-20 October 1989, supra note 163, at 5 (the EC argued that “benefit to the recipient” approach, 
supported by the United States, “could lead to abnormal results where the subsidy found would be much higher than 
that actually paid. It could also result in finding a subsidy where there was none.”). 
78 
 Eventually, the negotiating parties agreed to a general definition of a subsidy by joining 
both criteria. Under Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, for a measure to constitute a subsidy it 
must represent a financial contribution or income support by a government which confers a 
benefit.168 Therefore, both elements must be cumulatively present for a subsidy to exist. As the 
Panel stated in US-Export Restraints, “the definition ultimately agreed in the negotiations 
definitively rejected the approach espoused by the United States of defining subsidies as benefits 
resulting from any government action, by introducing the requirement that the government action 
in question constitute a ‘financial contribution’ as set forth in an exhaustive list.”169 
b. The “Traffic Light Approach” Apart from the prohibition of export subsidies on non-
primary goods by developed countries, the GATT and Tokyo Round Subsidies Code rules had 
concentrated on trade effects of subsidies in specific cases. For the Uruguay Round negotiators it 
was thus critical to reach agreement regarding what kinds of subsidies always, or never, distorted 
trade. This would only leave a middle category of potentially harmful subsidies for examination 
and would reduce the scope of application of CVDs.170 The solution to this problem was found 
in the suggested distinction between prohibited, actionable, and non-actionable subsides. 
 Prohibited (“red light”) subsidies were a controversial issue because some countries 
insisted upon expansion of this category while others preferred a narrow definition of prohibited 
subsidies. The Tokyo Round Subsidies Code had already introduced a prohibition on export 
subsidies on non-primary products; however, it was less successful with export subsidies for 
primary products. The United States, Australia, and Canada suggested the elimination of the 
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distinction between primary and non-primary products and to extend the prohibition of export 
subsidies on primary products.171 The EC, on the other hand, insisted upon leaving this issue to 
the negotiating group on agriculture.172  
 There was also disagreement as to whether certain domestic subsidies should be 
prohibited. The EC, India, and Korea maintained that the prohibition should not extend to any 
category of domestic subsidies.173 Other participants, including the United States, Canada, and 
Japan, opposed this view.174 For example, the United States proposed to include in the prohibited 
category subsidies contingent upon production performance, grants to cover operating losses, 
and direct forgiveness of debt, among others.175 
 The final agreement took a middle course. The SCM Agreement prohibits two types of 
subsidies: (1) export subsidies, i.e. subsidies which are contingent upon export performance, 
including the export subsidies specified in the “Illustrative List” (however, this provision does 
not apply to agricultural subsidies which are governed exclusively by the Agreement of 
Agriculture), and (2) subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over imported goods176 
(therefore, the Agreement does not directly prohibit any domestic subsidies). 
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 Non-actionable (“green light”) subsidies are exempt from countervailing actions, and 
WTO members have a “green light” to employ them.177 The creation of this category marked a 
major departure from previous multilateral negotiations on subsidies.178 The EC proposed this 
idea in June 1987, and by February 1988 the concept had been developed in a paper by 
Switzerland.179 This subject was one of the most contentious of the subsidies group negotiations, 
with a variety of proposals from participants to include certain types of subsidies in the non-
actionable category, including generally available public support measures (Australia, Canada, 
the EC, India, Japan, the Nordics, and Switzerland),180 environmental schemes based on the 
“polluter pays” principle (Switzerland and the Nordics),181 governmental aid for research and 
development (the EC, Canada, Switzerland, Japan and the Nordic countries),182 and regional 
development assistance (the EC, Canada, Switzerland, India, the Nordic countries and Japan).183 
The United States was the strongest advocate of keeping the category of non-actionable subsidies 
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to a minimum, since this category made it easier to disguise subsidies that were prohibited.184 
There was, however, a general consensus among all participants that governmental provision of 
basic human services, e.g. education, health services, etc., should not be actionable.185 
 In the end, the SCM agreement established the following categories of non-actionable 
subsidies: (1) non-specific; (2) assistance for research activities; (3) assistance to disadvantaged 
regions; and (4) assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental 
requirements.186 “Green light” subsidies, however, were included in the SCM Agreement on a 
provisional basis, subject to review.187 
 Actionable (“yellow light”) subsidies are subsidies that are not prohibited but 
countervailable or otherwise actionable. An actionable subsidy is determined by its trade effects 
(i.e., injury, nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice).188 The Tokyo Subsidies Code 
already had stated that one of the adverse effects that may be caused by the use of subsidies is 
“serious prejudice” to the interests of GATT signatories.189 However, problems with the 
interpretation of “serious prejudice” made the Track II provisions difficult to work with in 
practice.190 In the Uruguay Round, a number of participants pointed out this problem and 
suggested that the term should be reviewed in order to give it greater clarity. In particular, 
Canada stated that “present rules do not adequately address trade distortions that may occur as a 
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result of subsidies that displace imports in the home market of the subsidizing country or in third 
country markets.”191 
 The final agreement addresses “serious prejudice” in two ways. First, it establishes a 
category of “dark amber” subsidies, i.e. four categories of subsidies presumed to cause serious 
prejudice, with the burden shifted to the respondent state to show that no adverse effects were 
caused by the challenged measure.192 However, the provision establishing a presumption of 
serious prejudice was enacted to serve on a provisional basis, for 5 years; at the end of that time 
it will be reviewed to determine whether to extend its application.193 Second, the SCM 
Agreement provides that serious prejudice may be found where subsidized imports cause adverse 
effects in the subsidizing country’s market or third country markets, and lists four instances 
where serious prejudice may arise.194 If a complaining Member can show that a subsidy has any 
of these effects, then serious prejudice may be found to exist.195 
c. Countervailing Duties A number of measures to tighten the adoption of CVDs were 
undertaken to meet the interests of countries concerned about the U.S. practice. Because the 
GATT and the Subsidies Code lacked a subsidy definition, all kinds of government intervention 
which distort trade could potentially be countervailable and every country could apply its own 
unilateral definition of subsidy. In particular, the United States’ approach was to define as 
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countervailable subsidies benefits arising from government action, regardless of the nature of 
that action.196 The EC and essentially all other countries opposed this view.197 Canada, for 
example, stated that “while virtually any government action could be construed as having 
possible effects on production and trade, there need to be some outside limits on the scope of 
government activity that can be considered to be a subsidy and subject to countervail.”198 
 The resulting two-part definition of subsidy, consisting of” financial contribution” and 
“benefit,” “was intended specifically to prevent the countervailing of benefits from any sort of 
(formal, enforceable) government measures, by restricting to a finite list the kinds of government 
measures that would, if they conferred benefits, constitute subsidies.”199 In order to reduce the 
number of CVDs imposed by a WTO Member, an investigation must be initiated by the domestic 
industry200 rather than just a few troubled firms. Where the amount of a subsidy is “de minimis” 
(less than 1 percent), the authorities must terminate the investigation immediately.201 A sunset 
provision was also included to encourage the elimination of CVDs once the injurious effects of 
the subsidy are no longer pertinent.202 
 To sum up, the SCM Agreement significantly improved existing rules on a number of 
key aspects: (1) a precise definition of a subsidy; (2) distinction between prohibited, actionable, 
and non-actionable subsidies; and (3) tightening the rules on imposing CVDs. Furthermore, 
creating the WTO resulted in establishing a new multilateral dispute settlement mechanism, 
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which considerably improved the tools at the disposal of states to obtain redress against harmful 
subsidies. In the following Chapter, a detailed analysis of the current WTO rules on subsidies is 
undertaken.
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IV. REGULATION OF SUBSIDIES IN THE WTO 
The WTO rules on subsidies are set out in Articles VI and XVI of the GATT 1994 and in the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). The SCM Agreement 
is one of the agreements included in Annex 1A of the Agreement establishing the WTO, which 
includes multilateral commitments concerning trade in goods. With respect to the relationship 
between the GATT and the SCM Agreement, the Interpretative Note to Annex 1A1 states that in 
the event of conflict between a provision of the GATT and a provision of another agreement in 
Annex 1A the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.2 
 The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) provides for special rules on agricultural subsidies. 
In case of conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and the AoA, the latter 
prevails over the former.3 Subsidies granted to services are subject to the provisions of the 
General Agreement on the Trade in Services and, therefore, are not covered by the SCM 
Agreement. 
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A. THE AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES 
The goal of the SCM Agreement is not entirely clear because of the lack of a preamble which 
usually provides some indication of the object and purpose of an agreement. The WTO 
jurisprudence, although vague, provides some guidance, indicating that “[t]he object and purpose 
of the SCM Agreement is to impose multilateral disciplines on subsidies which distort 
international trade.”4 Professor Luca Rubini identifies two main objectives of the Agreement: 
(1) to discourage subsidies that may harm competing foreign producers in two ways, either by 
breaching their market access expectations or by affecting their competitive position, and (2) to 
control the unilateral reaction to those subsidies that injure domestic industries, ensuring that it is 
justified and proportionate and hence its possible damage is limited.5 In discussing the objectives 
of the Agreement, some scholars have argued that its purpose is not “to further global 
efficiency.”6 Although the Agreement initially recognized the legitimacy of certain subsidies, 
which suggested a more complex and balanced approach that went beyond producers’ interests, 
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have the potential to distort [international trade]”); Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing 
Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 
17 February 2004, para. 64 (the object and purpose of the Agreement is “to strengthen and improve GATT 
disciplines relating to the use of both subsidies and countervailing measures, while, recognizing at the same time, 
the right of Members to impose such measures under certain conditions”). 
5 LUKA RUBINI, THE DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY AND STATE AID: WTO AND EC LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 57 
(Oxford University Press 2009). 
6 Gene M. Grossman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? Privatization and the Injury Caused by 
Non-Recurring Subsidies, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2001, at 170, 180-86 (Henrik Horn & Pertos C. Mavroidis 
eds., 2003) (arguing that “an interpretation of the SCM Agreement that associates harm with a loss in aggregate 
economic welfare cannot be sustained in the light of the manner in which the Agreement was structured”; in 
particular, the Agreement “does not confine the use of countervailing duties to situations in which an importing 
country has established the presumption of a welfare loss . . . Rather, countervailing measures are permitted only 
when there has been . . . injury to a domestic industry in an importing country”) (emphasis in original). 
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since the expiry of non-actionable subsidies in 1999, the SCM Agreement is about discouraging 
subsidies that may harm producers’ interests.7 
1. Definition of Subsidy 
The SCM Agreement contains, for the first time in the GATT/WTO, a detailed and 
comprehensive definition of “subsidy,” by which it limits the scope of its coverage to 
government assistance that meets certain criteria. For a measure to constitute a subsidy, it must: 
(1) represent a financial contribution or an income/price support by a government; which 
(2) confers a benefit;8 (3) to a specific recipient.9 All three elements must be cumulatively 
present for a subsidy to exist. 
a. Financial Contribution Article 1.1 (a)(1) addresses the “financial contribution” criterion, 
describing three forms of such a contribution: (1) direct (e.g., grants, loans) or potential direct 
(e.g., loan guarantees) transfers of funds; (2) government revenue, otherwise due, that is 
foregone or not collected; and (3) the provision by a government of goods or services other than 
general infrastructure, or the purchase by a government of goods.10 This list is exhaustive.11 At 
                                                 
7 See RUBINI, supra note 5, at 56-59; Grossman & Mavroidis, supra note 6, at 180-86; Gary N. Horlick, How 
Subsidies Rules Have Been Shaped, in WHAT SHAPES THE LAW? REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND 
ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SUBSIDY DISCIPLINES 65, 66 (Luca Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins 
eds., 2016) (“the current SCM Agreement focuses mainly on harm to competitors, rather than harm to competition 
or – much more important – harm to global public goods . . . even in the absence of harm to competitors.”). 
8 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 231 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14, art. 1 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
9 Id., art. 2. 
10 Id., art. 1.1(a)(1). 
11 Panel Report, United States – Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R, adopted 
1 August 2001, para. 8.69. 
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the same time, as the Appellate Body in Canada – Renewable Energy concluded, the listed forms 
of financial contribution are “not mutually exclusive.” Thus, a transaction may fall under more 
than one type of financial contribution.12 
 It is important to emphasize that the “financial contribution” is separate from the 
“benefit,” and that these two criteria together determine whether a subsidy exists.13 In US – 
Export Restraints, the Panel explained that the determination of a financial contribution must 
concentrate on the examination of the nature of the action by the government and not its 
effects.14 The negotiating history and current WTO jurisprudence support the conclusion that the 
function of the financial contribution requirement is to ensure that not all government actions 
that confer benefits can be countervailable. As Professor Rubini sums it up, all forms of financial 
contribution involve a clear transfer of economic resources in the form of a transfer of something 
of value – either money, goods or services – from the government; however, as a consequence of 
the function of limitation of the financial contribution, not all transfers of economic resources 
constitute a financial contribution under the SCM Agreement.15 
 The direct/potential transfer of funds is a classic example of subsidy. This type of 
financial contribution involves financing provided by the government to the recipient. As the 
                                                 
12 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation 
Sector/Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WT/DS412, 426/AB/R, adopted 24 May 2013, 
paras. 5.120-5.121. 
13 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R, adopted 2 August 
1999, para. 157 (emphasis in original). 
14 US – Export Restraints, supra note 11, paras. 8.15-8.76 (noting that otherwise “the door would be reopened to the 
countervailing the benefits regardless of the nature of the government action that gave rise to them. This would 
effectively render the ‘financial contribution’ requirement meaningless.”). 
15 RUBINI, supra note 5, at 111. WTO jurisprudence substantially confirms the limiting role of the financial 
contribution element. In US – DRAMS, the Appellate Body explained that “not all government measures capable of 
conferring benefits would necessarily fall within Article 1.1(a)” as, otherwise, there would be no need for the 
financial contribution “because all government measures conferring benefits, per se, would be subsidies.” See 
Appellate Body, United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea, WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 20 July 2005, para. 114 building on its findings 
in US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 52. 
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Appellate Body explained in Japan – DRAMS (Korea), the term “funds” includes not only 
money, but also financial resources and other financial claims more generally.16 The inclusion of 
loans as a specific example of direct transfer of funds in Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) suggests that the 
provision of funds captures not only a donation but also cases where the recipient assumes 
obligations to the government in exchange for the funds provided.17 
 The second form of financial contribution is when a government does not collect, or 
forgoes, revenue which is otherwise due (e.g., fiscal incentives such as tax credits). The term 
“otherwise due” implies a comparison between the challenged measure and a “defined, 
normative benchmark.”18 In US – FSC, the Appellate Body explained: 
As Members, in principle, have the sovereign authority to determine their own 
rules of taxation, the comparison under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM 
Agreement must necessarily be between the rules of taxation contained in the 
contested measure and other rules of taxation of the Member in question.19 
 Initially, the Panel in US – FSC applied a “but for” test, in which the benchmark was 
found by identifying the tax treatment in the absence of the government measure. The Appellate 
Body, however, expressed concerns about the application of such an approach and its limitation 
in identifying a general rule and exception relationship, emphasizing that in doing so “a panel 
                                                 
16 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea, 
WT/DS336/AB/R, adopted, 17 December 2007, para. 250 (stating that “the fact that the words ‘grants, loans, and 
equity infusion’ are preceded by the abbreviation ‘e.g.’, indicates that they are cited as examples of transactions 
falling within the scope of Article 1.1(a)(1)(i).1289 These examples, which are illustrative, do not exhaust the class 
of conduct captured by subparagraph (i).”). 
17 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS353/AB/R, 
adopted 12 March 2012, paras. 616-17 n.1294 (explaining that “[t]he fact that there is an element of reciprocity in 
some of the transactions listed as examples in subparagraph (i) does not mean that what is provided to the 
government by the recipient in return for the funds must be equivalent to the value of the funds. That issue becomes 
relevant in the subsequent assessment of benefit under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement”). 
18 Appellate Body Report, United States – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations,’ WT/DS108/AB/R, 
adopted 20 March 2000, para. 89. 
19 Id. (emphasis added). 
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may artificially create a rule and an exception where no such distinction exists.”20 Instead, the 
identification of circumstances in which government revenue that is otherwise due is forgone 
requires “a comparison between the tax treatment that applies to the alleged subsidy recipients 
and the tax treatment of comparable income of comparably situated taxpayers.”21 
 The third form of financial contribution is the provision of goods and services or 
purchase of goods other than general infrastructure. The WTO adjudicating bodies have adopted 
a very broad interpretation of the word “goods.” For example, in US – Softwood Lumber III the 
question before the Panel was whether the Canadian stumpage program, a scheme whereby 
Canadian harvesters of timber would rent land at less than market value, constituted the 
provision of goods in the sense of the SCM Agreement. Canada argued that “stumpage” is a right 
to harvest standing timber while the term “goods” used in the Agreement refers to products 
which are capable of being imported and traded across borders.22 The panel disagreed, however, 
and concluded that: 
Although “goods” in Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) SCM Agreement certainly includes 
tradable products, there is no reason to limit its meaning to only such products 
. . . . In particular, this provision states that when the government provides “goods 
or services,” this constitutes a financial contribution. The “goods” in question are 
not imported or exported, simply provided by the government . . . Goods in this 
context are distinguished from services, and in our view the two cover the full 
spectrum of in-kind transfers the government may undertake by providing 
resources to an enterprise.23 
                                                 
20 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircrafts, supra note 17, para. 815; see also US – FSC, supra note 18, 
para. 91 (stating that “there may be situations where the measure at issue might be described as an ‘exception’ to a 
‘general’ rule of taxation. In such situations, it may be possible to apply a ‘but for’ test . . . . We do not, however, 
consider that Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) always requires panels to identify, with respect to any particular income, the 
‘general’ rule of taxation prevailing in a Member. Given the variety and complexity of domestic tax system, it will 
usually be very difficult to isolate a ‘general’ rule of taxation and ‘exceptions’ to that ‘general’ rule.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
21 Appellate Body Report, US – Large Civil Aircrafts, supra note 17, para. 812 (emphasis added). 
22 Panel Report, United States – Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from 
Canada, WT/DS236/R, adopted 1 November 2002, paras. 4.116-4.120. 
23 Id., para. 7.28. 
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 The only exception among all possible goods and services that could be provided by the 
government and explicitly defined as not constituting a financial contribution is general 
infrastructure.24 In the panel’s view, the term “general infrastructure” refers to “infrastructure 
that is not provided to or for the advantage of only a single entity or limited group of entities, but 
rather is available to all or nearly all entities.”25 In determining whether the infrastructure is 
“general infrastructure,” the relevant factors are not only the existence of de jure or de facto 
limitations on access or use it, but also the circumstances under which the infrastructure was 
created, as well as the nature and type of the infrastructure.26 
b. Attributing the Financial Contribution to a Government Art. 1.1 of the SCM Agreement 
distinguishes between direct and indirect financial contributions. 
 For a financial contribution to be a subsidy, it must be made by “a government or any 
public body,”27 including regional and local authorities. Since the concept of a “public body” is 
not further defined, it raises the question of the correct interpretation of the term. In addressing 
the issue whether state-owned enterprises are considered public bodies, the Appellate Body 
adopted a narrower interpretation of “public body.” It explained that Art. 1.1 joins “government” 
in a narrow sense and “public body” under the collective term “government,” which suggests 
                                                 
24 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 1.1(a)(1)(iii). 
25 Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft, WT/DS316/R, adopted 1 June 2011, para. 7.1036 [hereinafter Panel Report, EC – Large Civil Aircraft]. 
26 Id., para. 7.1037-7.1044 (stating that “we do not consider that there is any form or type of infrastructure which is 
inherently ‘general’ per se. For instance, in our view, such things as railroads or electrical distribution systems do 
not necessarily constitute ‘general infrastructure.’ Rather, the determination whether the provision of the good or 
service in question is ‘general infrastructure’ or not must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the 
existence or absence of de jure or de facto limitations on access or use, and any other factors that tend to 
demonstrate that the infrastructure was or was not provided to or for the use of only a single entity or a limited group 
of entities”). 
27 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 1.1(a)(1). 
92 
“certain commonalities in the meaning of the term ‘government’ in the narrow sense and the 
term ‘public body’ and a nexus between these two concepts.”28 
 The Appellate Body identifies these core commonalities between government and public 
body as “the performance of governmental functions, or the fact of being vested with, and 
exercising, the authority to perform such functions.”29 It is also acknowledged that the existence 
of mere formal links between an entity and government is unlikely to suffice to establish the 
necessary possession of governmental authority. Likewise, the absence of an express statutory 
delegation of authority does not necessarily preclude a determination that a particular entity is a 
public body.30 Accordingly, different types of evidence may be relevant in establishing the 
public body requirement – and ownership can be a contributing factor, but not the decisive one. 
 An indirect financial contribution occurs when the government makes payments to a 
funding mechanism or when it entrusts or directs a private body to make payments.31 The 
purpose of this provision is to ensure that governments do not evade their obligations under the 
SCM Agreement by using a private body as a “proxy” to make the contribution.32 
 The Appellate Body has clarified that “entrustment” occurs where a government “gives 
responsibility to a private body,” and “direction” refers to situations where the government 
“exercises its authority over a private body.”33 Although the Appellate Body adopted a fairly 
                                                 
28 Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 2011, para. 288. 
29 Id., para. 290. 
30 Id., para. 318 (stating that “[w]hat matters is whether an entity is vested with authority to exercise governmental 
functions, rather than how that is achieved”) (emphasis in original). 
31 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv). 
32 Appellate Body, US – DRAMS, supra note 15, paras. 108, 115, 116. 
33 Id., para. 116 (there, the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel conclusion that “entrusts” contains the notion of 
“delegation”, while “directs” contains the notion of “command.” “Delegation” usually involves a formal action, 
while “entrusts” connotes giving responsibility to someone. Likewise, while governments can exercise authority by 
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broad interpretation of “entrustment or direction,” it identified two important limitations. First, 
the private body must have been entrusted or directed to carry out one of the forms of financial 
contribution covered by subparagraphs (i)-(iii).34 Second, entrustment and direction suggest a 
more active role than mere acts of encouragement. In the Appellate Body’s view, in most cases it 
would involve “some form of threat or inducement.”35 Furthermore, entrustment and direction do 
not cover the situation in which the government intervenes in the market in some way, which 
may or may not have a particular result simply based on the given factual circumstances and the 
exercise of free choice by the actors in that market. Thus, government “entrustment” or 
“direction” cannot be inadvertent or a mere by-product of governmental regulation.36 
c. Benefit to the Recipient A financial contribution by a government is a subsidy within the 
meaning of the SCM Agreement only if the financial contribution confers a “benefit.” Article 1 
does not stipulate that the financial contribution must confer a benefit on a recipient. The 
Appellate Body, however, clarified that a benefit: 
does not exist in the abstract, but must be received and enjoyed by a beneficiary 
or a recipient. Logically, a “benefit” can be said to arise only if a person, natural 
or legal, or a group of persons, has in fact received something. The term “benefit,” 
therefore, implies that there must be a recipient.37 
                                                                                                                                                             
command, they are likely to have other, more subtle, means at their disposal. Thus, both Panel’s interpretations were 
found too narrow (para. 110)). 
34 Id., para. 112 (stating that “[a] situation where the government entrusts or directs a private body to carry out a 
function that is outside the scope of paragraphs (i) through (iii) would consequently fall outside the scope of 
paragraph (iv)”). 
35 Id., paras. 114, 116. 
36 Id., para. 114. 
37 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft – Recourse by Brazil to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS70/AB/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, para. 154. 
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Consequently, whereas the requirement to show that a financial contribution has been made is a 
question that must be addressed from the perspective of the government (the donor), whether a 
benefit has been conferred must be assessed from the perspective of the recipient.38 
 In assessing whether a recipient has received a benefit, WTO adjudicating bodies apply 
the private investor test. As the Appellate Body explained in Canada – Aircraft: 
the word “benefit” . . . implies some kind of comparison. This must be so, for 
there can be no “benefit” to the recipient unless the “financial contribution” 
makes the recipient “better off” than it would otherwise have been, absent that 
contribution. In our view, the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for 
comparison in determining whether a “benefit” has been “conferred”, because 
the trade-distorting potential of a “financial contribution” can be identified by 
determining whether the recipient has received a “financial contribution” on 
terms more favorable than those available to the recipient in the market.39 
In other words, for a benefit to be demonstrated it must be shown that a recipient obtained an 
advantage, which it could not have obtained in the marketplace. The term “benefit,” therefore, 
refers to benefit to the recipient, and uses the market or private investors as a benchmark for 
determining the existence and amount of benefit. For example, in the case of a government loan, 
no benefit is conferred unless there is a difference between the amount that the firm receiving the 
loans pays on the government loan and the amount the firm would pay on a comparable 
commercial loan which the firm could actually obtain on the market.40 
 It is important to note that the recipient of the benefit might be different from the 
recipient of the financial contribution. At least two types of cases are possible here: products 
                                                 
38 Panel Report, European Communities – Countervailing Measures on Dynamic Random Access Memory Chips 
from Korea, WT/DS299/R, adopted 3 August 2005, paras. 7.212, 7.175. 
39 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Aircraft, supra note 37, para. 157 (emphasis added). 
40 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 14. WTO adjudicating bodies have relied on Article 14 as the relevant context 
for the interpretation of “benefit” under Article 1.1(b) even though this provision serves in the context of CVDs 
investigation to determine the amount of subsidy in terms of the benefit to the recipient. See Appellate Body Report, 
Canada – Aircraft, supra note 37, para. 155; Appellate Body Report, Canada – Renewable Energy/Feed-in Tariff 
Program, supra note 12, paras. 5.163. 
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produced in previously subsidized state-owned enterprises and final products that are produced 
from subsidized inputs. 
 In US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, the panel and Appellate Body 
addressed whether a benefit derived from a non-recurring financial contribution continues to 
exist following a transfer of ownership of a state-owned enterprise to a new private owner at 
arm’s length and for fair market value. The U.S. argued that the fact that the private owner pays 
full market price for the enterprise indicates only that the private owner is not receiving a new 
subsidy. It does not indicate, however, that from the perspective of the legal person producing 
the subject merchandise, the effect of the subsidy has been eliminated.41 Both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body disagreed with this position: 
. . . the value of the “benefit” under the SCM Agreement is to be assessed using 
the marketplace as the basis for comparison. It follows, therefore, that once a fair 
market price is paid for the equipment, its market value is redeemed, regardless of 
the utility the firm may derive from the equipment. Accordingly, it is the market 
value of the equipment that is the focal point of analysis, and not the equipment’s 
utility value to the privatized firm.42 
Yet, at the same time, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel’s conclusion that there was an 
irrebuttable presumption to the effect that every time a fair market value has been paid the 
benefit disappears. Instead, it concluded that the presumption is rebuttable even in the case of 
payment of the market value, and that the facts of the case will reveal whether a benefit 
continues to exist after privatization.43 
                                                 
41 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the 
European Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R, adopted 9 December 2002, para. 99 (stating that a change in ownership 
“does not remove the new equipment, extract knowledge from the workers, or increase the previously lowered debt 
load”). 
42 Id., para. 102 (emphasis in original). 
43 Id., paras. 120-127 (Arguing that the Panel “overlooks the ability of governments to obtain certain results from 
markets by shaping the circumstances and conditions in which markets operate. Privatizations involve complex and 
long-term investments in which the seller – namely the government – is not necessarily always a passive price taker 
and, consequently, the ‘fair market price’ of a state-owned enterprise is not necessarily always unrelated to 
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 In US – Softwood Lumber IV, the WTO adjudicative bodies faced a related question. 
Canada had granted a subsidy, through a stumpage program, to timber harvesters, who then sold 
trees (standing timber) to the log producers. The logs were further processed into primary 
lumber by sawmills (some of which were independent and others owned by timber harvesters); 
part of lumber was then further processed by independent manufactures into remanufactured 
lumber. The U.S. had imposed countervailing duties on primary and remanufactured lumber 
based on a determination of subsidization of the lumber producers through the stumpage 
programs. The key question for the Panel and Appellate Body was whether the lumber producer 
benefited from cheap trees that were provided by the government to the harvester and log 
producers. Put differently, did the benefit pass through to the lumber producers? 
 The Appellate Body acknowledged that: 
Where a subsidy is conferred on input products, and countervailing duty is 
imposed on processed products, the initial recipient of the subsidy and the 
producer of the eventually countervailed product, may not be the same. In such a 
case, there is a direct recipient of the benefit – the producer of the input product. 
When the input is subsequently processed, the producer of the processed product 
is an indirect recipient of the benefit – provided it can be established that the 
benefit flowing from the input subsidy is passed through, at least in part, to the 
processed product.44 
The investigating authority must undertake a pass-through analysis when: (1) a subsidy is 
provided in respect of a product (not subject to investigation) that is an input into the processed, 
imported product that is the subject of the countervail investigation; and (2) the producer of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
government action. In privatizations, governments have the ability, by designing economic and other policies, to 
influence the circumstances and the conditions of the sale so as to obtain a certain market valuation of the 
enterprise.”). 
44 Appellate Body Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, supra note 4, para. 144. 
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input product and the producer of the imported product subject to the countervail investigation 
are unrelated.45 
d. Specificity Article 1.2 of the SCM Agreement provides that subsidies are subject to the rules 
on prohibited and actionable subsidies, as well as the rules on countervailing duties, only if they 
are “specific.”46 Accordingly, subsidies that are not “specific” cannot be challenged or 
countervailed. 
 The rationale for this requirement is, in the words of Professor Petros Mavroidis, that 
only specific subsidies can lead to inefficient resource allocation, and, eventually, to trade 
distortions; if a subsidy is generally available, then all productive units in a country can benefit 
from it, and there will be no diversion of resources to certain enterprises which would not 
otherwise have attracted such resources.47 Another reason for the exclusion from 
countervailability of generally available subsidies seems to be the acknowledgment of the role 
that subsidies play in promoting legitimate policy goals.48 
                                                 
45 In US – Softwood Lumber IV, the Appellate Body concluded that in the situations when timber harvesters sell logs 
(which are not subject to the investigation) to independent sawmills for further processing into primary lumber 
(subject to the investigation), a pass-through analysis is required; while in the situations when timber harvesters that 
own sawmills process the logs they harvest into primary lumber (subject to the investigation) and sell this lumber to 
unrelated remanufactures for further processing into remanufactured lumber (also subject to the investigation), no 
pass-through analysis was required. Id., paras. 145-64. 
46 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 1.2. 
47 PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, TRADE IN GOODS: THE GATT AND THE OTHER WTO AGREEMENTS REGULATING TRADE 
IN GOODS 549 (Oxford University Press 2012); see also MARC BENITAH, THE LAW OF SUBSIDIES UNDER THE 
GATT/WTO SYSTEM 258 (2001) (“[A] specific subsidy gives the industry having selectively received such a 
subsidy a wrong signal as to its real production costs. This leads this industry to artificially overproduce the 
subsidized goods relative to what it would have produced in a situation with undistorted production costs. At the 
same moment, more socially valued goods are under-produced due to the lack of productive resources. This type of 
‘distortion’ would not have taken place had the subsidy been generally available to all industries.”); Warren E. 
Schwartz & Eugene W. Harper, Jr., The Regulation of Subsides Affecting International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 
831, 840 (1972) (“. . . resources will be employed in the producing of the subsidized goods rather than other goods 
of greater real value.”). 
48 SIMON LESTER, BRYAN MERCURIO & ARWELL DAVIES, WORLD TRADE LAW: TEXT, MATERIALS AND 
COMMENTARY 429 (2012). 
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 According to Article 2, a subsidy is specific when it has been provided explicitly to an 
enterprise, an industry or a group of enterprises or industries.49 The SCM Agreement 
distinguishes between four types of specificity: (1) enterprise specificity; (2) industry specificity; 
(3) regional specificity; and (4) prohibited subsidies, which are considered specific per se.50 
 A subsidy is de jure specific if “the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to 
which the granting authority operates, explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain 
enterprises.”51 The Appellate Body explained that a limitation is “explicit” if it is “express, 
unambiguous, or clear from the content of the relevant instrument, and not merely ‘implied’ or 
‘suggested.’ ”52 It further clarified that a subsidy will be specific if access is limited to the 
financial contribution, to the benefit or to both.53 
 If the criteria and conditions governing eligibility for, and the amount of, a subsidy are 
objective, the subsidy is not specific, provided that eligibility is automatic and the criteria and 
conditions are strictly applied.54 According to footnote 2 to the SCM Agreement, these criteria 
and conditions are considered “objective” if they are neutral, do not favor certain enterprises 
over others, and are economic in nature and horizontal in application.55 
 Even if on its face a subsidy is not specific, it still can be specific de facto. In assessing 
whether a subsidy is de facto specific the factors to be considered are: (1) the use of a subsidy 
program by a limited number of certain enterprises; (2) the predominant use by certain 
                                                 
49 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2. 
50 Id. 
51 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.1(a) (emphasis added). 
52 Appellate Body Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), supra note 28, para. 372. 
53 Id., para. 378. 
54 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.1(b) (“The criteria or conditions must be clearly spelled out in law, 
regulation, or other official document, so as to be capable of verification.”). 
55 SCM Agreement, supra note 8 n.2. 
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enterprises; (3) the granting of disproportionately large amounts of subsidy to certain enterprises; 
and (4) the manner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the 
decision to grant a subsidy.56 In US – Softwood Lumber IV, the Panel clarified that there is no 
need to show intent (deliberate action by the government) in order to satisfy the de facto 
requirement. What matters is that at least one of the four above mentioned criteria has been 
met.57 
2. Classification of Subsidies 
As noted earlier, the WTO rules on subsidies only apply to measures that are subsidies within the 
meaning of Article 1.1, and which are also specific, as defined in Article 2. However, granting a 
subsidy covered under Articles 1 and 2 does not necessarily constitute an inconsistency with the 
SCM Agreement. The Agreement groups subsidies in three categories (prohibited, actionable 
and non-actionable subsidies), each imposing different discipline. 
a. Prohibited Subsidies Article 3 of the SCM Agreement prohibits: (1) export subsidies; and 
(2) import substitution subsidies.58 Thus, WTO Members may not grant or maintain these types 
of subsidies. 
 Export subsidies are “subsidies contingent, in law or in fact . . . upon export performance, 
including those illustrated in Annex I.”59 The language of the article suggests that there are two 
                                                 
56 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 2.1(c). 
57 Panel Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber 
from Canada, WT/DS257/R, adopted 17 February 2004, para. 7.116 (stating that Article 2 is concerned with the 
distortion that is created by a subsidy which “either in law or in fact is not broadly available” and does not, 
therefore, require an investigation into the intent of the subsidizing country). 
58 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 3. 
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categories of export subsidies: subsidies listed in Annex I (Illustrative List of Export Subsidies) 
and other subsidies that are contingent upon export performance.60 
 The Illustrative List in Annex I includes eleven types of export subsidies and it is 
basically the same as the list included in the previous Subsidies Code.61 A subsidy that falls 
within the scope of the Illustrative List is deemed to be a prohibited subsidy: there is no 
additional requirement to demonstrate that it is contingent upon export performance under 
Article 3.1(a).62 Additionally, because of the language of Article 3.1(a), which reads that “the 
following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited, it would appear that 
there is the need to demonstrate the subsidy elements. However, as the Panel concluded in 
Korea – Commercial Vessels, given the per se nature of the items set forth in the Illustrative List, 
no further separate analysis under Article 1 is necessary.63 Therefore, merely establishing that a 
measure falls under any type of subsidy included in the Illustrative List is sufficient for a finding 
that it constitutes a prohibited export subsidy. 
 Article 3.1(a) also prohibits subsidies contingent, in law or in fact, upon export 
performance. In contrast to subsidies covered by the Illustrative List, this type of export subsidy 
                                                                                                                                                             
59 Id., art. 3.1(a). 
60 As the Appellate Body explained: “[t]he use of the word ‘including’ in Article 3 . . . clearly indicates that there are 
measures other than those listed in the Illustrative List that could be covered by Article 3.” See Brazil – Aircraft, 
supra note 13, para. 34. 
61 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (MTN/NTM/W/236, April 5, 1979), Annex “Illustrative list of Export Subsidies” [hereinafter Subsidies 
Code]. 
62 Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU, WT/DS46/AB/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, para. 6.31 (stating that “[t]his is confirmed from the words 
‘subsidies contingent’ . . . upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I” (emphasis in original), 
which in their ordinary meaning tell us that measures identified in the Annex are ipso facto ‘subsidies contingent 
upon export performance’”). 
63 Panel Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 11 April 2005, 
para. 7.204 n.126 (noting that “[t]his perhaps reflects the historical context of the Illustrative List, in the sense that it 
was first drafted before the definition of “subsidy” set forth in the SCM Agreement was introduced”). 
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is present only if both elements are demonstrated: a subsidy that is contingent on exportation.64 
First, it should be established that the measure in question is a “subsidy” within the meaning of 
Article 1 (a financial contribution by a government conferring a benefit). Second, it is necessary 
to demonstrate that it is contingent de jure or de facto upon export performance under Article 
3.1(a). De jure export contingency is demonstrated on the basis of the words of the relevant 
legislation, regulation, or legal instrument.65 De facto export contingency is interpreted in 
footnote 4 of the SCM Agreement: 
This standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the grating of a subsidy, 
without having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact 
tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings. The mere fact that a 
subsidy is granted to enterprises which export shall not for that reason alone be 
considered to be an export subsidy within the meaning of this provision.66 
 In EC – Large Civil Aircraft, the Appellate Body further clarified that whereas “actual 
exportation” refers to exportation that has occurred at the time a subsidy is granted, “anticipated 
exportation” means exportation that is expected by the granting authority (not by the recipient) to 
occur in the future.67 The legal standard for de facto export contingency requires that there exist 
a relationship of conditionality between the granting of the subsidy and anticipated exportation. 
Such conditionality can be established by recourse to the following test: “is the granting of the 
subsidy geared to induce the promotion of future export performance by the recipient?”68 As the 
Appellate Body explained, this standard is only met when the subsidy is granted “so as to 
provide an incentive to the recipient to export in a way that is not simply reflective of the 
                                                 
64 DOMINIC COPPENS, WTO DISCIPLINES ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES: BALANCING POLICY 
SPACE AND LEGAL CONSTRAINS 119 (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
65 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 
20 August 1999, para. 167. 
66 SCM Agreement, supra note 8 n.4 (emphasis added). 
67 Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 1 June 2011, para. 1043. 
68 Id., para. 1044. 
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conditions of supply and demand in the domestic and export markets undistorted by the granting 
of the subsidy.”69 In other words, the mere fact that the subsidy increases the recipient’s export 
sales is not sufficient for establishing an export subsidy. The standard is only met if the subsidy 
is designed to increase the firm’s ratio of export sales to domestic sales.70 
 Import substitution subsidies are subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods.71 This is the only form of domestic subsidy that is prohibited. 
 Similarly to export subsidies, the WTO adjudicating bodies apply a two-part analysis for 
import substitution subsidies. First, it must be established that the measure in question is a 
“subsidy” within the meaning of Article 1. Second, this subsidy must be “contingent . . . upon the 
use of domestic over imported goods.”72 The legal standard of contingency is considered similar 
to that under the export contingency standard.73 The one key difference between the two 
provisions is that Article 3.1(a) explicitly refers to subsidies both “in law” and “in fact,” whereas 
                                                 
69 Id., para. 1045. 
70 The Appellate Body gives the following example: 
Assume that a subsidy is designed to allow a recipient to increase its future production by five units. 
Assume further that the existing ratio of the recipient’s export sales to domestic sales, at the time the 
subsidy is granted, is 2:3. The granting of the subsidy will not be tied to anticipated exportation if, all 
other things being equal, the anticipated ratio of export sales to domestic sales is not greater than the 
existing ratio. In other words, if, under the measure granting the subsidy, the recipient would not be 
expected to export more than two of the additional five units to be produced, then this is indicative of the 
absence of a tie. By contrast, the granting of the subsidy would be tied to anticipated exportation if, all 
other things equal, the recipient is expected to export at least three of the five additional units to be 
produced. In other words, the subsidy is designed in such a way that it is expected to skew the recipient’s 
future sales in favour of export sales, even though the recipient may also be expected to increase its 
domestic sales. 
Id., para. 1048. 
71 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 3.1(b). 
72 Id. 
73 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, WT/DS139, 142/AB/R, 
31 May 2000, para. 123 (stating that “this legal standard applies not only to ‘contingency’ under Article 3.1(a), but 
also to ‘contingency’ under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.”). 
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Article 3.1(b) does not. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body has explained that Article 3.1(b) 
covers both de jure and de facto contingency.74 
b. Actionable Subsidies Any specific subsidy within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 is subject 
to challenge in the event it causes adverse effects to the interests of another Member.75 Article 5 
distinguishes between three types of “adverse effect”: (1) injury to the domestic industry of 
another Member (Article 5(a)); (2) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or 
indirectly to other Members under the GATT 1994 (Article 5(b)); and (3) serious prejudice, 
including a threat thereof, to the interests of another Member (Article 5(c)). 
 Subsidies causing injury to the domestic industry are subject to challenge when three 
conditions are fulfilled: (1) there are subsidized imports, i.e. imports of products from producers 
who benefited from specific subsidies within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2; (2) there is injury 
to the domestic industry of the like products; and (3) there is a causal link between the 
subsidized imports and the injury to the domestic industry. 
 Injury must be caused to the domestic industry producing the “like product.” The concept 
of “like product” is defined in footnote 46 to the SCM Agreement as: 
a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under 
consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another products which, 
although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of 
the product under consideration.76 
                                                 
74 Id., paras. 135-43. (the Appellate Body noted that Article III:4 of the GATT also addresses measures that favour 
the use of domestic over imported products but covers both de jure and de facto inconsistency. Thus, in the 
Appellate Body’s view, “it would be most surprising if a similar provision in the SCM Agreement applied only to 
situations involving de jure inconsistency.” Furthermore, a finding that Article 3.1(b) extends only to contingency 
“in law” would “make circumvention of obligations by Members too easy.”). 
75 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 5. 
76 Id. n.46 (emphasis added). 
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 When compared to the definition of “like product” in non-discrimination provisions 
(Articles I and III of the GATT), the definition in the SCM Agreement seems narrower. 
Professor Won-Mog Choi identifies two reasons for that. First, since Articles I and III are basic 
anti-discrimination provisions at the heart of the GATT, the term should be construed broadly so 
as to strike down discriminatory measures wherever possible. In the case of anti-subsidy 
measures, on the other hand, the term should be interpreted most narrowly, since this provision 
establishes exceptions to general GATT rules. Second, by drawing too broad a category of “like 
product,” in can be more difficult for complainants to meet the standing criteria and to prove 
injury.77 Although it is generally accepted that the concept of “like product” has different 
meaning in the different provisions, the elements to consider in establishing “likeness” are 
basically the same: physical characteristics, end uses, consumer habits and preferences, 
substitutability, and tariff classification.78 
 Article 16.1 of the SCM Agreement defines “domestic industry” as: 
the domestic producers as a whole of the like products or . . . those of them whose 
collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total 
domestic production of those products.79 
In cases where producers are related to the exporters or importers, or are themselves importers of 
the subsidized product, such producers may be excluded.80 As these producers likely benefit 
                                                 
77 WON-MOG CHOI, ‘LIKE PRODUCTS’ IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: TOWARDS A CONSISTENT GATT/WTO 
JURISPRUDENCE 91, 128 (Oxford University Press 2003). 
78 See, e.g., Panel Report, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54, 55, 59, 64/R, 
adopted 23 July 1998, para. 14.173 (stating that “we do not see that the SCM Agreement precludes us from looking 
at criteria other than physical characteristics, where relevant to the like product analysis. The term ‘characteristics 
closely resembling’ in its ordinary meaning includes but not limited to physical characteristics, and we see nothing 
in the context or object and purpose of the SCM Agreement that would dictate a different conclusion.”). 
79 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 16.1. 
80 Id. 
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from the subsidized imports as a result of such relationship, they do not share the same interest 
with the rest of the domestic industry and unlikely are injured.81 
 The concept of “injury” to domestic industry covers: (1) material injury; (2) a threat of 
material industry to a domestic industry; and (3) material retardation of the establishment of a 
domestic industry.82 The “material injury” standard in the SCM Agreement is lower than the 
“serious injury” standard for safeguard measures because anti-subsidy measures counteract 
unfair trade actions.83 
 Finally, a causal link between the subsidized imports and the injury to the domestic 
industry must be established. Article 15.5 also contains a “non-attribution” requirement. 
According to this requirement, investigating authorities must examine any known factors other 
than the subsidized imports that are injuring the domestic industry at the same time and they 
must not attribute the injury caused by these other factors to the subsidized imports.84 
 Subsidies also have adverse effects on the interests of other Members when the 
subsidized imports cause the nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or 
indirectly to other Members under the GATT. According to footnote 12 to the SCM Agreement, 
the term “nullification and impairment” is used in the same sense as it is used in Article 
XXIII:1(b) of the GATT (non-violation complaints).85 In several cases, panels have 
acknowledged that nullification and impairment arises when the effect of a tariff concession is 
                                                 
81 COPPENS, supra note 64, at 234. 
82 SCM Agreement, supra note 8 n.45. 
83 See Panel Report, EC – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 25, para. 7.2083; Appellate Body Report, United States – 
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, 
WT/DS177, 178/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2001, para. 124. 
84 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 15.5 (“Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the 
volumes and prices of nonsubsidized imports of the product in question, contraction in demand or changes in 
patterns of consumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, 
developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry.”). 
85 Id. n.12. 
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systematically offset or counteracted by a subsidy program.86 The high standard of “systematic 
offsetting/counteracting” is set to preserve the exceptional nature of the non-violation remedy.87 
 Finally, subsidies have adverse effects on the interest of other Members when they cause 
serious prejudice to the interests of another WTO Member. Currently,88 according to Article 6.3 
“serious prejudice” or “threat of serious prejudice” may arise where a subsidy has one or more of 
the following effects: (1) the subsidy displaces or impedes the imports of a like product of 
another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member; (2) the subsidy displaces or impedes 
the exports of a like product of another Member from a third country market; (3) the subsidy 
results in a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product in comparison to the price of 
a like product of another Member in the same market or significant price suppression, price 
depression or lost sales in the same market; or (4) the subsidy leads to increase in the world 
market share of the subsidizing Member in a particular subsidized primary product or 
commodity in comparison to the average share it had during the previous period of three years.89 
                                                 
86 See, e.g., GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and 
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, adopted 25 January 1990, BISD 37S/86, paras. 147-48; 
Panel Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS 217, 234/R, adopted 
16 September 2002, para. 7.127. 
87 The Panel explained that “[a]ny subsidy to domestic producers is likely to have some adverse effect on the 
competitive relationship between domestic and imported products. However, the fact that there will be some impact 
should not be sufficient to uphold a claim of non-violation nullification or impairment. Otherwise, any specific 
domestic subsidy programme which is related to a product on which there is a tariff concession could constitute the 
non-violation nullification or impairment of benefits. This would hardly make non-violation nullification or 
impairment an “exceptional” or “unusual” remedy, as the Appellate Body has said it should be.” See US – Offset Act 
n.341. 
88 “Dark amber” category set out in Article 6.1, i.e. four categories of subsidies presumed to cause serious prejudice, 
with the burden shifted to the respondent state to show that no adverse effects were caused by the challenged 
measure, expired at the end of 1999 because there was no consensus among members in favor of continuing its 
existence. As Hoda and Ahuja explained, the drafters of the WTO Agreement conceived of the stricter discipline in 
Article 6.1 and the concession on non-actionability under Article 8 as a package and thus their future was bound 
together, as a result both expired after a period of five years. See Anwarul Hoda & Rajeev Ahuja, Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Need for Clarification and Improvement, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 1009, 1061 
(2005). 
89 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 6.3. 
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If a complaining Member can show that a subsidy within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 has any 
of these effects, then “serious prejudice” may be found to exist. 
 In Korea – Commercial Vessels, Korea argued that a finding of serious prejudice requires 
additional elements, such as injury to domestic industry and/or the importance of that industry to 
the overall interests of complaining party. However, the Panel disagreed, stating that serious 
prejudice is an entirely different concept from injury. Rather than having to do with the condition 
of a particular domestic industry within the territory of a Member (the subject matter of injury 
analysis), in the Panel’s view serious prejudice has to do in the first instance with negative 
effects on a Member’s trade interests in respect of a product caused by another Member’s 
subsidization.90 
 Although the complainant has to demonstrate that the challenged subsidies are causing 
adverse effects, Article 6.3 only requires present adverse effects during the reference period, and 
not present subsidization. In EC – Large Civil Aircraft, the Appellate Body concluded that the 
requirement that the effects of subsidies be felt in the reference period does not mean that the 
subsidies, and in particular the benefit conferred, must also be present during that period. By its 
terms, Article 6 imposes an obligation on Members not to cause adverse effects to the interests of 
other Members through the use of any subsidy as defined in Article 1. Thus, this obligation 
continues to exist in respect of subsidies that have come to an end by the time of the reference 
period.91 
c. Non-actionable Subsidies These are subsidies that are allowed and therefore may not be 
countervailed. The provisions of Article 8 on non-actionable subsides are no longer in force, 
                                                 
90 Panel Report, Korea – Commercial Vessels, supra note 63, paras. 7.576-7.580 (emphasis in original). 
91 Appellate Body Report, EC – Large Civil Aircraft, supra note 66, para. 712. 
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having lapsed five years after the SCM Agreement’s entry into force, because there was no 
consensus in favor of continuing the application of Article 8. As from 1 January 2000, the 
categories of research and development, regional and environmental subsidies have been 
actionable, provided that they are specific. 
 Article 8 identifies two groups of non-actionable subsidies: (1) subsidies that are not 
specific within the meaning of Article 2; and (2) certain types of specific subsidies, such as 
certain narrowly defined research and development subsidies, regional, and environmental 
subsidies.92 
 WTO Members must notify the SCM Committee of such subsidies before their adoption 
in order to benefit from non-actionable subsidy status.93 Thus, if a subsidy is not notified, it may 
be actionable and countervailable. However, such subsidies are still non-actionable if they are 
found during a countervailing or multilateral proceeding to conform to the standards set forth in 
Article 8.2.94 In fact, no single formal notification was made over the entire period that Article 8 
was in place.95 
3. Counteracting Subsidies 
The SCM Agreement provides WTO members with two possibilities for counteracting subsidies: 
(1) multilateral, when a WTO Member confronted with prohibited or actionable subsidies 
imposed by other Members may use the WTO dispute settlement system to force the Member 
acting in violation of the SCM’s subsidies regime to return to WTO-compatible behavior, and 
                                                 
92 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 8.1, 8.2. 
93 Id., art. 8.3. 
94 Id. n.35. 
95 G/SCM/W/546/Rev. 2, April 26, 2006, para. 17. 
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(2) unilateral, when a WTO Member may take unilateral actions by imposing countervailing 
duties (CVDs) to offset the effect of the prohibited or actionable subsidy in its domestic market. 
While the multilateral approach requires a WTO Member to bring the case before the WTO 
adjudicating bodies,96 the unilateral approach is normally initiated by the domestic industry 
injured by the subsidized imports.97 In the latter case, nevertheless, the final decision whether or 
not to impose CVDs is made by the importing WTO Member. Article 19.2 of the Agreement 
makes it clear that the imposition of CVDs even in cases where all requirements for such 
imposition have been fulfilled is a right and not an obligation of a WTO Member.98 
 Although the Agreement allows pursuing multilateral and unilateral approaches at the 
same time, with regard to the effects of a particular subsidy a WTO Member has to choose only 
one of the two forms of relief.99 Yet the Agreement does not prohibit a WTO Member from 
pursuing the unilateral approach to offset the negative effects in its domestic market, alongside 
the multilateral approach to address the negative effects of the same subsidy in its export 
markets.100 In some situations, however, only one option is available. 
 In general, three scenarios are possible. First, subsidies of country A enhance export 
potential of products into importing country B, causing harm to the domestic producers in 
country B. In this situation, both options are available for country B. The unilateral avenue has 
obvious advantages since it is a more direct route to take than challenging subsidies at the WTO. 
                                                 
96 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 4.4, 7.4. 
97 Id., arts. 11.1, 11.6 (it can be also initiated “by the authorities of their own accord.”). 
98 Id., art. 19.2 (“[t]he decision whether or not to impose a countervailing duty in cases where all requirements for 
the imposition have been fulfilled . . . to be made by the authorities of the importing Member.”). 
99 Id. n.35 (“The provisions of Part II or III may be invoked in parallel with the provisions of Part V; however, with 
regard to the effects of a particular subsidy in the domestic markets of the importing Member, only one form of 
relief (either a countervailing duty . . . or a countermeasure under Articles 4 or 7) shall be available”). 
100 M. MATSUSHITA, T.J. SCHOENBAUM, P.C. MAVROIDIS & M. HAHN, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 304 (3d ed. 2015) (arguing that in this case “neither the letter nor the spirit of footnote 35 
exclude the simultaneous but not overlapping use of both CVDs and of the multilateral track.”). 
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The investigation is initiated and controlled by the national authorities that autonomously 
determine the existence of a subsidy, the amount of subsidization and injury.101 Even though 
CVDs may be later challenged in the WTO, as Professor Davey points out, since WTO dispute 
settlement takes several years to produce a result, the fact that a CVD may at some time in the 
future be found WTO-inconsistent, does not preclude its effectiveness in alleviating harm caused 
to domestic industry in the meantime.102 Likewise, while CVDs are imposed by national 
authorities of the country that receives the subsidized imports, the only remedy available under 
the multilateral track is removal of the adverse effect or withdrawal of the subsidy by a 
subsidizing Member,103 which may raise the problem of non-compliance. On the other hand, it is 
important to note here that the adoption of CVDs only neutralizes the effects of the subsidy in 
the market of the Member that receives the subsidized imports, but it does not extinguish the 
subsidy. Professor Mavroidis points out that the imposition of CVDs may protect the domestic 
industry at home, but may be at the expense of the domestic industry’s export performance, as 
the subsidized products move to other markets.104 Moreover, prohibited subsidies can only be 
challenged unilaterally when they cause injury to the domestic industry of the importing country, 
while a multilateral option does not require this condition.105 
 The second possible scenario is when subsidies from country A enhance the exportation 
of its products to country C, where they compete with similar products that are exported from 
country B. And finally, if country A subsidies products that are sold in its home market, it is 
                                                 
101 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 11.2. 
102 William J. Davey, Subsidy Control in the GATT/WTO: Surveillance and Litigation, in WHAT SHAPES THE LAW? 
REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SUBSIDY 
DISCIPLINES 61, 63 (Luca Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins eds., 2016). 
103 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 4.7, 7.8. 
104 MAVROIDIS, supra note 47, at 603. 
105 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 3, 11.2. 
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harder for countries B and C to export similar goods to country A. In both of these situations, 
country B cannot respond with CVDs; its only option is to follow the multilateral approach and 
bring the case before the WTO adjudicating bodies. 
a. The Multilateral Option In addition to general rules of the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU), the SCM Agreement contains special procedural rules that apply to actions brought at the 
WTO regarding prohibited (Article 4) and actionable (Article 7) subsidies. 
 Regarding prohibited subsidies, the time-limits for actions under the SCM Agreement are 
half as long as those for proceedings under the DSU. Consultations may be requested with any 
WTO Member believed to be granting or maintaining a prohibited subsidy. If consultations fail 
within 30 days, the complaining member may then refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB).106 Given the compulsory nature of WTO jurisdiction, a responding member has no 
choice but to accept the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute system.107 The Panel must issue its 
report in a period of 90 days after it is established.108 Where a Panel report is appealed, the 
Appellate Body must issue its decision within 30 days (with the possibility of extending this term 
up to 30 more days) from the date when the party to the dispute notifies its intention to appeal. 
The Appellate Body report should be adopted by the DSB within 20 days following its issuance 
to the Members unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. The adopted 
Appellate Body report is accepted unconditionally by the parties to the dispute. 109 
                                                 
106 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4.4. 
107 Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 
(1994), art. 6.1 (“If the complaining party so requests, a panel shall be established at the latest at the DSB meeting 
following that at which the request first appears as an item on the DSB’s agenda.”) [hereinafter DSU]. 
108 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4.6 
109 Id., art. 4.9. 
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 If a subsidy is found by a WTO adjudicating body to be prohibited, the subsidizing 
Member must “withdraw the subsidy without delay.”110 The Panel must specify the time period 
within which the subsidy must be withdrawn.111 As the Appellate Body explained in Brazil – 
Aircraft, withdrawal of the prohibited subsidy involves removal of the subsidy.112 In the case of 
recurring subsidies, it seems clear that if payments continue to be made, the subsidy has not been 
withdrawn.113 The question remaining is what constitutes “withdrawal” in the case of non-
recurring subsidies that have been granted in the past. In Australia – Automotive Leather II, the 
U.S. proposed repayment only of the ongoing benefit conferred by the subsidy since the adoption 
of the panel report,114 which would be in line with the general principle that WTO law only 
provides for prospective remedies. The Panel, however, went further and concluded that 
repayment in full of the subsidy, and not just the prospective portion of the subsidy as allocated 
over time, was the only way to “withdraw” such subsidies.115 This ruling was heavily criticized 
by WTO Members and scholars because of its retroactive character, and to date this approach has 
not been adopted by other Panels. 
 If a recommendation to withdraw the subsidy is not followed within the time period set 
by the Panel, the DSB must, upon the request of the original complainant, authorize “appropriate 
                                                 
110 Id., art. 4.7. 
111 Id. 
112 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 
of the DSU, WT/DS46/AB/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, para. 45. 
113 Id., (stating that “[i]n our view, to continue to make payments under an export subsidy measure found to be 
prohibited is not consistent with the obligation to ‘withdraw’ prohibited export subsidies, in the sense of ‘removing’ 
or ‘taking away.’”). 
114 Panel Report, Australia – Subsides Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive Leather – Recourse to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS126/RW, adopted 11 February 2000, paras. 6.16, 6.21. 
115 Id., 6.39. 
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countermeasures.”116 Footnote 9 to the SCM Agreement explains that “appropriate” means not 
disproportional. Based on the notion that the case of prohibited subsidies is the only instance 
where the WTO Agreement not only explicitly outlaws a practice, but also modifies the 
substantive content of a Panel’s or Appellate Body’s recommendation, WTO adjudicating bodies 
have consistently held that the punishment of prohibited subsidies through countermeasures can 
be harder than the punishment of any other breach of the WTO Agreement.117 
 Like remedies for prohibited subsidies, the remedies for actionable subsidies also differ 
from the remedies provided for in the DSU. However, the time-frames are longer, compared with 
the remedies for prohibited subsidies. If consultations do not result in a mutually agreed solution 
within 60 days, any Member party to such consultations may refer the matter to the DSB for the 
establishment of a Panel.118 The Panel must issue its report within 120 days after it is 
established119 and the Appellate Body must issue its decision within 60 days, with the possibility 
of extending the term up to 30 more days.120 
 If a panel concludes that a subsidy causes adverse effects to the interests of another 
Member (be it injury, nullification or impairment, or serious prejudice), the subsidizing Member 
“shall take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effect or . . . withdraw the subsidy.”121 In 
other words, the subsidizing country is not required to withdraw the subsidy as long as it 
                                                 
116 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4.10, 4.11 (The defending party could refer the matter to arbitration if it does 
not agree that the proposed level is appropriate). 
117 PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, PATRICK A. MESSERLIN & JASPER M. WAUTERS, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN THE WTO 425-26 (2008) (noting that “whereas Art. 19 DSU requests Panel, assuming 
that they found that a violation occurred, to recommend that the WTO Member concerned bring its measures into 
compliance, without specifying how, Art. 4.7 SCM requests from Panels, in case they found that a prohibited 
subsidy was granted to recommend that ‘the subsidizing member withdraw the subsidy without delay.’”). 
118 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 7.4. 
119 Id., art. 7.5. 
120 Id., art. 7.7. 
121 Id., art. 7.8. 
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removes its adverse effects, which should be done within 6 months from the date when the DSB 
adopts the Panel or Appellate Body report.122 Instead of withdrawing the subsidy or removing its 
adverse effects, the subsidizing Member can also agree with the complaining member on 
compensation.123 It is worth emphasizing that in this specific context, compensation is a 
permanent alternative for bringing the measure into consistency with WTO law, which is not the 
case under general WTO dispute settlement rules where compensation is a temporary remedy 
only available in the event when a final remedy, i.e. the withdrawal of the WTO-inconsistent 
measure, has not been implemented.124 
 In case of non-compliance, the injured WTO Member can take countermeasures that 
must be “commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effect” of the subsidies 
granted.125 By contrast with certain cases dealing with countermeasures for prohibited subsides, 
where arbitrators decided that the amount of the countermeasures should be based on the amount 
of the subsidy and not its trade effect,126 here it seems that the level of countermeasures has to 
correspond to the adverse effects endured by the complaining member.127 
                                                 
122 Id., art. 7.9. 
123 Id. 
124 DSU, supra note 107, art. 22.1 (“Compensation and the suspension of concessions . . . are temporary measures 
available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time. 
However, neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions . . . is preferred to full implementation of a 
recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreement.”). 
125 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 7.9. 
126 Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse to Arbitration by 
Brazil under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS46/ARB, August 28, 2000, 
para. 3.60; Decision by the Arbitrators, United States – Tax Treatment for “Foreign Corporations” – Recourse to 
Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, 
WT/DS108/ARB, August 30, 2002, paras. 5.41, 5.49, 6.33, 6.35; Decision by the Arbitrator, Canada – Export 
Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft – Recourse to Arbitration by Canada under Article 22.6 of the 
DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, circulated February 17, 2003. 
127 There has been no jurisprudence so far in the context of Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement, therefore we can 
only speculate as to the precise scope of the term “commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effect.” 
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b. The Unilateral Option If a WTO Member can demonstrate that subsidized imports are 
causing injury to the domestic industry, it is allowed to take unilateral action against such a 
subsidy. A WTO Member does not need the WTO’s approval before it can impose CVDs. 
However, the SCM Agreement disciplines this unilateral option by providing that CVDs may 
only be imposed pursuant to an investigation in accordance with the procedural and substantive 
obligations stipulated in Part V of the Agreement. 
 An investigation can be initiated either by, or on behalf of, the domestic industry 
allegedly injured by the subsidized imports, or by the authorities of their own accord.128 The 
application by the domestic industry must contain sufficient evidence of the existence of (1) a 
subsidy, (2) injury to the domestic industry; and (3) a causal link between the subsidized imports 
and the alleged injury.129 When the investigating authority decides to initiate an investigation, it 
is required to notify exporters of the subsidized products and the exporting Member.130 Article 
12 provides for certain “due process” rights on the gathering of evidence. In particular, interested 
Members and all interested parties in an investigation must be given notice of the information 
which the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in writing all evidence which they 
consider relevant.131 They must also have the right to present information orally.132 
 Procedural requirements for CVD investigations are largely the same as those for anti-
dumping investigations set out in the Anti-dumping Agreement. Yet, at the same time, 
Mavroidis, Messerlin and Wauters point out that the important difference is the obvious 
involvement of the subsidizing government. This makes CVD actions much more sensitive 
                                                 
128 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 11.1, 11.6. 
129 Id., art. 11.2. 
130 Id., art. 22. 
131 Id., art. 12.1. 
132 Id., art. 12.2. 
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politically and partly explains why this instrument is used less frequently than anti-dumping 
actions.133 Likewise, according to Dominic Coppens, it explains why “due process” requirements 
in CVD procedures with regard to foreign governments are more extensive.134 In particular, once 
the complaint has been accepted, Members whose products may be subject to investigation must 
be invited for consultations with the aim of clarifying the situation and arriving at a mutually 
agreed solution.135 
 If a final determination is made that a subsidy has caused injury, a Member is allowed to 
impose definitive CVDs unless the subsidy is withdrawn.136 A CVD must never exceed the 
amount of the subsidy.137 The SCM Agreement also contains a lesser duty provision, providing 
that it is desirable that the duty be less than the total amount of the subsidy if such lesser duty 
would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry.138 CVDs may not be imposed 
retroactively, i.e. they may only be applied to products imported after the decision to impose 
CVDs enters into force.139 Article 21.1 states that CVDs shall remain in place “as long as and to 
the extent necessary to counteract subsidization which is causing injury.”140 Nevertheless, the 
SCM Agreement provides for a “sunset” clause under which all CVDs must be withdrawn five 
                                                 
133 MAVROIDIS, MESSERLIN & WAUTERS, supra note 117, at 375. 
134 COPPENS, supra note 64, at 222. 
135 SCM Agreement, supra note 8, art. 13. 
136 Id., art. 19.1. (There is no obligation to impose countervailing duties. According to Art. 19.2 “[t]he decision 
whether or not to impose a countervailing duty in cases where all requirements for the imposition have been 
fulfilled . . . to be made by the authorities of the importing Member.”). 
137 Id., art. 19.4. 
138 Id., art. 19.2. 
139 Id., art. 20.1 (There are two exceptions to this general principle, see Articles 20.2 and 20.6). 
140 Id., art. 21.1. 
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years after their imposition, unless the WTO Member concerned has concluded that the expiry of 
the duty would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury.141 
B. THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE 
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) provides for special rules on agricultural subsidies. The 
AoA provides the basic rules for agriculture products and the subsidy commitment schedules of 
the WTO Members, similar to the tariff schedules for goods, which are annexed to the 
Agreement. Where a commitment has been made in the schedule for a particular product, the 
Member agrees not to provide more than the confirmed amount of subsidies. Where no 
commitment has been made, no subsides are permitted for that product. 
 As Lester, Mercurio, and Davies point out, the approach of the AoA in addressing 
subsidies is different from that of the SCM Agreement. While the SCM Agreement explicitly 
focuses on the trade-distorting effects of subsidies, the AoA, aside from its distinction between 
export and domestic subsidies, does not focus on their effect.142 Likewise, the legal framework 
for agricultural products established by the AoA differs from that of the GATT era. The notion 
of “equitable share of world trade” has been replaced by a set of commitments to reduce 
domestic support to agricultural products and the use of export subsidies. 
 The AoA establishes two sets of obligations. The first set is found in the provisions on 
market access, which provide that WTO Members may protect their domestic agriculture 
producers only through tariffs. Article 4.2 of the AoA requires WTO Members first to convert 
                                                 
141 Id., art. 21.3. 
142 LESTER, MERCURIO & DAVIES, supra note 48, at 457. 
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protective measures to tariffs, and then to progressively liberalize the resulting protection 
through the reduction of tariffs, as happens in non-agricultural sectors.143 
 The second set of AoA obligations contains two categories of provisions, one dealing 
with general disciplines and individual commitments on export subsidies and one dealing with 
disciplines and commitments on domestic subsidies. 
1. Export Subsidies 
According to Article 8 of the AoA, each WTO Member “undertakes not to provide export 
subsidies otherwise than in conformity with this Agreement and with the commitments as 
specified in that Member’s Schedule.”144 Thus, unlike the SCM Agreement, the AoA does not 
prohibit export subsidies per se. Moreover, it distinguishes between the listed types of export 
subsidies (Article 9) and non-listed export subsidies that are subject to the anti-circumvention 
requirement (Article 10). 
 Article 9.1 provides for six types of agricultural export subsidies. As in the case with the 
Illustrative List under the SCM Agreement, a subsidy that falls within the scope of Article 9.1 is 
deemed to be an export subsidy. There is no need for a separate demonstration of an “export 
subsidy” within the meaning of Article 1.145 
 Under Article 3.3 of the AoA, a WTO Member: 
shall not provide export subsidies listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 in respect of 
the agricultural products or groups of products specified in Section II of Part IV of 
its Schedule in excess of the budgetary outlay and quantity commitment levels 
                                                 
143 AoA, supra note 3, art. 4.2. 
144 Id., art. 8. 
145 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS265,266,283/AB/R, 
adopted 19 May 2005, para. 269. 
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specified therein and shall not provide such subsidies in respect of any 
agricultural product not specified in that Section of its Schedule.146 
This provision clearly distinguishes between export subsidies that are subject to reduction 
commitments and those which are not. With regard to scheduled agricultural products, the listed 
types of export subsidies are only prohibited to the extent they are in excess of the reduction 
commitment level of the Member in question. With regard to unscheduled agricultural products, 
export subsidies subsidy are prohibited as such. 
 Article 10.1 of the AoA stipulates that export subsidies not listed in Article 9.1 shall not 
be applied in a manner which results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export 
subsidy commitments.147 Thus, it must first be established that the measure in question is an 
“export subsidy,” which is defined by the AoA as a subsidy “contingent upon export 
performance.”148 
 Current case law supports the view that circumvention is present, and not merely 
assumed, when export subsidies not listed in Article 9.1 are granted to scheduled products above 
their reduction commitment levels.149 At the same time, export subsidies not listed in Article 9.1 
                                                 
146 AoA, supra note 3, art. 3.3 (emphasis added). 
147 Id., art. 10.1. 
148 Id., art. 1(e); see also Appellate Body Report, US – FSC, supra note 18, para. 141 (stating that “[a]lthough there 
are differences between the export subsidy disciplines established under two Agreement, those differences do not, in 
our view, affect the common substantive requirement relating to export contingency. Therefore, we think it 
appropriate to apply the interpretation of export contingency that we have adopted under the SCM Agreement to the 
interpretation of export contingency under the Agreement on Agriculture.”). 
149 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of 
Dairy Products – Second Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by New Zealand and the United States, 
WT/DS103,113/AB/RW2, adopted 17 January 2003, para. 70 (noting that “[p]ursuant to Article 3 of the Agreement 
on Agriculture, a Member is entitled to grant export subsidies within the limits of the reduction commitment 
specified in its Schedule”). 
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and not subject to reduction commitments are flatly prohibited since members are not allowed to 
grant “any subsidy whatsoever to exports of unscheduled products.”150 
 Export subsidies must, to the extent they are inconsistent with the AoA, be withdrawn 
without delay pursuant to Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement. 
2. Domestic Subsidies 
While not prohibiting WTO Members from granting domestic subsidies on agricultural products, 
the AoA establishes annual limits for each Member (Total Aggregate Measurement of Support, 
Total AMS) in the specific Schedules of Commitments. According to Article 3.2, no WTO 
Member can provide support to a domestic producer in excess of the commitment levels 
specified in Section I of Part IV of its Schedule.151 However, if a measure is exempt from being 
included in the Total AMS, that measure is not considered “domestic support” in the meaning of 
the AoA and it is therefore allowed. Thus, as Gustavo Luengo put it, the AoA does not define 
domestic support but rather establishes rules for determining whether or not a government 
measure falls within the calculation of the Totals AMS.152 
 Domestic support measures are categorized in three different boxes, depending on their 
trade-distortive effect: amber box, blue box, and green box. 
 Green box subsidies are exempt from reduction commitments and, therefore, are 
permitted. This category of subsidies “shall meet the fundamental requirement that they have no, 
                                                 
150 Panel Report, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, 
WT/DS267/RW, adopted 20 June 2008 n.782. 
151 AoA, supra note 3, art. 3.2. 
152 GUSTAVO E. LUENGO HERNÁNDEZ DE MADRID, REGULATION OF SUBSIDIES AND STATE AIDS IN WTO AND EC 
LAW 210 (2007). 
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or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on production.”153 To meet this 
requirement, a measure should fulfill certain criteria. First, support must be provided through a 
publicly funded government program (including government revenue forgone) not involving 
transfers from consumers.154 Second, the support must not have the effect of providing price 
support to producers.155 Finally, the support program must meet the policy-specific criteria and 
fit into the list of programs listed in the AoA.156 
 Amber box subsidies are regarded as the most harmful for trade and beyond a certain de 
minimis level157 are subject to reduction commitments. All domestic support that is not exempted 
is considered subject to reduction commitments.158 AMS means annual level of support in 
monetary terms in the form of non-exempted product-specific and non-product-specific 
support.159A specific AMS is established for each basic agricultural product receiving market 
price support, non-exempt direct payments, or any other subsidy not exempt from the reduction 
commitment.160 Support which is non-product specific is totaled into one non-product specific 
AMS.161 The sum of all these AMS’s is the Total AMS, which is one single figure representing 
the full amount of domestic subsidies subject to reduction commitments. Thus, if the WTO 
Member is subject to reduction commitments, the domestic support it provides for agricultural 
                                                 
153 AoA, supra note 3, Annex 2, para. 1. 
154 Id., Annex 2, para. 1(a). 
155 Id., Annex 2, para. 1(b). 
156 Id., Annex 2, paras. 2-13 (the list covers general services, food security industry, domestic food aid, direct 
payment to producers, decoupled income support, etc.). 
157 Id., Article 6.4 establishes a de minimis threshold 5 percent (10 percent for developing Members) above the total 
value of production of an agricultural product for the year. 
158 Id., art. 6.1. 
159 Id., art. 1(a). 
160 Id., Annex 3, para. 1. 
161 Id. 
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products should not exceed the levels established in its commitments. On the other hand, if the 
Member is not subject to reduction commitments, it must not provide support to agricultural 
producers in excess of the de minimis level.162 
 Blue box subsidies are those that may be deemed trade-distorting, but are contingent 
upon limitations in production. They are excluded from reduction commitments if (1) they are 
based on fixed area and yields, or (2) they are made on 85 percent or less of the base level 
production, or (3) livestock payments are made on a fixed number of head.163 
 Domestic agricultural subsidies are actionable (if they cause adverse effects) and 
countervailable (if they cause injury to domestic industry) under the SCM Agreement. 
 In sum, the regulation of subsidies in GATT/WTO underwent a series of changes over 
the years and resulted in more precise and stricter disciplines regarding the use of subsidies and 
countervailing measures. Likewise, since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, the rules 
relating to subsidies have been further shaped by the WTO adjudicating bodies. Dominic 
Coppens observes that during the almost fifty years of the GATT, subsidy disciplines were 
developed by contracting parties (with virtually no influence of the largely inefficient GATT 
dispute settlement system); while, over the last twenty years, shaping of subsidy disciplines has 
been the result of judicial decisions.164 
 Yet, at the same time, as the previous Chapter has established, the current regime on 
subsidies in essence reflects a compromise between the opposing views of the United States and 
                                                 
162 Id., art. 7. 
163 Id., art. 6.5(a). 
164 Dominic Coppens, Twenty Years of (Re)-Shaping WTO Subsidy Law by the Appellate Body and Panels, in WHAT 
SHAPES THE LAW? REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND 
EUROPEAN SUBSIDY DISCIPLINES 69, 70 (Luca Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins eds., 2016); see also Horlick, supra note 
7, at 67 (noting that “we can expect continued rewriting of the SCM Agreement by an Appellate Body which clearly 
thinks it understands subsidies better than did the negotiators.”). 
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the EU. These views, in turn, reflect their domestic practice. Despite the importance of 
international efforts in regulating subsidies, the resulting discipline comes from the bottom, i.e. 
from domestic forces. The latter will also have a major impact on the prospects for future 
developments of WTO rules in this area.165 In this respect, thus, it is important to examine and 
compare U.S. and EU disciplines on subsidies, as well as to identify the reasons for existing 
differences. Chapter V and Chapter VI will address, respectively, the rules on subsidies in the 
EU and in the United States, while Chapter VII will compare the American and European 
approaches to subsidy. 
                                                 
165 Although the future dynamics of negotiations will likely to be determined more by the relationship between 
developed and developing countries, rather than by the relationship among the main developed economies. 
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V. EU RULES ON SUBSIDIES 
The European Union (EU), which legally replaced the European Community (EC) in 2009 as a 
result of the Treaty of Lisbon, is a complex supranational organization comprised of twenty-eight 
Member States. The EU is based on two treaties – the Treaty on European Union (TEU)1 and the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)2 – which constitute a primary law of 
the EU. The secondary legislation of the EU includes regulations, which are binding upon all the 
Members States and are directly applicable within all such states; directives, which are binding 
as to the end to be achieved while leaving some choice as to form and method open to the 
Member States; decisions, which are binding on those to whom they are addressed; and 
recommendations and opinions, which have no binding force.3 
 The EU has been a WTO member since 1 January 1995. All the Member States of the EU 
are also WTO members in their own right. Thus, the provisions of the WTO agreements are 
legally binding upon both the EU and its Member States. However, the EU does not extend the 
                                                 
1 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 26 October 2012, Official Journal of the European Union 
(C 326/15) [hereinafter TEU]. 
2 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 26 October 2012, Official Journal 
of the European Union (C 326/47) [hereinafter TFEU]. 
3 Id., art. 288. 
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direct effect doctrine to the WTO agreements.4 Consequently, the provisions of these agreements 
may only be invoked in EU law if EU law expressly refers to or incorporates such provisions. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With respect to subsidies, EU law contains two sets of rules: (1) on the use of subsidies (State 
aid); and (2) on the use of countervailing duties in response to subsidized imported goods. 
 In the EU, Member States are required to obtain authorization from the Commission 
before they implement State aid.5 The purpose of State aid control is to prevent companies from 
gaining an unfair competitive advantage through government support. The rules provide for the 
prevention of misallocation of resources since subsidies can lead to inefficiencies and a waste of 
public money to the detriment of the EU’s welfare. State aid control, thus, is meant to lead to the 
best allocation of resources and to serve the goal of economic integration and Europe-wide 
welfare.6 
 EU State rules are part of the EU competition rules. It needs to be pointed out, however, 
that they relate to two kinds of competition: competition between undertakings in the relevant 
                                                 
4 The EC Council stated that “by its nature the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, including the 
Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts” (94/800/EC: 
Council Decision (of 22 December 1994) concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as 
regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations, 
1994 OJ L 336/1, 11th recital in the preamble). 
5 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 108. 
6 Massimo Merola, The Forces Shaping State Aid Control in the EU, in WHAT SHAPES THE LAW? REFLECTIONS ON 
THE HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SUBSIDY DISCIPLINES 101, 102 
(Luca Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins eds., 2016); see also Ninth Report on State Aids in the European Union, COM 
(2001) 403 final, at para. 2 (18 July 2001) (stating that “State aid can frustrate free competition by preventing the 
most efficient allocation of resources and posing a threat to the unity of the internal market” and that “sound State 
aid control and the judicious use of state resources lead . . . to the reduction in the disparities between prosperous 
regions and regions where there is either a concentration of crisis-ridden sectors or indeed no jobs at all.”). 
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market (like antitrust) and competition between Member States in the internal market. Member 
States have different resources to grant aid. As a result, the undertakings may have greater or 
fewer possibilities to receive aid depending on the Member State in which they are located.7 
State aid control, therefore, was introduce to avoid distortions of competition between companies 
and also to avoid subsidies races between Member States trying to attract companies to their 
territories.8 
 Countervailing duties are imposed by the EU in order to counteract the injurious effects 
of subsidized imports from non-EU countries on the EU market and to restore fair competition.9 
The EU is based on a Custom Union where customs duties are prohibited between Member 
States and a common tariff is adopted in respect of third countries.10 Likewise, the creation of 
the Common Market resulted in granting the EU exclusive competence in Common commercial 
policy,11 which covers trade protection measures.12 Thus, the competence of the EU in imposing 
countervailing duties is exclusive, Member States are not allowed to take anti-subsidy actions 
against goods imported from other Member States or third countries. 
                                                 
7 Former Commissioner Neelie Kroes stated that “some Member States have deeper pockets than others” and 
noticed that “one Member State spent 20 billion Euro of State aid in 2005, compared to 64 billion for the entire EU 
27” (see Neelie Kroes, The Law and Economics of State aid control – A Commission Perspective, SPEECH/07/60, 
speech delivered in Berlin on 8 October 2007 at Joint EStALI/ESMT Conference on “The Law and Economics of 
European State Aid Control,” at 4.). 
8 Jose Luis Buendia Sierra, EU State Aid Control: Competition Between Undertakings or Between Member States?, 
in WHAT SHAPES THE LAW? REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
AND EUROPEAN SUBSIDY DISCIPLINES 121, 122 (Luca Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins eds., 2016). 
9 Council Regulation 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not 
members of the European Community OJ L188/93. 
10 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 28. 
11 Id., art. 3.1(e). 
12 Id., art. 207.1. 
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B. RULES ON THE USE OF STATE AID 
The State aid policy of the EU cannot be properly understood without appreciating the broader 
objectives of EU policy and especially EU competition policy, which includes the rules on state 
aid. 
 Competition law has played a pivotal role in the process of European integration and has 
been profoundly influenced by ordoliberalism economic theory,13 developed by German 
economists and legal scholars from the 1930’s to the 1950’s. Professor Razeen Sally describes 
ordoliberalism as a holistic conception of political economy that goes some way beyond the mere 
economics of the market.14 It does not regard the market exclusively as a utilitarian efficiency 
device or an end in itself. To the contrary, the ordoliberals viewed “individual economic 
questions as constituent parts of a greater whole.”15 They criticized laissez-faire economics for 
ignoring the interaction of different policy areas that form part of an overarching economic 
order, arguing that this kind of thinking overlooks repercussions of particular policies on each 
other and, by extension, on the order as a whole.16 In particular, Professor Walter Eucken, one of 
the founders of ordoliberalism, criticized laissez-faire theory for not constructing the rules of the 
                                                 
13 Ordoliberalism takes its name from “order” in Latin. The Ordo concept originates in ancient philosophy, where it 
found expression in the word kosmos, which signified both “universe” and “order.” It then recurs through Saint 
Augustine to the scholasticism of the Middle Ages. It reappears in the thoughts of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, making the distinction between a given ordre naturel and a consciously instituted ordre positif. (See 
RAZEEN SALLY, CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: STUDIES IN THEORY AND 
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 108 (1998), quoting WALTER EUCKEN, DIE GRUNDLAGEN DER NATIONALÖKONOMIE 239 
(1989 [1941].)) 
14 Id. at 106. 
15 Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm & Hans Grossmann-Doerth, The Ordo Manifesto of 1936, in GERMANY’S SOCIAL 
MARKET ECONOMY: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 23-24 (Allan T. Peacock & Hans Willgerodt eds., 1989). (Stating that 
“[t]he treatment of all practical political-legal and political economic questions must be keyed to the idea of the 
economic constitution . . . The economic constitution must be understood as a general political decision as to how 
the economic life of the nation is to be structures.”). 
16 SALLY, supra note 13, at 108. 
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game to govern the economic process, thus leaving the generation of order to uncontrolled and 
spontaneous development. This, in his view, resulted in the emergence and rise of monopolies 
and oligopolies that progressively distorted both the market and the legal orders of societies.17 
 In general, the ordoliberals accepted the basic classical liberal points – that competition is 
necessary for economic well-being and that individuals should be as free as possible from state 
interference. However, in their view, it was not sufficient to protect the individual from the 
power of government, because both political and economic power were threats to individual 
freedoms. In particular, Professor Wilhelm Röpke advocated an economy composed to the extent 
possible of small and medium-sized firms and thus a society with a minimum of “big 
businesses.”18 Second, classical liberals argue that the competitive process will protect itself 
better than governmental intervention can, and the best way to protect competition is to leave it 
alone. The ordoliberals, on the other hand, insist on a strong state capable of resisting the 
influence of private power groups and argue that the effectiveness of the economy depends on its 
relationship to the political and legal systems.19 Thus, the argument goes, the basis for successful 
economic policy is the establishment of a strong legal and institutional framework, the main task 
of which is to create conditions under which the market functions properly and creates optimum 
economic outcomes.20 
                                                 
17 Id. at 109 (quoting WALTER EUCKEN, GRUNDSÄTZE DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK 29, 41-43, 49-50, 52-55 (1990 
[1952])) (stating that without any mechanism to hinder and check monopolies laissez-faire contributed to the 
replacement of “competition through achievements” (Leistungswettbewerb), which rewarded and punished 
entrepreneurs through the selection process of the market, by “competition to prevent competition” 
(Behinderungswettbewerb), which entailed the use of predatory measures, such as boycotts, price discrimination and 
cartels, to drive out and close the gates to competition). 
18 WILHELM RÖPKE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISINTEGRATION 67-69 (1942). 
19 DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 245-50 
(Oxford 1998); SALLY, supra note 5, at 105-21. 
20 As Professor Eucken put is, ordoliberalism “seeks to construct the forms of the economy or to influence the 
conditions under which they come about. But it leaves within these forms the plans and actions of households and 
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 Finally, social goals are an important part of ordoliberal thought. Classical liberals argue 
that the market, if left to itself, will promote economic growth and thus enhance social welfare. 
The ordoliberals – although agreeing that the economy is the primary means for integrating 
society around democratic and humane principles – view economic power as a major obstacle to 
social justice, because it creates the perception that the market is unfair and thus prevents it from 
operating as an instrument of social integration.21 
 Ordoliberalism was the basis for the post-war “social market economy” created in 
Germany. Likewise, it became a model for the building of the European single market and 
eventually the EU.22 
 Ordoliberal influence was particularly important in the area of EU competition law. For 
ordoliberals, competition law is central to the economic constitution of society because it 
constrains both economic power by punishing anticompetitive conducts and political power by 
limiting discretionary public intervention in the economy. 
 The purpose of introducing EU competition law was to complement the internal market 
rules by preventing businesses from partitioning the internal market and by encouraging 
                                                                                                                                                             
enterprises completely free.” (emphasis in original) (SALLY, supra note 13, at 111 (quoting WALTER EUCKEN, 
GRUNDSÄTZE DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK 242 (1990 [1952])). 
21 GERBER, supra note 19, at 241 (quoting WALTER EUCKEN, GRUNDSÄTZE DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK 185-93 (1990 
[1952])); FRANZ BÖHM, DIE ORDNUNG DER WIRTSCHAFT ALS GESCHICHTLICHE AUFGABE UND 
RECHTSSCHÖPFERISCHE ELEISTUNG 185 (Stuttgart 1937) (arguing that a liberal program could not work if it did not 
satisfy a certain type of “social need.”)). 
22 Id. at 263-65 (“Ordoliberal ideas suffused the process of European unification at its earliest stages and its highest 
levels. The leading German representatives in the founding of the EC generally were closely associated with 
Ordoliberalism.”). For example, Walter Hallstein was one of the founders of the EC and the first president of the 
European Commission, Hans von der Groeben was one of the two principal drafters of the “Spaak Report,” on 
which the EC Treaty was based, and the first Commissioner for competition policy, and Müller-Armack, the creator 
of social market economy ideas, was responsible as an official of the German government for influencing the 
development of EC economic policy during its formative years. 
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competition across borders.23 Professors Craig and de Búrca identify three objectives of EU 
competition law: first, to enhance efficiency, in the sense of maximizing consumer welfare and 
achieving the optimal allocation of resources; second, to protect consumers and small firms from 
large aggregations of economic power; and third, to facilitate the creation of a single European 
market.24 The State aid policy, as an integral part of EU competition policy, is therefore tied to 
these objectives and is applied taking into account the broad context and overall goals pursued 
by the EU. 
1. The Evolution of State Aid Law and Policy 
State aid rules date back to the establishment of the EC in 1957 (originally Articles 92-94 of EC 
Treaty, now Articles 107-109 of TFEU). While the language of these provisions has never been 
modified, the actual implementation of the rules has change a lot over time. 
 Article 92(1) of the EC Treaty (now Article 107 of TFEU) establishes the general 
principle that any state aid which distorts competition and affects trade between Member States 
is incompatible with the common market.25 Further, Article 93 of the EC Treaty (now Article 
108 of TFEU) gives the European Commission the authority to examine the compatibility of 
State aids with the common market. It requires Member States to notify their aid to the 
Commission and obtain Commission authorization before the implementation of such aid.26 
                                                 
23 DAMIAN CHALMERS, CHRISTOS HADJIEMMANUIL, GIORGIO MONTI & ADAM TOMKINS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW: 
TEXT AND MATERIALS 928 (2006); G. Marenco, The Birth of Modern Competition Law in Europe, in EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION: STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN HONOUR OF 
C.-D. EHLERMANN 297, 298 (A. von Bogandy, P. Mavroidis & Y. Mény eds., 2002). 
24 PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 936-37 (3d ed. 2002). 
25 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 107(1). 
26 Id., art. 108. 
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Finally, Article 94 of the EC Treaty (now Article 109 of TFEU) empowers the Council to make 
any appropriate Regulations for the application of Articles 92 and 93.27 
 Although the logic of the EC Treaty is to ensure undistorted competition regardless of 
whether the distortion is caused by the behavior of businesses or by the state, originally State aid 
law did not receive the same attention as antitrust or merger control and was at the margin of 
competition policy. Until the mid-1980s, a period referred to by some authors as the “dark 
ages,”28 the EC was unable to contain national protectionism during the economic crisis of the 
1970s and early 1980, leading to subsidy wars in particular in the field of textiles and steel.29 
There was a lack of discipline among Member States in terms of notification of aid before 
implementing it. The Commission also had to withdraw a proposed Regulation – thus applying 
soft law to regulate State aid instead of using Regulations and limiting its own power in this 
area.30 
 In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) amended the EC Treaty to require the 
progressive establishment of an internal, barrier-free market by 31 December 1992.31 The basic 
assumption behind the creation of the European single market was that Europeans would gain 
economic benefits from a more competitive market. Competition law, therefore, was given an 
                                                 
27 Id., art. 109. 
28 Thibaut Kleiner, The State Aid Reform, in THE EC STATE AID REGIME: DISTORTIVE EFFECTS OF STATE AID ON 
COMPETITION AND TRADE 827, 828 (Michael Sánchez Rydelski ed., 2006). 
29 Thibaut Kleiner, Modernization of State Aid Policy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EUROPEAN STATE AID LAW 1, 6 
(Erika Szyszczak ed., 2012); see also Merola, supra note 6, at 103 (stating that because of the financial crisis 
“European government started to deliberately use public subsidies to promote national undertakings and raise 
employment level. Additionally, the fact that Japanese and American companies started locating their pants in 
Europe led some Member States to offer subsidies in order to attract them in their country.”). 
30 Kleiner, supra note 29, at 6. 
31 Single European Act, 1987 OJ L 169/1, at art. 8a (amending Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11) [hereinafter SEA]. 
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important role in ensuring that these economic benefits would be achieved.32 As a result, the 
Commission started to enforce State aid law more effectively, in particular regarding repayment 
of unlawful aid.33 Professor Massimo Merola emphasized that the Commission’s new policy 
ordering the recovery of unlawfully granted aid was the first key turning points in the reshaping 
of the EU State control system because without this instrument – not included in the Treaty – 
Member States would have had nothing to fear in implementing illegal aid.34 
 The most significant developments occurred during the 1990s. Hard law was adopted by 
the Council to regulate the Commission’s State aid procedure35 and to enable the Commission to 
adopt group exemption regulations in the field of horizontal aid.36 With the adoption of hard law 
the Commission started to have an increasing influence on Member States’ national aid policies. 
In parallel, during this period the European Court of Justice (ECJ) adopted landmark decisions 
on some key concepts in State aid law.37 
 In sum, this phase of the evolution of State aid policy is marked by tightening the rules on 
granting State aid and securing their enforcement. At the same time, as Thibaut Kleiner points 
                                                 
32 As Hans von der Groeben, the first Commissioner for competition policy, observed: “without rules on competition 
and an active competition policy, even the customs union would cease to exist.” Although restricting anti-
competitive behavior on the part of private actors was central, it was not sufficient to create a level playing field 
because, as customs barriers were removed and competition intensified, some Member States “would not be able to 
resist temptation to grant application for aid.” (VON DER GROEBEN, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. THE FORMATIVE 
YEARS 60, 63-54 (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1987)). 
33 In 1982, the first decision ordering a recovery was issued (Decision No. 1982/312/EC of 19 May 1982, OJ 1982 L 
138/18). This became possible due to the European Court of Justice support, which ruled that the Commission could 
ask for repayment of illegally granted aid (Case 70/72, Commission v. Germany, [1973] ECR 813, at para. 13.). 
34 Merola, supra note 6, at 104. 
35 Council Regulation No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of 
the EC Treaty, OJ L 83/1, 27.03. 1999 [hereinafter Procedure Regulation]. 
36 Council Regulation (EC) No 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community to certain categories of horizontal aid, OJ L 142, 14.5.1998. 
37 See, e.g., Case C-379/98, PreussenElekrta AG v. Schleswag, [2002] ECR I-2099; Case C-399/94, Syndicat 
Français de l’Express International (SFEI) and Others v. La Poste, [1996] ECR I-3547; Case C-305/89 Italy v. 
Commission (Alfa Romeo), [1991] ECR I-1603; Case C-75/97, Belgium v. Commission (Maribel), [1999] ECR I-
3671. 
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out, this period was influenced by the derogatory model, where State aid control was primarily 
associated with the preservation of the single market.38 In his view, this approach leads to a 
vision of State aid “as a legal process of formal typology, categorizing some State actions as aid 
and designating formal areas of derogation to the general prohibition of State aid.”39 
 In 2005, Commissioner Neelie Kroes introduced the State aid reform program through 
the State Aid Action Plan (SAAP).40 SAAP was meant to reshape certain aspects of State aid law 
and policy in order to better fulfil long term economic goals in EU industrial policy and 
economic growth. The SAAP’s subtitle, “less and better targeted aid,” reflects the idea of the 
Lisbon Strategy to create stronger growth and more jobs.41 Reforms promoted a new role for 
State aid, “not as a legal control mechanism restraining Member States’ from intervention in the 
economy, but rather as a policy supporting common goals of the Union.”42 In other words, the 
main objective was not just to reduce aid but rather to divert aid to reasonable objectives of 
common interest and, thus, to promote better-targeted aid and better public spending. By 
introducing the SAAP the Commission acknowledged that there are two possible ways of 
increasing society’s welfare through State aid. First, State aid, when it targets market failures, 
can improve efficiency. Second, when the market functions properly but produces undesirable 
                                                 
38 Kleiner, supra note 29, at 2-3. 
39 Id. (stating that in result “a strict legal tradition has developed in which State aid is deemed illegal, unless certain 
(largely form-based) criteria are met.”). 
40 State Aid Action Plan – Less and Better Targeted State Aid: A Roadmap for State Aid Reform 2005-2009, COM 
(2005) 107 final [hereinafter SAAP]. 
41 Communication to the Spring European Council – working together for growth and jobs – a new start for the 
Lisbon Strategy, Communication from President Barroso in agreement with Vice-President Verheugen COM 24 
final, Brussels 2.2.2005. 
42 Kleiner, supra note 29, at 12. 
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results (such as social or regional inequality), government intervention through State aid can be 
used to achieve equity objectives.43 
 The cornerstone of SAAP’s reforms was the introduction of a refined economic analysis. 
Before SAAP, EC State aid rules tended to be rather form-based and did not leave much room 
for assessing the impact of the measure on competition and trade.44 A newly developed 
“balancing test” now assesses the compatibility of a State aid measure in three steps: (1) whether 
there is a market failure or another objective of common interest (e.g. social or regional 
cohesion); (2) whether the aid measure is targeted, i.e. does the proposed aid address the market 
failure or other objective; and (3) are whether the distortions of competition and effect on trade 
are sufficiently limited, so that the overall balance is positive.45 Thus, the test looks at the 
positive and negative effects of aid and compares them in order to determine whether, on 
balance, the aid should be authorized. In this way, the new test not only distinguishes between 
“good” and “bad” aid, but also delivers a tool that might serve to justify “good” aid in terms of 
efficiency and equity, as compared to total welfare. 
 In 2012, the Commission launched the State Aid Modernization (SAM).46 The objectives 
pursued by SAM to a large extent overlap the ones pursed by SAAP.47 At the same time, the 
                                                 
43 SAAP, supra note 40, at I.1.10. 
44 Hans W. Friederiszick, Lars-Henkrik Röller & Vincent Verouden, EC State Aid Control: An Economic 
Perspective, in THE EC STATE AID REGIME: DISTORTIVE EFFECTS OF STATE AID ON COMPETITION AND TRADE 145, 
152 (Michael Sánchez Rydelski ed., 2006). 
45 Id. at 165. 
46 Communication from the Commission, EU State Aid Modernization, COM/2012/0209 final, 08/05/2012 
[hereinafter SAM]. 
47 Among the main objectives of SAM are to foster growth in a competitive internal market and to streamline the 
rules and provide for faster decisions (id. at 2.1, 2.3). 
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new reform appears to be “more pragmatic.”48 According to the Commission, “[t]he drive 
towards more efficient spending should not translate into micro control of all public expenditure 
but rather into prioritization and stronger scrutiny of the aid with a significant impact on the 
single market.”49 It is achieved by an extension of the categories of State aid that are exempt 
from ex ante notification to the Commission.50 This would allow the Commission to focus more 
efficiently on aid which has a significant impact on the single market. 
 In general, the latest developments resulted, in Professor Merola’s words, in “a move 
from a purely form-based approach towards an effects-based and efficiency-based approach.”51 
Similarly, according to Thibaut Kleiner, they demonstrate a move from a derogatory model to a 
competition model. While a derogatory model views State aid as belonging more to the single 
market body of regulation, and the prohibition of State aid as necessary for the preservation of 
the single market, a competition model views State aid control as one way to promote the good 
functioning of markets.52 
                                                 
48 Buendia, supra note 8, at 127; Claire Micheau, Evolution of State Aid Rules: Conceptions, Challenges, and 
Outcomes, in STATE AID LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 18, 34 (Herwig C.H. Hofmann & Claire Micheau eds., 
2016). 
49 SAM, supra note 46, at 19 (emphasis added). 
50 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1224/2013 of 29 November 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No. 800/2008, OJ 
L 320, 30/11/2013 (According to evidence collected for the 2014 State aid scoreboard, over 80% of compatible aid 
measure are now going through the General Block Exemption Regulation, and can therefore be implemented by 
Member States immediately, without having to seek prior approval by the Commission. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html). 
51 Merola, supra note 6, at 107. 
52 Kleiner, supra note 29, at 3-4. See also Buendia, supra note 8, at 215-27 (arguing that originally the main purpose 
of State aid policy was rather “to put limits on the competition between Member States and to prevent subsidy war 
between them.” Since 2000, however, the emphasis started to change more to “the competition between 
undertakings as the core mission of State aid control.”) (emphasis added). 
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2. The Concept of State Aid 
The basic objective of State aid policy is laid down in Article 107(1) of the TFEU, which 
provides that: 
Save as otherwise in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through 
state resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
common market.53 
The provision does not provide a definition of State aid. Instead, it contains cumulative 
conditions which a measure must satisfy in order to be classified as State aid: (1) it must be 
granted by the state or through state resources; (2) it must confer an advantage to the recipient; 
(3) it must favor certain undertakings and thus be selective; and (4) it must distort competition 
and affect trade between Member States. 
 If these criteria are met, a measure is considered to be State aid, must be notified to the 
Commission, and will normally be considered incompatible with the common market unless it 
falls under exceptions provided in Article 107(2) and (3). 
a. Aid Granted by a Member State or through State Resources The wording of Article 
107(1), which refers to “any aid” “in any form whatsoever,” suggests a very broad interpretation 
of the term “State aid.” This view was supported by the ECJ which held that the concept of aid is 
wider than that of a subsidy, 
because it embraces not only positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but 
also interventions which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are 
normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, without, therefore, 
                                                 
53 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 107(1). 
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being subsidies in the strict meaning of the word, are similar in character and have 
the same effect.54 
Under Article 107(1), State aid must be granted “by a Member State or through state resources” 
in order to be prohibited. Although the language of the provision seems to suggest that State aid 
may be granted alternatively by a Member State or through state resources, the ECJ had 
interpreted this provision to mean that both State attribution and State resources are required in 
order for a measure to fall under the scope of Article 107.55 
 The notion of “State” includes the central government and its ministries or departments, 
regional and local governments or councils and municipalities.56 Likewise, certain measures 
taken by public undertakings and private bodies can fall within Article 107(1).57 Aid, however, 
should not be presumed solely because the undertaking is under the influence or control of the 
State. Given that public undertakings often have a degree of autonomy in relation to decision-
making, whether or not an undertaking is to be considered acting under the influence of the State 
is to be determined by all the circumstances of the case and the context in which a given measure 
is taken.58 
 In its landmark decision, PreussenElektra, the ECJ determined that “only advantages 
granted directly or indirectly through State resources are to be considered as aid” within the 
                                                 
54 Case 30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, [1961] ECR 1, para. 27. 
55 Case 78/76, Steinike & Weinlig v. Federal Republic of Germany, [1977] ECR 595, para. 21. 
56 PHEDON NICOLAIDES, MIHALIS KEKELEKIS & MARIA KLEIS, STATE AID POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 11 (2d ed. 2008). 
57 In Steinike & Weinlig, the ECJ stated that the prohibition under Article 107(1) “covers all aid granted by a 
member state or through state resources without its being necessary to make a distinction whether the aid is granted 
directly by the state or by public or private bodies established or appointed by it to administer aid.” (supra note 55, 
para. 21). 
58 Case C-482/99, France v. Commission, [2002] ECR I-nyr, para. 55. 
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meaning of Article 107(1).59 In other words, aid must entail some form of financial burden on 
public funds. In his Opinion, Advocate General Jacobs, too, favored this narrow interpretation of 
“State resources” over a more extensive one, arguing that it “provides more legal certainty”: 
the more extensive interpretation would oblige the Member States, affected 
undertakings, the Commission, national courts and ultimately the Community 
Courts to decide in respects of all legislation regulating the relationship between 
enterprises whether it does confer selective advantages on certain 
undertakings . . . Since such an assessment is a difficult exercise with an uncertain 
outcome, it seems preferable that legislation regulating the relationship between 
private actors is as a matter of principle excluded from the scope of the State aid 
rules.60 
Consequently, regulatory or administrative measures are not considered to be State aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1), even if they confer a commercial advantage to certain undertakings. 
b. Advantage Granted to the Recipient The recipients of State aid are “undertakings.” This 
term is not defined anywhere in the Treaty. It refers broadly to any natural or legal person, 
regardless of legal status and means by which it is financed, who carries out economic activities 
of certain regularity and duration and which could be done for remuneration.61 
                                                 
59 Case C-379/98, PreussenElekrta AG v. Schleswag, [2002] ECR I-2099, para. 58 (There, the ECJ concluded that 
the German law requiring private electricity supply undertakings to purchase electricity produced in their area of 
supply from renewable energy sources at minimum prices higher than the real economic value of that type of 
electricity did not constitute State aid because the transfer of resources took place between private undertakings and, 
thus, there was no impact on the public budget). 
60 Opinion in PreussenElektra, id., para. 157 (emphasis added). 
61 NICOLAIDES, KEKELEKIS & KLEIS, supra note 56, at 17. In a recent case, it was confirmed that: 
[i]t is settled case law that, first, in the field of competition law the concepts of undertaking covers 
any entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the legal status and the way in which it is 
financed and, secondly, any activity consisting in offering goods or services on a given market is 
an economic activity. It follows from this that where or not an activity is economic in nature does 
not depend on the private or public status of the entity engaged in it or the profitability of that 
activity. 
Case C-288/11 P, Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle GmbH v. Commission, EU:C:2012:821, 
para. 50. 
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 To be able to ascertain whether the provision of public funds constitutes State aid which 
confers an advantage to certain undertakings, the Commission and the ECJ have developed the 
“private investor” test. The test examines the terms and conditions under which public authorities 
make funding available to undertakings and asks whether a hypothetical private investor would 
have made the funds available, and, if so, whether that investor would have done so on the same 
terms. If the terms and conditions would not have been acceptable to the hypothetical private 
investor, then the measure is considered to be State aid.62 The hypothetical market investor is, in 
principle, only guided by prospects of profitability and optimization of the return on the invested 
capital.63 Thus, other kinds of considerations, such as social or cultural considerations, should 
only be taken into account when assessing the compatibility of the aid.64 
c. Selectivity The selectivity criteria serve to distinguish general measures introduced by 
Member States from those that constitute State aid. Article 107(1) refers to the aid favoring “a 
certain undertaking or the production of certain goods,” i.e. only aids that are selective or 
specific fall within the notion of “State aid.” 
 In order to determine what “certain” means in “favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods,” the ECJ has made it clear that neither a high number of benefiting 
undertakings nor the diversity and importance of industrial sectors warrants the conclusion that a 
                                                 
62 Paris Anestis & Stephen Mavroghenis, The Market Investor Test, in THE EC STATE AID REGIME: DISTORTIVE 
EFFECTS OF STATE AID ON COMPETITION AND TRADE 109, 112 (Michael Sánchez Rydelski ed., 2006). 
63 In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (previously the ECJ) confirmed that it is established case law 
that when contributions of capital by a public investor disregard any prospect of profitability, even in the long term, 
such contributions must be regarded as aid (Joined cases C-533/12 P and C-536/12 P, SNCM and France v. Corsica 
Ferries France, EU:C:2014:2142, para. 39). 
64 See Case C-305/89 Italy v. Commission (Alfa Romeo), [1991] ECR I-1603, paras. 19, 20; joined Cases T-233/99 
Westdeutsche Landersbank Girozentrale and Land Nordrhein – Westfalen v. Commission (West LB), [2003] ECR 
II-435, paras. 250, 251, 255, 258. 
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scheme constitutes a general measure rather than a State aid.65 For example, a Spanish program 
to assist in the purchase of commercial vehicles by natural persons, small and medium 
enterprises, regional public bodies, and bodies providing local public services, was found to be 
selective because it excluded large enterprises.66 Similarly, in Adria-Wien, the ECJ concluded 
that the energy tax rebate for undertakings engaged primarily in the manufacture of goods was 
selective because the end result was that undertakings manufacturing goods were supplied with 
energy on preferential terms compared to undertakings supplying services.67 
 Notwithstanding the appearance of being generally available, the measure at issue may in 
fact be limited to certain enterprises and, thus, constitute State aid. In Commission v. Italy, in 
assessing whether a measure by which Italy reduced social welfare contributions by 4 per cent 
for male workers and 10 per cent for female workers was selective, the ECJ observed that such a 
measure favored de facto industries with a large number of female workers, in particular, the 
textile, clothing, footwear and leather industries. Accordingly, the Court concluded that such a 
measure constituted State aid.68 
 Thus, the notion of selectivity is a very broad one. As Advocate General Roemer sums it 
up, the requirement of selectivity applies to any measure which does not apply generally to all 
undertakings in a Member State.69 
                                                 
65 Case C-75/97, Belgium v. Commission (Maribel), [1999] ECR I-3671, paras. 32-34. 
66 Case C-351/98, Spain v. Commission, [2002] ECR I-8031, para.43. 
67 Case C-143/99, Adria-Wien Pipeline GMBH [2001] ECR I-8365, para. 48. 
68 Case 203/82, Commission v. Italy, [1983] ECR 2525, para. 4. 
69 Case 6 & 11/69, Commission v. France, [1969] ECR 523, per Advocate General Roemer, at 552. 
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 On the other hand, when aid is granted in accordance with objective, neutral and 
automatic criteria, there is no specificity. In the CETM case, the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
explained: 
The fact that the aid is not aimed at one or more specific recipients defined in 
advance, but that it is subject to a series of objective criteria pursuant to which it 
may be granted, within the framework of a predetermined overall budget 
association, to an indefinite number of beneficiaries who are not initially 
individually identified, cannot suffice to call into question the selective nature of 
the measure, and, accordingly, its classification as state aid.70 
For example, investment in infrastructure which benefits undertakings generally, rather than one 
or more specific undertaking, is regarded as a general measure which is not selective and thus 
does not constitute State aid.71 
d. Effect on Trade and Distortion of Competition The definition of State aid under Article 
107(1) provides for two different final elements: the measure must “distort or threaten to distort 
competition,” and it must “affect trade between Member States.”72 Although formally separate, 
these elements usually have been assessed together.73 
 As aid must “distort or threaten to distort” competition, it is not necessary to establish 
that the aid actually disturbs the conditions of competition. It suffices to show that the measure 
threatens to distort competition.74 The main approach for the assessment of the distortion of 
                                                 
70 Case T-55/99, Confederación Espaňola de Transporte de mercancias (CETM) v. Commission, [2000] ECR II-
3207, para. 40. 
71 See Commission Decision 91/390, Saint Gobain (Eurofloat), OJ 1991 L315/11, Case C-225/91, Matra SA v. 
Commission, [1993] ECR I-3203, para. 29. 
72 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 107(1). 
73 Case T-288/97, Regione Autonoma Friuli Venezia Giulia v. Commission, [2001] ECR II-1169, paras. 49-50. 
74 Id. 
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competition (and the effect on trade) was set in the Philip Morris case.75 The ECJ there required 
the strengthening of “the position of [the recipient] undertaking compared with other 
undertakings competing in intra-Community trade” to prove a distortion of competition and an 
effect on trade.76 
 While the Commission is required to provide a statement of reasons for its determination 
of distortion of competition,77 in principle no type of market analysis in necessary. For example, 
in the Wam case,78 the General Court concluded that the Commission was not required to define 
the relevant market and analyze its structure, as well as the competitive relationships that arise. 
Furthermore, the court explained that aid that is intended to release an undertaking from costs 
which it would normally have to bear in its day-to-day management or normal activities, in 
principle, distorts the conditions of competition.79 Therefore, the standard of proof for the 
“distortion of competition” element is relatively low and no detailed evidence is required. 
 As mentioned above, the “effect on trade between Member States” is traditionally 
analyzed together with the concept of “distortion of competition.” Moreover, in Philip Morris, 
the ECJ concluded that once the position of an undertaking active in Community trade is 
“strengthened,” an effect on trade should almost invariably be assumed.80 
                                                 
75 Case 730/79, Philip Morris v. Commission, [1980] ECR 2671. 
76 Id., para. 11. 
77 Case 296/82, Netherlands and Leeuwarder Papiervarenfabriek BV, [1985] ECR 809, para. 24. 
78 Case T-257/10, Italy v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:504, para. 100. 
79 Id., para. 78-79. 
80 Case 730/79, Philip Morris, supra note 75, para. 11. In a more recent case, the General Court confirmed that it is 
settled case law that since these two conditions [affecting inter-state trade and distorting competition] are linked, the 
Commission is not required to analyze them separately provided that the Commission’s reasoning clearly shows 
how these conditions have been fulfilled (Case T-257/10, Italy v. Commission, supra note 60, para. 100). 
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 If a measure benefits only products which are not subject to any competition, or which 
are not the subject of inter-State trade, or where trade is affected only at the national level, the 
measure does not fall within the scope of Article 107(1). For example, the Commission has 
concluded that aid for research and development granted to Airbus did not affect trade between 
Member States and, therefore, did not constitute State aid under Article 107(1), because Airbus 
is the only producer of civil aircraft in the EU, and there is potentially no market for more EU 
producers.81 Similarly, subsidies granted to hairdressers would not be considered to be State aid 
within the meaning of Article 107(1) because individuals do not normally buy hairdressing 
services from other Member States.82 
 Nevertheless, even if aid is granted to an undertaking which sells its products exclusively 
within the domestic market, it still may have an effect on trade between Member States. This 
could be the case where undertakings established in other Member States have less chance of 
exporting their products to the markets in the Member State granting the aid,83 or where there is 
no intra-Community trade at the time when the aid is granted but it is already foreseeable that 
exports will shortly be directed to other Member States.84 
 There is no threshold below which it may be concluded that aid does not distort 
competition or affect trade between Member States. As the ECJ explained in Spain v. 
Commission: 
As regards the Spanish government’s first argument that the overall amount of aid 
in question is small and that it is divided among a large number of farmers, each 
of whom received a negligible sum in national or Community terms, it is settled 
                                                 
81 Commission Decision N 369/98, 1998 OJ (C52) 10. 
82 XXVIth Report on Competition Policy, 1996, at 230. 
83 Case 102/87, France v. Commission, [1988] ECR 4067, para. 19; Cases C-278/92-280/92, Spain v. Commission, 
[1994] ECR I-4103, para. 40. 
84 Cases T-447-449/93, AITEC v. Commission, [1995] ECR II-1971, paras. 139-140. 
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case-law of the Court that the relatively small amount of aid or the relatively 
small size of undertaking which receives it does not as such exclude the possibility 
that intra-Community trade may be affected . . . Other factors may be decisive 
when assessing the effect of aid on trade, such as whether the aid is cumulative 
and whether the undertakings that receive it are operating in a sector that is 
particularly exposed to competition.85 
 In sum, “distort competition” and “effect on trade” elements are both relatively easy to 
establish. As Vittorio Di Bucci observes, whenever the other requirements of the definition are 
fulfilled, a distortion of competition affecting intra-EC trade will almost invariably follow.86 
3. Compatibility with the Common Market 
Article 107(1) does not contain a direct prohibition against aid but only a declaration of 
incompatibility with the common market. Although the ECJ originally interpreted this provision 
as an implied prohibition, it emphasized that the prohibition is neither absolute nor 
unconditional.87 In certain cases, State aid is compatible with the common market and, therefore, 
permissible. First, Article 107(2) lays down that certain categories of aid are automatically 
compatible with the common market. Second, the Commission has discretion under Article 
107(3) to consider the compatibility of certain categories of aid with the common market on the 
basis of a number of objectives. Finally, according to Article 107(3)(e) the Council may decide 
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that other categories of aid may be compatible with the common market if such a decision is 
justified by exceptional circumstances. 
a. State Aid per se Compatible with the Common Market Article 107(2) defines three 
categories of State aid that are automatically compatible with the common market: (a) aid having 
a social character, granted to individual consumers; (b) aid designed to make good the damage 
caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences; and (c) aid granted to the economy of 
certain areas of the Federal Republic of Germany affected by the division of Germany.88 
 Although these categories of State aid must be notified to the Commission prior to being 
put into effect, once it is established that a type of aid falls under the scope of one of these 
provisions, the Commission cannot withhold its authorization and should regard it as compatible 
with the common market.89 
 Aid of a social character should be granted directly to individual consumers rather than 
undertakings. Thus, for example, the provision of cheap bread for consumers with low incomes 
falls under the scope of Article 107(2)(a), whereas aid granted directly to the mill in the form of 
subsidized wheat does not.90 This aid must also be granted “without discrimination related to the 
origin of the products concerned.”91 
 Aid to offset the damages caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences are 
compatible with the common market if there is a direct link between a natural disaster or 
                                                 
88 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 107(2). 
89 Case 730/79, Philip Morris, supra note 75, para. 17. 
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91 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 107(2)(a). This also applies to discrimination in favor of providers of services 
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exceptional occurrence and the economic disadvantage which calls for the aid in question.92 
“Natural disasters” include floods, droughts, tornadoes, forest fires, earthquakes, plagues, and the 
like.93 To fall in the scope of Article 107(2)(b) the natural disaster must be out of the ordinary, 
substantial and unpredictable. Thus, for example, rainfall below normal rates that has a negative 
effect on agricultural production is not to be considered a natural disaster.94 “Exceptional 
occurrences” are war, serious civil disturbance, nuclear explosions, and other cases of force 
majeure.95 In all of these cases, the aid granted should not exceed the damage to be repaired.96 
 Aid in relation to the division of Germany was authorized before German re-unification, 
when the objective of the aid was to offset the effects of the physical division of the country 
(transport, communications, etc.), not the overall effects of the communist economic system in 
East Germany.97 As of 1990, the Commission has considered item (c) no longer to justify aid 
granted to regions of East Germany.98 
b. State Aid which may be Compatible with the Common Market Article 107(3) lists five 
categories that “may be considered to be compatible with the common market.”99 The first four 
categories of aid are subject to control by the Commission, whereas under Article 107(3)(e) the 
Council has the power to exempt other categories of aid. It must do so acting by a qualified 
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94 Id. 
95 CONOR QUIGLEY & ANTONY COLLINS, EC STATE AID LAW AND POLICY 78 (2003). 
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majority on a proposal from the Commission.100 The four categories of aid subject to 
Commission approval are: (1) aid to certain severely depressed regions;101 (2) aid to promote the 
execution of an important project of common European interest or to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State;102 (3) sectoral and regional aid which does not 
adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest;103 and (4) aid to 
promote culture and heritage conservation.104 
 The Commission has a wide discretion as to whether such aid should be authorized. In 
1980, the Commission established a general approach for exercising its discretional power with 
regard to Article 107(3), which has become known as the “compensatory justification principle.” 
In particular, the Commission explained that for aid to benefit from exemption under Article 
107(3) it must contain a “compensatory justification which takes the form of a contribution by 
the beneficiary of aid over and above the effects of normal play of market forces to the 
achievement of Community objectives.”105 In other words, whereas it is necessary for the aid to 
be consistent with an objective in Article 107(3), consistency alone is not sufficient to merit 
exception. The Member State Government must demonstrate that the aid is indispensable to the 
achievement of the Article 107(3) objective.106 In Philip Morris, the Dutch government granted 
aid to assist cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris expand its facility in the economically 
depressed region of Bergen-op-Zoom. Both the government and Philip Morris argued that the aid 
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merited exemption under Article 107(3)(a) because it would help “promote the economic 
development” in the area, where the standard of living was “abnormally low.” The Commission 
agreed that the region was economically depressed, but at the same time it noted that Philip 
Morris, a healthy and profitable company, was capable of undertaking the investment on its own 
and did not require government assistance. According to the Commission, such aid was not 
indispensable to reaching the objectives of Article 107(3) and, therefore, lacked a compensatory 
justification.107 
 Subsequently, the Commission indicated that it would take into account the following 
factors when exercising its discretion with regard to Article 107(3): (1) the aid should promote 
development which is in the interest of the Community as a whole; (2) the aid must be necessary 
for the achievement of this result, and the objective must not be obtainable otherwise in its 
absence; (3) the duration, intensity and scope of the aid must be proportional to the importance 
of the intended result.108 
 Over the years, the Commission also adopted a number of regulations and so-called soft-
law provisions, such as guidelines and communications. In particular, through General Block 
Exemption Regulations the Commission can declare certain categories of aid (for small and 
medium-sized enterprises, research and innovation, region development and the like) compatible 
with the common market and not subject to the notification requirement.109 The purpose of block 
exemption regulations is to release the Commission from the time-consuming assessment of 
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rather small aid schemes and ad-hoc cases and to enable it to concentrate on the important cases 
in terms of potential effects on competition.110 
 Although the general principle behind the Commission’s compatibility assessment is to 
balance the positive impact of the aid measure (pursuing an objective of common interest) with 
its potential negative effects (distortions of trade and competition), in practice decisions tend to 
be “rather form-based and [do] not leave much room for assessing the impact of the measure on 
competition and trade.”111 Consequently, as Professors Friederiszick, Röller and Dr. Verouden 
point out, this increases the risk of disallowing aids which do not meet the conditions but which 
would very likely be benign from the common EU point of view, while allowing aids which 
formally meet the conditions but which are likely to be ineffective or to distort competition.112 
 In 2005, the Commission introduced its State Aid Action Plan (SAAP) which is intended 
to strike a better balance between the costs and benefits of State aid through an increased reliance 
on economic analysis.113 Under SAAP, the Commission’s assessment of the compatibility of aid 
should be more firmly grounded on the wider economic impact of the aid measure, its potential 
to remedy market failures, and its impact on competition and relevant market – as opposed to its 
impact on rivals’ costs.114 The SAAP indicates that there are two ways in which State aid may 
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increase welfare: by improving efficiency when the market fails to deliver an optimal economic 
outcome; and by improving equity, when the market produces social or regional inequality.115 
Therefore, the centerpiece of the refined economic approach in the State aid reform package is 
the “balancing test,” which assesses the compatibility of a State aid measure in response to three 
questions: (1) is the State aid aimed at a well-defined objective of common interest (e.g. social or 
regional cohesion); (2) is the State aid well designed to deliver the objective of common interest, 
i.e., does the proposed measure address the market failure or other objective; and (3) are the 
distortions of competition and effect on trade sufficiently limited, so that the overall balance is 
positive?116 In other words, a particular State aid measure should be declared compatible 
whenever its benefits (in terms of economic efficiency or equity) outweigh the distortions of 
competition that the measure is likely to cause. 
 Before the SAAP, the only application of economic analysis was in the area of the 
“private investor test,” which is used to identify whether the transfer of state resources 
constitutes aid.117 The balancing test, therefore, is an important development, as it advances a 
much needed economic approach to the compatibility criteria under Article 107(3), and thus 
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provides the opportunity for reducing the level of political interference in State aid control and 
furthering the role of economic and legal analysis.118 
4. Procedure and Remedies 
Supervisory control by the Commission is considered essential to the effective enforcement of 
the EU rules on State aid. Article 108 of the TFEU sets out the procedure for the examination of 
State aid measures by the Commission. In order to make the process more transparent and 
predictable, Council Regulation 659/1999 (hereinafter “Procedural Regulation”) lays down 
detailed rules for the application of Article 108.119 These rules have been further refined and 
clarified by Commission Regulation 794/2004 (hereinafter “Implementing Regulation”), which 
provides interpretative rules and a set of notification forms.120 Finally, EU case law has 
developed a consistent practice for the application of Article 108. 
a. Commission’s Supervisory Control According to Article 108 of the TFEU, Member States 
are required to notify each State aid to the Commission and obtain Commission authorization 
before they implement the measure.121 Member States are thus under an obligation not to 
implement a State aid before the Commission has stated its position by declaring either that the 
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measure does not constitute State aid under Article 106 or that it is compatible with the internal 
market under Article 107. In contrast to other competition procedures, where the parties 
concerned are directly involved and have procedural rights of their own, State aid procedure 
involves only the Member State and the Commission. Third parties, such as a beneficiary or a 
competitor of a beneficiary, do not have a formal role to play other than being an “informant.”122
 The procedures for controlling State aid vary depending on whether or not the measure 
has been previously notified to the Commission. The notification requirement is applicable to 
“new aid” measures.123 Article 1(c) of the Procedural Regulation defines “new aid” as any aid 
that is not “existing aid,”124 but including alterations to existing aid.125 According to Article 2.1 
of the Procedural Regulation, any plans to grant new aid must be notified to the Commission “in 
sufficient time” by the Member State concerned.126 Once the notification is received, the 
Commission must conduct a preliminary examination of the State aid.127 The preliminary 
procedure is intended to enable the Commission to form a prima facie opinion on the partial or 
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complete compatibility of the aid in question.128 As a result of its preliminary examination, the 
Commission can conclude that (1) the measure does not constitute State aid in the meaning of 
Article 106(1) of the TFEU;129 (2) “no doubts are raised” as to the compatibility of the measure 
with the common market;130 or (3) there are “doubts” as to the compatibility of the measure with 
the common market.131 The decision must be taken within two months.132In cases where the 
Commission has serious doubts as to the compatibility of the measure, it must open the formal 
investigation procedure.133 The Member State concerned is informed of the initiation of 
proceedings by letter, whereas the other Member States and interested third parties are informed 
by a notice published in the Official Journal.134 The Commission must conclude the formal 
procedure within 18 months from the opening of the procedure.135 This time limit may be 
extended by common agreement between the Commission and the Member State concerned.136 
As a result of the formal procedure, the Commission may determine: (1) that the measure does 
not constitute State aid;137 (2) that the measure is compatible with the common market (positive 
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decision);138 (3) that the measure may be considered compatible with the common market if it is 
subject to certain conditions (conditional decision);139 or (4) the measure is incompatible with 
the common market (negative decision).140 
 Article 108(3) of the TFEU specifically prohibits the granting of any State aid before the 
Commission has had the opportunity to assess its compatibility with the common market.141 
Thus, a measure that does constitute a State aid, and that has been implemented without prior 
notification, is considered to be an unlawful or illegal aid. On the other hand, the mere fact that 
aid is unlawful does not mean that it is also incompatible with the common market.142 The 
procedure for unlawful aid is similar to that for new aid. It consists of two phases, a preliminary 
examination and, in case there are doubts regarding the nature of the measure or its 
compatibility, a formal investigation procedure. The Commission may issue an injunction 
requiring the Member State to suspend any unlawful measure until the Commission has taken a 
decision on the compatibility of the measure with the common market (suspension 
injunction).143 Likewise, the Commission may adopt a decision requiring the Member State to 
provisionally recover any unlawful aid until the final decision is taken (recovery injunction).144 
The provisional recovery is exceptional, and the Commission does not use it in practice.145 In the 
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case of non-notified aid, the Commission always assesses the compatibility of unlawful State aid 
with the common market in accordance with the rules applicable at the time when the aid was 
granted.146 If, at the end of the investigation procedure, the Commission reaches the conclusion 
that the unlawful aid is not compatible with the common market it must order recovery of the 
unlawfully paid aid.147 
 Misuse of aid involves action by a beneficiary rather than by a Member State and arises 
where aid is used by the beneficiary in contravention of a decision of the Commission declaring 
a measure to be compatible with the common market.148 The procedure is the same as that for 
unlawful aid, but the Commission should always open the formal investigation procedure, given 
that misuse of aid can only arise in the context of existing aid.149 Where the Commission finds 
that the misuse of aid is incompatible with the common market, it requires the Member State to 
recover the aid that has been misused.150 
b. Recovery of Aid If, in the course of a State aid investigation, the Commission reaches the 
conclusion that the grant of certain aid is incompatible with the common market, the 
Commission must decide that the Member State concerned “shall take the necessary measures to 
recover the aid from the beneficiary,” unless this would be contrary to a general principle of 
Community law.151 Thus, the Commission has no discretion to wave the recovery of the 
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unlawful aid. The language of the article also makes it clear that a recovery decision must be 
addressed to the Member State which granted the unlawful aid rather than to the beneficiary. 
 According to Article 14.3, recovery “shall be effected without delay and in accordance 
with the procedures under the national law of the Member State concerned, provided that they 
allow the immediate and effective execution of the Commission’s decision.”152 Thus, after the 
Commission decides that the Member State must recover unlawful aid, the Member State 
recovers this aid from the beneficiary pursuant to the applicable national procedures. 
 The ECJ has explained that the main purpose of the recovery of unlawful aid is “to 
eliminate the distortion of competition caused by the competitive advantage afforded by the 
unlawful aid.”153 The recovery “seeks to re-establish the previous situation.”154 At the same 
time, the Commission is not obliged to determine the precise amount of aid to be recovered. It 
suffices that the Commission determines in a clear manner what measures are State aids and 
when they were adopted. In these cases, the national courts determine the amount to be repaid.155 
Recovery of the aid must also include interest on the aid, from the time the aid was first granted 
until the moment the aid is fully recovered.156 Recovery of interest is necessary to ensure that the 
competitive advantage resulting from the grant of the unlawful aid is completely eliminated. It 
prevents the beneficiary from benefiting after reimbursement of the principal aid amount de facto 
from an interest-free loan.157 
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 Recovery does not necessarily have to be in the form of a cash payment. A Member State 
is free to choose the means of fulfilling the recovery order, provided that the measures chosen do 
not adversely affect the scope and effectiveness of EU law.158 
5. Comparison of the WTO and EU Rules on Subsidies and State Aid 
The WTO and the EU have different general objectives, which affect the rules on subsidies and 
state aids in each organization. The WTO is a “trade” organization which merely aims to 
gradually eliminate trade barriers among its members.159 The EU, on the other hand, has a much 
further reaching object and purpose. It pursues quite extensive economic policies (creation of 
internal market, competition, infrastructure, transport, etc.) as well as other policy areas (human 
rights, health, consumer protection, environment, culture, immigration, etc.).160 Moreover, the 
EU is a regional organization comprised of countries with a substantial degree of commonality of 
values and objectives while the WTO is a universal international organization which currently 
counts 164 members. 
 These differences have implications at the institutional level. The institutional framework 
and enforcement regime in the EU are far more complex, sophisticated and effective than those 
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in the WTO system. The WTO is a classical international organization where all decisions are 
made by Member States.161 In the EU, on the other hand, the decision-making process involves 
more actors and therefore interests: the Council (composed of representatives of the Member 
States and representing their interests); the European Parliament (directly elected by the EU 
citizens and thus representing the people of the Member States), and the Commission (a 
politically independent institution that represents and uphold the interests of the EU as a 
whole).162 Moreover, EU law enjoys primacy over the domestic laws of Member States163 and 
may have direct effect,164 which is not the case with WTO law. 
 The rules on subsidy control in the WTO and EU are tied to these main objectives and are 
applied and enforced, taking into account the institutional structure and overall goals pursued by 
the WTO and EU. The WTO law on subsidies is aimed at ensuring free trade between WTO 
Members by providing a system that enables the Members to protect their domestic industries 
against injury caused by subsidized goods.165 Consequently, the main objective of the WTO 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) is to discourage 
subsidies that might harm competing foreign producers rather than reduce aggregate economic 
welfare.166 Even though initially the SCM Agreement recognized the legitimacy of certain 
subsidies, which suggested a more complex and balanced approach that went beyond producers’ 
interests, since the expiry of the non-actionable subsidies in 1999 the WTO rules are about 
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discouraging subsidies that may harm producers’ interests. As Professor Rubini puts it, the 
balance is now tipped too far towards subsidy aversion.167 
 By contrast, EU State aid law is part of EU competition policy. While it also is aimed at 
preventing trade barriers and preserving the common market, it goes much further, focusing on 
the protection of the competitive process in the market. Protection of competition does not only 
mean protecting competitors but ensuring that markets work efficiently as well. Economic 
efficiency is analyzed by assessing the effect of a State aid measure on total welfare, i.e. the sum 
of consumer welfare and producer welfare.168 Consequently, the EU State aid policy is aimed at 
improving the efficient functioning of markets by correcting market failures, as long as the 
benefits of intervention outweigh the costs. Moreover, the EU acknowledges that government 
intervention through State aid can be used to achieve equity objectives in order to compensate 
for the consequences of competitive markets, which may create disparities between individuals 
and between regions. As a result, the EU is more likely to allow certain subsidies within its legal 
framework than is the WTO. 
 In addition to the differences regarding the objectives of the rules, there is an essential 
difference regarding the scope of the rules. The GATT and the SCM Agreement only regulate 
the subsidization of goods,169 whereas the TFEU regulates state aid to both goods and services. 
Thus, the following comparison of WTO and EU law on subsidies will be limited to the 
subsidization of goods. 
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a. Definitions of “Subsidy” and “State Aid” Most elements of the definitions of “subsidy” and 
“State Aid” (granted by a government/Member State, advantage/benefit granted to a recipient, 
specificity/selectivity170) are considered to be not fundamentally different.171 The main 
difference between the two definitions notable arises with regard to the nature of the resources 
granted. 
 In addition to being provided by the State, Article 107(1) of the TFEU requires that a 
prohibited State aid measure be granted out of “state resources.”172 In PreussenElektra, the ECJ 
made it clear that “only advantages granted directly or indirectly through State resources are to 
be considered as aid” within the meaning of Article 107(1).173 There, the ECJ held that 
legislation forcing private regional electricity suppliers to purchase electricity produced from 
renewable energy producers in their area of supply at fixed minimum prices did not constitute 
State aid because it did not “involve any direct or indirect transfer of State resources to 
undertakings which produce that type of electricity.”174 Thus, State aid will only exist where the 
measure involves a “charge on the public account.” 
 By contrast, no such requirement exists under WTO law. The first element of the 
definition of a subsidy in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement consists of an alternative between a 
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“financial contribution by a government” or “any form of income or price support”.175 The latter 
involves no burden on government funds. The “financial contribution” may involve a charge on 
the public account in certain cases (for example, transfer of public resources, foregoing of 
government revenue or the provision of goods or services by the government) but not in all of 
them. The question whether subsidies within the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement 
necessarily involve a charge on the public account was answered in Canada-Civilian Aircraft.176 
The context of the debate, however, was not the interpretation of the “financial contribution” 
element but the definition of the “benefit” under Article 1.1(a)(2).177 In particular, Canada was 
arguing that a “cost to government” must be demonstrated in order to establish a benefit.178 The 
Panel, however, rejected the argument and concluded that: 
If “benefit” were to include the notion of net cost to government, it could exclude 
from the definition of “subsidy” situations explicitly identified in Article 1.1(a)(1) 
itself as constituting government financial contributions even though no cost to 
the government might be involved. Specifically, Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) identifies as 
a “financial contribution” the situation where a government directs a private body 
to make “financial contribution” within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(i)-(iii). In 
such a situation, the net cost could be incurred entirely by the private body rather 
than the government. Canada’s interpretation of “benefit” (i.e., to include net cost 
to government) would render Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) meaningless, since a form of 
“financial contribution” explicitly included in Article 1.1(a) would automatically 
(i.e., because it would never meet the net cost to government test) be excluded by 
Article 1.1(b).179 
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 Therefore, because of the absence of the requirement of a “charge on the public account,” 
the notion of a subsidy in WTO law is broader than the notion of State aid in EU law. Some 
scholars and experts have expressed the view that government measures such as those in 
PreussenElektra – which in view of the ECJ’s finding are not State aid within the meaning of 
Article 107(1) of the TFEU – would most likely to be considered subsidies within the meaning of 
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement.180 
b. Prohibited and Permitted Measures in the WTO and the EU The most significant 
difference between the two systems is what happens once a measure is established to be a 
subsidy or a State aid. As Gustavo Luengo observes, the dividing line between measures that are 
prohibited and measures that are permitted is drawn differently in the WTO and the EU.181 
 WTO law expressly prohibits export subsidies and import substitution subsidies.182 If a 
subsidy is found by a WTO adjudicating body to be prohibited, the subsidizing Member has an 
obligation to immediately withdraw it.183 Prohibited subsidies are considered specific per se,184 
therefore, the “specificity” element does not have to be established. Moreover, measures that fall 
under the scope of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies are deemed to be prohibited subsidies, 
there is no need to establish all elements of a subsidy (i.e. (1) financial contribution by a 
                                                 
180 Marco M. Slotboom, Subsidies in WTO Law and in EC Law: Broad and Narrow Definition, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 
517, 539-40 (2002); LUENGO, supra note 145, at 448; Jessen, supra note 140, at 301-02. 
181 LUENGO, supra note 171, at 456. 
182 SCM Agreement, supra note 175, art. 3. 
183 Id., art. 4.7. 
184 Id., art. 2. 
163 
government, which (2) confers a benefit to (3) a specific recipient) pursuant to Articles 1 and 2 
of the SCM Agreement.185 
 In the EU, all government measures that fall within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the 
TFEU (i.e. measures which are granted by the state or through state resources; confer an 
advantage to the recipient; are selective; distort competition, and affect trade between Member 
States) are considered to be State aids which are incompatible with the common market.186 This 
prohibition is not absolute though; a State aid measure still may be authorized by the 
Commission as compatible with the common market and, therefore, permissible under Articles 
107(2) and 107(3). 
 Export subsidies and import substitution subsidies187 are not prohibited per se under EU 
law. They may be authorized by the Commission in light of any of the objectives contained in 
Article 107(3) of the TFEU. Even though the Commission has recognized that export subsidies 
are “clearly at odds with the objective of an internal market,”188 it nevertheless has pointed out 
that it could authorize “soft aid in favor of SMEs related to the development of export markets, 
such as aid for consultancy and marketing research, provided that the aid is a one-off operation 
and limited to the penetration of new markets.”189 
 Thus, while WTO law expressly prohibits certain types of government measures without 
demonstration of the specificity element (and in certain cases without even establishing the 
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subsidy elements), EU law does not contain such a prohibition. At the same time, although all 
State aids are declared to be incompatible with the common market, they still may be justified in 
many cases. 
 With regard to permitted (green) subsidies, since the expiry of the non-actionable 
subsidies in 1999, WTO law recognizes no exceptions to its discipline on the basis of the 
objectives of a measure. By contrast, in the EU includes in the green category aids of a social 
character and aids to offset the damages caused by natural disasters or exceptional circumstances 
to be per se compatible with the common market.190 In terms of State aid that may be declared 
compatible with the common market, the Commission adopted a set of Guidelines and 
Regulations to establish the criteria that aids under Article 107(3) of the TFEU must comply with 
in order to be authorized. This body of soft law justifies the use of sectoral (agricultural, 
broadcasting services, coal, electricity, fishing, steel, transport, energy, etc.) and horizontal 
(environment protection, research and innovation, regional development, employment and 
training, promoting small and medium enterprises, rescuing and restructuring companies in 
crisis) aids. 
 Finally, the approach to actionable (yellow) subsidies (which are all subsidies that do not 
fall within category of “red” subsidies in the WTO and all State aids that do not fall within 
category of “green” subsidies in the EU) is also different. In the WTO, if a subsidy causes 
“adverse effects to the interests of other Members”, the subsidizing Member has to withdraw the 
subsidy or remove its adverse effects.191 Thus, as Luengo observes, if a subsidy causes harmful 
effects to the interests of another Member, other types of (positive) effects on other Members, 
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either social or economic, will not be taken into account.192 The EU, by contrast, does not 
consider the effect that a State aid might have on another Member. Instead, it evaluates the 
impact of the aid on the EU interest as a whole.193 Consequently, if the aid increases EU’s 
welfare, the Commission may authorize it even though it might negatively affect the interest of a 
particular Member. Second, whereas the WTO analysis focuses exclusively on harm to 
producers in another Member, the EU evaluates whether State aid is used to improve the 
efficiency of the market or to achieve other social objectives (social or regional cohesion, 
employment, cultural diversity, etc.). Therefore, the EU takes into account more objectives and 
interest when permitting or prohibiting State aids than those taking into account by the WTO. 
 In sum, given that the concept of State aid under EU law is narrower than the concept of 
subsidy under WTO law and that EU provides more possibilities for justifying State aid while 
the WTO does not provide any, the EU allows for a greater intervention of Member States in 
their economies that the WTO does. 
c. Control and Remedies The enforcement regimes of the WTO and the EU are very different, 
largely as a result of the different institutional organization. The WTO system is “complaint-
driven,”194 the subsidy must always be challenged by another WTO Member before remedies 
follow.195 By contrast, the EU provides for ex ante assessment of State aid: EU Member States 
are required to notify their aid to the Commission and obtain its authorization before they 
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implement it.196 Moreover, EU Members cannot adopt unilateral measures against another EU 
Member, while WTO Members affected by subsidized imports causing material injury to their 
domestic industry may impose countervailing duties unilaterally.197 
 Under WTO law, the Member that granted a prohibited subsidy has to withdraw it,198 
which means that the Member must stop granting a subsidy after it was declared prohibited by a 
WTO adjudicating body. With regard to actionable subsidies, if a Panel concludes that a subsidy 
causes adverse effects to the interests of another Member, the subsidizing Member can choose 
between withdrawing the subsidy and removing its adverse effect.199 Under EU law, on the other 
hand, a Member State cannot continue to keep the subsidy that was declared to be incompatible 
with the common market by means of compensation.200 Second, WTO rules only offer a 
prospective remedy, i.e. they do not affect subsidies that have been granted in the past. In 
Professor Hudec’s words, the only remedy for violation of WTO rules is “a forward-looking 
order to directing the defendant to comply in the future.”201 Under EU law, by contrast, if the 
Member State has not notified State aid that is incompatible with the common market (unlawful 
aid) or grants the aid that has been notified and authorized but in a manner contrary to the 
Decision of the Commission (misused aid), the offending Member has to recover the aid.202 The 
recovery must also include interest on the aid, from the time the aid was first granted until the 
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moment the aid is fully recovered.203 The retrospective character of remedies in the EU is aimed 
at the reestablishing the previous situation on the market. 
 In case of non-compliance, the injured WTO Member can adopt retaliatory measures,204 
which usually take the form of increase in the custom duties. As a result, the offending WTO 
Member may choose to maintain the subsidy, while the injured party imposing these measures 
may also be negatively affected by them.205 By contrast, under EU law the ECJ can impose 
penalties if a Member State has not complied with it judgment206 and it does so “in a remarkably 
aggressive way.”207 Moreover, competitors and other third parties affected by unlawful or 
misused aids, can also claim damages from national authorities in national courts for failure to 
implement the Commission recovery Decision.208 
 In sum, the EU allows more government interventions, authorizing the State aids that 
may fall into categories of prohibited or actionable subsidies under WTO law. Such a difference 
is a reflection of the fact that the EU and the WTO pursue different objectives. While the WTO 
merely aims to gradually eliminate trade barriers among its members, the EU pursues not only 
economic integration among its members through the creation of a common market where 
products, services, capital and people move freely, but it also seeks social and political 
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integration. As a result, the WTO focuses exclusively on protecting trade interests of an 
individual WTO Member, which means the interests of producers of that Member. The EU, on 
the other hand, concentrates on the Community interest, protecting the competitive process in the 
common market (taking into account interests of both producers and consumers), as well as other 
social objectives. 
 At the same time, the enforcement of the EU State aid rules is more advanced and 
effective than that in the WTO, basically as a result of their different institutional arrangements. 
In the EU, there is ex ante control: subsidies are submitted to the Commission, which either 
authorizes or prohibits them. Already granted State aid, which is declared incompatible with the 
common market, must be repaid. In the WTO, there is ex post control: another WTO Member 
has to challenge the measure before remedies follow. Those remedies do not include repayment. 
C. EU COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW 
EU countervailing duty (CVD) law has been substantially amended as a result of the SMC 
Agreement209 and includes “almost verbatim”210 provisions of that Agreement. Currently, CVD 
proceedings are governed by the Council Regulation 597/2009 (hereinafter Regulation).211 
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1. Substantive Elements 
In order to impose countervailing measures against subsidized imports, three basic elements need 
to be established during the course of investigation: (1) the imports concerned are benefiting 
from countervailable subsidies; (2) the subsidized imports cause or threaten to cause material 
injury to the Union industry producing the like product; and (3) the imposition of countervailing 
measures is in the interest of the EU.212 
a. Subsidy With regard to the definition of a subsidy, the Regulation closely follows the 
language of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. In order to find the existence of a subsidy, two 
cumulative conditions must be met: (1) there must be a financial contribution by a government in 
the country of origin or export or there must be a form of income or price support within the 
meaning of Article XVI of the GATT 1994; and (2) there must be a benefit conferred thereby.213 
 Prior to the Uruguay Round, the EU approach was consistent with their positon regarding 
a State aid: a subsidy can only be found if government intervention involves a charge on the 
public account.214 This restrictive interpretation is no longer applicable now that the SCM 
Agreement contains a much broader definition of a subsidy, without specifying that there must 
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be a cost to the government.215 Thus, the current practice is to examine the existence and amount 
of subsidy in terms of benefit to the recipient.216 
 Article 4 of the Regulation provides that subsidies shall be subject to countervailing 
measures only if they are specific.217 Like in the WTO, while export subsidies and domestic 
content subsidies are automatically considered as specific and therefore countervailable,218 
domestic subsidies must be specific in order to be countervailable. In general, the EU institutions 
tend to adopt a very broad interpretation of the notion of specificity. As a result, schemes which 
are available to a large portion of domestic industry were nevertheless found to be specific.219 
 Article 5 of the Regulation follows the language of Article 14 of the SCM Agreement 
stating that the amount of countervailable subsidies shall be calculated in terms of the benefits 
conferred on the recipient which is found to exist during the investigating period.220 Yet, at same 
time, while the SCM Agreement does not contain specific rules on the exact calculation methods 
to be used for determining the amount of subsidy in terms of benefit to the recipient, more 
detailed rules concerning calculation methods to be used are set out in Articles 6 and 7 of the 
Regulation.221 Those rules were further elaborated upon by the Commission in its Guidelines for 
the calculation of the amount of subsidy in countervailing duties investigations adopted in 
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1998.222 One of the most important new elements in the Guidelines is the interest adjustment, 
which is not provided for neither in the Regulation nor in the SCM Agreement. The Guidelines 
distinguishes between the “face” value of a subsidy which is the amount at the time it is 
transferred to the recipient or foregone by the government and the value “found to exist” during 
the investigation period. Article 5 of the Regulation requires to establish the value found to exist 
during the investigating period. In order to do so, the Commission has to adjust the “face” value 
and does so by transforming that face value into the value prevailing during the investigation 
period though the application of the normal commercial interest rate.223 
b. Injury The determination of injury to the Union industry in CVD proceedings is governed by 
Articles 8 and 9 of the Regulation. The factors to be considered in determining whether an 
industry is suffering injury are listed in Article 8.4 of the Regulation. This list almost exactly 
mirrors the list in Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement. Although the WTO Appellate Body 
concluded that each of those factors must be addressed by the investigating authority,224 the ECJ 
nevertheless emphasized the discretion of the EU authorities and explained that they have to 
examine only the relevant factors having a bearing on the state of the Union industry.225 
 The list of factors to be considered in examining the impact of the subsidized import on 
the Union industry includes a factor not provided for in the SCM Agreement – “the fact that an 
industry is still in the process of recovering from the effects of past subsidization or 
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dumping.”226 The rationale behind this language seems to be a concern that otherwise prices that 
have been depressed by past dumping or subsidization would be used for the calculation of the 
injury margin, thus leading to the imposition of a duty lower than that needed to remove 
injury.227 
c. The Union Interest One of the main differences between EU and WTO CVD law is that the 
EU law requires an additional element to allow the imposition of countervailing measures, i.e. 
the existence of a “Union interest” calling for intervention. Article 31.1 of the Regulation 
provides that: 
A determination as to whether the Community interest calls for intervention 
should be based on an appraisal of all the various interests taken as a whole, 
including the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumers. A 
determination pursuant to this Article shall be made only where all parties have 
been given the opportunity to make their views known pursuant to paragraph 2. In 
such an examination, the need to eliminate the trade-distorting effects of injurious 
subsidisation and to restore effective competition shall be given special 
consideration.228 
 The EU institutions must give consideration to the Union interest when imposing 
provisional measures,229 definitive duties,230 and when terminating proceedings following 
withdrawal of complaint.231  
 When assessing the Union interest requirement, the EU institutions examine, where 
appropriate, the interest of the Union industry, users, importers, and consumers. Having 
established that material injury has been caused to the Union industry by subsidized imports, it is 
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necessary to assess whether it is in the interest of the Union industry to impose CVDs. The 
factors considered in the examination mostly overlap with those analyzed in the injury 
examination but with the focus on the future. Since even if subsidized imports have caused injury 
in the past, the imposition of duties may not always render the domestic industry viable.232 Some 
factors considered in this context, such as safeguarding employment233 or protecting the 
environment,234 have no connection with injury. 
 End-users may also be badly affected by the imposition of CVDs because they may lead 
to a shortage of supply, increase in prices, etc. Nevertheless, the EU institutions have 
traditionally given more weight to the interest of complainant industry than to those of user 
industry.235 For example, in Styrene-butadiene-styrene thermoplastic rubber (SBS), some users 
argued that the imposition of CVDs would negatively affect the price and availability of SBS. 
The Commission disagreed, however, stating that: 
the imposition of provisional countervailing measures, does not foreclose the 
Community to imports . . . [but] . . . will merely establish fair trading conditions. 
As to the availability of SBS, there are a number of producers operating in the 
Community; these producers have unused production capacity, and there are other 
sources of imports which, under fair trading conditions, will find the Community 
market more appealing again.236 
 Likewise, in most cases the Commission concludes that the interest of 
importers/distributors/traders are not at serious risk.237 In Printers, foreign producers argued that 
                                                 
232 EDMOND MCGOVERN, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ANTI-DUMPING AND TRADE DEFENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 44:1 
(2008). 
233 Council Regulation No 1799/2002 of 8 October 2002, OJ (L 274), at recital 114. 
234 Commission Regulation No 1783/94 of 18 July 1994, OJ (L 189), at recital 43. 
235 See VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 215, at 298; see also ADAMANTOPOULOS & PEREYRA-FRIEDRICHSEN, supra 
note 210, at 141-42 (stating that “in order to outweigh the interest of the Community industry deriving from the 
imposition of measures, the interest of the end-users need to be substantial.”). 
236 Commission Regulation No 1092/2000 of 24 May 2000, OJ (L 124/26), at recital 12. 
237 VAN BAEL & BELLIS, supra note 215, at 300. 
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they employ a considerable amount of people in the distribution of their products on the Union 
market and that imposition of measures could jeopardize these job. The Commission replied 
stating that: 
. . . on balance, the Community’s interests lie more in maintaining employment in 
the manufacturing sector of the Community industry than in protecting a dealer 
and distributor business which depends to a great extent on imports.238 
 The imposition of countervailing measures generally does not benefit the consumer since 
the prices will increase and the choice of products available to the consumer may also be 
reduced. In Laser Optical Reading System, the Commission concluded that imposition of 
protective measures would “severely limit consumer choice” and that “this loss of choice as 
regard the current variety of models available could not be compensated in the foreseeable future 
by the Community industry.”239 In such circumstances the Commission considered that “the 
interests of consumers [were] by far outweighing the interest of the Community industry” and 
proceeding was terminated accordingly.240 
 Finally, when assessing the Union interest requirement, the impact of countervailing 
measures on competition within the EU is also a factor to consider. For example, in Typewriter 
Ribbon Fabrics, where there was only one Union producer and one Chinese producer/exporter of 
the product in question, the Commission concluded that it was not in the Union’s interest that 
there would be only one supplier of this product and that, therefore, any protective measures 
should not lead to the withdrawal of Chinese imports from the Union market or eliminate 
                                                 
238 Commission Regulation No 1413/88 of 25 May 1988, OJ (L 130), at recital 12. 
239 Commission Decision 1999/55/EC, OJ (L 18) 62, at recital 18. 
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competition between these imports and Union production. Consequently, a price undertaking 
was considered more appropriate.241 
2. Procedure and Remedies 
a. Procedure CVD investigation can be initiated upon a written complaint by any natural or 
legal person, or any association not having legal personality, acting on behalf of the Community 
industry.242 A complaint may be submitted to the Commission, or to a Member State, which 
shall forward it to the Commission.243 Typically, complaints are brought by European trade 
associations of the manufactures of the product in question, on behalf of one or more their 
members. They can also be filed by national producers’ associations, a group of national 
producers, or even by individual producers, as long as they fulfil the major proportion 
criterion.244 
 A complaint must include sufficient evidence of the existence of (1) countervailable 
subsidies; (2) injury; and (3) a causal link between the allegedly subsidized imports and the 
alleged injury.245 When the Commission decides to initiate an investigation, it should notify the 
exporters, importers and representative associations of importers or exporters, as well as the 
country of origin and/or export and the complainants of the initiating of the proceedings.246 
Because of the “Union interest” requirement, the Regulation provides certain procedural rights 
                                                 
241 Commission Regulation No 1937/90 of 4 July 1990, OJ (L 174), at recital 19. 
242 Regulation, supra note 211, art. 10.1. 
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244 THEMISTOKLIS K. GIANNAKOPOULOS, SAFEGUARDING COMPANIES’ RIGHTS IN COMPETITION AND ANTI-
DUMPING/ANTI-SUBSIDIES PROCEEDINGS 253 (Kluwer Law International 2004). 
245 Regulation, supra note 211, art. 10.2. 
246 Id., art. 10.13. 
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and obligations not only for complainants and importers but also for representative users and 
consumer organizations, which are considered as interested parties.247 During the investigation, 
the right to a fair hearing includes two basic elements: the parties’ right of access to information 
and the right to be heard.248 There is no formal hearing procedure; hearings are normally 
attended by the members of the Commission’s staff in charge of the case. As they are not public 
and there is no official record, they are more like informal meetings.249 
 The provisions of the Regulation dealing with interim, newcomer and expiry reviews 
largely correspond to their equivalent in the SCM Agreement.250 The only significant difference 
between the EU and the WTO rules is a circumvention provision which the SCM Agreement 
does not contain. Allegations of circumvention arise when products subject to countervailing 
duties manage to enter the EU without the appropriate duties having been paid. Adamantopoulos 
and Pereyra-Friedrichsen identify three ways in which duties are typically avoided: (1) the 
product is subject to further or lesser processing in the country of origin: the tariff heading is 
therefore changed and it falls outside the product scope of the measures; (2) processing takes 
place in another country: the origin of the products is therefore changed and the measures are 
thus avoided; (3) parts of the product are imported and assembled within the EU: this avoids the 
payment of duties due upon importation of the finished assembled product.251 
 Article 23.3 of the Regulation defines circumvention as: 
a change in the pattern of trade between third countries and the Community or 
between individual companies in the country subject to measures and the 
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250 Regulation, supra note 211, arts. 18-20; SCM Agreement, supra note 175, arts. 19.3, 21. 
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Community, which stems from a practice, process or work for which there is 
insufficient due cause or economic justification other than the imposition of the 
duty, and where there is evidence of injury or that the remedial effects of the duty 
are being undermined in terms of the prices and/or quantities of the like product 
and that the imported like product and/or parts thereof still benefit from the 
subsidy.252 
 Consequently, the circumvention measures can be invoked where: (1) countervailing 
measures have already been duly imposed; (2) there is a change in the pattern of trade between 
the Community and third countries;253 (3) the change in the pattern of trade must be the result of 
a practice, process or work for which there is insufficient cause or economic justification other 
than the circumvention of the duties; (4) there is evidence that the remedial effects of the duty 
being undermined in terms of prices and/or quantities of the like product; and (5) the imported 
like product and/or parts thereof still benefit from the subsidy. 
 As a result of the anti-circumvention investigation, either the existing duty is extended 
with retroactive effect as from the date of initiation of the investigation, or the investigation is 
terminated but the existing duty remains in force.254 
b. Remedies Like in the WTO law, the EU law provides for two types of relief in CVD 
proceedings: (1) the imposition of CVDs (provisional and definitive duties); or (2) the 
acceptance of undertaking. 
 Provisional duties are imposed by the Commission no earlier than 60 days from the 
initiation of the proceedings but no later than nine months from the initiation of the 
                                                 
252 Regulation, supra note 211, art. 23.3. 
253 The Regulation does not define “change in the pattern of trade,” consequently the Commission has a considerable 
margin of discretion when determining whether this condition has been fulfilled. Typically, a change in pattern 
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proceedings.255 Nevertheless, the Commission is not obliged to impose provisional measures as 
the sole alternative to the termination of the proceedings. On the contrary, the Commission may 
decide not to propose their imposition but to continue with its investigation towards the 
definitive stage.256 In practice, provisional duties are not physically collected upon imposition, 
but are secured by way of customs guarantee at the point where the goods subject to such duties 
enter the EU.257 Provisional duties are imposed for a maximum period of four months, there is 
no possibility to extend this period. 258 
 Initially, definitive duties were imposed by the Council acting on the proposal submitted 
by the Commission, as opposed to provisional duties imposed by the Commission.259 The 
proposal must have been adopted by the Council unless it decides by a simple majority (where 
each Member State has one vote) to reject the proposal.260 As a result, very often political 
considerations rather than the findings of the Commission influenced the decision of certain 
Member States.261 
 In 2013, the Council and the European Parliament agreed on new rules that increase the 
Commission power in imposing definitive CVDs, which makes the process more technical and 
less political in nature. The purpose of the new rules is to bring EU CVD law in line with the 
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new “comitology procedures” introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon.262 Regulation 182/2011 (New 
Comitology Regulation) lays down the new procedure for the adoption of implementing acts by 
the Commission, including the adoption of regulations imposing infinitive CVDs (until 2014 the 
mechanisms for the adoption of CVD and anti-dumping duties were excluded from the scope of 
the general comitology rules). The most important change to the process is that definitive CVDs 
are adopted by the Commission, not the Council.263 Another change is that these measures are 
subject to standard comitology rule where only a qualified majority of Member States may block 
their adoption.264 
 Definitive CVDs may not exceed the total amount of countervailable subsidies 
established.265 EU law, like WTO law, contains a lesser duty provision. However, while the 
SCM Agreement provides that it is desirable that the duty be less than the total amount of the 
subsidy if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry,266 
in the EU the Regulation obliges Member States to impose the duty that is not higher than the 
total amount of countervailable subsidies if it would be adequate to remove the injury.267 The 
EU institutions’ practice is to calculate an “injury margin” by comparing the export prices of the 
subsidized products with the production costs of the Community production of the like product 
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plus a reasonable profit margin. This “injury margin” puts a cap on the level of the 
countervailable duty.268 The “lesser duty” rule results in a lower level of duties overall, which 
arguably leads to fewer distortions to market competition. 
 CVDs remain in place as long as, and to the extent that, it is necessary to counteract the 
countervailable subsidies which are causing injury.269 In order to establish if the duties are still 
necessary, the Regulation provides for a system of reviews270 and refunds.271 The normal 
duration of definitive CVDs is five years from its imposition or from the date of its most recent 
review.272 If a review reveals that an expiry would lead to a continuation or recurrence of 
subsidization or injury, the CVDs will remain in force.273 
 A price undertaking is an alternative to imposing CVDs. A price undertaking is an 
agreement between the Commission and (1) the country of origin and/or export whereby the 
latter agrees to eliminate or limit the subsidy or take other measures concerning its effect; or 
(2) any exporter whereby the latter agrees to revise its prices or to cease exports to the area in 
question as long as such exports benefit from countervailable subsidies so that the injures effects 
of the subsidies is eliminated.274 For example, in Women’s Shoes, the Commission accepted the 
undertaking of the Brazilian government to impose a tax on exports of the product in question 
that would completely neutralize the effect of the subsidy.275 
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 In sum, EU CVDs law largely corresponds to that of WTO. The main differences 
between the two systems arise with regard to three areas where EU law goes beyond WTO rules. 
First, the EU law requires an additional element to allow the imposition of CVDs, i.e. the 
existence of a “Union interest” calling for intervention. Second, EU law, unlike WTO law, 
contains a circumvention provision. Finally, under EU law an investigative authority should 
apply a lesser duty than the subsidy margin if this is sufficient to remove injury, while WTO law 
does not impose such an obligation. 
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VI. U.S. RULES ON SUBSIDIES 
U.S. law does not contain any rules governing granting or controlling subsidies by any level of 
government; states are not allowed to countervail the subsidies of other states. On the other hand, 
U.S. countervailing duty (CVD) law, which allows the imposition of countervailing duties on 
foreign goods receiving subsidies is a fully developed body of law. Over more than a century, 
U.S. CVD law has changed considerably; the most significant modifications are the result of 
implementation of GATT/WTO rules: first, after the Tokyo Round, and then, after the Uruguay 
Round. 
 Since the United States is a WTO Member, the WTO agreements constitute a binding 
international obligation of the United States.1 They are not directly effective, however, in the 
domestic legal order.2 Consequently, the provisions of these agreements may only be invoked in 
U.S. law if the U.S. act expressly refers to or incorporates such provisions. Likewise, WTO 
dispute settlement decisions have no direct effect on U.S. law.3 
                                                 
1 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 
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A. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW 
1. Early U.S. Countervailing Duty Law 
The United States was the first country to enact CVD law. It was contained in the Tariff Act of 
1890 and initially only imposed a CVD on refined sugar coming from countries paying an export 
bounty.4 Seven years later, in the Tariff Act of 1897, Congress broadened the law to apply to all 
dutiable imports coming from countries which “pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty 
or grant” upon their export.5 In order to provide relief from the effects of such subsidies, the Act 
stipulated that a CVD, equal to the net amount of the bounty, be imposed on the import.6 Since 
the amount of the tariff was assumed to be necessary to provide the desired protection, any 
subsidized dutiable import was presumed to cause injury to the U.S. industry. Therefore, no 
injury test was required.7 For the same reason, CVDs were designed to offset the exact amount 
of the foreign subsidy and thereby maintain the integrity of the tariff protection.8 This first 
                                                 
4 Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 237, 26 Stat. 567, 584 (McKinley Tariff). 
5 Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (Dingley Tariff). 
6 Id. 
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8 Kennedy, supra note 7, at 2 (“Because tariffs were set by Congress at a level judged to be sufficient to provide the 
desired protection to targeted industries, foreign subsidies were viewed as attempts to breach the tariff wall erected 
by Congress.”). 
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general CVD law in the United States became “the true forerunner of the modern American 
countervailing duty law.”9 
 The Tariff Act of 1922 further expanded the scope of the CVD law in two ways. First, it 
allowed CVD’s to be imposed on private bounties given by a “person, partnership, cartel, or 
corporation.”10 Second, it broadened the law to cover bounties bestowed “upon the manufacture 
or production” of goods, as well as on their exportation.11 Although the United States only 
countervailed against a domestic (production) bounty for the first time in 1973,12 in general, as 
Professor Viner observes, at the time, CVDs were “strictly, perhaps even harshly, enforced.”13 
 Early case law adopted a very broad interpretation of the meaning of “bounties or 
grants.” In 1903, in Downs v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether a 
Russian tax scheme, under which the government taxed all sugar produced but then remitted the 
tax upon export of the sugar, constituted “a bounty upon exportation.”14 The Court concluded 
that “[w]hen a tax is imposed on all sugar produced, but remitted upon all sugar exported, then, 
by whatever process, or in whatever manner, or under whatever name, it is disguised, it is a 
bounty upon exportation.”15 The Court also rejected the argument of the Russian government 
there was no intent to encourage export; their only goal was to help control the domestic price of 
sugar by limiting the domestic supply.16 Instead, the Court focused at on the harmful effects that 
                                                 
9 Barceló, supra note 7, at 322. 
10 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 858, 935-36 (Fordney-McCumber Tariff). 
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the bounty had on the U.S. industry.17 In Nicolas & Co. v. United States, an even broader 
meaning was applied to the term “bounty or grant”: 
If the word “bounty” has a limited sense, the word “grant” has not. A word of 
broader significance than “grant” could not have been used. Like its synonyms 
“give” and “bestow,” it expresses a concession, the conferring of something by 
one person upon another. And if the “something” be conferred by a country “upon 
the exportation of any article or merchandise,” a countervailing duty is required.18 
The language of Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 was basically identical to that of the Tariff 
Act of 1922;19 this provision eventually became the main source of U.S. CVD law and remained 
essentially unchanged until 1979. 
 Anti-subsidy policy has been an integral part of U.S. trade policy, in particular tariff 
policy, and, therefore, should be understood in a broader context. As Professor Taussig points 
out, the period of the economic history of the United States, which started in 1808,20 was 
characterized by the protection of young industries.21 Complications with Europe, resulted from 
the war between Britain and France, led to an embargo in 1807; and the war with England was 
declared in 1812.22 During the war, trade with England was prohibited and all import duties were 
doubled. This series of restrictive measures blocked the customary channels of exchange and 
production, and gave a stimulus to those branches of U.S. industry whose products had before 
                                                 
17 Id. at 515. 
18 G.S. Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34, 39 (1919). 
19 Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687 (Smoot-Hawley Tariff) (varying from Tariff Act of 1922 only 
by requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to measure and declare each distinct subsidy applied to an imported item 
and not simply their sum). 
20 The previous period was chiefly a continuation of the colonial period, when “the colonies had been necessarily 
engaged almost exclusively in agriculture, and in the occupations closely connected with it.” See F.W. TAUSSIG, THE 
TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 8 (8th ed. 1931). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 16. 
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been imported.23 Professor Taussig observes that “[t]he consequent rise of a considerable class of 
manufacturers, whose success depended largely on continuance of protection, formed the basis 
of a strong movement for more decided limitation of foreign competition.”24 This kind of 
protectionist tariff philosophy prevailed through the first third of the Twentieth century. 
 CVD law, therefore, should be viewed as a part of this philosophy. On the one hand, one 
can argue that the rationale for this law was that subsidies create an “artificial” advantage for the 
exporting country, which if left uncorrected, would destroy the competing industry of the 
importing country. As Senator Caffery put it in 1897, “natural advantages possessed by one 
country ought not to be offset by artificial aids afforded by another.”25 On the other hand, 
however, it seems fairly clear that, at the time, the main goal of CVD law was to preserve the 
level of protection established by existing tariffs. The first general CVD law was introduced as a 
part of the Tariff Act of 1897, which was “the outcome of an aggressive spirit of protection.”26 
With some amendments these provisions were included in the Tariff Act of 1930, which 
established “the highest general tariffs rate structure that the United States had ever 
experienced.”27 Given that CVDs only applied to dutiable imports, and no injury test was 
required, it is logical to conclude that the main object of CVD law was to maintain the status quo 
in extremely high tariff protection. In the words of E. Kwaku Andoh, “both sets of arguments 
                                                 
23 Id. at 16-17 (noting that “the restrictive legislation of 1808-15 was, for the time being, equivalent to extreme 
protection”). 
24 Id. at 17. 
25 30 CONG. REC. 2203, 2225-26 (1897) (remarks of Sen. Caffery). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 
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26 TAUSSIG, supra note 20, at 358. 
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seek not a ‘level’ playing field, but rather, a ‘static’ playing field – one on which the advantages 
in trade secured by the United States (both ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’) are protected by 
countervailing duties and other trade policies.”28 
 The first shift towards a more liberal trade policy began with adoption of the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act of 1934, which gave the President power to negotiate and conclude 
bilateral, reciprocal tariff agreements with other countries without approval of Congress.29 By 
linking tariff setting to international obligations, an executive branch prerogative, members of 
Congress sought to protect themselves from the direct, one-sided pressure from producer 
interests.30 By the middle of the Second World War, 30 bilateral trade agreements with 25 
countries were in force; they led to the reduction of many tariff rate levels.31 Weaknesses of the 
bilateral approach became apparent, however, and a multilateral approach seemed to offer better 
solutions.32 Hence, the more dramatic shift towards liberal trade policy happened after 
completion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947.33 As a result of a series of 
GATT negotiations, U.S. average tariff levels on dutiable imports had gradually been reduced 
from 60 percent in 1931 to 5.7 percent in 1980.34 
                                                 
28 E. Kwaku Andoh, Countervailing Duties in a Not Quite Perfect World: An Economic Analysis, 44 STAN. L. REV. 
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29 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, ch. 474, 48 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C. § 1351. 
30 I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 14-17 (3d ed. 1995). 
31 DOBSON, supra note 27, at 36 (also noting that because the agreements “simultaneously stimulated increased 
trade, the total amount of the duties collected under the reciprocity agreement’s trade concession was actually higher 
that it had been under the original Smoot-Hawley rates of duty”). 
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34 DOBSON, supra note 27, at 34. 
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 These developments, however, did not affect U.S. law related to the imposition of CVDs, 
which remained unchanged. Moreover, although Article VI of the GATT only allows CVDs 
when subsidized imports “cause or threaten material injury to an established domestic 
industry . . . or retard materially the establishment of a domestic industry,”35 under U.S. law, 
CVDs could still be imposed merely upon determination of a subsidy, without assessing the 
injury to the domestic industry caused by the subsidized imports. Since this law was dated before 
GATT 1947, it was grandfathered from Article VI of the GATT.36 
 In the Trade Act of 1974, Congress amended Section 303, expanding the scope of the law 
to cover any subsidized article or merchandize, regardless of whether it was a dutiable good.37 
Since the extension of countervailing procedure to these imports was not covered by the 
grandfather clause, the Act required a determination of injury to U.S. industry before imposing a 
CVD on duty-free imports, but only if such a test is required by international obligations.38 
Furthermore, the Act imposed specific time limits on administrative determinations by requiring 
the Department of Treasury, which then administered the CVD law, to reach a final decision on 
each case within twelve months39 and, for the first time, made judicial review available to 
domestic producers.40 Both because of extension of the scope of products subject to CVDs and 
because the Treasury was moving faster under the new timetable, the number of CVD 
                                                 
35 GATT 1947, supra note 33, art. VI. 
36 Protocol of Provisional Application of the 1947 GATT (Part II of the GATT applied only “to the fullest extent not 
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38 Id. § 303(b), 88 Stat. 2049. 
39 Id. § 303(a)(4), 88 Stat. 2049. 
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investigations rose sharply, from 5 in 1974 to 38 in 1975.41 It was also during this period that 
Treasury, for the first time, countervailed against a domestic subsidy in a foreign country.42 
 In sum, the early U.S. CVD law was highly protectionist and originally served to 
supplement tariff protection. The law was not designed to secure a level playing field, but rather 
to provide greater protection to U.S. producers. As Professor Robert O’Brien has written, “[t]he 
system is seen to respond to domestic American industry seeking protection from competition 
rather than a decision on the effect of subsidies.”43 The shift of the policy toward lower tariffs 
did not affect the main provisions of the CVD law; this could be explained by the fact that while 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 transferred the authority to negotiate tariff 
reductions from Congress to the President, trade-remedy law remained within the power of 
Congress, which was more susceptible to pressure from domestic industry. Nevertheless, since 
tariffs were reduced the perception of the CVD law shifted from a pure tariff approach to an 
antitrust-related approach, which views CVD law as a device to control trade distortions caused 
by unfairly subsidized imports. 
2. Changes Resulting from the Tokyo Round 
After the Tokyo Round, the focus of GATT negotiations moved from tariff reduction to non-
tariff barriers. The Trade Act of 1974 granted so called “fast track” negotiating authority 
                                                 
41 DESTLER, supra note 30, at 145-48 (Noting, however, that since the EC was not ready to negotiate at the Tokyo 
GATT round, which was dealing with the subsidy issue, “if the United States simultaneously began enforcing a 
tough antisubsidy statute,” Congress granted the secretary of the Treasury the authority to waive imposition of 
CVDs for four years if the foreign government was taking steps to reduce a subsidy’s effect. As a result, from 1976 
through 1978, for example, the Treasury made 35 affirmative CVD decisions but the secretary then exercised the 
waiver in 19 of the cases.). 
42 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
43 ROBERT O’BRIEN, SUBSIDY REGULATION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION IN NORTH AMERICA, THE GATT AND THE 
EU 24 (1997). 
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concerning non-tariff matters to the President.44 Unlike the previous system of trade authority 
delegation regarding tariff reduction, however, Congress had to implement the agreement 
through legislation.45 Consequently, U.S. negotiators had to take into account the opinions of 
members of Congress, as well as the interests of industry groups they represented.46 
 The main purpose of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (TAA)47 was to bring U.S. law 
into conformity with the agreements on non-tariff measures negotiated in the Tokyo Round, in 
particular the Subsidies Code.48 The four most distinctive features of the new CVDs law were: 
(1) a more explicit definition of the term “subsidy”;49 (2) an injury test for dutiable imports;50 
(3) a new provisional remedy available early in the investigation;51 and (4) stricter time limits 
and the authorization for the Customs Court, predecessor to the Court of International Trade 
(CIT), to review preliminary and final decisions of the Department of Commerce and the 
International Trade Commission (ITC).52 The law applied only to the signatories of the Subsidies 
Code or countries that assumed substantially equivalent obligations.53 Thus, exports from all 
other countries was still governed by Section 303 of the Act, which imposed CVDs on 
subsidized imports without reference to injury to U.S. producers.54 
                                                 
44 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 37, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2497(b). 
45 Id. 
46 ROBERT E. BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. IMPORT POLICY 74-77 (The MITT Press 1985). 
47 Trade Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
48 Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (MTN/NTM/W/236, 5 Apr. 1979) [hereinafter Subsidies Code]; see also supra Chapter III, Part C, for a 
more detailed discussion of the Subsidies Code’s negotiating history and the resulting agreement. 
49 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(5)-(6). 
50 Id. §§ 1671, 1677(7). 
51 Id. § 1671(b). 
52 Id. §§ 1516, 1671. 
53 Id. § 1671(b)(1)-(2). 
54 Id. § 303. 
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 Prior to 1979, the determination whether to impose CVDs involved a one-step test 
conducted by the Treasury Department.55 The new law imposed a two-step test that must be 
satisfied before CVDs can be imposed:56 (1) the Commerce Department must determine whether 
there is a subsidy under the statutory definition;57 (2) if the Commerce Department finds a 
subsidy, the ITC must determine whether there has been material injury to a U.S. industry.58 
a. Subsidy Section 771(5) of the TAA defined subsidy as having “the same meaning” as “bounty 
or grant” in section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930.59 “Subsidy” was further broken down into 
(1) export subsidies60 and (2) domestic subsidies “if provided . . . to a specific enterprise or 
industry, or group of enterprises or industries.”61 As a result, countervailable domestic subsidies 
were limited to those domestic subsidies that were directed at specific targets as opposed to those 
that were generally available.62 Based on the statutory definition of domestic subsidy, the 
Commerce Department went beyond the U.S. international obligations under the Subsidies Code 
and developed the “specificity test,” according to which domestic subsidies are only 
countervailable when available to a specific enterprise or industry.63 
                                                 
55 See supra note 39. 
56 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677k. 
57 Id. §§ 1671(a)(1), 1677(1). 
58 Id. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1677(2). 
59 Id. § 1677(5). 
60 Id. § 1677(5)(a) (“Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the [Subsidies Code] Agreement (relating to 
illustrative list of export subsidies.)”). 
61 Id. § 1677(5)(b). 
62 William K. Wilcox, GATT-Based Protectionism and the Definition of a Subsidy, 16 B.U. INT’L L.J. 129, 138 
(1998). See also Michael J. Sussman, Countervailing Duties and the Specificity Test: An Alternative Approach to the 
Definition of ‘Bounty or Grant,’ 18 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 475, 484 (1985) (“Current law and the legislative 
history of 1979 and 1984 amendments make clear that ‘bounty or grant’ is not intended to be given its broadest 
reading when applied to domestic subsidies.”). 
63 See, e.g., Anhydrous and Aqua Ammonia from Mexico, 48 Fed. Reg. 28, 522, 28, 523-24 (1983); Certain 
Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24, 159, 24, 171-72 (1983); Certain Steel Products from France, 48 
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 The early decisions of the CIT on the specificity test, however, were rather “unclear and 
inconsistent.”64 In Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, the CIT explicitly found the 
specificity test to be a reasonable interpretation of the statute.65 The court rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that “benefits from governmental programs are countervailable even if they are 
generally available on a nonpreferential basis,”66 determining that allowing CVDs to be imposed 
against generally available benefits would lead to the “absurd result” that almost all imports 
could be countervailed, a result that would create an overwhelming administrative burden and 
make impossible the calculation of benefits.67 It was only a year later that the CIT, in Bethlehem 
Steel Corp. v. United States, rejected the specificity test stating that general availability is not a 
relevant consideration and will not place a government program beyond the reach of the CVD 
law on that basis alone.68 The court expressed doubts that Congress had implicitly adopted the 
specificity test in the TAA69 and explained that: 
The fundamental purpose of the countervailing duty law is to provide a special 
duty to eliminate the advantage an imported product may obtain from forms of 
assistance termed “subsidies”. . . . The extent to which subsidization is practiced 
in the country of production is entirely immaterial.70 
                                                                                                                                                             
Fed. Reg. 39, 332, 39, 338 (1982); Certain Steel Products from the Netherlands, 47 Fed. Reg. 39, 372, 39, 373-74 
(1982). 
64 Pieter Matthijs Alexander, The Specificity Test under U.S. Countervailing Duty Law, 10 MICH. J. INT’L L. 807, 
819 (1989); Wilcox, supra note 62, at 139 (stating that “issues regarding specificity play a major role in the 
confusing case law that results.”); Kennedy, supra note 7, at 7 (also noting the CIT “reached divergent conclusions 
regarding the specificity question.”); Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Pork, Panel No. USA-89-1904-06, 1990 FTAPD 
LEXIS 12, at 57 (U.S.-Can. Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review Sept. 28, 1990) (“[d]espite continuing 
efforts of Commerce and the courts to explain and clarify this issue . . . the standards for finding . . . specificity 
remain underdeveloped, opaque, contradictory, elusive, and unsatisfying.”). 
65 Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 834 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1983). 
66 Id. at 837. 
67 Id. at 838-39. 
68 Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1237, 1240-41 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1984). 
69 Id. at 1243-44. 
70 Id. at 1241 (emphasis added). 
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 In the decisions immediately following Carlisle and Bethlehem Steel the CIT, although 
reaffirming the specificity test as a means of defining an actionable subsidy, was not clear about 
the limits of the test and its correlation with the actual distortion of trade. For example, in 
Agrexco v. United States, the Commerce Department found no subsidy in a research and 
development program provided by the government of Israel to its rose growers because the 
results of the research were equally available to rose growers worldwide, including those from 
the U.S.71 The CIT disagreed, however, and concluded that the question is not whether the 
information is generally available, but rather “whether the research and development is targeted 
to assist a particular, rather than a general industry.”72 Thus, since the program was targeted at 
the production of roses, it constituted a subsidy.73 The Agrexco language, therefore, suggests that 
nominal specificity is sufficient for a subsidy to exist regardless of whether the government 
program in fact bestows a competitive advantage upon the specific group. 
 In Cabot Corp. v. United States, on the other hand, the court concluded that when a 
government program, nominally available to all industries, only works to confer a benefit on 
specific enterprises or industries, the program meets the test for a countervailable subsidy.74 The 
focus, therefore, is on “the de facto case by case effect of benefits provided to recipients rather 
than on the nominal availability of benefits.”75 The Cabot de facto specificity standard was 
further clarified in PPG Industries v. United States to mean that when a government program is 
                                                 
71 Agrexco, Agricultural Export Co., Ltd., 604 F. Supp. 1238, 1241-42 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1985). 
72 Id. at 1242. 
73 Id. 
74 Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1985). 
75 Id. at 732. 
194 
nominally generally available and in fact widely used, the program is not a countervailable 
subsidy.76 In 1988, U.S. law was subsequently amended to include the de facto specificity test.77  
b. Material Injury If the Commerce Department finds a subsidy, the second stage of inquiry is 
whether there is a material injury to a U.S. domestic industry. Material injury is defined as “harm 
which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.”78 Congress made it clear that the 
“material injury” standard was to be generally the same as the test applied in antidumping cases 
after the Trade Act of 1974,79 which suggests that the standard is much softer than the “serious 
injury” standard under the escape clause.80 
 The post-Tokyo Round CVD law also adopted the causation requirement of the prior 
antidumping law: material injury must be “by reason of” the subsidized imports.81 At the same 
time, competing causes of injury are not to be weighed against each other.82 Thus, the ITC may 
                                                 
76 PPG Industries v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 258 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1987). 
77 See section 1312(b) of the Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1988 Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 
1184-85 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(b) (1988)), amending subsection B of § 771(5) of the TTA, 
regarding domestic subsidies (“[T]he administering authority, in each investigation, shall determine whether the 
bounty, grant, or subsidy in law or in fact is provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or 
industries. Nominal general availability, under the terms of the law, regulation, program, or rule establishing a 
bounty, grant, or subsidy, of the benefits thereunder is not a basis for determining that the bounty, grant, or subsidy 
is not, or has not been, in fact provided to a specific enterprise or industry, or group thereof.”). 
78 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7)(A). 
79 S. REP. NO. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 45, at 87 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]; H.R. REP. NO. 317, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 46 (1979) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. 
80 John J. Barceló III, Subsidies, Countervailing Duties and Antidumping After the Tokyo Round, vol. 13, Issue 2 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 257, 271-72 (1981). See also John J. Barceló III, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise It, 
in MICH. Y.B. INT’L LEGAL STUDIES 53, 54-57 (1979) (comparing the injury test under the escape clause with the 
injury test under the antidumping law, as amended by The Trade Act of 1974). 
81 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671(a)(2). 
82 SENATE REPORT, supra note 79, at 74-75; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 79, at 47. 
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determine that even though other factors have affected the industry adversely, the subsidized 
imports nonetheless are the cause of material injury.83 
 The conventional approach to injury analysis, favored by the majority of the ITC, was 
first to determine whether the industry is injured and then to inquire whether the subsidized 
imports are a cause of that injury.84 In other words, the test investigates the condition of the 
domestic industry and the imports separately and tries to establish a causal link in a third step. 
 A longstanding issue in CVD injury determination was whether the ITC must take into 
account the level of subsidies found by the Commerce Department in deciding whether material 
injury is caused by subsidized imports. As David Palmeter put it, should it make any difference 
whether the amount of subsidy of the imports is one percent or 100 percent?85 In 1982, in 
Certain Carbon Steel Products from Spain, for the first time, a majority of the ITC expressly 
declined to consider the amount of the net subsidy in determining whether there is material 
injury stating that “the statute does not direct the Commission” to do so since it speaks of 
material injury “by reason of import,” and not “by reason of subsidy.”86 Since then, a majority of 
the ITC has consistently declined to consider net subsidy in its analysis of causation.87 Individual 
Commissioners, however, have continued to take it into account in some cases. In particular, 
                                                 
83 N. David Palmeter, Injury Determination in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases – A Commentary on 
U.S. Practice, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 7, 31 (1987); see also, e.g., Carton Closing Staples and Nonautomatic Carton-
Closing Staple Machines from Sweden, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-1, 16 and 117 (Final), USITC Pub. 1454 (Dec. 1983); 
Certain Tool Steelsfrom Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-187 and 731-TA-100 
(Final), USITC Pub. 1403 (July 1983). 
84 HANS-JÜRGEN BLINN, THE INJURY-TEST UNDER U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS AS 
INTERPRETED BY THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE: A COMPARISON 
STUDY OF THE CONVENTIONAL “TREND-ANALYSIS” AND THE “ELASTICITY-TEST” 21, 43 (1991). 
85 Palmeter, supra note 83, at 38. 
86 Certain Carbon Steel Production from Spain, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-155, 157-160 and 163 (Final), USITC Pub. 1331 
at 14 (Dec. 1982). 
87 Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Recent Developments Regarding Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Injury Determination, in THE ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAWS: KEY LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 
153, 162-67 (Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F. Holmer eds., 1987); Palmeter, supra note 83, at 39. 
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Commissioner Stern argued that the proper basis for assessing causality is not to judge the full 
impact of the subject imports, which happen to benefit from a subsidy, but rather to judge the 
effect of the subsidy in causing the injury through the subject imports.88 Thus, according to her 
opinion, the ITC is required “to trace, to whatever extent possible, the actual effects of the 
subsidies on the domestic industry.”89 Nevertheless, the court held that the ITC is not required to 
consider the amount of subsidy. In Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, it concluded that “[o]ur 
law does not go so far as to require that the subsidy itself be shown to be the cause of injury.”90 
Consequently, the size of the net subsidy is only a “discretionary factor in determining injury.”91 
 In sum, the reforms following the Tokyo Round mark a change in direction from the 100-
year trend in U.S. CVD policy of ever-increasing protection of U.S. industries to establishing 
more “equal” competitive conditions between foreign firms and their U.S. counterparts, as well 
as increasing emphasis on the welfare of consumers and the economy generally. This was mainly 
achieved by limiting the use of CVDs through imposing the specificity test and the material 
injury test. On the other hand, however, as a result of these changes, the United States had two 
different CVD laws – one that applied to countries that had signed the Subsidies Code or a 
similar agreement (requiring a determination of material injury before imposing CVDs), and a 
second law that applied to all other countries (not requiring the establishment of material injury). 
Furthermore, the lower threshold of injury compared to that for the escape clause,92 the 
                                                 
88 Certain Steel Wire Nails from Korea, Inv. No. 701-TA-145 (preliminary), USITC Pub. 1223 at 12 (Mar. 1982). 
89 Id. at 11. 
90 Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1984), reh’g denied, slip op. 85-27 
(Mar. 11, 1985), dismissed (order of Aug. 13, 1985), at 646 (emphasis in original). 
91 Certain Carbon Steel Production from Spain, supra note 86, at 14. 
92 See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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expedited procedure, and the new provisional measures resulted in an increase the number of 
complaints filed.93 
 Despite the changes, however, CVD laws remained one of “the costliest, in terms of net 
economic welfare, of U.S. import restraint programs.”94 A study conducted by Gallaway, 
Blonigen and Flynn demonstrated that the magnitude of the impact is due not only to the large 
number of CVD orders.95 Orders are applied on the subject product indefinitely, and thus, there 
is an accumulation of orders over time.96 Moreover, a large number of CVDs are imposed in 
manufacturing sectors that are upstream to many significant U.S. production sectors.97 
Consequently, these distortions result in larger welfare losses not only for U.S. consumers, but 
also for U.S. producers and exporters downstream to the sector subject to an order.98 
3. Changes Resulting from the Uruguay Round 
In 1994, Congress amended U.S. CVD law99 to conform to the agreements reached during the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, in particular the new Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
                                                 
93 While CVDs had only been used by the United States 58 times before 1974, they had been used 289 times 
between 1980 and 1987. See Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 199, 200 (1989). 
94 Michael P. Gallaway, Bruce A. Blonigen & Joseph E. Flynn, Welfare costs of the U.S. antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws, 49 J. INT. ECON. 211, 236 (1999) (the study demonstrates that the collective net economic 
welfare cost of anti-dumping and CVD orders in 1993 is $4 billion which is larger than any other U.S. restraint 
import program in place in 1993). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 237. 
98 Id. at 236-37. 
99 The implementation of the new WTO rules on countervailing measures is embodied in the Tariff Act of 1930, as 
amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (“URAA”) (Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 701-09, as amended by 19 
U.S.C. §§ 1671-71h and Uruguay Round Agreements Act §§ 211-34, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 
Stat.) 4842-4901). 
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Measures.100 Unlike the 1979 Subsidies Code, which only applied to the signatories of the Code, 
the SCM Agreement binds all WTO members;101 thus, imports from all WTO members are now 
entitled to an injury test and CVDs may not be imposed absent an affirmative determination of 
injury. The most distinctive features of the post-Uruguay Round CVD law are: (1) a more 
detailed and comprehensive definition of subsidy;102 (2) new de minimis limitations;103 
(3) “domestic industry” requirements;104 and (4) “sunset” review.105 
a. Definition of Subsidy Among the most notable changes in CVD law prompted by the 
Uruguay Round agreements was the inclusion of the statutory definition of subsidy. The 
amended Tariff Act closely follows the language of Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement 
stating that, for a measure to constitute a countervailable subsidy it must: (1) represent a financial 
contribution or income/price support by a government, which (2) confers a benefit106 (3) to a 
specific recipient.107 All three elements must be cumulatively present for a countervailable 
subsidy to exist. 
 The introduction of the specificity requirement into the definition of subsidy basically 
reflects acceptance by the WTO Members of prior U.S. practice. Section 771(5)(A) of the Tariff 
                                                 
100 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM 
Agreement]; see also supra Chapter III, Section D, subsection 2 for a more detailed discussion of the SCM 
Agreement’s negotiating history and the resulting agreement. 
101 WTO Agreement, supra note 1, art. II:2. 
102 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B), as amended by Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4902 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B)). 
103 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b)(4)(A), as amended by Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 263, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 1994 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4911 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b)(4)(A)). 
104 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c)(4), 1673a(c)(4), as amended by Uruguay Round Agreements Act § 212, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4844, 4846 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c)(4), 1673a(c)(4)). 
105 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c), as amended by Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(108 Stat.) 4861 (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c)). 
106 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B). 
107 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A). 
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Act108 mirrors the provision of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement dealing with specificity, which, 
in turn, reflects U.S. practice.109 Likewise, following the pre-existing U.S. practice, Section 
771(5A)(D) distinguishes between de jure specificity and de facto specificity.110 
 Similarly, the “benefit” requirement essentially reflects previous U.S. practice, which 
acknowledged it as a central element of a subsidy.111 Yet, at the same time, measuring the 
benefit in each instance was one of the most challenging areas of U.S. CVD law. The earlier law 
neither defined the meaning of “bounty or grant” nor included any criteria for identifying and 
measuring them. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 provided an “Illustrative List of Domestic 
Subsidies,”112 which offered certain guidelines regarding the basis for identifying 
countervailable subsidies. The first item on the list included “the provision of capital, loans, or 
loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with commercial consideration.”113 The language of the 
provision suggests using a market benchmark to establish the benefit.114 On the other hand, the 
                                                 
108 Id. 
109 See supra Chapter VI, Section A, subsection 2(a); see also The Uruguay Round Agreements Act – Statement of 
Administrative Action (19 U.S.C. § 3511(a)(2), at 932) stating that Section 771(5A)(D)(iv) of the Tariff Act 
“corresponds to the SCM Agreement Article 2.2, while codifying Commerce’s current specificity test.” 
110 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D). 
111 See, e.g., Cabot Corp. v. United States, supra note 74, at 729 (“a bounty or grant is a benefit which gives rise to a 
“competitive advantage.” See British Steel Corp. v. United States, 9 C.I.T., 605 F. Supp. 286, 294 (1985); ASG 
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 82 Cust. Ct. 101, 137 C.D. 4797, 467 F. Supp. 1200, 1230 (1979); Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 98 S. Ct. 2441, 57 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1978).); Carlisle Tire and Rubber Co. v. 
United States, at 837 (“in the view of the ITA, a condition precedent to finding that a domestic program provides a 
bounty or grant is that the program give an advantage to one or more industries vis-a-vis other industries within the 
same country”) (emphasis added); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. United States, supra note 68, at 1243 (“It is true that the 
subsidies found to exist in past cases were selectively bestowed. But it was the element of benefit, not the element of 
selectivity, which made them subsidies.”) (emphasis in original). 
112 Trade Act of 1979, supra note 47, § 1677(A)(i). 
113 Id. § 1677(5)(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis added). 
114 Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: The Case of Countervailing Duty Law, 19 
MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2010) (Arguing that “[w]hen determining whether the government provision of capital, 
loans, or loan guarantees confers a subsidy, the criterion is whether the government provision is consistent with 
commercial considerations. Logically, if the terms on which capital, loans, and loan guarantees are provided by the 
government differ from that would be justified by commercial considerations, recipients of such financial transfers 
must have received an advantage.”). 
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second item on the list – “the provision of goods or services at preferential rates”115 – introduced 
a competing, preferentiality benchmark. The Commerce Department explained that 
preferentiality typically means “only more favorable to some within the relevant jurisdiction than 
to others within that jurisdiction” and “it does not mean ‘inconsistent with commercial 
considerations.’”116 As Professor Zheng put it, according the Commerce Department, the 
standard for determining preferentiality is preferential to “others,” not preferential to the 
“market.”117 
 The SCM Agreement, although it does not define “benefit,” sets forth guidelines for 
calculating the amount of a subsidy in terms of “the benefit to the recipient.”118 All of them 
embody a market benchmark. Likewise, WTO adjudicating bodies concluded that comparison 
with a market benchmark is indispensable.119 In Canada – Aircraft, the Appellate Body made it 
clear that the SCM Agreement adopts the market benchmark as the sole benchmark for 
identifying and measuring subsidies: 
. . . the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for comparison in determining 
whether a “benefit” has been “conferred”, because the trade-distorting potential of 
a “financial contribution” can be identified by determining whether the recipient 
has received a “financial contribution” on terms more favourable than those 
available to the recipient in the market.120 
 To bring U.S. law into compliance with WTO rules, the Commerce Department adopted 
a new set of CVD regulations, which adopted the market benchmark analysis in identifying 
                                                 
115 Trade Act of 1979, supra note 47, § 1677(5)(A)(ii)(II) (emphasis added). 
116 Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 
24167 (May 31, 1983). 
117 Zheng, supra note 114, at 12. 
118 SCM Agreement, supra note 100, art. 14. 
119 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector, 
WT/DS412/AB/R, adopted May 24, 2013, para. 5.164. 
120 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft – Recourse by Brazil to 
Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS70/AB/RW, adopted 4 Aug. 2000, para. 157. 
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subsidies.121 In particular, when it comes to the government provision of goods or services, the 
regulations set forth a three-tiered hierarchy of benchmarks, all of which are market based: 
(1) market prices from actual transactions within the country under investigation; (2) world 
market prices that would be available to purchasers in the country under investigation; and (3) an 
assessment of whether the government price is consistent with market principles.122 
Consequently, the market benchmark became the only officially recognized benchmark for 
identifying and measuring subsidies.123 
 Section 771(5)(D), closely following the language of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, 
defines financial contribution as: 
(i) the direct transfer of funds, such as grants, loans, and equity infusions, or the 
potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities, such as loan guarantees, 
(ii) foregoing or not collecting revenue that is otherwise due, such as granting tax 
credits or deductions from taxable income, 
(iii) providing goods or services, other than general infrastructure, or purchasing 
goods.124 
 Prior to 1995, essentially any government action that caused a benefit to a certain 
enterprise or industry was considered a subsidy.125 Likewise, this was the U.S. position on the 
                                                 
121 19 C.F.R. § 351.511. 
122 Id. 
123 Zheng, supra note 114, at 17. 
124 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(D). 
125 See, e.g., Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Poland; Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 
19375 (May 7, 1984) (“We believe a subsidy (or bounty or grant) is definitionally any action that distorts or 
subverts the market process and results in a misallocation of resources.”) (emphasis added); see also U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1979, at 381, 470 (the Senate Finance Committee report stated that “[t]he reference to 
specific subsidies in the definition [section 771(5)] is not all inclusive, but rather is illustrative of practices which are 
subsidies within the meaning of the word as used in the bill. The administering authority may expand upon the list of 
specified subsidies consistent with the basic definition”) (emphasis in original); 125 CONG. REC. S10, 313 (daily ed. 
July 23, 1979) (Senator Heinz also commented that “[t]he point of this language . . . is to define subsidy broadly so 
as to catch within the scope of our law as many unfair trade practices as we can. That, of course, does not mean we 
countervail, because injury must also be found. It was the Committee’s intent, however, that the Treasury 
Department, or whatever administering authority ends up with this new law, not resolve petitions by arbitrarily 
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notion of subsidy in the Uruguay Round negotiations.126 New WTO law substantially limited the 
coverage of the definition of subsidy by introducing the “financial contribution” requirement, 
which functions to ensure that not all government measures that confer benefits can be deemed 
to be subsidies. 
 In the landmark WTO decision for the definition of subsidy, US – Export Restraints, the 
issue was whether an “export restraint” could constitute a financial contribution in the meaning 
of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) and (iv) of the SCM Agreement.127 The U.S. argument, which essentially 
mirrored its pre-existing practice, was based on an exclusive emphasis on the beneficial effect 
produced by the governmental intervention in the economy.128 The Panel, however, disagreed 
with this “effect approach,” deciding that the determination of whether a financial contribution 
exists must concentrate on the examination of the nature of the action by the government and not 
on its effects. Thus, the SCM Agreement regulated only certain forms of government actions that 
are listed in items (i) to (iii) and the list should be considered exhaustive.129 The Panel concluded 
that: 
. . . the negotiating history confirms that the introduction of the two-part definition 
of subsidy, consisting of “financial contribution” and “benefit”, was intended 
specifically to prevent the countervailing of benefits from any sort of (formal, 
                                                                                                                                                             
concluding that various practices are not subsidies. Better to define the term broadly, as it ought to be defined, and 
then use the injury test as it is intended to be used.”). 
126 The United States proposed to define a subsidy as “any government action or combination of government actions 
which confers a benefit on the recipient firm(s).” (Elements of the Framework for Negotiations, Submission by the 
United States, GATT Doc. No. MTN.GNG/NG10/W/29. at 2 (Nov. 22, 1989).) 
127 Panel Report, United States – Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R, adopted 1 Aug. 
2001, para. 8.16 (there, the Panel considered as an export restraint “a border measure that takes the form of a 
government law or regulation which expressly limits the quantity of exports or places explicit conditions on the 
circumstances under which exports are permitted, or that takes the form of a government-imposed fee or tax on 
exports of the product calculated to limit the quantity of exports”). 
128 Id. para. 55 (In particular, the United States argued that “domestic purchasers of a restrained product may be able 
to purchase that product at a lower price than would otherwise be the case if the market for that product was not 
artificially limited by the government. In such a case, domestic purchasers of the restrained product would receive a 
benefit in the form of lower costs for their inputs.”). 
129 Id. para. 8.69. 
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enforceable) government measures, by restricting to a finite list the kinds of 
government measures that would, if they conferred benefits, constitute subsidies. 
The negotiating history confirms that items (i)-(iii) of that list limit these kinds of 
measures to the transfer of economic resources from a government to a private 
entity.130 
Therefore, under the post-Uruguay Round law, only certain government measures, listed in 
Section 771(5)(D), fall within the definition of subsidy. 
 To sum up, the definition of subsidy introduced in U.S. law as a result of the Uruguay 
Round agreements further limits the scope of the CVD law. The two elements of subsidy 
(“selectivity” and “benefit”), although for the first time included in the statutory definition of 
subsidy, do not substantially affect the pre-existing U.S. practice of viewing a government action 
that causes a benefit to a certain enterprise or industry as a subsidy. The most notable change, 
however, is the introduction of the “financial contribution” element, which narrows the definition 
of a countervailable subsidy to include only certain government measures. 
b. De Minimis Countervailable Subsidy U.S. law provides for certain de minimis limitations: if 
the subsidies found do not exceed these limitations, CVDs may not be imposed. Before 
implementing the changes required by the Uruguay Round agreements, a de minimis subsidy 
margin was defined as 0.5 percent or less.131 WTO law sets a much higher threshold for 
challenging actionable subsidies.132 Consistent with the SCM Agreement, the new U.S. law 
provides for a de minimis threshold of 1% ad valorem for developed countries133 and 2% for 
developing countries.134 Moreover, for certain developing country the de minimis level is 3%.135 
                                                 
130 Id. para. 8.73 (emphasis in original). 
131 19 C.F.R. § 353.6. 
132 SCM Agreement, supra note 100, arts. 11.9, 27.10 and 27.11. 
133 19 U.S.C. § 167b(b)(4)(A). 
134 19 U.S.C. § 167b(b)(4)(B). 
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By raising the threshold for challenging actionable subsidies, the WTO thus further limited the 
use of CVD measures. 
c. Domestic Industry The SCM Agreement strengthened the requirements for initiating a CVD 
investigation. In the U.S, prior to 1995, a petition to start an investigation could be brought by 
any number of domestic producers. This allowed initiation of an investigation by representatives 
of a small portion of total domestic production of the like product and even where other members 
of the industry indicated their opposition to the petition, unless the opposition was shown to 
represent a majority of the domestic industry.136 
 Under the new law, in order to prevent the CVD procedure from being captured in this 
manner, a sufficiently important part of the domestic industry must have expressed support for 
the application. The amended Tariff Act closely follows the language of Article 11.4 of the SCM 
Agreement, stating that the petition is considered to be filed “by or on behalf of” the domestic 
industry only if (1) the domestic producers who support the petition account for at least 25 
percent of the total production of the domestic like product, and (2) the domestic producers who 
support the petition account for more than 50 percent of the production of the domestic like 
                                                                                                                                                             
135 19 U.S.C. § 167b(b)(4)(C) (Two categories of developing countries are eligible for the 3% standard: (1) least-
developed countries identified in Annex VII of the SCM Agreement; (2) developing countries that eliminated their 
export subsidies on an expedited bases pursuant to Article 27.11 of the SCM Agreement.). 
136 Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 667 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Based on the 
respective statutory provisions governing standing of parties to bring petitions to commence investigations, it 
[Commerce] relies upon the petitioner’s representation that it has filed “on behalf of” the domestic industry until it 
is affirmatively shown that a majority of the domestic industry opposes the petition. . . . [N]either the [statutory 
framework] nor its legislative history restricts access to the unfair trade laws by requiring that parties petitioning for 
relief . . . establish affirmatively that a majority of the members of the relevant domestic industry support the 
petition. The only requirement is that the party filing the petition act as the representative of the domestic industry.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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product produced by that portion of the industry expressing support for or opposition to the 
petition.137 
d. Sunset Provision Prior to the Uruguay Round, U.S. law did not contain a sunset provision and 
CVD measures could remain in effect for an unlimited period of time.138 Consistent with Article 
21.3 of the SCM Agreement, U.S. law now requires that all CVDs must be withdrawn five years 
after their imposition, unless the investigating authorities show that revocation of the duty is 
likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury to the domestic 
industry.139 As the Appellate Body explained in US – Carbon Steel, “termination of a 
countervailing duty is the rule and its continuation is the exception.”140 Thus, absent a sunset 
review, all CVDs in place must immediately be withdrawn. 
 In sum, U.S. CVD law has undergone substantial change over the last century. In the first 
period, stretching from the 1890s until the late 1970s, CVD law played a primarily protectionist 
role. For that purpose, it was rather broad so as to embrace as many measures as possible, and it 
became even broader over time. Developments after the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds 
demonstrate a move from pure protection of U.S. industry to a focus on the effect of subsidies. In 
order to limit the use of CVDs, the scope of application of the law has been substantially 
narrowed. 
 The following table demonstrates the evolution of the substantive law on CVDs: 
                                                 
137 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(c)(4). 
138 Some CVD orders had been in effect more than 15 years (see How the GATT Affects U.S. Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Policy 73 (Washington DC: Congressional Budget Office 1994)). 
139 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c). 
140 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from 
German, WT/DS213/AB/R, adopted 19 Dec. 2002, para. 88. 
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Table 2. The Evolution of U.S. Substantive Law on Countervailing Duties 
 1890s – 1970s After Tokyo Round After Uruguay Round 
Subsidy • Any government action 
• that gives an advantage 
to recipient(s) 
• Any government action 
• that gives an advantage 
• to specific recipient(s) 
• Financial contribution or 
income/price support by a 
government 
• which confers a benefit 
• to specific recipient(s) 
Material injury 
test 
Not required (except for 
duty-free imports since 
1974) 
Required only for imports 
from the countries that 
signed the Subsidies Code 
(24 countries) 
Required for imports from all 
WTO Members (164 
countries) 
B. U.S. COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW 
CVD proceedings are now governed by Subtitle A of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as 
added by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and subsequently amended,141 and the relevant 
Customs Regulations.142 While the previous sections of this chapter outlined the development of 
the law over time, this section provides a more comprehensive view of the current state of U.S. 
law. 
1. Substantive Elements 
In order to impose countervailing measures against subsidized imports, two basic elements need 
to be established during the course of the investigation: (1) the Commerce Department must 
determine whether there is a countervailable subsidy under the statutory definition; (2) in the 
                                                 
141 19 U.S.C. § 1671. 
142 19 C.F.R. pt. 351. 
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case of a country that is a WTO member, or that has assumed similar obligations with respect to 
the U.S., the ITC must determine whether there has been material injury to a U.S. industry.143 
a. Subsidy With regard to the definition of a subsidy, U.S. law closely follows the language of 
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. In order to find the existence of a subsidy, the two cumulative 
conditions must be met: (1) there must be a financial contribution by a government in the country 
of origin or export or there must be a form of income or price support within the meaning of 
Article XVI of the GATT 1994; and (2) there must be a benefit conferred thereby.144 The statute 
provides further guidance on the meaning of the term “benefit conferred” by stating that “a 
benefit shall normally be treated as conferred where there is a benefit to the recipient.”145 In 
determining whether a subsidy exists, the Commerce Department is not required to consider the 
effect of the subsidy on the price or output of the merchandise under investigation.146 
 Subsidies are subject to CVD measures only if they are specific.147 While export 
subsidies and domestic content subsidies are automatically considered to be specific and 
therefore countervailable,148 domestic subsidies must be specific in order to be 
countervailable.149 A domestic subsidy is de jure specific when it is explicitly limited, by its own 
terms, to a company, industry, or group of companies or industries, or to a geographical 
region.150 If the criteria and conditions governing eligibility for a subsidy are objective, however, 
                                                 
143 19 U.S.C. § 1671. 
144 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B). 
145 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E). 
146 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(C). 
147 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A). 
148 19 U.S.C. § 1677 5(A), (B) and (C). 
149 19 U.S.C. § 1677 5(A), (D). 
150 19 U.S.C. § 1677 5(A), (D)(i). 
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the subsidy is not specific.151 The statute follows the language of footnote 2 of the SCM 
Agreement, defining “objective” as criteria or conditions that are “neutral and that do not favor 
one enterprise or industry over another.”152 
 Even if on its face a subsidy is not specific, it still can be specific de facto. The statute 
sets out the following factors that the Commerce Department is to use in determining de facto 
specificity: (1) whether only a small number of companies actually use a subsidy; (2) whether a 
subsidy is predominantly used by a company or industry; (3) whether a particular company or 
industry receives disproportionately large benefits under the program, and (4) whether the 
foreign governmental authority has used its discretion to grant the subsidy in a manner intended 
to benefit a particular company or industry.153 In practice, the Commerce Department has placed 
the greatest emphasis on the number of firms or industries receiving a government benefit in 
determining whether a particular subsidy is specific de facto.154 
b. Injury After the Commerce Department has found a subsidy to exist, the ITC is required to 
determine whether an industry in the United States is materially injured, or threatened with 
material injury, or the establishment of a U.S. industry is materially retarded, “by reason of 
imports” of the merchandise under investigation.155 
                                                 
151 19 U.S.C. § 1677 5(A), (D)(ii). 
152 Id. 
153 19 U.S.C. § 1677 5(A), (D)(iii). 
154 See, e.g., Certain Pasta from Italy (Final), 61 Fed. Reg. 30288 (June 14, 1996); Certain Textile Mill Products 
from Thailand (Final), 52 Fed. Reg. 7636-01 (Mar. 12, 1987); Certain Carbon Steel Products from Brazil (Final), 49 
Fed. Reg. 17988-01 (Apr. 26, 1984). 
155 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2). 
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 Material injury is defined as “harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or 
unimportant.”156 In accordance with Article 15.4 of the SCM Agreement, the statute provides a 
list of factors which the ITC must examine in order to reach a determination of material injury 
(the volume of imports, the effect of imports on prices in the U.S., the impact of imports on U.S. 
producers of the like product).157 Therefore, following the statutory language, the ITC is required 
to discuss each of the factors listed in the statute in their opinion. Although the ITC may choose 
to give minimal weight to, or even to disregard, a particular factor, there must be a showing that 
the factor was considered in some form.158 
 The concept of threat of material injury is not defined. Nevertheless, the statute states that 
the determination must be made “on the basis of evidence that the threat of material injury is real 
and that actual injury is imminent.”159 Such determination may not be made on the basis of mere 
conjecture or supposition.160 
 The statute provides a list of factors that must be considered by the ITC in making the 
material injury determination: unused productive capacity or increases in capacity in the 
exporting country; rapid increases in U.S. market share; the probability that low-priced imports 
could suppress or depress U.S. prices; increases in inventories of the product; and the possibility 
of product shifting by foreign producers.161 Generally, the ITC has been more reluctant to issue a 
determination of threat of injury when it finds no current injury.162 
                                                 
156 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A). 
157 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C). 
158 COHEN, DUNN & KAYE, supra note 7, at 54. 
159 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(ii); see also Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640, 650 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
1984) (stating that the “essence of a threat lies in the ability and incentive to act imminently”). 
160 Id. 
161 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(F)(i). 
162 COHEN, DUNN & KAYE, supra note 7, at 60. 
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 In 2015, Congress amended the definition of “material injury” and the factors the ITC 
must examine when evaluating material injury or threat of material injury. In particular, the new 
amendment prohibits the ITC from finding that there has been no injury “merely because that 
industry is profitable or because the performance of that industry has recently improved.”163 
Although even in previous years the ITC did not make its conclusions based on profitability 
alone, and always examined it together with other factors before finding injury, this change 
might be viewed by some industries as an “easing” of the injury standard.164 As a result, it might 
encourage some U.S industries that are only beginning to experience adverse financial impact 
from subsidized imports, but show other signs of injury, to file petitions before bad financial 
results appear.165 
 CVDs may also me imposed when “the establishment of an industry in the United States 
is materially retarded” by reason of imports.166 Nevertheless, such determinations are extremely 
rare because it is difficult to prove that the complainant would have been able to establish an 
industry “but for” the imports. Thus, U.S. producers are more likely to claim that they have an 
established industry that is being injured by a history of imports.167 
 There is also a requirement to establish the causal link between the subsidized import and 
the material injury. The injury to the U.S. industry must be “by reason of imports of the 
                                                 
163 Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-27, § 503, 219 Stat. 385 (2015). 
164 COHEN, DUNN & KAYE, supra note 7, at 56; see also Arnold & Porter Advisory: AD/CVD and Customs 
Amendments Included in Recent US Trade Legislation, http://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/ 
publications/2016/2/ad_cvd-and-customs-amendments-in-recent-us-trade (stating that “[t]he amendments pertaining 
to material injury will likely make it easier for domestic industries to demonstrate material injury in AD/CVD injury 
investigations”). 
165 Richard P. Ferrin, Douglas J. Heffner & Eric L. Johnson, U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws 
Accompany Trade Preferences Extension Act, THE NAT’L L. REV. (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/us-antidumping-and-countervailing-duty-lawsaccompany-trade-preferences-
extension-ac. 
166 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a)(1)(B). 
167 COHEN, DUNN & KAYE, supra note 7, at 61. 
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merchandise,” which is the subject of the investigation.168 As mentioned above, the conventional 
approach to injury analysis, favored by the majority of the ITC, was first to determine whether 
the industry is injured and then to inquire whether the subsidized imports are a cause of that 
injury.169 In the mid-1980s, however, individual Commissioners began to assert that the proper 
basis for assessing causality is not whether there is material injury overall, but rather whether the 
impact of imports is such as to constitute material injury.170 Courts have concluded that both 
tests constitute a permissible reading of the statute, and that neither test is prohibited.171 
2. Procedure and Remedies 
a. Procedure CVD investigations are conducted on the basis of a petition filed simultaneously 
with the Commerce Department and ITC on behalf of a domestic industry, or by the Commerce 
Department on its own initiative.172 The International Trade Administration (ITA), an agency 
within the Commerce Department, determines whether there is a subsidy and the ITC determines 
whether there is material injury. 
 If an investigation is initiated by a petition, the Commerce Department must, within 20 
days, determine the sufficiency of the petition.173 If the Commerce Department’s determination 
at this stage is negative, the petition is dismissed and the proceedings end.174 
                                                 
168 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2). 
169 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
170 See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. 
171 See, e.g., R-M Industries, Inc. v. United States, 18 Ct. Int’l Trade 219, 848 F. Supp. 204, 16 Int’l Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 1338 (1994); American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 8 Ct. Int’l Trade 20, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 6 Int’l 
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1025 (1984), judgment aff’d, 3 Fed. Cir. (T) 123, 760 F.2d 249, 6 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2380 
(1985). 
172 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(a). 
173 19 C.F.R. § 351.203(b). 
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 Upon receiving notice from the Commerce Department that the petition is sufficient, the 
ITC begins to investigate whether there is “a reasonable indication” of injury.175 The ITC must 
make a preliminary determination of material injury within 45 days of receiving notice from the 
Commerce Department.176 If the ITC’s determination is negative, the proceedings end.177 This is, 
however, a relatively rare occurrence since the preliminary injury standard is much lower than 
required for the final determination.178 
 If the ITC’s determination is affirmative, the Commerce Department begins its 
preliminary investigation to determine “whether there is a reasonable basis to believe or suspect 
that a subsidy is being provided.”179 The preliminary determination must be made within 65 days 
unless the Commerce Department determines that the case is “extraordinarily complicated” and 
should be postponed.180 Even if the Commerce Department’s determination is negative, both the 
Commerce Department and the ITC continue the investigation to the final stage.181 
 The Commerce Department must issue a final determination on the issue of subsidies 
within 75 days of an affirmative preliminary determination.182 Before issuing a final 
determination, the Commerce Department must hold a hearing upon the request of any party to 
the proceeding.183 It also must conduct a verification of the information upon which the final 
                                                                                                                                                             
174 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(c)(3). 
175 19 U.S.C. § 1673b. 
176 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a). 
177 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a)(1). 
178 LESLIE ALAN GLICK, ESQ., GUIDE TO UNITED STATES CUSTOMS AND TRADE LAWS: AFTER THE CUSTOMS 
MODERNIZATION ACT 130 (2008). 
179 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(1). 
180 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(c). 
181 ITC: 19 C.F.R. § 207.20; ITA: 19 C.F.R. § 351.205 (Prior to the Uruguay Round, a final injury investigation by 
the ITA would only occur upon the ITA’s preliminary affirmative determination.). 
182 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(a)(1). 
183 19 C.F.R. § 351.310. 
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determination is based.184 Since the Commerce Department sends separate questionnaires to the 
government and to exporters, it must verify both the government’s response and the responses of 
exporters. If for some reason the information cannot be verified, the Commerce Department will 
base the determination on “facts available,” which could be the information in the petition.185 
Upon making the final determination the Commerce Department issues a final order which, if 
negative, ends the proceedings.186 If a final determination is affirmative, the investigation 
continues to the final injury phase at the ITC.187 
 The ITC must make its final determination: (1) within 120 days of the Commerce 
Department’s preliminary subsidy determination; or (2) within 45 days of an affirmative final 
subsidy determination by the Commerce Department.188 If the Commerce Department has made 
a negative preliminary subsidy determination and a positive final determination, the ITC must 
make a final injury determination within 75 days of the final subsidy determination.189 If both the 
final injury determination and the final subsidy determination are positive, then the Commerce 
Department issues a CVD order.190 
 A decision of the Commerce Department or the ITC may be appealed to the U.S. Court of 
International Trade, which has exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals.191 Appeals from 
decisions of the Court of International Trade are taken to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, which reviews the underlying agency determination to see whether it is supported by 
                                                 
184 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a); 19 C.F.R. § 351.307(a). 
185 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b); 19 C.F.R. § 351.308(a). 
186 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(c)(2). 
187 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(c)(1). 
188 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(2). 
189 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b)(3). 
190 19 U.S.C. § 1671d. 
191 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(2)(B); § 1516a(a)(1)(C). 
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substantial evidence or otherwise is in accordance with the law, rather than reviewing the 
decision of the Court of International Trade.192 
b. Remedies Consistent with WTO law,193 U.S. law provides for two types of relief in CVD 
proceedings: (1) the imposition of CVDs (provisional and definitive duties); or (2) a suspension 
agreement (referred to as a price undertaking in the SCM Agreement).194 
 Provisional duties are imposed when the Commerce Department makes an affirmative 
preliminary determination regarding the existence of countervailable subsidies.195 The 
Commerce Department instructs the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to order the suspension 
of liquidation of all entries of merchandise subject to the determination which are entered, or 
withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the later of the date on which notice of 
the determination is published in the Federal Register, or the date which is 60 days after the date 
on which notice of the determination to initiate the investigation is published in the Federal 
Register.196 All entries of subject merchandise are subject to a security requirement. The 
importer must, at the time the merchandise is entered, post security in an amount sufficient to 
cover the CVD liability as set forth in the preliminary determination. Although the statute 
provides for acceptance of security in the form of “a cash deposit, bond or other security,”197 in 
                                                 
192 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 3 Fed. Cir. (T) 44, 750 F.2d 927, 932, 6 Int’l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 1465 (1984). 
193 SCM Agreement, supra note 100, art. 19. 
194 19 U.S.C. § 1671. 
195 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(d). 
196 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(d)(2). 
197 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(d)(1)(b). 
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2011 the Commerce Department announced that it would “normally” accept only cash deposit as 
security.198 
 If the Commerce Department makes a preliminary affirmative determination of “critical 
circumstances,”199 the suspension of liquidation applies retroactively.200 Retroactive liquidation 
applies to entries made beginning on the later of the date of publication of the notice of initiation 
of the investigation (normally, 20 days after the filing of petition), or 90 days after the 
preliminary determination.201 
 If the preliminary investigation is negative, the Commerce Department conducts a final 
determination, although there is no suspension of liquidation. 
 Definitive duties are imposed when the ITC makes an affirmative final determination of 
injury. Within 7 days after being notified by the ITC of an affirmative final determination the 
Commerce Department publishes in the Federal Register a CVD order.202 Once a CVD order is 
in effect, all entries are subject to a cash deposit requirement equal to the subsidies percentage 
found in the final determination.203 Duties are imposed on all subject merchandise entered on or 
after the date of suspension of liquidation (i.e. Commerce’s preliminary affirmative 
determination), unless the ITC’s final determination is based on threat of material injury or 
                                                 
198 Modifications of Regulations Regarding the Practice of Accepting Bonds During the Provisional Measures 
Period in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations, 76 Fed. Reg. 61042. 
199 Critical circumstances exist if (1) the alleged countervailable subsidy is inconsistent with the SCM Agreement; 
and (2) there have been “massive imports” of subject merchandise over a relatively short period. See 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1671b(e)(1). 
200 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(e). 
201 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(e)(2). 
202 19 U.S.C. § 1671e. 
203 19 U.S.C. § 1671d. 
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material retardation. In these cases, duties are imposed only on merchandise entered on or after 
the date of publication of the ITC’s final affirmative determination.204 
 CVD orders are subject to annual administrative reviews, conducted upon request as 
frequently as once a year by the Commerce Department, and “changed circumstances” review, 
conducted by either the Commerce Department or the ITC, depending upon the nature of the 
change involved.205 “Sunset” review must be conducted on each CVD order no later than once 
every 5 years.206 The Commerce Department determines whether subsidies would be likely to 
continue or resume if an order were to be revoked, and the ITC conducts a similar review to 
determine whether injury to the domestic industry would be likely to continue or resume. If both 
determinations are affirmative, the CVD remains in place; if either determination is negative, the 
order is revoked.207 
 A compensation agreement is an alternative to imposing CVDs. A compensation 
agreement is an agreement between the Commerce Department and (1) the exporters and 
producers, or (2) the foreign government, whereby the latter agrees to modify their behavior so 
as to eliminate subsidization or the injury caused thereby.208 The statute provides for only three 
types of suspension agreements: (1) agreements to cease exporting the investigated product to 
the United States; (2) agreements to eliminate the subsidies (i.e. to eliminate the subsidies 
completely or to offset the subsidy with an export tax); and (3) agreements to eliminate injurious 
effects of subsidies (the agreement must eliminate or offset at least 85 percent of the subsidy and 
                                                 
204 19 U.S.C. § 1671e. 
205 19 U.S.C. § 1675. 
206 19 U.S.C. § 1675(c). 
207 19 C.F.R. § 351.218. 
208 19 C.F.R. § 351.208. 
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must result in the elimination of the suppression or undercutting of U.S. prices).209 In practice, 
however, the first type of agreement doesn’t happen, because there is no incentive for the 
exporter to enter into it. An exporter that intends to stop exporting to the United States could 
simply withdraw from the case rather than go through the procedural difficulties of a suspension 
agreement.210 Therefore, there are basically two types of suspension agreements: to eliminate the 
subsidy and to eliminate injurious effects. 
3. Consistency with WTO Rules 
In general, U.S. CVD law and administrative practice are consistent with WTO law. This has 
been achieved through the implementation of WTO rules by the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act,211 as well as through implementing the Dispute Settlement Body’s (DSB) decisions. At the 
same time, CVDs imposed by the United States have been the most challenged in the WTO. Of 
the 41 cases in which a CVD was challenged on the ground of its inconsistency with the SCM 
Agreement, 26 were brought against the United States.212 The disputes are various and distinct; 
at the same time, they address only certain, very specific aspects of U.S. law and administrative 
practice. 
 For example, in US – Softwood Lumber IV,213 Canada granted a financial contribution in 
the form of the provision of goods by granting the right to harvest standing timber (“stumpage”) 
                                                 
209 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(b)(1). 
210 COHEN, DUNN & KAYE, supra note 7, at 65. 
211 URAA, supra note 99. 
212 World Trade Organization, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_ 
e.htm?id=A20# (last visited Sept. 27, 2016). 
213 Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain 
Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/R, adopted 17 Feb. 2004, para. 124. 
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at terms beneficial to harvesters. When the stumpage was harvested, the logs were further 
processed into primary lumber by sawmills. Part of such lumber was further processed by 
independent remanufactures into remanufactured lumber. The Commerce Department imposed 
CVDs on both primary and remanufactured lumber on the basis of a determination that 
stumpage had been subsidized, without assessing whether the benefit was effectively passed 
through to independent lumber producers. The Appellate Body decided that where the CVDs are 
to be imposed on processed products, and where a downstream producer is unrelated to the 
alleged subsidized upstream producer of the input, the investigating authority is not allowed to 
simply assume that a benefit has passed through.214 Similarly, in US – Lead and Bismuth II, the 
Appellate Body concluded that the Commerce Department should not have presumed that the 
non-recurring subsidies given to a state-owned enterprise would have passed through.215 
 The United States has generally complied with DSB rulings. In one case, however, it 
failed to do so, resulting in retaliatory measures imposed against the United States. In US – 
Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), the Appellate Body condemned the so-called Byrd Amendment by 
finding that it was inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.216 Enacted on October 28, 2000, the 
Byrd Amendment mandated the distribution of the proceeds from CVDs to all U.S. producers 
supporting a domestic petition seeking such duties.217 As Congress explained, the purpose of 
                                                 
214 Id. paras. 141, 143 (in the absence of such a pass-through determination, “it cannot be shown that the essential 
elements of the subsidy definition in Article 1 are present in respect of the processed product”). 
215 Appellate Body Report, United States – Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and 
Bismuth Carbon Steel products Originating in the United Kingdom, WT/DS138/R, adopted 7 June 2000, paras. 126-
127. 
216 Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/AB/R, 
WT/DS234/AB/R, adopted 27 Jan. 2003. 
217 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (“Duties assessed pursuant to a countervailing duty order . . . shall be distributed on an annual 
basis under this section to the affected domestic producers for qualifying expenditures. Such distribution shall be 
known as the ‘continued . . . subsidy offset.”). The U.S. Customs Services distributed a total amount of $231 million 
in 2001 and $329 million in 2002 (see 2001 U.S. Customs Ann. Rep., CDSOA FY 2001 Disbursements, 
www.customs.gov). 
219 
U.S. unfair trade law is to restore the conditions of fair trade in order that economic investment 
and jobs that should be in the United States are not lost as a result of disingenuous market 
signals; and if foreign subsidization persists, U.S. producers will be hesitant to rehire employees 
that were laid off in order to survive and may be incapable of maintaining pension or health care 
benefits.218 
 From the time of its enactment, the Byrd Amendment was controversial both 
domestically219 and internationally. In the largest joint dispute resolution action in the history of 
the WTO, thirty countries challenged the Byrd Amendment.220 The Appellate Body found that 
the Byrd Amendment is inconsistent with Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement because it is a 
specific action against a subsidy other than those permitted by the SCM Agreement.221 Since the 
SCM Agreement allows only three measures in response to subsidies (provisional CVDs, 
definitive CVDs, or a price undertaking), the United States violated its obligations under the 
WTO by introducing a measure to counteract a subsidy other than the three permissible forms. 
 In June 2003, the United States was granted eleven months to bring the measure into 
conformity with its WTO obligations.222 When the United States failed to do so, the WTO 
                                                 
218 Id. (Historical & Statutory Notes – Findings of Congress Respecting Continued Dumping and Subsidy) (1999 & 
Supp. 2002). 
219 See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati & Petros C. Mavroidis, Killing the Byrd Amendment with the Right Stone, 3 WORLD 
TRADE REV. 1, 119-27 (2004); Hale E. Shepard, The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd 
Amendment): A Defeat before the WTO May Constitute an Overall Victory for U.S. Trade, 10 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 121, 121-55 (2002); Claire Hervey, The Byrd Amendment Battle: American Trade Politics at the WTO, 27 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 131, 131-44 (2003); Xuesong A. Yu, The Byrd’s View Might Not Give You a 
Whole Picture – The Battle in the World Trade Organization on the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 
2000, 17 FLA. J. INT’L L. 417, 417-38 (2005). 
220 Eleven complaining parties (Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the European Communities, India, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Mexico and Thailand) and five third-party participants (Argentina, Costa Rica, Hong Kong, Israel and 
Norway). Together, the 15 parties represent 30 countries, given that the “European Communities” represented the 15 
countries of the EC (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). 
221 US – Offset Act (Byrd Amendment), supra note 216, para. 265. 
222 Arbitrator Award, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/14, 
WT/DS234/22, at 83 (June 13, 2003). 
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authorized retaliation by eight complaining WTO Members, giving them the right to impose 
additional import duties having a total trade value of up to 72% of total Byrd Amendment 
disbursements.223 
 In February 2006, the United States eventually repealed the Byrd Amendment effective 
October 1, 2007.224 Nevertheless, while duties are no longer collected under the Byrd 
Amendment, distribution of “duties on entries of goods made and filed before October 1, 2007” 
continue.225 The WTO complaining Members asserted that the United States had not brought its 
measures fully into conformity with the DSB ruling.226 As a result, the EU continues to apply 
retaliatory tariffs.227 
 In three disputes, the compliance proceedings are still ongoing.228 In particular, in US – 
Countervailing Measures (China), the Appellate Body found that the Commerce Department had 
applied unlawful standards and methodologies for determining the benefit to the recipient. The 
Appellate Body concluded that “government-related prices” other than the financial contribution 
at issue should not be automatically rejected and may serve as a benchmark in calculating the 
benefit for the purpose of determining the existence of a subsidy under Article 14 of the SCM 
                                                 
223 Arbitrator Decisions, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Recourse to 
Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU), WT/DS217/ARB/BRA, WT/DS217/ARB/CHL, 
WT/DS217/ARB/EEC, WT/DS217/ARB/IND, WT/DS217/ARB/JPN, WT/DS217/ARB/KOR (Aug. 31, 2004). 
224 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 7601, 120 Stat. 4, 154. 
225 Id. 
226 Communication from the European Union, United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 
WT/DS217/64, adopted 4 Apr. 2014, at 1. 
227 Japan continued to apply the retaliatory measures until 2014, when they notified the DSB about non-application 
of the suspension of concessions because the authorized level was marginal. (See Current Status of US – Offset Act 
(Byrd Amendment), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds217_e.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 
2016)). 
228 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS437/AB/R, adopted 18 Dec. 2014; Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-
Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/AB/R, adopted 7 July 2014; Appellate Body 
Report, United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea, 
WT/DS464/AB/R, adopted 7 Sept. 2016. 
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Agreement, provided they are market determined.229 On this basis, it was found that the United 
States acted inconsistently with its obligation under Article 14(d) as it failed to conduct the 
necessary market analysis to verify whether in-country prices in China were market determined 
or not.230 
 In US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China), the Panel addressed the 
issue of “double remedies,” where the simultaneous application of anti-dumping and CVDs on 
the same imported products results in the offsetting of the same subsidization twice. The Panel 
explained that (1) the imposition of double remedies arising from concurrent imposition of 
CVDs and anti-dumping duties calculated under non-market economy methodology is 
inconsistent with the obligation in Article 19.3 of the SCM Agreement to levy CVDs “in the 
appropriate amounts”; and (2) the burden is on an investigating authority imposing such 
concurrent duties to investigate whether it is offsetting the same subsidies twice.231 Therefore, it 
was found that the United States acted inconsistently with Article 19.3 by failing to investigate 
whether double remedies arose in 25 CVD investigations.232 
 In the most recent case, US – Washing Machines, the Appellate Body concluded that the 
Commerce Department’s calculation of ad valorem subsidization rate fails to ensure that CVDs 
are not imposed in excess of the amount of subsidy found to exist.233 The Commerce Department 
originally found that tax credits Samsung received from the Government of Korea were not tied 
to any particular products and, therefore, attributed the subsidies received by Samsung under 
                                                 
229 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), supra note 220, para. 4.64. 
230 Id. 
231 Panel Report, United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS449/R, adopted 27 Mar. 2014, para. 7.308 (quoting Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-
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those programs across all products.234 According to the Commerce Department, a subsidy is tied 
to a product “only when the intended use is known to the subsidy giver”235 and in the present 
case the Government of Korea “had no way to know the intended use” of the subsidy at the time 
Samsung was authorized to claim the tax credits.236 Although the Appellate Body confirmed that 
the SCM Agreement does not dictate any particular methodology for calculating subsidy ratios 
and an investigating authority has the discretion to choose the most appropriate methodology for 
carrying out its calculation, the methodology, nevertheless, has to allow for a sufficiently precise 
determination of the amount of subsidization bestowed on the investigated products, as required 
under Article 19.4 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT.237 The Appellate Body 
explained that, rather than focusing on “the intended use,” the appropriate inquiry into the 
existence of a product-specific tie requires: 
. . . a scrutiny of the design, structure, and operation of the subsidy at issue, aimed 
at ascertaining whether the bestowal of that subsidy is connected to, or 
conditioned on, the production or sale of a specific product. Based on this 
assessment, a subsidy that does not restrict the recipient’s use of the proceeds of 
the financial contribution may, nevertheless, be found to be tied to a particular 
product if it induces the recipient to engage in activities connected to that 
product.238 
Thus, it was found that the Commerce Department acted inconsistently with the United States’ 
obligations under Article 19.4 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT by applying 
a flawed test for ascertaining whether the tax credits were tied to particular products.239 
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 In conclusion, U.S. CVD law has undergone substantial change over the last century. The 
current law is the result of a certain synthesis between internal developing and evolving of CVD 
law and bringing it into conformity with GATT/WTO rules. Indeed, on the one hand, the United 
States has demonstrated historical leadership in developing CVD law. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that WTO law has accepted certain fundamental features of U.S. CVD law (such as 
“benefit” and “specificity” requirements). On the other hand, the United States was ready for the 
changes on a multilateral level and a number of changes in U.S. law over time have been 
specifically in response to developments in GATT and WTO rules (for example, “financial 
contribution” requirement, injury to the domestic industry, sunset provision). 
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VII. COMPARISON OF THE EU AND U.S. RULES ON SUBSIDIES 
The United States and the EU have confronted the problem of subsidies over a long period of 
time and have responded differently to the issue. Having provided a general overview of the 
rules on subsidies in the EU (Chapter V) and in the United States (Chapter VI), this Chapter will 
focus on a comparison of the European and American approaches to subsidies regulation. Given 
that the current WTO discipline on subsidies in essence reflects a compromise between the 
opposing views of the United States and EU, it is striking that there is a very limited literature on 
a comparison of these two sets of rules.1 The United States and the EU have rather similar 
approaches when it comes to assessing and addressing subsidies through countervailing duties 
(CVDs), with some minor although important distinctions. The major difference between U.S. 
and EU legal systems, which are less studied but significant, exists with regard to granting 
internal subsidies. In this Chapter, I compare: (1) rules on the use of CVDs in response to 
subsidized imported goods and (2) rules on internal subsidization in the United States and the 
EU, respectively. 
                                                 
1 Alan O. Sykes, The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 473 (2010) (comparing the WTO, EU, and U.S. approaches to subsidies regulation); Giuseppe Cacciato, 
Subsidies, Competition Laws and Politics: A Comparison of the E.U. and the U.S.A., European Policy Paper Series 
(1996); Diane P. Wood, Cuno v. Daimler Chrysler, Inc.: State “Aids” from an American Perspective, 1 EUR. ST. 
AID L.Q. 3 (2007). 
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A. SUBSIDIZED IMPORTS AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 
Both the United States and the EU are WTO Members. Thus, they have incorporated the terms of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures2 in their national legislation.3 As a 
result, the basic structure and content of the countervailing duties (CVD) law in the United States 
and the EU are strongly influenced, if not determined, by obligations under the WTO agreements 
and, thus, are largely the same in both systems. Yet, certain differences exist which, in turn, 
reflect quite different understandings of the goals and purposes of CVD. 
 The only purpose of U.S. CVD law is to offset the unfair competitive advantage that 
foreign manufactures enjoy over U.S. producers as a result of subsidies granted by foreign 
government to their industries.4 This approach is largely based on the “entitlement theory,” 
which rests on the assumption that U.S. producers are entitled to protection from the effects in 
the domestic market of certain foreign subsidy programs.5 The U.S. CVD law, therefore, is 
primarily aimed at safeguarding U.S. producers’ interests. 
 The approach of the EU to imposing CVDs, on the other hand, is more nuanced. While 
also aimed at defending its producers against subsidized imports, EU CVD law focuses on 
                                                 
2 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 1999, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter the 
SCM Agreement]. 
3 The United States has incorporated the SCM Agreement by amending title VII of the Tariff and Trade Act of 1930. 
The EU has included the provisions of the SCM Agreement in its Regulation (Council Regulation 597/2009 of 
11 June 2009 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not members of the European Community (OJ 
L188/93) [hereinafter Regulation]). 
4 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 455-56 (1978) (“The purpose [of the countervailing duty 
statute] is relatively clear from the face of the statute and is confirmed by the congressional debates: The 
countervailing duty was intended to offset the unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers would otherwise 
enjoy from export subsidies paid by their governments.”). 
5 Charles J. Goetz, Lloyd Granet & Warren F. Schwartz, The Meaning of “Subsidy” and “Injury” in Countervailing 
Duty Law, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 17, 18-19 (1986) (“We assume that American firms are entitled to that domestic 
market outcome which would have resulted from a ‘fair’, competitive process, by which is meant one which has not 
been ‘manipulated’ by foreign government subsidization. The idea then is to restore the competition in the American 
market to its ‘but for’ state by neutralizing the effect of the subsidy.”). 
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creating a level playing field and on taking into account wider public interest considerations, 
providing for a delicate balance between the various interests involved (end-users, importers, 
consumers, etc.). The EU has gone beyond its WTO obligations by tightening conditions for use 
of CVDs so that the remedy itself does not create additional trade distortions. As a result, the EU 
has produced a unique CVD law that is “arguably more open and more balanced than [that of] 
any other WTO Member.”6 
1. Substantive Elements 
Under both U.S.7 and EU8 law, in order to impose CVDs against subsidized imports, two basic 
elements must be established during the course of the investigation: (1) the imports concerned 
must benefit from a countervailable subsidy; and (2) the subsidized imports must cause or 
threaten to cause material injury to the domestic industry producing the like product. The key 
difference between U.S. and EU CVD laws, however, is that EU law requires proof of an 
additional element before the imposition of CVDs – Union interest. 
 From the EU perspective, it is indisputable that domestic producers are entitled to 
protection against subsidized imports. Yet, at the same time, the effect of imposing CVDs cannot 
be seen in isolation. As Professor Marco Bronckers has pointed out: 
countervailing duty actions rarely if ever maximize economic welfare overall. 
They are, in fact, likely to reduce economic welfare by imposing costs on other 
                                                 
6 Communication from the Commission – Global Europe – Europe’s trade defence instruments in a changing global 
economy – A Green Paper for public consultation, COM/2006/0763 final (Dec. 6, 2006). 
7 19 U.S.C. § 1671. 
8 Regulation, supra note 3, art. 15.1. 
227 
economic sectors (notably, consumers), which are not outweighed by the benefits 
to the industry receiving protection against subsidized imports.9 
It seems reasonable, therefore, that in order to correct some of the inefficiencies that CVDs 
might entail, the investigative authorities should take into account Union interests in addition to 
just those of the complaining industry before they impose CVDs. 
 To strike a balance between the various competing interests, the EU has developed the 
concept of “Union interest.” After an affirmative finding of subsidization causing injury to a 
domestic industry, the Commission must examine whether Union interests as a whole call for 
adoption of CVDs. Article 31.1 of the Regulation provides that: 
A determination as to whether the Community interest calls for intervention 
should be based on an appraisal of all the various interests taken as a whole, 
including the interests of the domestic industry and users and consumers. . . . In 
such an examination, the need to eliminate the trade-distorting effects of injurious 
subsidization and to restore effective competition shall be given special 
consideration.10 
Thus, even though subsidization causing injury to a domestic industry is established, CVDs may 
not be applied if “it can be clearly concluded that it is not in the Union interest to impose such 
measures.”11 
 When assessing the Union interest requirement, the Commissions examines, where 
appropriate, the interests of the Union industry, users, importers, and consumers. Examination of 
the interest of the Union industry is addressed first. The factors considered in the examination 
mostly overlap with those analyzed in the injury examination, but with the focus on the future 
because, even if subsidized imports have caused injury in the past, the imposition of CVDs may 
                                                 
9 M.C.E.J. BRONCKERS, Private Remedies Against Foreign Subsidization: A European View, in SUBSIDIES AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A EUROPEAN LAWYERS’ PERSPECTIVE 187, 192 (Jacques H.J. Bourgeous ed., 1991). 
10 Regulation, supra note 3, art. 31.1. 
11 Id. 
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not necessarily render the domestic industry viable.12 The interests the Commission may 
consider as worthy of protection include prevention of further unemployment;13 prevention of 
industry decline;14 safeguarding of sufficient earnings;15 and protection of an upstream 
industry.16 
 End-users may also be negatively affected by the imposition of CVDs if the measures 
may lead to a shortage of supply, increase in prices, or other harm. Here, the Commission will 
attempt to predict the effect of CVDs on the user’s cost of production by considering, inter alia, 
the existence of alternative sources such as non-subsidized imports and domestic production. The 
Commission has often found that the negative effects of CVDs can be mitigated by the existence 
of alternative sources.17 
 Likewise, the Commission has traditionally given more weight to the interest of the 
complainant industry that to the interest of importers/distributors/traders. The Commission made 
it clear, when it stated: 
on balance, the Community’s interests lie more in maintaining employment in the 
manufacturing sector of the Community industry than in protecting a dealer and 
distributor business which depends to a great extent on imports.18 
                                                 
12 EDMOND MCGOVERN, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ANTI-DUMPING AND TRADE DEFENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 44:1 
(2008). 
13 Council Regulation No. 1799/2002 of 8 October 2002, OJ 2002 (L 274), at recital 114. 
14 Commission Regulation No. 618/2000 of 22 March 2002, OJ 2000 (L 075/18), at recital 195. 
15 Id., at recital 194. 
16 Commission Regulation No. 1556/1998 of 17 July 1998, OJ 1998 (L 202/40). 
17 See, e.g., Commission Regulation No. 1092/2000 of 24 May 2000, OJ 2000 (L 124/26), at recital 12 (“[T]he 
imposition of provisional countervailing measures, does not foreclose the Community to imports . . . [but] . . . will 
merely establish fair trading conditions. As to the availability of SBS [Styrene-butadiene-styrene thermoplastic 
rubber], there are a number of producers operating in the Community; these producers have unused production 
capacity, and there are other sources of imports which, under fair trading conditions, will find the Community 
market more appealing again.”). 
18 Commission Regulation No. 1413/88 of 25 May 1988, OJ (L 130), at recital 12. 
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 The imposition of CVDs generally does not benefit the consumer since the prices will 
increase and the choice of products available to the consumer may also be reduced. In Laser 
Optical Reading System, the Commission concluded that imposition of protective measures 
would “severely limit consumer choice” and that “this loss of choice as regard the current variety 
of models available could not be compensated in the foreseeable future by the Community 
industry.”19 In such circumstances the Commission considered that “the interests of consumers 
[were] by far outweighing the interest of the Community industry” and the proceeding was 
terminated without the imposition of a CVD.20 
 Finally, when assessing the Union interest requirement, the impact of CVDs on 
competition within the EU is also a factor. For example, in Typewriter Ribbon Fabrics, where 
there was only one Union producer and one Chinese producer/exporter of the product in 
question, the Commission concluded that it was not in the Union’s interest that there would be 
only one supplier of this product and that, therefore, any protective measures should not lead to 
the withdrawal of Chinese imports from the Union market or eliminate competition between 
these imports and Union production. Consequently, a price undertaking was considered to be a 
more appropriate remedy than a CVD.21 
 By contrast, there is no equivalent to the concept of the Union interest in the U.S. CVD 
legislation. If the subsidization causing injury to a U.S. industry has been established, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce “shall issue a countervailing duty order.”22 In other words, the 
investigating authority is under an obligation to impose CVDs when a countervailable subsidy 
                                                 
19 Commission Decision 1999/55/EC, OJ (L 18) 62, at recital 18. 
20 Id. 
21 Commission Regulation No. 1937/90 of 4 July 1990, OJ (L 174), at recital 19. 
22 19 U.S.C. § 1671d (emphasis added). 
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and material injury to domestic industry are found to exist. As a result, U.S. CVD legislation 
aims exclusively at protecting the interest of the U.S. industry affected by subsidized import. It 
does not seek to provide for a balance between other economic interests involved or to enhance 
general welfare. 
2. Remedies 
Under both U.S.23 and EU24 law, definitive CVDs may not exceed the total amount of 
countervailable subsidies established. Yet, at the same time, whereas in the United States, CVDs 
are based on the amount of the countervailable subsidy (i.e. subsidy margin),25 EU law has 
established the “lesser duty rule,” which requires the CVDs imposed by the EU to be lower that 
the subsidy margin if such lower duty rate is sufficient to remove the injury suffered by the 
Union industry.26 
 Pursuant to the lesser duty rule, the Commission imposes CVDs at the level of the lower 
margin between the subsidy margin and injury margin.27 The injury margin is calculated by 
comparing the export prices of the subsidized products with the production costs of the Union 
production of the like product plus a reasonable profit margin.28 
                                                 
23 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a). 
24 Regulation, supra note 3, art. 15.1. 
25 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a). 
26 Regulation, supra note 3, art. 15.1. 
27 VASSILIKI AKRITIDIS & SVEN BALLSCHMIEDE, Comparative Overview of EU and US Subsidies Regulation, in 
WTO – TRADE REMEDIES 856, 904 (R. Wolfrum, P. Stoll & M. Koebele eds., 2008). 
28 VAN BAEL & BELLIS, ANTI-DUMPING AND OTHER TRADE PROTECTION LAWS OF THE EC 562 (Kluwer Law 
International 2004). 
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 The lesser duty rule results in a lower level of duties overall,29 which leads to reducing 
trade distortions. Unlike the United States, which uses CVDs exclusively to protect domestic 
industry interests, the EU provides for a more delicate balance “between the interest of the 
domestic industry to be safeguarded from unfair practices, the interests of the Community’s 
trading partners in applying the lesser duty rule thus ensuring that duties are imposed only to the 
extent necessary to remove any injury suffered, and the interests of other economic operators that 
might by negatively affected by measures.”30 This makes the EU CVD law more balanced, 
nuanced and based on corrective philosophy, whereas the U.S. approach to imposing CVDs is 
more retaliatory than corrective. 
B. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO INTERNAL SUBSIDIES 
EU State aid law prohibits EU Member States from granting State aid in a manner that distorts 
competition in the European internal market. As a result, the law requires EU Member States to 
obtain authorization from an EU institution – the Commission – prior the implementation of a 
state aid.31 U.S. law, on the other hand, does not contain similar rules on granting or controlling 
subsidies given by the States. Nevertheless, certain constraints are imposed on State government 
actions under the dormant Commerce Clause (DCC). 
                                                 
29 For example, as Fitch rating agency estimated: “Duties imposed by the Commission on Chinese cold-rolled flat 
steel products . . . were 13.4%-16%. But if the lesser duty rule had not been in force the duties imposed would have 
been 52.7%-59.1%” (Jorge Valero, Rating Agency Says Ignoring ‘Lesser Duty Rule’ Could Protect European Steel 
Against China, http://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/rating-agency-says-ignoring-lesser-duty-rule-
could-protect-european-steel-against-china/). 
30 Thinam Jakob, Lesser Duty Rule and Community Interest in Anti-dumping Proceedings: The Community System 
in Perspective, INTERECONOMICS, July/August 191, 195 (2001). 
31 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 26 October 2012, Official Journal 
of the European Union (C 326/47), art. 108 [hereinafter TFEU]; see supra Chapter V for a more detailed analysis of 
EU rules on subsidies. 
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 The Commerce Clause, which is found in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 
expressly grants to Congress the power to regulate commerce “among the several states.”32 The 
negative implication of this power for the federal government is known as the Dormant 
Commerce Clause (DCC). The DCC impliedly restricts state regulation of interstate commerce.33 
In New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, the Supreme Court stated: 
It has been long accepted that the Commerce Clause not only grants Congress the 
authority to regulate commerce among the States, but also directly limits the 
power of the States to discriminate against interstate commerce. . . . This 
“negative” aspect of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic protectionism – 
that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by 
burdening out-of-state competition. . . . Thus, State statutes that clearly 
discriminate against interstate commerce are routinely struck down, [. . .] unless 
the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to 
economic protectionism.34 
 Although the DCC doctrine has been a feature of U.S. constitutional law for nearly two 
centuries,35 it has undergone significant doctrinal evolution over the years.36 Under the current 
approach, which was developed in 1970s, the Court applies a two tiered standard of review: (1) a 
State measure that discriminates against interstate commerce is prohibited unless the government 
can demonstrate both that a measure serves a legitimate (i.e., non-protectionist) purpose and that 
                                                 
32 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
33 Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980) (“although the Clause . . . speaks in terms of powers 
bestowed upon Congress, the Court long has recognized that it also limits the power of the States to erect barriers 
against interstate trade”); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Haely, 512 U.S. 186, 192 (1994); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 
Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1024 (3d ed. 2000) 
(“All of the [dormant Commerce Clause] doctrine . . . is thus traceable to the Constitution’s negative implications; it 
is by interpreting ‘these great silences of the Constitution’ that the Supreme Court has limited the scope of what the 
state might do.” (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949))). 
34 New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988). 
35 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 188-89 (1824) (interpreting the scope of the Commerce Clause and the extent of its 
restraints on states for the first time). 
36 For a historical review of the dormant Commercial Clause doctrine, see, e.g., SUSAN LOW BLOCH & VICKI C. 
JACKSON, FEDERALISM: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 92-94, 129-34 (2013); Brannon 
P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 427-49 (2008). 
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“this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means;”37 and (2) even 
a nondiscriminatory measure that nevertheless burdens interstate commerce may be barred if the 
interstate burden imposed by a measure outweighs the local benefit (the Pike balancing test).38 
Although the balancing test is still invoked, more cases currently turn on discrimination than on 
undue burdens.39 
 The underlying rationale for the Commerce Clause, including its dormant aspects, is to 
create and foster the development of a common market among the states by imposing some self-
executing limitations on the scope of permissible state regulation.40 As Justice Cardozo 
explained: 
What is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealings with another may not 
place itself in a position of economic isolation . . . Neither the power to tax nor the 
police power may be used by the state of destination with the aim and effect of 
establishing an economic barrier against competition with the products of another 
state or the labor of its residents. Restrictions so contrived are an unreasonable 
clog upon the mobility of commerce. They set up what is equivalent to a rampart 
of customs duties designed to neutralize advantages belonging to the place of 
origin. They are thus hostile in conception as well as burdensome in result.41 
 Invoking the DCC doctrine, the Court has (1) condemned state customs duties;42 (2) held 
unconstitutional state regulations affecting interstate commerce (for example, price controls that 
                                                 
37 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); see also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) 
(“where simple economic protectionism is effected by a state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been 
erected”). 
38 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (stating that a state measure having only “incidental” effect 
on interstate commerce “will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation 
to the putative local benefits”). 
39 BLOCH & JACKSON, supra note 36, at 218-19 (noting that “it is difficult to identify any Supreme Court cases in 
this period in which application of the Pike balancing test resulted in a statutory invalidation unless there were also 
‘discriminatory’ aspects to the challenged law”). 
40 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281-82 (8th ed. 2010); see also McLeod v. I.E. 
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944) (stating that the purpose of the Commerce Clause as well as DCC is to 
create an area of free trade among the several states) (emphasis added). 
41 Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527. 
42 Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 539. 
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strip away advantages of out-of-state producers;43 and facially neutral legislation that diverts 
market share to in-state sellers44); and (3) invalidated discriminatory state tax laws, including 
credits or exemptions that favor local businesses.45 
 The DCC covers a very broad scope of measures (regulations, taxation). In addition, in 
accord with the main objective of the clause – free trade among the states – the focus of DCC 
analysis is on discrimination and the burden on interstate commerce: whether the state measure 
has the purpose or effect of disadvantaging out-of-state goods in favor of goods produced within 
a state. 
 Given these characteristics of the U.S. DCC, the closest analogues to this doctrine are the 
“free movement” principle in EU law46 and the “national treatment” principle in WTO law.47 
Just like the Commerce Clause is aimed at creating a common market among the states within 
the United States, the free movement is the fundamental principle of the internal market of the 
EU.48 The means to achieve this goal are basically the same: (1) prohibition of customs duties 
between EU Member States;49 (2) prohibition of measures having an effect equivalent to 
                                                 
43 Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521. 
44 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977). 
45 Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848, 860 (1996); Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647-54 
(1994); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318, 328-29 (1977). 
46 TFEU, supra note 31, arts. 26, 28-36, 110. 
47 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT], art. III 
(prohibiting discrimination between imported and domestically produced goods with respect to internal taxation and 
other government regulation); see also Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A 
GATT’s-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401 (1994) (comparing the DCC rule and 
national treatment principle under GATT). 
48 TFEU, supra note 31, art. 26(2) (“the internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”). 
49 Id., arts. 28(1), 30. 
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quantitative restrictions,50 i.e. any trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of 
hindering intra-community trade;51 and (3) prohibition of discriminatory taxation.52 
 At the same time, even though the EU State aid rules are not an exact equivalent to the 
U.S. DCC, enough commonality exists to justify comparison of both sets of rules. First, certain 
forms of government intervention that are considered State aid under EU law may be subject to 
the DCC rule.53 Second, both sets of rules impose certain limitations (although different in 
nature) on the right of States to grant subsidies within their territory and, therefore, on the 
sovereignty of the States.54 Finally, both sets of rules were introduced with the purpose of 
integration through creation and maintenance of an internal market. 
 EU State aid policy was primarily designed to contribute to the creation of a common 
market, which is widely viewed as the core component of the wider project of European 
unification.55 In fact, it was not until the initiation of the single market project,56 that the 
                                                 
50 Id., arts. 34, 35. 
51 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, [1974] ECR 837:125, para. 5 (“All trading rules enacted by Member 
States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be 
considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.”). 
52 TFEU, supra note 31, art. 110 (“No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of other 
Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic 
products.”). 
53 See infra subsection 2 for a more detailed discussion on that topic. 
54 Whereas under the U.S. law certain State aid measures that discriminate against intra-state commerce are 
unconstitutional, the EU law requires the Member States to obtain authorization from a EU institution – the 
Commission – prior the implementation of State aid. 
55 See, e.g., MICHELLE CINI, EU State Aid Policy – The Origins and Early Years, in WHAT SHAPES THE LAW? 
REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SUBSIDY 
DISCIPLINES 17, 17 (Luca Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins eds., 2016); RAJ CHARI, HERWIG C.H. HOFMANN & CLAIRE 
MICHEAU, State Aid Review in a Multi-Level System: Motivations for Aid, Why Control It, and the Evolution of State 
Aid Law in the EU, in STATE AID LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 3, 9 (Herwig C.H. Hofmann & Claire Micheau 
eds., 2016). 
56 Single European Act, 1987 OJ L 169/1, art. 8a [hereinafter SEA] (amending Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11) (requiring the progressive establishment of an internal, 
barrier-free market by 31 December 1992). 
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Commission started to prioritize State aid policy.57 With the removal of intra-EC quotas and 
tariffs at the end of the 1960s, and with the removal of remaining non-tariff barriers as a result of 
the completion of the Single Market by 1992, subsidies and other forms of State aid were some 
of the few remaining tools used to unfairly advantage domestic industry. It was reasonable, 
therefore, for EU actors to focus attention on this type of non-tariff barrier. From the single 
market perspective, “a broad definition of State aid was necessary in order to cover all possible 
alternative barriers to trade created by States through financial regulatory and fiscal measures.”58 
 Similarly, in the United States, the DCC has safeguarded the common market for more 
than a century. As Professor Richard Epstein has written, “free competition and the free 
movement of goods and services across state lines are the driving forces behind the Supreme 
Court’s take on the dormant Commerce Clause.”59 Indeed, the DCC jurisprudence has played an 
important role in protecting against state legislation that would interfere with a common market 
in the United States, emphasizing the economic goal of the jurisprudence. In Hood & Sons, 
Justice Jackson, writing for the majority, expressly recognized the benefits of this free trade 
approach: 
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every 
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free 
access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his 
export, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. . . 
Such was the vision of the Founders; such had been the doctrine of this Court 
which has given it reality.60 
                                                 
57 For a more detailed discussion on the evolution of the EU State aid policy see Chapter V, Section B, subsection 1. 
58 Chari, Hofmann & Micheau, supra note 55, at 9. 
59 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED 
GOVERNMENT 229 (2014); see also Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 4, 17 (1987) (“When so interpreted, the commerce clause becomes a charter of free trade.”); Jack L. 
Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 795 (2001) 
(“The primary justification is that the dormant Commerce Clause ensures free trade among the states and thereby 
secures the associated economic benefits.”). 
60 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949). 
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Despite these similarities, however, the EU and U.S. systems also differ in significant ways. 
1. EU State Aid Rules as Competition Law versus the Dormant Commerce Clause as 
Constitutional Law 
The fundamental differences between the two legal systems stem from the fact that EU State aid 
rules and U.S. DCC represent two different bodies of law. In the EU, State aid rules – together 
with antitrust law – are a part of competition law.61 From the EU perspective, therefore, the main 
goal of competition law is the protection of economic freedom by ensuring that the competitive 
process and market structure are not distorted by either government interventions or private party 
behavior. The competition-policy reason for establishing State aid control is deeply embedded in 
EU law. Article 107(1) of the TFEU explicitly prohibits government intervention by means of 
aid which “distorts or threatens to distort competition” in the relevant market.62 The 
“competition model” basically seeks to avoid that positive effects of a state measure enjoyed in 
one jurisdiction do not produce negative effects in the form of distortions of competition in other 
jurisdictions.63 
 The competition policy approach, just like the approach in antitrust cases, requires a 
reliance on an economic analysis, which is applied in two stages. First, economic analysis is used 
to ascertain whether a measure constitutes a State aid caught by the provisions of the TFEU. 
                                                 
61 TFEU, supra note 31, Title VII, Chapter I “Rules on Competition,” arts. 101-09 (containing rules regarding 
(1) cartels, controlling the collusion and other anti-competitive practices; (2) market dominance, preventing the 
abuse of firms’ market dominant positions; (3) mergers, controlling mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures 
involving companies that have a certain amount of turnover in the EU; and (4) State aid control). 
62 Id., art. 107(1). 
63 Chari, Hofmann & Micheau, supra note 55, at 6; see also Philip Lower, The Design of Competition Policy 
Institutions for the Twenty-First Century, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE EU: FIFTY YEARS FROM THE TREATY OF 
ROME 21, 21-41 (Xavier Vires ed., 2009). 
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Article 107(1) defines State aid as a government measure which, inter alia, confers an advantage 
on the recipient.64 To determine whether an advantage has been conferred, the “private investor 
test” is applied.65 This is an objective test used to determine whether a rational private investor 
would have entered into the transaction in question on the same terms, having regard to the 
foreseeability of obtaining a return and leaving aside all social and policy considerations.66 
Second, when assessing the compatibility of State aid within the common market,67 a “balancing 
test” is applied. State aid may be declared compatible with the common market and, therefore, 
permissible, when the positive impact of the aid (in terms of economic efficiency or equity) 
outweighs its potential negative effects (distortion of trade and competition).68 
 In the United States, on the other hand, the DCC doctrine is a part of constitutional law. 
Although the U.S. Constitution expressly grants Congress the power to regulate commerce 
“among the several states”69 (Commerce Clause), it is silent regarding what power, if any, is left 
to the states to regulate interstate commerce. It has been judicially established that the Commerce 
Clause is not only a “positive” grant of power to Congress, but it is also a “negative” constraint 
upon the States; that is, the doctrine of the “dormant” commerce clause. What is dormant is the 
congressional exercise of the power, not the clause itself, under which the Court may police state 
                                                 
64 TFEU, supra note 31, art. 107(1). 
65 See, e.g., PARIS ANESTIS & STEPHEN MAVROGHENIS, The Market Investor Test, in THE EC STATE AID REGIME: 
DISTORTIVE EFFECTS OF STATE AID ON COMPETITION AND TRADE 109, 112 (Michael Sánchez Rydelski ed., 2006). 
66 See supra Chapter V, Section B for a more detailed discussion on this topic. 
67 Article 107(1) of the TFEU does not contain a direct prohibition against aid but only a declaration of 
incompatibility with the common market. State aid can be declared “compatible” under Article 107(3) when it is 
deemed (by the Commission) to be in the common interest. 
68 State aid Action Plan – Less and better targeted State Aid: a roadmap for State Aid reform 2005-2009, COM 
(2005) 107 final [hereinafter SAAP]; see infra Chapter V, Section B, Subsection 3(b) for a more detailed review of 
the balancing test. 
69 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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taxation and regulation of interstate commerce.70 Defining the degree of exclusive federal power, 
however, has proven extremely difficult. A complex federal system gives rise to numerous 
constitutional problems inherent in the division of authority between federal and state 
governments. 
 The central question posed in DCC cases is whether, in the absence of congressional 
action, state laws that interfere with the free flow of commerce nonetheless stand. The 1824 case 
of Gibbons v Ogden71 was the first Supreme Court decision to discuss the Commerce Clause. 
Chief Justice John Marshall advanced the idea that the Constitution vested the power over 
interstate commerce exclusively in Congress, thereby divesting the states of authority over any 
interstate commercial activities, even in the absence of conflicting congressional legislation 
regulating those activities.72 
 In 1851, in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,73 Justice Curtis, writing for the majority, 
developed the concept of “selective exclusiveness,” rejecting the argument that Congress had 
been granted exclusive power to regulate commerce.74 He maintained that if the Constitution 
stripped the states of all power to regulate commerce, then Congress could not delegate such a 
power to the states.75 Under the Cooley rule, the power to regulate commerce must be viewed in 
terms of the subject being regulated. While some subjects of commerce that “imperatively 
                                                 
70 The Commerce Clause as a Restraint of State Power, in CRS ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION, Cornell University 
Law School, https://www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/html/art1frag49_user.html. 
71 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (1924). 
72 Id. at 197-210 (“In imposing taxes for State purposes, [the States] are not doing what Congress is empowered to 
do. Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the States. 
When, then, each government exercises the power of taxation, neither is exercising the power of the other. But, 
when a State proceeds to regulate commerce . . . among the several States, it is exercising the very power that is 
granted to Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do.”). 
73 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How) 299, 317-18 (1852). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 318. 
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demand a single uniform rule” operating throughout the country are within the exclusive control 
of Congress, others require diverse regulation that only the states can provide and, thus, may be 
regulated by the States.76 Nevertheless, Cooley provided little guidance for distinguishing 
between national and local subjects of commerce.77 In particular, it left unanswered the question 
whether the Court would find any interstate commerce other than that which Congress had 
designated as such to be local.78 
 In Welton v. Missouri,79 the Court further developed the justification for the DCC 
doctrine. Justice Field explained that “[t]he fact that Congress has not seen fit to prescribe any 
specific rules to govern inter-State commerce does not reflect the question. Its inaction on this 
matter . . . is equivalent to a declaration that inter-State commerce shall be free and 
untrammeled.”80 Likewise, in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan,81 the Court stated: 
“For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that . . . where Congress has not 
acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of 
the competing demands of state and national interest.”82 In other words, when Congress has not 
                                                 
76 Id. at 319 ([W]hen the nature of a power like this is spoken of, when it is said that the nature of the power requires 
that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, it must be intended to refer to the subjects of that power, and to 
say they are of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. Now the power to regulate commerce, 
embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some 
imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port; 
and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local 
necessities of navigation.). 
77 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 233 
(1985); see also R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 107 (1968) (noting that 
“Curtis have no clues beyond the case as to which aspects of commerce required uniformity, which diversity. Nor 
did he supply any specific criteria for determining these essential categories.”). 
78 CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 53 (1974). 
79 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 257 (1875). 
80 Id. at 282. 
81 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
82 Id. at 769. 
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regulated the objects of commerce in question, the Court itself determines whether the nature of 
the commerce requires exclusive federal regulation. 
 A significant criticism of DCC jurisprudence is based in the argument that the doctrine 
has no foundation in text or history. From the bench, Justice Scalia has called the doctrine “a 
judicial fraud.”83 In his view, “[t]he historical record provides no ground for reading the 
Commerce Clause to be other than what it says – an authorization for Congress to regulate 
commerce.”84 Justice Thomas, too, has argued that “there is no basis in the Constitution” to 
interpret “the Commerce Clause as a tool for courts to strike down state laws that it believes 
inhibit interstate commerce.”85 Likewise, many scholars have challenged the constitutional basis 
for the DCC doctrine.86 
 From a comparative perspective, EU State aid rules and the DCC pursue different 
objectives. The principal objectives of EU State aid rules, as a part of competition law, are to 
maintain and encourage the process of competition in order to promote efficient use of resources 
while protecting the freedom of economic activity of various market participants. The effect-
                                                 
83 Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
84 Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 263 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
85 United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 349 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
86 See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 77, at 230-34 (describing the early DCC cases as “arbitrary, conclusory, and 
irreconcilable with constitutional text”); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and 
the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 4 DUKE L.J. 569-617 (1987) (arguing that the DCC “lacks a foundation or 
justification in either the Constitution’s text or history, and . . . cannot be satisfactory rationalized outside the text of 
Constitution” and arguing that the DCC “alters the delicate balance of federalism clearly manifested in the 
constitutional text”); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 430 (1982) 
(“The commerce clause does not expressly prohibit the states from enacting protectionist economic legislation. It 
merely gives Congress the power to rectify such excess by superseding enactments.”); Richard D. Friedman, Putting 
the Dormancy Doctrine Out of Its Misery, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1745, 1745 (1991) (“[T]he dormancy doctrine ought 
to be abandoned . . . .”); Amy M. Petragnani, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L. REV. 
1215, 1216 (1994) (“Not only is the doctrine absolutely without support in the text of the Constitution or the intent 
of the Framers, but the doctrine also violates two principles upon which the constitutional democracy of our nation 
was built – separation of powers and the balance of federalism.”). 
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based approach results in the use of economic analysis to identify State aid, and then to 
distinguish potentially harmful from less detrimental forms of aid. 
 By contrast, the main objective of the DCC, as a part of U.S. constitutional law, is to 
preserve a true balance of power between federal and state governments established by the 
Constitution (and to determine the locus of power over commerce within the three branches of 
the federal government). Even though the DCC is driven in part by concern about economic 
protectionism, eventually the Court invalidates economically protectionist state laws on the 
ground that such laws invade Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce. As Professor 
Tribe has written: 
the validity of state action affecting interstate commerce must be judged in light 
of the desirability, in terms of the Constitution’s structure and goals, of permitting 
diverse responses to local needs and undesirability, again evaluated by a 
constitutional metric, of permitting local interference with such uniformity as the 
unimpeded flow of interstate commerce may require.87 
 Therefore, from the DCC perspective, the court has to determine the constitutionality of 
state commercial regulation in a case where the federal government has been silent in the area. In 
other words, the question is whether certain types of state regulation offend the Congressional 
commerce power even in the absence of a conflicting act of Congress. 
 From the EU State aid rule perspective, on the other hand, the only question is whether a 
State measure – that confers an advantage to the recipient, distorts competition, and affects trade 
between Member States – may still be declared compatible with the common market and, 
                                                 
87 TRIBE, supra note 33, at 1048-57 (emphasis added) (Also stating that “[b]ehind the Court’s [jurisprudence] stands 
an important doctrinal theme: the negative implications of the Commerce Clause derive principally from a political 
theory of union, not from economic theory of free trade. The function of the clause is to ensure national solidarity, 
not necessarily economic efficiency.”) (emphasis in original). See also Philip M. Tatarowicz, The Dormant 
Commerce Clause and State Tax Discrimination: Parceling State Actions Between Permissible and Impermissible 
Burdens, THE STATE AND LOCAL TAX LAWYER, Symposium Edition 135, 148 (2007) (Arguing that “[t]he 
Commerce Clause, as an instrument of federalism, facilitates a system of government that places a national 
government over fifty sovereign states. Federalism requires a balancing of the interest in a unified national approach 
to government with the competing interest in state sovereignty.”). 
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therefore, permissible because its benefits (in terms of economic efficiency or equity) outweigh 
the distortions of competition that the measure is likely to cause. Consequently, whereas in the 
United States, the main focus is on the form of a state measure, in the EU the only focus is on the 
actual economic effect of the same measure. 
 In addition, whereas EU State aid rules are well established and relatively unambiguously 
articulated in the EU Treaties88 and regulations,89 the DCC doctrine is solely a judicial creation. 
It is not expressly stated in the text of the Constitution. Rather, the DCC is implied from the text 
of the Constitution and the historical settings in which it was framed. In large part because of 
that, the doctrine, as mentioned earlier, has been questioned by a number of scholars and even 
some judges. Accordingly, judges have a tendency to be more cautious in applying it. As Judge 
Diane Wood has pointed out: 
the constitutional approach has led U.S. courts to tread cautiously when they are 
asked to find that a State has taken actions that distort interstate commerce. The 
net result (oddly enough) that the States of the United States are in principle more 
free than the Member States of the EU to engage in behavior that would, at a 
minimum, raise eyebrows in Brussels, and that would often lead to corrective 
measures.90 
Indeed, as the next section will demonstrate, the exact same problem might have a different 
outcome in the two different systems. 
                                                 
88 TFEU, supra note 31, arts. 107-09. 
89 Council Regulation (EC) 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of [ex] Article 
93 of the EC Treaty [Article 108 of the TFEU], OJ 1999 L 83 (amended by Council Regulation (EU) No. 734/2013 
of 22 July 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No. 659/1999, OJ L 204); Commission Regulation (EC) 794/2004 of 
21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) laying down detailed rules for the application of [ex] Article 
93 of the EC Treaty [Article 108 of the TFEU], OJ 2004 L 140. 
90 Wood, supra note 1, at 3. 
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2. Prohibited and Permitted Measures under the DCC and EU State Aid Law 
In the United States, the scope of the DCC has never been precisely defined. Whether a State 
measure is subject to the DCC rule is determined by the Court on a case-by-case basis. By 
contrast, Article 107(1) of the TFEU expressly lays down the conditions that a measure must 
satisfy in order to be classified as State aid: (1) it must be granted by the State Member and 
through state resources; (2) it must confer an advantage to the recipient; (3) it must favor certain 
undertakings and thus be selective; and (4) it must distort competition and affect trade between 
Member States.91 As a result, not every measure that falls under the scope of Article 107(1) of 
the TFEU and thus prohibited in the EU would also be a subject to the DCC rule and prohibited 
in the United States. 
a. Regulatory Measures In the United States, state laws regulating trade violate the DCC when 
they establish “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits 
the former and burdens the latter.”92 For example, in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 93 the Court 
found unconstitutional a New Jersey statute that prohibited “the importation of most solid or 
liquid waste which originated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State”94 on the 
basis that it violates the principle of nondiscrimination. Likewise, in Hunt v. Washington State 
Apple Advertising Commission, North Carolina enacted a statute requiring that all closed 
                                                 
91 TFEU, supra note 31, art. 107(1). See supra Chapter V, Section B, subsection 2 for a more detailed analysis of the 
concept of State aid. 
92 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005) (quoting Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of 
Environmental Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)) (“This rule is essential to the foundations of the 
Union.”). 
93 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618 (1978). 
94 Id. (quoting the state law). 
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containers of apples sold or shipped into the state bear “no grade other than the applicable U.S. 
grade or standards.”95 The law was challenged by the State of Washington, which tested and 
graded its apples under a system superior to that of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The 
Court found the North Carolina law to be an unconstitutional burden on interstate sales (because 
Washington apple growers would have to undergo substantial costs to comply with the 
regulation by removing their own grading system) and an unconstitutional discrimination against 
Washington apple growers (because the regulation deprived them of the competitive advantage 
of their superior grading system).96 
 In the EU, on the other hand, the ECJ determined that “only advantages granted directly 
or indirectly through State resources are to be considered as aid” within the meaning of Article 
107(1) of the TFEU.97 In other words, State aid must entail some form of financial burden on 
public funds. In its landmark decision, PreussenElektra,98 the ECJ concluded that the German 
law requiring private electricity supply undertakings to purchase electricity produced in their 
area of supply from renewable energy sources at minimum prices higher than the real economic 
value of that type of electricity did not constitute State aid because the transfer of resources took 
place between private undertakings and, thus, there was no impact on the public budget.99 
 To sum up, in the United States the regulatory or administrative measures that 
discriminate against out-of-state goods violate the DCC and, thus, are prohibited. In the EU, on 
the other hand, the identical measures are not considered to be State aid within the meaning of 
                                                 
95 Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 334 (1977) (quoting the state law). 
96 Id. at 350-53. 
97 Case C-379/98, PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag, [2002] ECR I-2099, para. 58 (emphasis added). 
98 Id., see also an opinion of Advocate General Jacobs arguing that “it seems preferable that legislation regulating 
the relationship between private actors is as a matter of principle excluded from the scope of the State aid rules” 
(Opinion in PreussenElektra, id., para. 157). 
99 Id. 
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Article 107(1) and are not prohibited, even if they confer a commercial advantage to certain 
undertakings.100 
b. Taxation In the United States, the prohibition against state taxes that discriminate against 
interstate commerce has been a fundamental tenant of the Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence.101 Professors Hellerstein and Coenen summarize the existing case law in the 
following way: “a tax which by its terms or operation imposes greater burden on out-of-state 
goods, activities, or enterprises than on competing in-state goods, activities, or enterprises will be 
struck down as discriminatory under the Commerce Clause.”102 As a result, tax discrimination is 
forbidden equally if it is effected through a higher tax rate imposed upon interstate commerce103 
or through the denial of a tax exemption or tax credits to out-of-state interests.104 For example, in 
Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,105 the Court struck down a New York stock 
transfer tax scheme that provided reduced rates for stock transfers when the sale of the stock was 
made through a New York rather than out-of-state broker. Likewise, in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v 
Dias,106 the Court found unconstitutional an exemption from Hawaii’s excise tax on wholesale 
liquor sales for certain locally-produced alcoholic beverages. 
                                                 
100 It should be emphasized though that trading rules enacted by Member States of the EU which are capable of 
hindering intra-community trade would still violate “free movement of goods” principle under Articles 34 and 35 of 
the TFEU and therefore prohibited. 
101 Welton, 91 U.S. at 275. 
102 Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 789, 793 (1996). 
103 See, e.g., Associated Industries of Missouri v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994). 
104 See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997). 
105 Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318 (1977). 
106 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984). 
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 Similarly, in the EU, a measure by which the public authorities grant certain undertakings 
tax treatment which places them in a more favorable financial position than other taxpayers 
constitute a State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) of the TFEU.107 In 1998, the 
Commission adopted a Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation, in which it explained that tax measures can provide an “advantage” 
because “the loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of 
fiscal expenditure.”108 
 In 2014, the Commission announced a new focus on fiscal State aid which has been 
triggered by the OECD/G 20’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan.109 The 
initiative seeks to protect the tax bases of all countries by creating a model that taxes a 
multinational’s profits based on where the economic value is created, rather than on the locations 
of corporate headquarters after allowing for inter-group “transfer pricing” (i.e. contracting 
between subsidiaries in different jurisdiction at prices that are not arm’s length). As a result, the 
EU has begun to rely more heavily on State aid prohibitions to address tax practices it perceives 
as harming the distribution of tax revenues among the Member States.110 By the end of 2014, the 
                                                 
107 Case C-105/14, Taricco and Others, EU:C:2015:555, para. 61; Case C-6/12, P Oy, EU:C:2013:525, para. 18; 
Joined Cases C-106/09 P and C-107/09 P, Commission and Spain v. Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, 
paras. 72-73; Case C-387/92, Banco Exterio de España, EU:C:1994:100, para. 14. 
108 Commission Notice on the Application of the State Aid Rules to Measures Relating to Direct Business Taxation 
98/C 384/03 (Oct. 12, 1998). 
109 OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing, http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/taxation/action-plan-on-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264202719-en (Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) refers to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift 
profits from low or no-tax locations where there is little or no economic activity). 
110 The EU considered two options to attempt to reduce the effects of a lack of unified tax treatment of company 
profits throughout the EU: tax harmonizing legislation (which requires unanimity by the EU Member States and thus 
is very difficult to achieve) or State aid control (for which the EU has exclusive competence). In effect, the EC has 
begun focusing on the latter option while continuing to pursue options for introducing tax harmonizing legislation. 
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Commission asked all EU Member States to provide information about their tax ruling practice. 
It then selected certain rulings for a case-by-case review.111 
 The EU inquiry into state tax rulings led to the opening of a formal State aid 
investigations by the Commission on tax rulings granted by Ireland (to Apple), Luxemburg (to 
Fiat, to Amazon, and to McDonald’s), the Netherlands (to Starbucks) and by Belgium (the 
Excess Profit scheme that benefited to the 35 multinational companies).112 The four 
investigations that have been finalized so far each led to a finding of State aid with a recovery 
decision.113 In particular, in August 2016 the Commission issued its largest-ever negative State 
aid decision for an individual measure, requiring Ireland to recover € 13 billion plus accrued 
interest from Apple.114 Apple had set up sales operations in Europe in such a way that customers 
were contractually buying products from Apple Sales International (ASI) located in Ireland 
rather than from the shops that physically sold the products to customers. Apple thus recorded all 
profits stemming from these sales in Ireland. Under the tax rulings issued by Ireland, most profits 
were then allocated away from Ireland to the “head office” that was not based in any country and 
did not have any employees or premises.115 As a result, only a small percentage of ASI’s profits 
                                                 
111 Raymond Luja, EU State Aid Law and National Tax Rulings, TAXE Special Committee, European Parliament 12 
(2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/563453/IPOL_IDA(2015)563453_ EN.pdf. 
112 Commission Decision of 11 June 2014 in Case SA.38373 (Apple), OJ C 369, 17.10.2014; Commission Decision 
of 11 June 2014 in Case SA.38375 (Fiat), OJ C 369, 17.10.2014; Commission Decision of 11 June 2014 in Case 
SA.38374 (Starbucks), OJ C 460, 19.12.2014; Commission Decision of 7 October 2014 in Case SA.38944 
(Amazon), OJ C 44, 6.2.2015; Commission Decision of 3 February 2015 in Case SA.37667 (Belgian excess profit 
rulings), OJ C 188, 5.6.2015; Commission Decision of 3 December 2015 in Case SA. 38945 (McDonald’s), OJ C 
258, 15.07.2016. 
113 Commission Decision of 21.10.2015 in Case SA.38375 (Fiat), OJ L 351, 22.12.2016; Commission Decision of 
21.10.2015 in Case SA. 38374 (Starbucks), not yet published; Commission Decision of 11.01.2016 in Case 
SA.37667 (Belgian excess profit rulings), OJ L 260, 27.09.2016; Commission Decision of 30.08.2016 in Case 
SA.38373 (Apple), not yet published. All cases are under appeal. 
114 Apple, supra note 112, para. 432. 
115 Id., paras. 39-48. 
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were taxed in Ireland, and the rest was taxed nowhere.116 The Commission concluded that this 
selective tax treatment of Apple in Ireland constituted illegal State aid because it gave Apple a 
significant advantage over other businesses that were subject to the same national taxation 
rules.117 In this decision – much like in the other three decisions mentioned above – the 
Commission relied primarily on the “arm’s length” principle. According to this principle, a 
selective advantage exists when a tax ruling “endorses a transfer pricing methodology for 
determining a corporate group entity’s taxable profit that does not result in a reliable 
approximation of a market-based outcome in line with the arm’s length principle.”118 
 To sum up, although the DCC does not go so far as to expand the investigation to 
targeting tax rulings in transfer pricing matters, both the DCC and the EU State aid rules cover 
discriminatory taxation. The two sets of rules differ, however, in one significant way. State aid 
rules govern intra-state distinctions in taxation between enterprises (within the same Member 
State) and the DCC rule governs inter-state distinctions in taxation between enterprises 
(distinctions between residents and non-residents or between cross-border income and domestic 
income). Despite this difference, however, in many cases discriminatory taxation may violate 
both the DCC and the State aid rules as it can be both benefiting certain businesses as compared 
to other (domestic) businesses and discriminating against foreign businesses. In the EU, in order 
to be classified as State aid a measure must “affect trade between Member States.”119 
                                                 
116 For example, in 2011 ASI recorded profits of € 16 billion but under the terms of the tax ruling only around € 50 
million were considered taxable in Ireland, leaving € 15.95 billion profits untaxed. As a result, the ASI paid less than 
€ 10 million of corporate tax in Ireland in 2011 – an effective rate of about 0.05% of its overall annual profits. 
117 Apple, supra note 112, para. 414. 
118 Commission Notice on the Notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) of the TFEU, 2016/C 262/01 
(June 19, 2016), para. 171. 
119 TFEU, supra note 31, art. 107(1). See supra Chapter V, Section B, subsection 2d for a more detailed analysis of 
this criterion for establishing State aid. 
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Consequently, only the discriminatory taxation benefiting certain businesses that affects intra-
Union trade falls within the scope of Article 107(1) of the TFEU. 
 In both the EU and the United States a prohibition on discriminatory taxation is not 
absolute. In the United States, the DCC does not apply when Congress authorises state action 
that would otherwise be invalid under the Commerce Clause since once Congress has legislated 
on the matter it is no longer dormant.120 Congress can consent to State taxes that discriminate 
against inter-state commerce.121 Furthermore, the DCC is not violated when the state government 
can demonstrate both that a measures serves a legitimate (i.e., non-protectionist) purpose and that 
“this purpose could not be served as well by available nondiscriminatory means.”122 Similarly, in 
the EU, discriminatory taxation might be allowed if it falls under exceptions provided in Article 
107(3) of the TFEU (i.e. it may be declared compatible with the common market and, therefore, 
permissible, when the Commission concludes that the positive impact of the measure outweighs 
its potential negative effects).123 
c. Direct Transfer of Funds In the EU, the notion of State aid includes, first and foremost, 
direct monetary payments to businesses by a Member State.124 By contrast, in the United States 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., Western & Southern Life Ins. v. State Board of California, 451 U.S. 648 (1981). 
121 Id. (There, the Court held that the California law that imposes a “retaliatory” tax only on out-of-state insurance 
companies does not violate Commerce Clause. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, which leaves the regulation and 
taxation of insurance companies to the States, removes entirely any Commerce Clause restriction upon California’s 
power to tax the insurance business.). 
122 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986). 
123 See supra Chapter V, Section A, subsection 3 for a more detailed discussion on the categories of State aid that 
might be declared compatible with the common market. 
124 See, e.g., C-39/94, Syndicat Français de l’Express International (SFIE) and others v. La Poste, [1996] ECR I-35-
47, para. 58 (“. . . the notion of ‘aid’ did not only involve direct benefits, such as subsidies, but also interventions 
which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking.”) 
(emphasis added); Case 30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. High Authority, [1961] ECR 1, 
para. 50. See also, GUSTAVO E. LUENGO HERNÁNDEZ DE MADRID, REGULATION OF SUBSIDIES AND STATE AIDS IN 
WTO AND EC LAW: CONFLICTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 307 (2007) (“. . . the notion of ‘aid’ would be 
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the DCC does not apply to State awards of cash grants to businesses. The Supreme Court has 
exempted “direct subsidization of domestic industry” from the DCC stating that this kind of 
subsidization “does not ordinarily run afoul of this prohibition.”125 In Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison,126 the Court – while invalidating the discriminatory 
tax exemption – emphasized that the distinction between direct subsidies and discriminatory 
taxation “is supported by scholarly commentary as well as precedent, and we see no reason to 
depart from it.”127 
 In West Lynn Creamery,128 the issue was the constitutionality of a nondiscriminatory tax 
on milk dealers, the revenues from which were placed into a segregated fund and then distributed 
exclusively to in-state dairy farmers. The Court found that the tax-and-subsidy package was 
unconstitutional. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, explained that the milk subsidy 
transformed the Massachusetts milk program into a “tax rebate” scheme “most similar to the law 
at issue in Bacchus.”129 The Court expressly acknowledged that a subsidy paid to Massachusetts 
dairy farmers “would be constitutional standing alone”130 and emphasized that they are only 
                                                                                                                                                             
broader than ‘subsidy’ since it includes not only direct payments . . . .”); CHRISTOPHER BOVIS, ROBERTO CISOTTA, 
AINDRIAS O. CAOMH, KATERINA PANTAZATOU, WOLF SAUTERN & ERICA SZYSZCZAK, The Notion of State Aid, in 
STATE AID LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 68 (Herwig C.H. Hofmann & Claire Mechenau eds., 2016) (“The 
granting of an aid may take many forms. This includes inter alia direct grants . . . .”). 
125 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988); see also West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 
186, 199 (1994) (“A pure subsidy funded out of general revenue ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate 
commerce, but merely assists local business.”). 
126 Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997). 
127 Id. at 606. 
128 West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. 186 (1994). 
129 Id. at 197. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with the decision of the Court but on the narrower 
ground that the milk taxes had gone into and back out of a “segregated fund.” According to him, if the milk subsidy 
had been paid “from the general revenues,” it would have been constitutional “with or without nondiscriminatory 
taxation of the industry.” Id. at 210 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
130 Id. at 199 (majority opinion). 
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addressing the problem of “conjoining a tax and a subsidy”131 here. The Court, therefore, 
distinguished a pure subsidy from the tax and subsidy scheme developed by Massachusetts and 
concluded that even though a nondiscriminatory tax and a subsidy may not individually violate 
the DCC, a violation may occur when the two are used in conjunction.132 As Professor Dan 
Coenen points out, the Court analysis “permitted, and indeed encouraged, lower courts to 
distinguish the subsidy that is ‘standing alone’ from an ‘integrated’ program that involves both 
‘contributions to’ and ‘distributions from’ a subsidy fund.”133 
 Although the Court acknowledged that pure subsidies are permitted, West Lynn Creamery 
signaled a potential retreat from the previous Court’s position that States possess basically 
unlimited powers to grant monetary subsidies for in-state producers.134 In footnote 15 of its 
decision, the Court stated: “We have never squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies, 
and we need not to do so now.”135 Many scholars and judges read the footnote as putting back on 
the table the question whether direct monetary subsidies to businesses violate the DCC.136 The 
                                                 
131 Id. (emphasis added). 
132 Id. at 200-01. 
133 Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 975 (1988) 
(footnotes omitted). 
134 See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 102, at 840-46 (discussing pre-West Lynn Creamery subsidy cases in 
detail). 
135 West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 199 n.15. 
136 Coenen, supra note 133, at 968; Peter Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints 
on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 431 n.295 (1996) (Arguing that “[t]he Court left open 
the question whether a subsidy restricted to in-state businesses is constitutional if funded in a manner that does not 
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businesses.”); Christopher P. La Puma, Note, Massachusetts tax and Subsidy Scheme Violates Commercial Clause: 
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 48 TAX LAW 641, 653 (1999) (concluding that West Lynn Creamery “has 
inadvertently cast doubt on the validity of subsidies themselves”); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State 
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1196 (1986) (stating that 
“the Court should stand ready to reconsider what it has said about direct subsidies”); see also Cumberland Farms, 
Inc. v. Mahany (Cumberland Farms II), 943 F. Supp. 83, 90 (D. Me. 1996) (“In West Lynn Creamery, the Supreme 
Court did not directly address the issue of whether subsidies to in-state businesses are, in themselves, 
constitutional.”). 
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Supreme Court, nevertheless, continues to distinguish between pure subsidies, which are ipso 
facto constitutional, and discriminatory taxation, which is not.137 
 Therefore, whereas under the EU law direct government grants – the most obvious form 
of subsidization – are considered a State aid which is, as a general rule, incompatible with the 
common market, U.S. law places no constraints on state subsidies unless they can be 
characterized as a tax that discriminates against interstate commerce. These diametrically 
different approaches reflect differences of goals of the EU State aid rules as a part of competition 
law and of the U.S. DCC doctrine as a part of constitutional law. 
 As the U.S. Supreme Court explained: 
The Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state actions designed to give its 
residents an advantage in the market place, but only action of that description in 
connection with the State’s regulation of interstate commerce. Direct 
subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of that 
prohibition; discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufactures does.138 
In other words, subsidies are constitutional not because their effect is different from 
discriminatory taxation but because the DCC does not apply. This exemption – known as the 
“market participant” exception – relies on the distinction between States as regulators of the 
market and States as participants in the market. If the State is a market regulator it is subject to 
the restraints of the DCC. However, if the State is a market participant, it is treated as a private 
party rather than a governmental entity and the DCC does not apply.139 
                                                 
137 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 1605 (“a direct subsidy benefitting only those [businesses] serving 
[local] residents would be permissible”). 
138 New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278. 
139 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980) (“The Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and 
regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national market-place, and there is no indication of a 
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regulator the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities”). 
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 The market participant exception reflects the Supreme Court desire to protect States’ 
autonomy.140 The most important justification for this exception, therefore, arises from 
underlying notions of federalism.141 Restricting the freedom of a State to exploit its own 
resources is considered as a significant intrusion on its sovereignty.142 As Professor Coenen 
explains, when a state government regulates or taxes, it turns over nothing that belongs to it; 
rather, it compels private action through the exercise of raw governmental power. In contrast, 
when a state government grants a subsidy, it is controlling and distributing its own resources.143 
 The market participant exception is also compatible with two key goals of U.S. 
constitutional federalism: the encouragement of novel state experiments and the fostering of 
governmental responsiveness to distinctive local needs.144 Finally, there is a textual justification 
for the market participant exception. Because the text of the Commerce clause grants Congress 
the power to “regulate” interstate commerce,145 it follows that the scope of the clause’s negative 
implication must also be limited to prohibiting the States from “regulating” commerce in certain 
respects. As the Court explained in United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of 
Camden,146 “when the State acts solely as a market participant, no conflict between state 
                                                 
140 Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 438 (“Restraint in this area also counseled by considerations of state sovereignty. . . .”). 
141 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961), at 310 (“the States will retain under the 
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145 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
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regulation and federal regulatory authority can arise.”147 Consequently, since the main purpose 
of the DCC is to preserve a true balance of power between federal and state governments, the 
market participant exception aims to ensure that the DCC does not go further than that. 
 Given that the DCC is an instrument of federalism and constitutional law, in assessing 
whether a measure is subject to the DCC rule, the main focus is on the form of the State measure, 
i.e. whether a State is acting as a market regulator rather than a market participant. By contrast, 
the objective of EU State Aid, as a part of competition law, is to prevent distortions of 
competition as a consequence of governmental support for national market players to the 
detriment of competitors from other Member States. Achieving this goal requires a broad 
definition of State aid. Consequently, the aid granted by a Member State “in any form 
whatsoever” that provides a selective advantage, distorts competition, and affects trade between 
Member States constitutes a State Aid within the meaning of Article 107 if the TFEU.148 What 
matters, therefore, is not the form of the measure but the economic effect of the measure. 
 To sum up, while both the DCC and the EU State aid rules would similarly prohibit 
certain types of state grants, they do have very different results when applied to the direct 
transfer of funds. In the United States, the DCC does not apply to pure subsidies because by 
granting them a State acts as a market participant rather than a market regulator. In the EU, on 
the other hand, a pure subsidy is considered an illegal State aid as long as it provides a selective 
advantage, distorts competition and affects trade between Member States. 
d. Sale/Purchase of Goods/Services by a Government The difference seen in the direct 
transfer of funds also exists in regard to the sale or purchase of goods and services by a State 
                                                 
147 Id. at 220 (emphasis added). 
148 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 107(1). 
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government. In the EU, when public authorities or public enterprises sell goods or services at a 
price below market rates, this implies granting an advantage and therefore can constitute an 
illegal State aid.149 Likewise, when a Member State purchases goods or services from an 
enterprise (public or private) at prices above market rates, such a purchase can constitute a State 
aid.150 The basic idea here is that transactions between a Member State and other enterprises 
should be carried out in line with normal market conditions. In the event that an agreement 
contains more advantageous conditions for enterprises than a normal market transaction, such an 
agreement would be considered to grant an advantage in the meaning of Article 107(1) of the 
TFEU. As the European Commission has explained: 
The Union legal order is neutral with regard to the system of property ownership 
and does not in any way prejudice the right of Member States to act as economic 
operators. However, when public authorities directly or indirectly carry out 
economic transactions in any form, they are subject to Union State aid rules.151 
 In the United States, the distinction between States as regulators of the market and States 
as participants in the market152 supports the conclusion that government support through 
preferential sales or purchases should survive constitutional attack. The argument in favor of the 
constitutionality of below-market sales and above-market purchases by a State begins with the 
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,153 in which the Court extended the market participant exception to States as 
sellers. There, South Dakota restricted the sale of cement from a state-operated plant to residents 
of the State.154 Upholding the resident preference, the Court relied on the market participant 
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exception and recognized the right of private traders to choose their own trading partners.155 The 
Court explicitly stated that 
the commerce clause responds principally to state taxes and regulatory measures 
impeding free private trade in the national market place. There is no indication of 
a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely 
in the free market.156 
Thus, if a State “as a seller of cement, unquestionably fits the ‘market participant’ label,”157 so 
should the State as a seller/buyer at prices below/above market rates. 
 Another reason which apparently would justify the application of the market participant 
exception to this category of government support is that State proprietary activity generally falls 
outside of the scope of the Commerce clause. As the Court has explained, once a State is 
spending its own funds, it is acting as a market participant, not as a market regulator.158 Just as 
with subsidies, when a State government sells or buys, it is controlling and distributing its own 
resources; therefore, the market participant exception applies. 
 In the United States, then, the formal appearance of the State as a market participant 
provides a reason to exclude the situations when a State acts as a seller or a buyer from the scope 
of the DCC rule. In the EU, on the other hand, the mere fact that a State participates in an 
economic transaction does not automatically exclude its actions from the scope of State aid rules. 
The decisive question in the EU is whether the State acted as a private market participant would 
have done in a similar situation. If this is not the case, as in situations when the State sells at 
below-market prices or buys at above-market prices, the beneficiary enterprise has received an 
                                                 
155 Id. at 438-39. 
156 Id. at 436-37 (1980); see also Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 1097, 1137 
(1988) (“The commerce clause always has focused on state interference in commerce through taxes and 
regulations.”). 
157 Id. at 440. 
158 White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 215 (1983). 
258 
economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market condition, placing it 
in a more favorable position compared to that of its competitors. Thus, this category of 
government support constitutes an illegal State aid provided the other elements of State aid are 
satisfied. 
3. Procedural Issues 
The U.S. and EU procedures and remedies relating to subsidy control are also very different in 
large part as a consequence of the entirely different institutional arrangements, which in turn 
reflects a different level of readiness of States to abandon their sovereignty in the area of 
granting subsidies. 
a. Procedures to Control Subsidies The EU is one of the few jurisdictions in the world that has 
introduced specific procedural provisions for controlling State aid. This occurred largely due to 
the explicit delegation of power in the area of State aid control by EU Member States to the 
supranational body – the European Commission, which is the EU executive body.159 It follows 
that the EU State aid regime mostly relies “on a technocratic model empowering the executive 
branch of power whilst explicitly excluding the parliamentary component of legislation.”160 The 
procedural rules to be applied by the Commission under Article 108 of the TFEU have been 
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further refined and clarified by Council Regulation 659/1999161 and Commission Regulation 
794/2004162 and thus constitute a fully developed and relatively unambiguous body of law. 
 EU law provides for ex ante control subjecting the State aids of Member States to 
extensive review prior to implementation: EU Member States are required to notify their aid to 
the Commission and obtain its authorization before they implement it.163 In other words, 
Member States are under an obligation not to implement a State aid before the Commission has 
stated its position by declaring either that the measure does not constitute State aid under Article 
106 or that it is compatible with the internal market under Article 107. 
 Nothing of the sort exists in the United States. States are not required to obtain an 
authorization from the federal authorities before granting any kind of subsidies. Accordingly, no 
federal agency has a power similar to that of the European Commission to prevent the State-
driven distortion of competition that affects the United States as a whole. As a result, the 
procedure of granting subsidies in the United States has no clear procedural relationship to 
preservation of a free competitive market. Giuseppe Cacciato summarizes the process of granting 
subsidies in the United States in the following way: 
[A] pluralistic process occurs by which each player attempts individually or in 
alliance with others to affect the initial decision. While the players converge 
around the authority that has the power to decide on the specific cases, that 
authority might not have a watchdog role and it may not have explicit concern 
with preserving the level playing field so central to European notions of 
competition policy and subsidy control.164 
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 Unlike the EU, in the United States there is ex post control. The system is entirely 
complaint-driven: a private party has to challenge the measure by bringing a lawsuit before a 
remedy may follow. This, in turn, raises the question of finding parties with proper standing to 
sue in the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has identified three requirements for constitutional 
standing to sue: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered a personal injury; (2) the defendant’s action 
must have caused that injury; and (3) the court must be capable of redressing that injury.165 In 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,166 a group of taxpayers brought suit claiming that a franchise 
tax credit under Ohio law, which was enacted to encourage the construction of a new automobile 
plant in Toledo, violated the DCC by granting preferential treatment to in-state businesses. The 
Court, nevertheless, ruled that the State taxpayers did not have standing to challenge State tax or 
spending decisions because their injury cannot be differentiated from that of the general 
public.167 It thus seems that, in cases involving discriminatory taxation, the parties with standing 
would be, as Judge Diane Wood has argued, out-of-state businesses that themselves were 
disadvantaged by their ineligibility for the tax exemptions, or another State or municipality that 
had been competing to attract the relevant business to its territory.168 
 In theory, Congress also has the power under the Commerce clause to block State 
subsidies.169 In practice, however, it rarely exercises it. As Professor Sykes has observed, 
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Congress is “vastly more likely to authorize industry assistance itself than to stand in the way of 
state measures.”170 
b. Remedies Discriminatory taxation is the only category of government support covered by 
both EU State aid rules and the DCC rule in the United States. Thus, any discussion of 
comparative remedies may be limited to this area of subsidy. 
 Under EU law, the general rule is that if a Member State has not notified State aid that is 
incompatible with the common market, or grants the aid that has been notified and authorized but 
in a manner contrary to the Decision of the Commission, that Member State has to recover the 
aid from the beneficiary.171 The recovery must also include interest on the aid, from the time the 
aid was first granted until the moment the aid is fully recovered.172 In the case of State aid in the 
form of tax measures, the amount to be recovered is calculated on the basis of a comparison 
between the tax actually paid and the amount which should have been paid if the generally 
applicable rule had been applied.173 Interest is added to this basic amount.174 The ECJ has made 
it clear that the main purpose of recovery is “to eliminate the distortion of competition caused by 
the competitive advantage afforded by the unlawful aid”175 and “to re-establish the situation that 
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existed on the market prior to the granting of the aid.”176 The recovery process is not included in 
the Treaty text. It has been developed beginning with a 1982 decision ordering recovery.177 
 In the United States, the current rules with regard to remedies for DCC incompatibility 
were first developed in the early 1990s. It has always been indisputable that once a State tax has 
been declared unconstitutional under the DCC, the State may not continue to collect the tax. The 
questions remained, however, whether the Court’s decision should be applied retroactively and 
whether it should require the payment of refunds to taxpayers. 
 For a long period of time, the Supreme Court declined to address the retroactivity 
issue.178 Instead, the Court remanded each case for further proceedings in State courts relating to 
remedies.179 As a result, whereas a very few State courts applied the decision retroactively and 
ordered a refund of taxes paid by out-of-state businesses,180 numerous others ruled that a tax is 
unconstitutional on a prospective basis only, thereby allowing the States to retain the revenues 
collected under the unconstitutional tax.181 Courts usually refer to the State’s need for financial 
stability as a justification for the restrictions that make refunds unavailable.182 This approach 
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resulted in reliance on the prospectivity doctrine and other devices to avoid the refund of 
unconstitutional taxes. This approach raised concerns amongst the experts.183 
 In 1990, in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco,184 the 
Supreme Court explicitly stated for the first time that “if a State places a taxpayer under duress 
promptly to pay a tax when due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which he 
can challenge the tax’s legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obliges 
the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional 
deprivation.”185 A State has several alternatives with regard to the form of relief: (1) it may pay a 
refund equal to the difference between the tax paid and the tax that would have been due under 
rates afforded to in-state competitors; (2) it may assess and collect back taxes from competitors; 
or (3) it may combine these two forms of relief.186 The Court has explained that the main 
purpose of retrospective relief is that the “resultant tax actually assessed during the contested tax 
period reflects a scheme that does not discriminate against interstate commerce.”187 
 In American Trucking Ass’ns Inc. v. Smith,188 a sharply divided Supreme Court held that 
prospective-only relief may still be permissible in some circumstances, based on a three-part test 
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established by the Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.189 The three questions to be addressed are: 
(1) whether the decision to be applied retroactively establishes a new principle of law; 
(2) whether retroactive application of the new rule would further or retard the operation of the 
rule in light of its history and purpose; and (3) whether retroactivity would produce substantial 
inequity. In other words, Chevron allows federal courts to deny retroactive application to a new 
rule of law if retroactivity would impose undue hardship on the litigant. In American Trucking 
Ass’ns, the taxpayers challenged Arkansas’s flat highway use tax that discriminated against out-
of-state trucks in violation of the DCC under the Court’s decision in American Trucking Ass’ns, 
Inc. v. Scheiner.190 In Scheiner, the Court had overruled earlier precedents and concluded that an 
identical flat highway use tax imposed by Pennsylvania was unconstitutional because it 
discriminated against interstate commerce.191 Arkansas, nevertheless, continued collecting the 
tax even after the Scheiner decision, until the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the Arkansas 
tax was unconstitutional under Scheiner. The issue in American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., therefore, 
was whether taxpayers were entitled to relief with respect to taxes imposed prior to the decision 
in Scheiner.192 The Court held that, because Scheiner met Chevron’s test, the Supreme Court 
decision should be applied prospectively only, and that taxpayers were entitled to meaningful 
retrospective relief only with respect to taxes imposed after Scheiner was handed down.193 
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 Just three years later, the Supreme Court rejected the prospective-only approach in 
Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation.194 The Court held that the decision must apply 
retroactively, because 
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is 
the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive 
effect in all cases still open on direct review and as to all event, regardless of 
whether such events predate or postdate the announcement of the rule.195 
The Court made clear that the legal imperative “to apply a rule of federal law retroactively after 
the case announcing the rule has already done so” must “prevail over any claim based on 
Chevron Oil analyses.”196 No federal or state court after Harper has cited Chevron in a case 
involving unconstitutional taxes. It seems, therefore, that Harper overruled Chevron, and that 
decisions holding a tax unconstitutional on the basis of the DCC should be applied retroactively 
for purposes of remedies.197 
 In Harper, the Court once again confirmed that the State is free to choose the form of 
relief it will provide: “the State must provide meaningful backward-looking relief either by 
rewarding full refunds or by issuing some other order that creates in hindsight a 
nondiscriminatory scheme.”198 
 Both the U.S. DCC rule and the EU State aid rules now provide for retroactive remedies. 
However, whereas the retrospective character of remedies in the EU is aimed at reestablishing of 
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the previous situation on the market, in the United States the main purpose of remedies is to 
eliminate discrimination against interstate commerce. This has implications for the forms of 
remedies. In the EU, the only form of remedy available is a recovery of State aid from a 
beneficiary. In the case of taxation, this means the Member State has to recover unpaid taxes 
from the businesses that were granted favorable tax treatment. This type of recovery is the only 
logical consequence for situations when a Member State violated EU law by granting illegal 
State aid. In the United States, on the other hand, the DCC prohibits discrimination against 
interstate commerce. The main purpose of a remedy, is thus to create “in hindsight a 
nondiscriminatory scheme.”199 This may be accomplished by recovering the unpaid taxes from 
the businesses that were granted a favorable tax treatment; by refunds to out-of-state 
competitors; or by a combination of the two. In practice, State and local governments mostly use 
the third option.200 
C. CONCLUSION 
Unlike the rules on internal subsidization, the rules on the use of CVDs are largely the same 
under the U.S. and the EU law. Nevertheless, when deciding on imposing CVDs and the 
appropriate level of CVDs, the European Commission takes into account other Union interests, 
besides those of the complaining industry (upstream industry, downstream industry, consumers, 
impact of CVDs on competition within the EU). Thus, due to Union interest requirement and 
lesser duty rule, the Commission has the discretion either to refuse to apply CVDs, even though 
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the subsidization causing injury to domestic industry has been established, or to impose the 
CVDs lower than the total amount of countervailable subsidy if such lower duty rate is sufficient 
to remove the injury suffered by the domestic industry. 
 The U.S. CVD law, on the other hand, is tailored to serve the interests of the U.S. 
industry affected by subsidized import and does not seek to provide for a balance between other 
economic interests involved. The U.S. Department of Commerce does not have the discretion 
similar to that of the European Commission. When a countervailable subsidy and material injury 
to domestic industry are found, the Department of Commerce is under an obligation to impose 
CVDs which are assessed on the amount of the countervailable subsidy. 
 As a result, whereas the U.S. CVD law is primarily aimed at safeguarding the interests of 
the U.S. industry affected by subsidized imports, the EU more focuses on the protection of the 
competition process by ensuring that markets work efficiently and by assessing the effect of the 
CVDs on total welfare, i.e. the sum of consumer welfare and producer welfare. Likewise, the EU 
approach leads to reducing trade distortions at the international level that results by imposing 
CVDs. Generally, it seems the EU CVD law is more focused on correction of market distortions 
whereas the U.S. approach to imposing CVDs is more about offsetting injury to the domestic 
industry. 
 The major difference between U.S. and EU subsidy laws are found in the rules on 
internal subsidies. In fact, the U.S. and EU approaches to this issue are diametrically opposed, 
from the largely laissez-faire approach of the United States to the very elaborated rules on State 
aid control in the EU. To a large extent, this difference is rooted in a different level of readiness 
of States to abandon their sovereignty in the area of granting subsidies. In the EU, the power in 
the area of State aid control has been explicitly delegated by Member States to a supranational 
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body – the Commission. This, in large part, puts aside concerns about the intrusion on EU 
Member States’ sovereignty by restricting their freedom to grant subsidies. EU State aid law 
became a part of competition law, with its principal goal the protection of economic freedom by 
ensuring that the competitive process is not distorted by government intervention. In the United 
States, by contrast, there is no federal agency that has a power similar to that of the European 
Commission when it comes to the application of the DCC. In effect, subsidies granted by States 
raise exclusively constitutional law concerns under the DCC, i.e., whether State laws invade 
Congressional authority to regulate interstate commerce. Consequently, in DCC cases the main 
focus is on preserving a balance of power between federal and state governments (and among the 
three federal branches of government) rather than on protection of the process of competition on 
the U.S. market. This difference has significant implications for the scope of EU State aid rules 
and the U.S. DCC rule. 
 From the EU perspective, a broad scope of application of State aid rules is necessary in 
order to cover all possible measures that might affect the competitive process within the EU. 
Under Article 107(1) of the TFEU, State aid is any measure whatsoever that (1) is granted by the 
State Member and through state resources; (2) confers an advantage to the recipient; (3) favors 
certain undertakings (i.e. selective); and (4) distorts competition and affects trade between 
Member States.201 When deciding whether a measure at issue is a subject to EU State aid rule, 
the focus, therefore, is not only on the form of the measure (granted by the State Member and 
through state resources) but also on its economic effect (advantage to selective recipients; 
distortion of competition and effect on trade between Member States). As a result, State aid can 
take a variety of forms: direct transfer of funds, discriminatory taxation, sales of goods/services 
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by a Member State at a price below market rates; purchase of goods/services by a Member State 
at prices above market rates, etc. (except for regulatory measures which are not considered to be 
a State aid since they are not granted through State resources).202 
 In the United States, by contrast, when determining whether a measure is a subject to the 
DCC rule, the main concern is to find the right balance between prohibiting a State from 
interference into commerce in a way that discriminates against interstate commerce and the 
State’s autonomy, and empowering a State to freely participate in the market and to exercise the 
right to favor its own citizens over others.203 Driven primarily by a concern about State 
sovereignty, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed the distinction between States as regulators 
of the market and States as participants in the market. If the State is a market regulator it is 
subject to the restraints of the DCC. If, however, the State is a market participant, it is treated as 
a private party rather than a governmental entity and the DCC does not apply even though the 
effect of the measure is exactly the same as in the former case.204 What matters, therefore, is not 
the economic effect but the form of the measure: a mere formal appearance of the State as a 
market participant provides a reason to exclude the measure from the scope of the DCC rule. As 
a result, only regulatory measures and discriminatory taxation are covered by the DCC rule.205 
Direct subsidies, sales of goods/services by a State at a price below market rates, or purchases of 
goods/services by a State at prices above market rates, are not subject to the DCC rule.206 It 
follows, therefore, that discriminatory taxation is the only area in which both there is application 
of both the U.S. DCC rule and the EU State aid rules. 
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 Control is exercised differently in the two jurisdictions. The EU is one of the few 
jurisdictions in the world that has introduced specific procedural provisions for controlling State 
aid. Indeed, very few states, even federally organized ones, have national systems for controlling 
subsidies granted by their component parts. In fact, even Member States of the EU generally lack 
any powerful regime for controlling subsidies internal to those states. EU law, on the other hand, 
provides for ex ante control subjecting the State aids of Member States to extensive review prior 
to implementation: EU Member States are required to notify their aid to the Commission and 
obtain its authorization before they implement it. In other words, Member States are under an 
obligation not to implement a State aid before the Commission has stated its position by 
declaring either that the measure does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107 
of the TFEU or that it is compatible with the internal market. 
 In assessing the compatibility of a State aid with the internal market, the Commission 
applies a “balancing test,” determining (1) whether the State aid pursues an objective of common 
interest, e.g. by addressing a market failure or equity concern; (2) whether there is an incentive 
effect; and (3) whether the positive effect of the measure outweighs the negative effects 
(distortion of competition and trade). The goal is not only to reduce aid but to divert State aid to 
reasonable objectives of common interest. The key priorities recently defined for the 
Commission are creating high-value, innovative sectors; stimulating entrepreneurship, in 
particular in favor of start-ups and young, innovative SMEs; investing in human sectors by 
providing incentives for employers to provide appropriate trainings for workers; environmental 
protection.207 Moreover, in order to be approved, State aid must have an incentive effect, that is, 
it induces the beneficiary to undertake activities that it would not have done without the aid. In 
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other words, aid must be necessary and proportionate to achieve a particular objective of 
common interest. Thus, in many cases, the Commission would refuse to authorize aid to large 
corporations since they are capable of undertaking the investment on their own and thus would 
have had carry out the investment even in the absent of the aid.208 
 As a result, over the years, the EU State aid control has become a sophisticated 
instrument of macro- and microeconomic coordination as well as an important tool for building 
the European model of social market economy. The EU State aid control rules ensure a level 
playing field for European companies and avoid subsidy races between Member States which are 
non-sustainable for individual Member States and detrimental to the EU as a whole.209 The 
Commission also encourages Member States to prioritize action to strengthen the 
competitiveness of their economy by redirecting aid to research and development, innovative 
SMEs, environmental protection, as well as increase social and regional cohesion.210 Finally, 
State aid control ensures avoiding a wasteful use of public resources that could be more usefully 
utilized elsewhere.211 
 In the United States, on the other hand, the system for controlling subsidies granted by 
States is rather limited. With respect to regulatory measures and discriminatory taxation, there is 
ex post control under the DCC rule: a private party has to challenge the measure by bringing 
lawsuits in the courts before remedies follow. Thus, only the portion of the implemented 
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measures that violate the DCC will be eventually found unconstitutional. With respect to direct 
payments and other forms of subsidies, U.S. law places no constraints on States to grant them. 
 As a result, as Giuseppe Cacciato put it, the U.S. process of granting subsides: 
seems likely to produce outcomes that are both economically irrational and 
distorting to competition. Since subsidies are granted on an ad hoc, individual 
basis and by a process of bilateral negotiation between the applicant and the 
grantor, neither consistency nor protection of broader interests is assured.212 
 Recent studies seem to support this conclusion. A study by the U.S. National Bureau of 
Economic Research has shown that “states have strong incentives to subsidize firm relocation in 
order to gain at the expense of other states” and that “[w]hile some states still benefit from a 
subsidy war, the subsidies also create distortions which move the country inside its efficiency 
frontier.”213 Another study found that 75 percent of the dollar value of state and local subsidies 
have gone to large corporations214 which indicates a “profound bias against small businesses.”215 
More importantly, it shows that subsidies are often granted to the profitable companies and 
sectors that do not need government support to carry out the investment, meaning that subsidies 
                                                 
212 Cacciato, supra note 1, at 11. 
213 Ralph Ossa, A Quantitative Analysis of Subsidy Competition in the U.S., 2 National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Working Paper 20975 (2015) (The study also shows that “manufacturing real income can be up to 3.9 
percent higher if states stop competing over firms.”). 
214 Philip Mattera, Subsidizing the Corporate One Percent 1 (Good Jobs First, Feb. 2014), 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/subsidizingthecorporateonepercent.pdf (The study shows 
that, in dollar terms, the biggest recipients are Boeing, Alcoa, Intel, General Motors, and Ford Motor.). 
215 Greg LeRoy, Carolyn Fryberger, Kasia Tarczynska, Thomas Cafcas, Elizabeth Bird & Philip Mattera, 
Shortchanging Small Businesses: How Big Businesses Dominate State Economic Development Incentives 3 (Good 
Jobs First, Oct. 2015), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/shortchanging.pdf. (“An analysis of 
more than 4,200 economic development incentive awards in 14 states finds that large companies received dominant 
shares, ranging between 80 and 96 percent of their dollar values. The deals, worth more than $3.2 billion, were 
granted in recent years by programs that, on their faces, are equally accessible to small and large companies. Yet big 
businesses overall were awarded 90 percent of the dollars from the programs analyzed . . . .); see also Kasia 
Tarczynska & Thomas Cafcas, Slicing the Budget Pie for Big Business: How Three States Allocate Economic 
Development Dollars, Large Companies versus Small 2 (Good Jobs First, Mar. 2016), 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/slicingthebudget.pdf (“A detailed analysis of economic 
development budgets in three diverse states—Florida, Missouri, and New Mexico—finds that at least 68 percent of 
overall state economic development spending goes to large companies and programs that support those companies. 
Only a small fraction of state funds—typically about 19 percent—goes to small companies and programs that 
support their operations.”). 
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serve mainly to increase profits rather than to promote broad-based economic growth.216 
Furthermore, when subsidizing large corporations that pay low wages, tax payers money are 
used to expand law-quality employment and to intensify economic inequality.217 
 
                                                 
216 Philip Mattera, Kasia Tarczynska & Greg LeRoy, Tax Breaks and Inequality: Enriching Billionaires and Low-
Road Employers in the Name of Economic Development 6-7 (Good Jobs First, December 2014), 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/taxbreaksandinequality.pdf (In particular, the study found 
members of the Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest Americans linked to 99 firms that have been awarded more than 
$19 billion in cumulative subsidies.). 
217 Id. at 8-10 (“In some cases, both things are happening at the same time; i.e., subsidy awards have gone to 
corporations that are linked to the Forbes 400 and have low-road compensation practices . . . . When a state or local 
government subsidizes a Wal-Mart store or an Amazon.com warehouse, it is doing the most to intensify economic 
inequality by enriching individuals at the very top of the income hierarchy while also perpetuating poor quality jobs 
at the bottom.). 
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VIII. REFORMING THE WTO SUBSIDIES REGIME 
Any changes to the current WTO subsidy regime must be based on a clear definition of the goals 
of that regime. Thus, in this Chapter, I first identify the object and purpose of a coherent 
subsidies regime, which is of crucial importance in order to approach the numerous technical 
issues of the subsidy discipline in a coherent and consistent manner. Since the SCM Agreement 
does not expressly define its objectives, I propose a more precise definition of the object and 
purpose of the SCM Agreement. I then focus on identifying the parts of the Agreement that are 
most inconsistent with the proposed object and purpose and recommend appropriate changes. In 
particular, I propose (1) changes regarding the causality requirement in establishing injury to the 
domestic industry in the case of actionable subsidies; (2) reinstating the category of non-
actionable subsidies; and (3) changes regarding the unilateral use of CVDs by WTO Members. 
A. THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE WTO SUBSIDIES REGIME 
Identifying goals of any legal discipline is a crucial and obvious starting point. Nevertheless, the 
current WTO rules on subsidies lack clarity and thus generate controversy regarding their 
purpose and economic rationale. A Preamble to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement) would contribute to a better understanding of the object and 
purpose of the Agreement and the meaning of its provisions. Moreover, that preamble should 
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incorporate a clear object and purpose that should be identified as protecting competition in the 
market as a means of ensuring economic efficiency. 
1. The Need for a Preamble to the SCM Agreement 
The goal(s) of the SCM Agreement are not entirely clear due to the lack of a preamble, which 
usually provides some indication of the object and purpose of a treaty. Of all the WTO 
agreements, only two lack a preamble: the Anti-Dumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement. 
As has been established in Chapter III, the current WTO subsidy discipline embodies an uneasy 
compromise between diametrically opposed opinions: that of the United States, whose objective 
was more stringent rules on subsidies, and that of the EU and other members, whose objective 
was disciplining the extensive use of countervailing duties (CVDs) by the United States. As a 
result, some concepts of the SCM Agreement “may not have any obvious economic or policy 
rationale, but instead reflect a difficult and, in some respects, an incoherent political bargain.”1 
 Despite quite elaborated subsidy rules, contained in the SCM Agreement, there is still no 
clear answer to the question: what is the ultimate purpose of the regime the Agreement 
establishes? As James Flett put it, “[t]he problem with the SCM Agreement is not to understand 
where it is coming from, but rather to understand where it is going.”2 Answering this question is 
necessary to establish a workable regulatory framework for subsidies in two respects: first, for 
                                                 
1 M. MATSUSHITA, T.J. SCHOENBAUM, P.C. MAVROIDIS & M. HAHN, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY 335 (3d ed. 2015). See also M. Cartland, G. Depayre & J. Woznowski, Is Something Going 
Wrong in the WTO Dispute Settlement, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 979, 992 (2012) (stating that the SCM Agreement “does 
not contain any preamble or explicit/implicit indication of its object and purpose because the drafters specifically 
decided that it would be impossible to agree on these matters. . . .”). 
2 JAMES FLETT, Preserving the Balance Between Trade and Non-Trade Interests Through a Systematic 
Interpretation of WTO Subsidies Law, in WHAT SHAPES THE LAW? REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY, LAW, POLITICS 
AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN SUBSIDY DISCIPLINES 91, 91 (Luca Rubini & Jennifer Hawkins 
eds., 2016) (emphasis in original). 
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interpreting the current provisions of the SCM Agreement in a coherent and consistent manner 
and, second, to propose the modifications and changes to this Agreement that are aimed at 
achieving its objective and purpose. 
 Under Article 3.2 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), the WTO dispute settlement system serves to clarify the existing 
provisions of the WTO agreements in accordance with “customary rules on interpretations of 
public international law.”3 The Appellate Body, in its first case, recognized the rules contained in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as “customary rules on interpretations of public 
international law.”4 Article 31.1 of the Convention states that a treaty shall be interpreted “in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”5 Although a hierarchy among the 
interpretative elements embedded in Article 31 (ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty, 
context, object and purpose) is not entirely clear from the language of the Article, the Appellate 
Body has acknowledged that it exists: 
A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular 
provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in 
their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must 
first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or 
inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text 
                                                 
3 Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 354 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 
(1994), art. 3.2 [hereinafter DSU]. 
4 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 
adopted 20 May 1996, para. 17. See also Donald M. McRae, The WTO in International Law: Tradition Continued 
or New Frontier?, 3 J. INT’L ECON L 27, 39 (2000) (“. . . the careful articulation by the Appellate Body of the legal 
basis for its decisions, grounding its interpretative function in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of 
Treaties, is evidence of an organ that understands its role in explaining the role in a way that will provide guidance 
not only for panels but also for WTO Members seeking to conduct themselves in accordance with their WTO 
obligations.”). 
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention]. 
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itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may 
usefully be sought.6 
This means that the Appellate Body has adopted the “textual” method of interpretation, by which 
it determines the meaning of the existing rules through analyzing the text of the agreement and 
only looks beyond the text in limited cases, such as where the text leaves the question 
unanswered.7 According to Professor Joost Pauwelyn, the text of the treaty is the necessary 
reference for and, at the same time, limitation of the other tools of treaty interpretation.8 
 Establishing “ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty” means not only 
finding their dictionary meaning, but also considering words in their context. The Vienna 
Convention embodies a relatively narrow interpretation of context, which is defined to mean “the 
text (including the preamble and annexes).”9 An examination of the text and context of the treaty 
has to be made “in the light of its object and purpose.” The object and purpose is to be 
established from the treaty as a whole.10 In particular, this involves examining a preamble. Given 
the “textual” approach, however, the more precise the “object and purpose” is formulated in a 
preamble, the more weight it would likely be given.11 For example, the International Law 
                                                 
6 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 12 October 1998, para. 114. See also Panel Report, European Communities – Customs 
Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/R, adopted 30 May 2005 (explicitly acknowledging 
that this passage is evidence of the hierarchy amongst the various interpretative elements laid down in Article 31 of 
the Convention). 
7 Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO Agreements, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 20-24 
(2002); see also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Reflection on the Appellate Body of the WTO, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 695, 699 
(2003) (noting that “among the three criteria mention in Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention . . . the Appellate 
Body has attached the greatest weight to the first, i.e. the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty”). 
8 JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER 
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 245 (2003). 
9 Vienna Convention, supra note 5, art. 31.2 (emphasis added). 
10 Lennard, supra note 7, at 27. 
11 See, e.g., IAN SINCLARE, THE VIENNA CONVENTION AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 127-28 (2nd ed. 1984) (arguing 
that when the search for the object and purpose of a treaty is done through the search for the common intention of 
the parties “there can be no common intention of the parties aside or apart from the text they have agreed on. The 
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Commission considered the “object and purpose” of the treaty as referring to expressed objects 
and purposes, particularly as expressed in the preamble.12 
 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, therefore, requires that the WTO adjudicating 
bodies establish the ordinary meaning of the terms of each WTO treaty “in the light of its object 
and purpose.” When it comes to interpreting the SCM Agreement, however, this crucial element 
of the interpretative rule is almost impossible to apply. The Appellate Body has admitted this, 
when it stated: “considerations of object and purpose are of limited use . . . [w]e do not see that 
the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement provides clear indications as to the intentions of 
the drafters of the SCM Agreement.”13 Similarly, in Canada – Aircraft, the Panel acknowledged 
that the SCM Agreement “does not contain any express statement of its object and purpose . . . 
[w]e therefore consider it unwise to attach undue importance to arguments concerning the object 
and purpose of the SCM Agreement.”14 
 Interpretation of the terms of the agreement “in the light of its object and purpose” 
ensures that a treaty’s text is interpreted to reflect the goals embodied in the document as a whole 
and that all articles are read together in a coherent and consistent manner. The exclusion of this 
element of interpretation considerably undermines the effectiveness and predictability of the 
WTO subsidy discipline. Thus, I propose that the SCM Agreement be amended by adding a 
Preamble that defines the object and purpose of the Agreement. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
text is the expression of the intention of the parties; and it is to that expression of intent that one must first look”) 
(emphasis in original). 
12 International Law Commission Commentary on the draft Vienna Convention, Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, 1996, vol. II, at 221. 
13 Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products 
from China, WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 25 March 2011, paras. 302, 574. 
14 Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R, adopted 20 August 
1999, para. 9.119 [hereinafter Canada – Aircraft]. 
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2. Defining the Object and Purpose of the SCM Agreement 
The WTO jurisprudence, although vague, provides a useful starting point for identifying the 
goals of the WTO subsidy regime. In Brazil – Aircraft, the Panel stated that “[t]he object and 
purpose of the SCM Agreement is to impose multilateral disciplines on subsidies which distort 
international trade.”15 Furthermore, in US – Carbon Steel, the Appellate Body concluded that 
“[t]aken as a whole, the main object and purpose of the SCM Agreement is to increase and 
improve GATT disciplines relating to the use of both subsidies and countervailing measures.”16 
Finally, in US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, the Appellate Body explained 
that the SCM Agreement “reflects a delicate balance between the Members that sought to impose 
more disciplines on the use of subsidies and those that sought to impose more disciplines on the 
application of countervailing measures.”17 
 On the basis of the analysis of the WTO jurisprudence, it may be concluded that the SCM 
Agreement is aimed at discouraging WTO Members from taking unilateral actions that might 
harm international trade. Specifically, the Agreement could deter harm in two ways: first, by 
                                                 
15 Panel Report, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/RW, adopted 4 August 2000, para. 
7.26 (emphasis added); see also Canada – Aircraft, supra note 14, para. 9.119 (stating that the object and purpose of 
the SCM Agreement is “the establishment of multilateral disciplines on the premise that some forms of government 
intervention distort international trade [or] have the potential to distort [international trade]”); Panel Report, United 
States – Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies, WT/DS194/R, adopted 1 August 2001, para. 8.63 
(acknowledging that “while the object and purpose of the [SCM] Agreement clearly is to discipline subsidies that 
distort trade, this object and purpose can only be in respect of ‘subsidies’ as defined in the Agreement. This 
definition, which incorporates the notions of ‘financial contribution,’ ‘benefit,’ and ‘specificity,’ was drafted with 
the express purpose of ensuring that not every government intervention in the market would fall within the coverage 
of the Agreement”) (emphasis in original). 
16 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from Germany, WT/DS213/AB/R, adopted 19 December 2002, para. 73 (emphasis added); see also 
Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood 
Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, para. 64 (stating that the object and purpose of 
the SCM Agreement is “to strengthen and improve GATT disciplines relating to the use of both subsidies and 
countervailing measures, while, recognizing at the same time, the right of Members to impose such measures under 
certain conditions”). 
17 Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors (DRAMS) from Korea, WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 20 July 2005, para. 115. 
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discouraging the grant of subsidies that distort international trade, and second, by controlling the 
unilateral responses to such subsidies by imposing CVDs, ensuring that they are justified and 
proportionate – thus, their distorting effect on international trade is limited. 
 Defining the object and purpose of the WTO subsidy discipline cannot be completed, 
however, without identifying the negative effect produced by the subsidy that has to be 
addressed. Put differently, in what ways might a subsidy cause harm to another country? 
Different interpretations of the word “harm” may result in different understandings of the 
ultimate purpose of the WTO subsidy regime. 
 Professors Gene Grossman and Petros Mavroidis persuasively argue that the main 
objective of the current SCM Agreement is not to advance global economic efficiency, but rather 
to discourage subsidies that may harm producers in importing countries.18 They point out that 
the SCM Agreement “does not confine the use of CVDs to situations in which an importing 
country has established the presumption of welfare loss.”19 Indeed, the Agreement makes no 
reference to market structure, to labor-market conditions, or to consumer welfare. To the 
contrary, CVDs are permitted only when there has been injury to a domestic industry in an 
importing country.20 Likewise, Articles 14 and 19 of the SCM Agreement require that the 
                                                 
18 GENE M. GROSSMAN & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? Privatization and the Injury 
Caused by Non-Recurring Subsidies, in THE WTO CASE LAW OF 2001, at 170, 180-86 (Henrik Horn & Pertos C. 
Mavroidis eds., 2003); see also Wentong Zheng, Counting Once, Counting Twice: The Precarious State of Subsidy 
Regulation, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 427, 470 (2013) (stating that the SCM Agreement “makes no distinction between 
subsidies that distort the market process and subsidies that correct the market process, belying any claim that the 
purpose of subsidy regulation under the SCM Agreement is to enhance efficiency”). 
19 Id. at 185. 
20 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 231 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 14, art. 15 [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. 
281 
maximum amount of CVDs be the amount of the subsidy found to exist,21 which can only be 
understood as an attempt to restore the status quo prior to the injury to the domestic industry. 
 Professor Luka Rubini, while agreeing with the conclusion that the SCM Agreement 
seeks to discourage subsidies that may harm producers’ interest,22 makes another important 
observation. In its original version, the SCM Agreement, by permitting certain subsidies that 
targeted market failure and other policy objectives,23 embraced a more complex, balanced, and 
welfare-oriented approach that went beyond producers’ interests. The authorization of certain 
categories of subsides was also a recognition of other (non-trade) interests pursued by subsidies. 
Since the expiry of non-actionable subsidies in 1999, however, the balance has moved “too far 
towards subsidy aversion.”24 
 This current understanding of the object and purpose of the WTO subsidy discipline is, to 
a large extent, the result of viewing subsides from a trade perspective, particularly in terms of 
their impact on market access. Indeed, the WTO is a “trade” organization that primarily aims to 
gradually eliminate trade barriers (tariffs, quotas, and other obstacles to market access) among its 
members.25 When the GATT of 1947 was drafted, tariffs and quotas were considered to be the 
primary obstacles to international trade. To address this issue, the GATT sets out a general 
                                                 
21 Id., arts. 14, 19. 
22 LUKA RUBINI, THE DEFINITION OF SUBSIDY AND STATE AID: WTO AND EC LAW IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
57 (Oxford University Press 2009). 
23 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, art. 8 (Contained the list of non-actionable subsidies, i.e. subsidies that are 
allowed and thus may not be countervailed: research and development subsidies, regional, and environmental 
subsides.). 
24 RUBINI, supra note 22, at 59 (emphasis in original). 
25 According to the Preamble for the WTO Agreement, the ultimate objectives of the WTO are rather broad and 
include the increase of standards of living, the attainment of full employment; the growth of real income, and the 
expansion of production of, and trade in, goods and services. At the same time, the principal means to achieve these 
objectives are limited to the reduction of trade barriers and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
international trade. (See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE 
LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].) 
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prohibition on quotas;26 tariff duties have been substantially reduced through negotiated 
reciprocal concessions.27 The effects of reduced tariffs, however, can be easily replaced with 
other policy tools that produce the same protective effect, including subsidies.28 For example, the 
potential for market access for foreign steel producers due to a tariff reduction on steel can be 
nullified by subsidizing domestic steel production. This concern has resulted in considering 
subsidies primarily as obstacles to international trade, which frustrate market access and the 
relevant tariff commitments. The adoption of a trade approach, focusing more on trade 
expectations and opportunities, has led to a rather blunt mechanism of operation: export and 
import substitution subsidies are considered prohibited per se – there is no need to establish the 
distortion element;29 the injury to a domestic industry is the only element that has to be 
established in order to impose CVDs;30 and other legitimate policy objectives the subsidies may 
address are not considered. 
 This approach, however, suffers from at least three significant problems. First, subsidies 
may not only affect market access, but may also distort competition. As mentioned above, the 
current WTO subsidy discipline is primarily concerned with the negative impact that a subsidy 
may have on competitors (i.e. foreign producers of the like product), which aligns with 
considering subsidies from a trade (market access) perspective. From a competition perspective, 
                                                 
26 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. XI [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
27 Id., art. II. In the late 1940s, before the creation of the GATT, the average duty on industrial products imposed by 
developed countries was about 40% ad valorem. After the tariff negotiations, this average has been reduced to about 
3.9% ad valorem. 
28 See, e.g., André Blais, The Political Economy of Public Subsidies, vol. 19, No. 2 COMP. POLIT. STUD. 201, 210 
(1986) (stating that as the rates of tariffs have decreased in the industrialized world, governments have chosen to 
increase disbursement of production subsidies; the study finds that a reduction of 3 percentage points in tariffs leads 
to an increase of 1 percentage point in public subsidies). 
29 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, art. 3. 
30 Id., art. 15. 
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on the other hand, the main concern of the subsidy regulation should be the protection of the 
process of competition, rather than the protection of competitors. In the competitive markets, 
firms seek to bring products to market that are more highly valued by consumers than those of 
their competitors, and to do so at the lowest cost possible.31 Thus, a subsidy affects competition 
when it allows inefficient firms to survive artificially in a competitive market to the detriment of 
more efficient competitors. In other words, from a competition perspective, the subsidy 
discipline should not necessarily be concerned with any harm to competitors, but only harm to 
competitors that are more, or at least equally, efficient.32 To illustrate this point, under the 
predatory pricing rule developed in EU law, prices are generally not regarded as predatory as 
long as they exceed average total cost.33 Indeed, a dominant firm that lowers its prices to its 
average total cost may harm some of its competitors. The underlying idea, however, is to protect 
equally efficient competitors. Equally efficient competitors are always able to match a price that 
equals average total cost and thus cannot be driven out of the market. 
 Second, subsidies may affect the total welfare of the importing country, i.e. the sum of 
consumer welfare and producer welfare.34 In certain cases, however, this effect may be positive 
even when the competitors (producers of the like product in the importing country) have been 
injured. For example, subsidization often results in cheaper prices, which could be beneficial for 
the upstream industry and consumers in the importing country; thus, when benefits to the 
upstream industry and consumers outweigh the loss to injured competitors, the subsidy produces, 
                                                 
31 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 197-204 (8th ed. 1920). 
32 RUBINI, supra note 22, at 382-84; CHRISTIAN AHLBORN & CLAUDIA BERG, Can State Aid Control Learn from 
Antitrust? The Need for a Greater Role for Competition Analysis under the State Aid Rules, in THE LAW OF STATE 
AID IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 41, 50 (Andres Biondi, Piet Eeckhout & James Flynn eds., 2004). 
33 Case C-62/86, AZKO v. Commission, [1991] ECR I-3359, para. 7. 
34 HAL L. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 160 (3d ed. 19921). 
284 
from the welfare perspective, a positive effect.35 More importantly, economic theory shows that 
state intervention may, in fact, improve the functioning of markets when market mechanisms left 
alone fail to achieve the best outcome for the economy. Under such circumstances, subsidies (a 
second-best option) may increase welfare by offsetting the consequences of market failures.36 
Moreover, some economists suggest that subsidies should be a preferred form of government 
involvement in trade matters, as they are not as distorting as tariffs.37 This is because a subsidy 
distorts only one margin (a production margin), whereas a tariff distorts two margins (a 
production margin and a consumption margin). In this context, Professors Grossmann and 
Mavroidis have pointed to an inconsistency in the SCM Agreement that prohibits subsidies, or 
makes them actionable, even when they arguably expand trade, while in the same circumstances 
instruments that reduce trade (such as tariffs) are neither prohibited nor actionable.38 
 Finally, the current approach to regulating subsidies may result in over-disciplining this 
area. As the previous analysis demonstrates, the assessment of whether a subsidy is good or bad 
depends on the “impact standard” adopted. If this is a purely “effect on competitors” standard, 
the subsidy is bad, because it adversely affects the competing industry. If we apply a 
“competition” or “total welfare” standard, the conclusion might be different. As a result, the 
adoption of an approach focusing more on trade opportunities rather than on actual effects and 
competitive process, typically results in prohibiting measures that may be permitted under a 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., ROBERT J. CARBAUGH, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 208-09 (16th ed. 2016). 
36 PAUL R. KRUGMAN, MAURICE OBSTFELD & MARC J. MELITZ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 
226-27 (9th ed. 2012); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 77 (3d ed. 2000); HANS W. 
FRIEDERISZICK, LARS-HENDRIK RŐLLER & VINCENT VEROUDEN, European State Aid Control: An Economic 
Framework, in HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 625, 632-34 (Paolo Buccirossi ed., 2007). 
37 Jagdish N. Bhagwati & V.K. Ramaswami, Domestic Distortions, Tariffs and the Theory of Optimum Subsidy, 
71(1) J. POLIT. ECON. 44, 44-50 (1963); HARRY G. JOHNSON, Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of 
Domestic Distortions, in TRADE, GROWTH AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENT 3, 3-34 (Richard E. Caves, Harry G. 
Johnson & Peter B. Kenen eds., 1965). 
38 GROSSMAN & MAVROIDIS, supra note 18, at 186. 
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more competition-oriented approach. As Professor Rubini puts it, this creates the risk of “over-
inclusions.”39 Some commentators express concerns about over-disciplining subsidies.40 In fact, 
research shows that a significant strengthening of the WTO subsidies regime may ultimately 
undermine the goals of that regime, even if we view subsidies primarily from a trade perspective, 
i.e. focusing on the ability of tariff negotiations to serve as the mechanism for expanding market 
access. The findings of Professors Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger demonstrate that subsidies 
rules which are too restrictive may have a “chilling” effect on tariff negotiations: if governments 
are too limited in using subsidies, it makes them more reluctant to relinquish their capacity to use 
tariffs as a policy tool.41 As a broader conclusion, while a regime which is too lenient on the use 
of subsides would deter tariff concession (since the effect of reduced tariffs can be replaced with 
subsidies), too strict a regime may lead to the same result. Taking both arguments together, the 
SCM Agreement needs to strike a balance “between the benefits of government discretion in 
using domestic subsidies to address market distortion and the need to limit governments’ 
flexibility as a mean to secure market access commitments.”42 
                                                 
39 RUBINI, supra note 22, at 422. 
40 PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, TRADE IN GOODS: THE GATT AND THE OTHER WTO AGREEMENTS REGULATING TRADE 
IN GOODS 527-28 (2012) (arguing that “if subsidies become costly (say because of retaliations), then WTO Members 
might have an incentive to say impose high non-discriminatory taxes. This could be the case, for example, when 
governments, because they cannot use subsidies to address climate change issues, have recourse to high sale taxes, 
imposed on goods, creating similar problem”); Alan O. Sykes, The Limited Economic Case for Subsidies 
Regulation, 1, 6-8 E15 Initiative. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and World 
Economic Forum (2015), www.e15initiateve.org/ arguing that since the current WTO rules on subsides are “highly 
flawed from an economic perspective” and “there are no simple solutions to these problem,” the “second-best” 
solution could be a developing more narrow industry or sector-specific arrangements instead of generally applicable 
rules on subsidies). 
41 K. Bagwell & R.W. Staiger, Will International Rules on Subsidies Disrupt the World Trading System?, 96 AM. 
ECON. REV. 877, 891 (2006). 
42 Daniel Brou & Michele Ruta, A Commitment Theory of Subsidy Agreements, World Trade Organization, 
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 The different dimensions of subsidies require a more balanced and sophisticated 
treatment. The crucial question is what should be the ultimate purpose of the rules. Should it be 
the safeguarding of market access opportunities or the preservation of effective competition and 
increasing total welfare (i.e. economic efficiency)? On the one hand, subsidies may endanger 
trade liberalization and make a market less open. Yet, at the same time, if subsidies are viewed 
primarily as barriers to trade, this could result in counteracting a subsidy that negatively affects 
foreign producers, even though it has no impact (or has a positive impact) on the competitive 
process (total welfare) in an importing country. This would unjustifiably limit the ability of an 
exporting country to address the problem of economic inefficiency in the domestic market by 
granting subsidies that target market failures. Additionally, if importing countries impose CVDs 
when competition is not distorted by the subsidy, this may create distortion(s) and thus reduce 
competition, possibly even leading to a domestic producer monopoly. 
 The underlying problem with a trade approach, which is based on the “effect on 
competitors” standard, is that it does not directly assess the effect of the subsidy on either 
market, competition, or consumers. As Friederiszick, Röller and Verouden point out, although 
the “effect on competitors” standard is closely linked to the idea of a “level playing field,” the 
idea of a level playing field focuses on ex ante fairness: a subsidy is not distortive if it leaves the 
market position of all competitors unchanged.43 Since the inherent effect of most subsidies is to 
change the relative market position of firms, this approach essentially leads to most subsidies 
being “bad” and is thus not particularly helpful in distinguishing bad from good subsidies. By 
failing to identify subsidies that do distort competition, rules on subsidies based exclusively on a 
                                                 
43 FRIEDERISZICK, RŐLLER & VEROUDEN, supra note 36, at 34-35. 
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trade approach do not serve the objective of promoting economic efficiency in order to increase 
total economic welfare. 
 There is merit in implementing a competition approach to regulating subsidies. Building 
upon suggestions by Professor Rubini44 and Professors Grossman and Mavroidis,45 the WTO 
subsidies regime should ensure that positive effects of a subsidy enjoyed in one country do not 
produce negative effects in the form of distortion of competition in other countries. That is, the 
main focus of the analysis should be on the actual effects of the measure on competition in the 
relevant market. Only those subsides which have the effect of distorting competition should be 
targeted. The “effect on competitors” standard could still play a role in identifying the dynamic 
effects of a subsidy on competition, but it should not be endorsed as a final (or singular) 
objective. 
 This suggestion does not mean that the competition approach will replace the trade 
approach; rather, they will have to be suitably reconciled. While there are significant differences 
between international competition law and international trade law, they should be, to a large 
extent, complementary. As Dr. Martyn Taylor, who advocated for incorporating an international 
competition agreement in WTO law, explains: 
Competition theory views a “barrier to trade” as a form of structural barrier to 
market entry created by government border regulation. If trade barriers are 
significant in respect of a particular domestic market, foreign firms will have a 
reduced ability to enter that domestic market to compete with domestic firms, 
reducing competition. Conversely, if such trade barriers are reduced, foreign firms 
can more readily enter domestic markets to increase competition. To the extent 
                                                 
44 RUBINI, supra note 22, at 25-90, 422 (arguing that “more than traditional ‘trade regulation’ (aimed at removing 
obstacles to free movement of economic factors), [WTO subsidy rules] should be looked at as ‘competition 
regulation’ (aimed at directly controlling the impact of subsidies on the cost/revenue structure of recipients and, via 
this, on their competitors)”). 
45 GROSSMAN & MAVROIDIS, supra note 18, at 201 (arguing that “the SCM Agreement would better serve the 
objective of promoting efficiency in trade relations if Members were limited in their application of countervailing 
measures to circumstances in which they demonstrated that foreign subsidies have been damaging to aggregate 
economic welfare”). 
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that international trade law reduces such trade barriers, it is complementary to 
competition law as it facilitates competition by promoting greater market entry.46 
 EU State aid law is a good example of the co-existence of trade and competition 
approaches to regulating subsidies. On the one hand, State aid control is a part of competition 
law. Article 107(1) on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) is not only 
part of the chapter on competition law, but also explicitly prohibits State intervention by means 
of aid, “which distorts or threatens to distort competition,” in the relevant market.47 On the other 
hand, Article 107(1) has the ultimate goal of contributing to integration through creating and 
maintaining the internal market (i.e. market access): the Treaty requires that the application of 
State aid rules must never produce a result that is contrary to the Treaty rules governing free 
movements.48 Accordingly, as Professors Andrea Biondi and Piet Eeckhout have concluded, the 
EU State aid rules are based on “the recognition that both sets of rules [internal market and 
competition]” are pursuing an identical aim, namely that of ensuring the free movement of goods 
under normal conditions of competition.”49 
 Identifying the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement as protecting competition on 
the market as a means of ensuring economic efficiency would both better serve the objective of 
promoting economic efficiency and better distinguish bad subsidies from good subsidies. This 
object and purpose should be implemented by adding an appropriately-worded Preamble to the 
                                                 
46 MARTYN TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW: A NEW DIMENSION FOR THE WTO? 177 (2006). 
47 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 26 October 2012, Official Journal 
of the European Union (C 326/47), art. 107(1) [hereinafter TFEU]. 
48 ANDREA BIONDI & MARTIN FARLEY, The Relationship Between State Aid and the Single Market, in EUROPEAN 
HANDBOOK ON STATE AID LAW 277, 282 (Erika Szyszchak ed., 2011) (with reference to Case Commission v. Italy 
(Sovraprezzo)). 
49 ANDREA BIONDI & PIET EECKHOUT, State Aid and Obstacles to Trade, in The Law of State Aid, in THE LAW OF 
STATE AID IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 108 (A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout & J. Flynn eds., 2004) (emphasis added). 
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SCM Agreement. Using the Preambles of the other WTO Agreements as models, I suggest the 
following language: 
Members, 
Having in mind the overall objectives of the GATT 1994; 
Recognizing the need to clarify and reinforce rules for the application of the 
provisions of GATT 1994 that relate to subsidies and countervailing duties, in 
particular the provisions of Articles III:8(b), VI and XVI; 
Recognizing that Members should not use subsidies that distort competition and 
reduce economic efficiency in the markets of other Members; 
Desiring to ensure that countervailing duties and other legal actions to counteract 
subsidies themselves do not create distortion of competition; and 
Recognizing that Members should not be prevented from granting subsidies to 
domestic producers in order to pursue legitimate objectives, provided that they 
comply with the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994 and other applicable WTO 
agreements; 
Hereby agree as follows: 
This language would recognize both the trade and competition purposes of a proper WTO 
subsidies regime, and would provide clear objective and purpose to be applied in the 
interpretation and application of the text of the SCM Agreement. 
B. MODIFYING THE SCM AGREEMENT IN ORDER TO BRING IT IN LINE WITH 
THE PROPOSED OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE WTO SUBSIDIES REGIME 
Legal and economic scholarship points to numerous concerns regarding the existing WTO 
subsidy rules.50 Likewise, 182 proposals for amendments to the SCM Agreement have been 
                                                 
50 See, e.g., Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 41, at 877-95; R. Diamond, Economic Foundations of Countervailing 
Duty Law, 29 VA. J. INT’L L. 767-812 (1989); R. Diamond, Privatization and the Definition of Subsidy: A Critical 
Study of Appellate Body Textualism, 11/3 J. INT’L LAW 649-78 (2008); RUBINI, supra note 22; Warren F. Schwartz 
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submitted by WTO Members in the Doha Round negotiations on subsidies and countervailing 
measures.51 While acknowledging that there are many important issues in the current WTO 
subsidies regime that must be addressed, the focus of this section is on the most crucial changes 
that should be made in order to bring it in line with an object and purpose which takes into 
account both trade and competition concerns. 
1. Actionable Subsides 
Any specific subsidy within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of the SCM Agreement is subject to 
challenge in the event that it causes “adverse effects” to the interests of another Member.52 
Article 5 distinguishes between three types of “adverse effect”: (1) injury to the domestic 
industry of another Member; (2) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing directly or 
indirectly to other Members under the GATT 1994; and (3) serious prejudice to the interests of 
another Member.53 The second and third categories of actionable subsidies seem to be more 
suitable for a “competition-oriented” analysis. With regard to notification or impairment of 
benefits, GATT jurisprudence54 has recognized that subsidies may alter and distort the 
competitive relationship between domestic and imported products so as to nullify or impair the 
                                                                                                                                                             
& Eugene W. Harper, Jr., Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70 MICH. L. REV. 831-58 (1972); 
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21 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 699-721 (1989); WHAT SHAPES THE LAW? REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY, LAW, 
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Duty Law, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1-54 (2010); Zheng, supra note 18, at 427-76. 
51 John R. Magnus, World Trade Organization Subsidy Discipline: Is This the “Retrenchment Round”?, 38 J. 
WORLD TRADE 990 (2004). 
52 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, art. 5. 
53 Id. 
54 There has been no jurisprudence on the application of this provision in the SCM Agreement’s context so far. 
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reasonable expectations of benefits under the GATT.55 More importantly, the Oilseeds Panel 
emphasized that the main focus should be on “condition of competition for trade, not on volumes 
of trade.”56 Thus, by offsetting an efficiency-enhancing reduction of a distortive trade barrier, 
usually in the form of a bound-tariff concession, subsidizing governments are able to tamper 
with the competitive process, decreasing global efficiency.57 
 Similar conclusions may be drawn with regard to “serious prejudice” claims. According 
to Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement, “serious prejudice” arises where a subsidy (1) displaces or 
impedes the imports of a like product of another Member into the market of the subsidizing 
Member; (2) displaces or impedes the exports of a like product of another Member from a third 
country market; (3) results in a significant price undercutting by the subsidized product or 
significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market; or (4) leads to an 
increase in the world market share of the subsidizing Member.58 The notion of “serious 
prejudice” is thus much more complex than that of “injury to the domestic industry” and more 
easily can be “construed in a ‘distortion of competition’ way.”59 Likewise, whereas “injury to 
domestic producers” must be the result of the “subsidized imports,”60 the language of Article 6.3 
makes it clear that “serious prejudice” must be the “effect of the subsidy,” which suggests the 
direct link between the subsidy and the distortion of competition. This means that “serious 
                                                 
55 GATT Working Party Report, The Australian Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate, adopted 3 April 1950, BISD 
II/188 335, paras. 12-14. 
56 GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community – Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and 
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58 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, art. 6.3. 
59 RUBINI, supra note 22, at 415; see also Zampetti, supra note 57, at 23. 
60 See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. 
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injury” analysis does not focus exclusively on protecting market access opportunities; rather, it 
expands to concentrate on the actual effect of the subsidy in the market. 
 Much more problematic, in terms of the protection of competition, is the third category of 
adverse effect, i.e. “injury to the domestic industry.” This concept is used in the same sense as in 
Part V of the SCM Agreement, which regulates CVDs unilaterally imposed by WTO Members. 
As has been established in the previous section, the “effect on competitors” approach considers 
the effect on neither competition nor total welfare.61 It is, therefore, rather difficult to reconcile 
the “injury to the domestic industry” concept with the objective of preserving competition. The 
most straightforward way to address this problem is to abolish this element, which would require 
prohibiting WTO Members from imposing CVDs. For example, Professor Sykes has advocated 
this solution, arguing that existing national CVD laws have no convincing efficiency rationale, 
either from a national or an international perspective, and thus have to be abolished.62 Given that 
CVDs, along with anti-dumping measures, continue to be important trade protection tools for 
many WTO Members, such a radical solution is not appropriate. It is appropriate, however, to 
make adjustments in order to make this category of subsidies more consistent with the overall 
goals of the WTO subsidies regime. 
a. Changing the Causality Requirement for Establishing Injury to the Domestic Industry 
Subsidies causing injury to the domestic industry are subject to challenge when three conditions 
are fulfilled: (1) there are subsidized imports, i.e. imports of products from producers who 
benefited from specific subsidies within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2; (2) there is injury to the 
                                                 
61 See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. 
62 Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 199-263 (1989). See 
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domestic industry of the like products; and (3) there is a causal link between the subsidized 
imports and the injury to the domestic industry.63 Although the rules on this category of 
subsidies are elaborated in Article 15 of the SCM Agreement, the language of the provisions 
governing causation in CVD proceedings is “remarkably ambiguous.”64 
 Indeed, the relevant provisions attribute a language of causality alternatively to 
subsidized imports or to subsidization. Under Article VI:6 of the GATT, a WTO Member may 
not impose CVDs “unless it determines that the effect of . . . subsidization . . . is such as to cause 
or threaten material injury to an established domestic industry.”65 Similarly, according to Article 
21.1 of the SCM Agreement, CVDs may remain in force only “as long as and to the extent 
necessary to counteract subsidization which is causing injury.”66 Article 15 (paragraphs 1, 2 and 
4) of the SCM Agreement, on the other hand, refers exclusively to subsidized imports as a cause 
of injury. In particular, a determination of injury to the domestic industry must be based on the 
examination of (1) the volume of subsidized imports and the effect of the subsidized imports on 
prices in the domestic market, and (2) the consequent impact of the subsidized imports on the 
domestic producers of such products.67 The most puzzling language, however, is found in Article 
15(5), which contains both terms: 
It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effect of 
subsidies, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The examination 
of a causal relationship between the subsidized imports and the injury to the 
domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence. . . .68 
                                                 
63 See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large 
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64 Diamond, supra note 50, at 673. 
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It seems, therefore, that two alternative constructions of the causation requirement are possible. 
One of them is that an “injury to the domestic industry” claim requires demonstration of injury 
caused by subsidized imports rather than by the subsidy itself. Support for this reading can be 
found in case law. In Japan – DRAMS,69 the Appellate Body found that “for determining 
whether the ‘subsidized imports are, through the effects of subsidies, causing injury’ to the 
domestic industry” only the examination of the “effects of the subsidized imports” on prices and 
consequently on domestic producers is required.70 
 The main problem with this approach is that the demonstrated causal link between 
subsidized imports and injury does not prove that such injury has, in fact, been caused by 
subsidization. As Dominic Coppens points out, any volume or price effect of subsidized imports 
is simply assumed to be the effect of subsidization.71 This could lead either to false positive 
findings (for example, in cases where increased volumes of imports are the result of factors other 
than subsidies, such as better quality, design or innovations) or to higher CVDs than would 
otherwise be justified. In other words, this approach may result in permitting CVDs imposed to 
offset an injury that is not being caused by the subsidies in question. Furthermore, it creates 
unnecessary inconsistency in interpretation of the “injury” standard: an “injury to the domestic 
industry” claim requires demonstration of injury caused by subsidized imports, whereas a 
“serious injury” claim requires demonstration of trade effects caused by subsidies. In other 
words, when assessing injury to the domestic industry, the focus is on the impact of subsidized 
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import on the domestic industry of another Member, whereas the focus of the serious prejudice 
analysis is on the actual effect of a subsidy in a market. There is no sound justification for this 
bifurcation. Indeed, as Professor Rubini put it, the SCM Agreement is about how “to regulate 
subsidies and responses to them.”72 
 Interpreting the current provisions of the Agreement as requiring demonstration of injury 
to the domestic industry by subsidies would better serve the objective of protection of 
competition and would reduce the current inconsistencies in the SCM Agreement. If the injury is 
the result of factors other than subsidization, no determination of injury should be made and, 
thus, no CVDs imposed. 
b. Revising the Non-contribution Requirement A requirement that the injury must by caused 
by subsidization, moves the analysis to a second question: what kind of injury caused by 
subsidization should be addressed? Although “injury to the domestic industry” is not the same as 
distortion of competition, the injury test still may be construed in a “competition-oriented” way. 
According to Article 15.5: 
The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the subsidized 
imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the 
injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the subsidized 
imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the 
volumes and prices of non-subsidized imports of the product in question, 
contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade restrictive 
practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, 
developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the 
domestic industry.73 
When assessing this non-attribution requirement, the Panel in Mexico – Olive Oil applied a two-
part analysis in which an investigating authority is obliged to (1) list those factors known to it 
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either as a result of its own investigation or because they were raised by interested parties; and 
(2) “analyze each of these factors separately and to explain the nature and extent of the injurious 
effects of these other factors, separating and distinguishing them from the injurious effects of the 
subsidized imports.”74 
 As mentioned earlier,75 protection of competition is not about protecting any competitors, 
but rather equally effective competitors. The non-attribution requirement is supposed to serve this 
purpose. Indeed, bad management, for example, could be another factor that injures the domestic 
producer; thus, excluding this factor ensures that only injury to more effective competitors is 
offset by CVDs. Nevertheless, the current reading of Article 15 adopted by the Appellate Body – 
requiring the establishment of a causal link between injury and subsidized imports rather than 
between injury and subsidization – makes the non-attribution requirement less effective in this 
respect. Following the “injury by subsidized imports” approach, investigating authorities analyze 
and exclude factors other than subsidized imports.76 
 Consider this example: the increased volume of sales of an imported product that injured 
the domestic producer was due to better quality and design, which made this product more 
attractive to consumers. Let us also assume that the company that imports this product happened 
to receive a subsidy from its government. If the improvements in quality and design were due to 
the subsidy, the injury to domestic industry would be found based on either injury standard, i.e. 
“subsidized imports” or “subsidy.” Alternatively, if the subsidy had no impact on quality and 
design of the products in question, the outcome will depend on the injury standard chosen. Under 
the “injury by subsidized imports” approach, quality and design of the subsidized product are not 
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75 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. 
76 Japan – DRAMS, para. 267. 
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factors “other than subsidized imports;” to the contrary, they are the factors attributed to the 
subsidized import that injures the domestic industry. As a result, CVDs may be imposed to 
protect less efficient domestic producers. Under the “injury by subsidization” approach, on the 
other hand, quality and design are considered as factors that do not result from subsidization and, 
based on the non-attributable requirement, the injury caused by them should therefore not be 
attributed to the subsidy. Thus, the main problem with the current non-attribution requirement is 
that it does not distinguish those factors related to the “subsidized imports” that do not result 
from subsidization,77 which may lead to protection of less efficient domestic producers, to the 
detriment of more efficient foreign competitors. 
 A shift from “injury by subsidized imports” to “injury by subsidization,” would resolve 
the conceptual problem – that is, that the current subsidies regime should not be over-inclusive 
and only regulate subsidies and responses to them. It also would better serve the objective of 
protection of competition. Although the rules applicable to the injury to domestic industry claims 
concentrates almost exclusively on protection of the domestic industry, the concept itself is 
reconcilable with the protection of competition. The latter could be better achieved by excluding, 
based on the non-attribution requirement, factors causing injury to the domestic industry that do 
not result from subsidization, rather than those that are not attributable to the subsidized imports. 
2. Non-actionable Subsidies 
The original SCM Agreement distinguished between prohibited, actionable and non-actionable 
subsidies. Under Article 8 of the SCM Agreement, non-actionable subsidies – i.e. subsidies that 
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are allowed and thus may not be countervailed – included three types of subsidies: regional aid, 
environmental subsidies, and subsidies for research and development (R&D) purposes.78 
However, the provisions of Article 8 on non-actionable subsides are no longer in force, having 
lapsed five years after the SCM Agreement’s entry into force, because there was no consensus in 
favor of continuing the application of Article 8. As of January 1, 2000, the above mentioned 
types of subsidies have been actionable, provided that they are specific.79 
 From the perspective of economic efficiency (i.e. total welfare), subsidies need to be 
regulated so that they do not distort resource allocation and thus reduce economic efficiency.80 
The current WTO subsidies regime, however, cannot be fully reconciled with the efficiency 
rationale. Subsidies may cause various effects, both positive and negative. As shown 
previously,81 a subsidy may in fact enhance economic efficiency when it corrects “market 
failures.” This is clearly the case with regard to the environmental, R&D and regional aid 
subsidies. 
 Climate change has been recognized as the “greatest market failure the world has ever 
seen,” capable, if unaddressed, of shaving off 5% (and as much as 20% if other risks and impact 
are taken into account) of the world’s GDP “each year, now and forever.”82 In contrast, the cost 
of action – reducing greenhouse gas emissions – can be limited to around 1% of global GDP 
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each year.83 Environmental subsidies, therefore, may promote the production and consumption 
of clean energy as a substitute for conventional fuels. In fact, the Appellate Body has 
acknowledged the importance of the environmental rationale for the government intervention: 
Governments intervene by reducing reliance on fossil energy resources and 
promoting the generation of electricity from renewable energy resources to ensure 
the sustainability of electricity markets in the long term. Fossil energy resources 
are exhaustible, and thus fossil energy needs to be replaced progressively if 
electricity supply is to be guaranteed in the long term. Government intervention in 
favour of the substitution of fossil energy with renewable energy today is meant 
to ensure the proper functioning or the existence of an electricity market with a 
constant and reliable supply of electricity in the long term.84 
Likewise, the development and adoption of advanced technology is critical for growth in 
productivity and employment. 
 The private market generally underinvests in R&D. First, R&D can be expensive and 
uncertain. It is difficult to predict the cost and duration of a project and the commercial success 
of its outcome.85 Second, when a company undertakes R&D, this activity may have positive 
spillover effects for other companies (diffusion of knowledge, technological breakthrough, etc.), 
thus making them more productive. Firms contemplating investments in R&D do not profit from 
the increased productivity of other firms, and, consequently, lack incentives to invest.86 As a 
result, the market failure in relation to R&D activity means that the social rates of return from 
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R&D are commonly higher than private rates of returns.87 One of the means to address this 
market failure and to stimulate private investments is R&D subsidies to private firms. 
 Finally, many countries experience extreme disparities in the cost of investment in 
different regions within their borders and extreme variations in income and employment 
opportunities in those areas.88 This type of market failure could be corrected with regional 
subsidies, which are often used by governments as a development tool for underdeveloped areas. 
 The current SCM Agreement makes no distinction between subsidies that distort and 
subsidies that address distortions. Thus, by failing to separate subsidies producing a positive 
effect from subsidies producing a negative effect, the rules do not serve the objective of 
promoting economic efficiency and increasing total welfare. There is broad scholarly agreement 
that certain subsidies have to be permitted and that appropriate reforms of the WTO rules on 
subsidies are needed.89 Similarly, in the Doha Round negotiations some WTO Members 
submitted their proposals to reinstitute the green subsidy category.90 Express exceptions for 
certain categories of legitimate subsidies should be provided. 
                                                 
87 Hauknes & Nordgren, supra note 85, at 3; see also Pierre Mohnen, R&D Externalities and Productivity Growth, 
18 STI REV. 39, 64 (1996) (The research has shown that in the majority of OECD countries, the social rate of return 
on investments in R&D and human capital largely exceeds the private rate of return.). 
88 Gary H. Horlick & Peggy A. Clark, WTO Subsidies Discipline During and After the Crisis, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L 
859, 870 (2010). 
89 See, e.g., Liesbeth Casier & Tom Morenhout, WTO Members, Not the Appellate Body, Need to Clarify 
Boundaries in Renewable Energy Support, International Institute for Sustainable Development 1-10 (2013), 
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2013/wto_members_renewable_energy_support.pdf; Aaron Cosbey & Petros C. Mavroidis, 
A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the 
Subsidies Agreement of the WTO, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 11-47 (2014); Horlick & Clark, supra note 88, at 859-74; 
ROBERT HOWSE, Do the World Trade Organization Disciplines on Domestic Subsidies Make Sense? The Case for 
Legalizing Some Subsidies, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONTINGENT PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
85-103 (Kyle W. Bagwell, George A. Bermann & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2010); Luca Rubini, Ain’t Wastin’ Time 
No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, the SCM Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform, 15(2) J. INT’L 
ECON L 525-79 (2012); Debra Steger, The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement: Ahead of Its Time or 
Time for Reform?, 44 J. WORLD TRADE 779-96 (2010). 
90 Proposals by the European Communities, TN/RL/W/30, at 3 (November 2002); Proposals by Canada, TN/RLW/1, 
at 1-2 (April 2002); TN/RFL/W/112, at 4 (June 2003); Proposals by Venezuela, TN/RLW/41, at 1-2 (December 
2002); Joint Proposals by Cuba and Venezuela, TN/RL/W/131, at 2 (July 2003). 
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a. Options for (Re)instating of the Category of Non-actionable Subsidies There are three 
possible avenues for justifying certain types of subsidies, and thus for placing them in the green 
subsidy category: (1) applying Article XX of the GATT; (2) reinstating Article 8 of the SCM 
Agreement; or (3) introducing a revised Article 8. 
1. Applying GATT Article XX Article XX of the GATT (General Exceptions) allows WTO 
Members to maintain otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures if they have been adopted to 
promote or protect certain societal values. According to Article XX, “nothing in this [GATT] 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement” of certain measures.91 
Measures satisfying the conditions set out in Article XX are thus permitted, even if they are 
inconsistent with other provisions of the GATT. 
 Professor Rubini92 and Professor Howse93 have argued that since the SCM Agreement is 
lex specialis to the GATT provisions, Article XX can be used as a defense against a claim of 
violation of the more specialized rules in the SCM Agreement. If this option is followed, there is 
then no need to amend the SCM Agreement in order to accomplish the result. 
 Indeed, there is partial overlap between the GATT Article XX list and the list in Article 8 
of the SCM Agreement. In particular, Article XX includes two provisions with regard to 
environmental measures. the Article XX(b) exception for measures “necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health,” and the Article XX(g) exception for measures “relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources.”94 The Appellate Body has concluded that 
                                                 
91 GATT, supra note 26, art. XX. 
92 Rubini, supra note 89, at 558-70. 
93 Robert Howse, Climate Mitigation Subsidies and the WTO Legal Framework: A Policy Analysis, International 
Institute for Sustainable Development 17-19 (2010), www.iisd.org. 
94 GATT, supra note 26, art. XX. 
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paragraph (b) may cover climate change95 and that clean air can be protected under the paragraph 
(g) exception.96 
 The GATT Article XX approach to green subsidies presents certain problems. First, it 
raises a broader concern about the applicability of Article XX to WTO agreements other than the 
GATT. Article XX states that “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement” of certain measures.97 The language may suggest a narrow scope for 
exception: it only applies to GATT obligations, not to other WTO agreements or instruments. 
The Appellate Body has addressed this issue. In China – Publications,98 the Appellate Body 
concluded that Article XX of the GATT could apply to Article 5.1 of the China’s Accession 
Protocol, because the language of this provision expressly referred to “the WTO Agreement.” By 
contrast, in China – Raw Materials,99 the Appellate Body rejected applying Article XX to Article 
11.3 of the China’s Accession Protocol, because it refers to Article VIII of the GATT “but leaves 
out reference to other provisions of the GATT 1994, such as Article XX.” It seems, therefore, 
that the current WTO jurisprudence supports the view that where the Article XX exceptions are 
meant to apply to other WTO agreements, those exceptions must be expressly incorporated in the 
other agreements. 
                                                 
95 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 
17 December 2007, para. 151. But see also Panel Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 
WT/DS332/R, adopted 12 June 2007, para. 7.46 (stating that a party invoking an environmental justification under 
Article XX(b) “has to establish the existence not just of risks to “the environment” generally, but specifically of 
risks to animal or plant life or health”). 
96 Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 
adopted 20 May 1996, para. 18. 
97 GATT, supra note 26, art. XX (emphasis added). 
98 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publication and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 21 December 2009, paras. 216-23. 
99 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportations of Various Raw Materials, 
WT/DS394/AB/R, adopted 30 January 2012, para. 291. 
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 The SCM Agreement does not contain an explicit reference to Article XX of the GATT. 
It does, however, refer to the GATT Agreement as a whole. Under Article 32.1 of the SCM 
Agreement “[n]o specific action against a subsidy of another Member can be taken except in 
accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement.”100 Some 
scholars have argued that, based on the decision in China – Publication, Article XX is applicable 
to the SCM Agreement, since a measure satisfying an exception is “in accordance with the 
provisions of GATT.”101 Yet, at the same time, the exact wording of Article 32.1 is “in 
accordance with the provisions of GATT, as interpreted by this Agreement.” This suggests that 
the SCM Agreement is an “interpretation” of the subsidies provisions contained in the GATT. In 
Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, when addressing the issue of the relationship between Article 10 of 
the SCM Agreement and Article VI of the GATT, the Appellate Body concluded that: 
A countervailing duty being a specific action against a subsidy of another WTO 
Member, pursuant to Article 32.1, it can only be imposed “in accordance with the 
provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this Agreement”. The ordinary 
meaning of these provisions taken in their context leads us to the conclusion that 
the negotiators of the SCM Agreement clearly intended that, under the integrated 
WTO Agreement, countervailing duties may only be imposed in accordance with 
the provisions of Part V of the SCM Agreement and Article VI of the GATT 1994, 
taken together. If there is a conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement 
and Article VI of the GATT 1994, the provisions of the SCM Agreement would 
prevail as a result of the general interpretative note to Annex 1A.102 
In other words, the provisions of the GATT, although generally applicable, must not be read in 
isolation but rather in conjunction with the SCM Agreement. Consequently, even though certain 
provisions of the GATT are clearly applicable to the SCM Agreement, Article XX might not be. 
                                                 
100 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, art. 32.1 (emphasis added). 
101 Rubini, supra note 89, at 566 (stating that “[i]n the China – Publications decision, the gateway for the 
applicability of GATT Article XX to the Protocol of Accession of China was the phrase ‘in conformity with the 
WTO Agreement’s’ in the Protocol’s Article 5.1.”). 
102 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 21 February 
1997, at 16 (emphasis in original). 
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 Article 8 of the SCM Agreement defines the environmental subsidies that are considered 
non-actionable in a rather narrow way, imposing a number of caps.103 For example, to qualify for 
an exemption, a subsidy must be a one-time recurring measure and limited to 20% of the cost of 
adaptation.104 This suggests that negotiators of the SCM Agreement clearly intended to construct 
the Agreement as a specific regime with its own exceptions and limitations for subsidies, instead 
of making them subject to the general exceptions provisions of Article XX of the GATT that 
potentially may have a much broader scope of application regarding environmental measures. 
Furthermore, Article 8 was introduced on a provisional basis to apply for a period of five years 
with a possibility to extend its application.105 The provisions of the Article expired in 2000 
specifically because there was no consensus to renew them.106 Therefore, considering both the 
provisions and legislative history of Article 8 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI of the 
GATT, it seems unlikely that the Appellate Body would allow the much broader exceptions 
taken through the back door of GATT Article XX after WTO Members had explicitly rejected 
much narrower exemptions (Article 8). 
 Second, even assuming that GATT Article XX applies to the SCM Agreement, there is 
only a partial overlap between the Article XX list and the list in Article 8 of the SCM 
Agreement, i.e. environmental subsides. R&D subsidies, regional aid subsidies, and many other 
subsidies that WTO Members may want to include in a green subsidy category in the future (for 
                                                 
103 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, art. 8.2(c) (An environmental subsidy is non-actionable, provided that it: “(i) is 
a one-time non-recurring measure; and (ii) is limited to 20% of the cost of adaptation; and (iii) does not cover the 
cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must be fully borne by firms; and (iv) is directly 
linked to and proportionate to a firm’s planned reduction of nuisances and pollution, and does not cover any 
manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; and (v) is available to all firms which can adopt the new 
equipment and/or production process.”). 
104 Id., art. 8.2(c)(i) and 8.2(c)(ii). 
105 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, art. 31. 
106 See, e.g., Cosbey & Mavroidis, supra note 89, at 41 (discussing the possible reasons for abandoning Article 8). 
305 
example, subsidies to small and medium enterprises or public health subsidies) do not fall within 
a category of general exceptions under Article XX. The application of Article XX to the SCM 
Agreement, therefore, seems to be only a partial solution to the problem of legalizing certain 
subsidies, since it covers only a limited number of subsidies that correct market distortions. 
 Finally, nothing in the GATT or the SCM Agreement suggests that CVDs may not be 
imposed against subsidies that are justified under Article XX of the GATT.107 Thus, the 
application of Article XX to subsidies may result in a rather incoherent system where multilateral 
actions against certain types of subsidies are prohibited, whereas unilateral CVD actions against 
the same subsides are still possible. 
 Based on the above reasons, the application of general exceptions under GATT Article 
XX to the SCM Agreement is not the appropriate avenue for justification of certain types of 
subsides. Introducing a special provision on non-actionable subsidies into the SCM Agreement 
itself is a more promising solution. 
2. Reinstating Article 8 of the SCM Agreement The easiest way to achieve a special provision 
on non-actionable subsidies in the SCM Agreement would be to simply re-instate Article 8 as 
presently drafted. However, the rules of Article 8, “which were negotiated and designed in the 
1980s and early 1990s, are not up to the job in the current climate.”108 For example, an 
environmental subsidy must be only a one-time non-recurring payment limited to 20 per cent of 
                                                 
107 COPPENS, supra note 71, at 194; Howse, supra note 93, at 19. 
108 Luka Rubini, Rethinking International Subsidies Disciplines: Rationale and Possible Avenue for Reform, E15 
Initiative. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and World Economic Forum, 1, 1 
(2015), www.e15initiative.org/. 
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the cost of adaptation.109 As Cosbey and Mavroidis point out, if this provision were in force 
today, most measures aimed at the protection of the environment would not pass the test.110 
 In order to serve the objective of enhancing economic efficiency, the provisions of 
Article 8 must distinguish between those subsidies that actually address market failures (such as 
climate change) and those that simply transfer income from taxpayers to protect domestic 
producers. Instead, the overly strict eligibility criteria of Article 8 have significantly narrowed 
the scope of non-actionable programs so that they would be unlikely to serve this objective.111 
For example, Article 8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement, which provides an exemption for 
environmental subsidies, only applies “to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new 
environmental requirements imposed by law and/or regulations which result in greater 
constraints and financial burden on firms.”112 In other words, the exception only applies to 
situations where governments provide financial assistance to private firms to upgrade their 
existing facilities to meet new environmental standards set by the government. As Professor 
Jaemin Lee observes, this means that various green programs, including programs to develop 
renewable energy, are not covered by this provision. 113 Consequently, Article 8 “does not permit 
governments to freely pursue any type of governmental initiatives for green activities, but instead 
                                                 
109 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 8.2(c)(i), 8.2(c)(ii). 
110 Cosbey & Mavroidis, supra note 89, at 45. 
111 Id. at 43-45; Horlick & Clark, supra note 88, at 870-71; Howse, supra note 93, at 20-21 (“The detailed nature of 
the conditions and criteria in these provisions reflect the great difficulty in ensuring that subsidies are effective for 
“legitimate” goals, for example capturing public goods in the case of research and development, while not providing 
any real competitive advantage to particular domestic industries.”); see also Negotiating Group on Rules, WTO 
Negotiations Concerning the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Proposals by the 
European Communities, TN/RL/W/30, 21 November 2002, at 2 (stating that non-actionable category has proven to 
“be of very limited use since the definitions and procedures were so complicated that no Member could make 
serious use of it”). 
112 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, art. 8.2(c) (emphasis added), see also footnote 33 explaining the “the term 
“existing facilities” means facilities which have been in operation for at least two years at the time new 
environmental requirements are imposed” (emphasis added). 
113 Jaemin Lee, SCM Agreement Revisited: Climate Change, Renewable Energy, and the SCM Agreement, 15 
WORLD TRADE REV. 613, 626 (2016). 
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only allows certain, stipulated types of government support for private entities.”114 For these 
reasons, the current language of Article 8 is neither sufficient nor appropriate to address the 
underlying problem. 
3. Introducing a revised Article 8 It is submitted that the best way to reinstate the non-
actionable subsidy category is to introduce a new Article 8, which will expand the scope of 
exceptions from the SCM Agreement so that they are tailored to the needs of the economic 
justification. Furthermore, to ensure the effectiveness of subsidies in pursuing public policy 
objectives, two important questions must be asked: (1) whether a subsidy is well designed to 
deliver a chosen objective, and (2) whether there is an incentive effect (i.e. whether the subsidy 
affects the behavior of the recipient in a way which meets the objective). 
b. Creating Effective Article 8 Language 
1. Adding a necessity test The rationale for introducing the category of non-actionable subsidies 
is that certain subsidies produce positive effects by enhancing economic efficiency (total 
welfare).115 In this respect, simply demonstrating that a subsidy falls under one of the exceptions 
listed in Article 8 is not enough to ensure that the subsidy is, in fact, effective and will lead to a 
welfare enhancing outcome. Put differently, pursuing a legitimate objective is a necessary but 
not a sufficient condition for a subsidy to be effective. It thus becomes necessary to ensure that a 
subsidy is well designed to deliver a chosen objective. 
                                                 
114 Id. 
115 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. 
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 One of the key questions here is whether the subsidy is the appropriate and necessary 
instrument for achieving the chosen objective. Indeed, from an economic point of view, there 
might be other more effective and less trade-restrictive instruments that may be used to improve 
the functioning of markets.116 In cases in which a subsidy is not an appropriate instrument to 
address a market failure, the subsidy might create distortion of competitions and trade that could 
be avoided or limited by using other policy instruments (education, regulatory measures, 
taxation, etc.).117 Thus, a subsidy is not appropriate and necessary where other less-distortive 
instruments can achieve the same results. 
 In this regard, GATT Article XX and the relevant case law can offer useful guidance. 
Paragraphs (b) and (d) of Article XX of the GATT set forth a necessity test: measures must be 
necessary “to protect human, animal or plant life or health” or “to secure compliance with law 
and regulations.”118 The standard for this test was developed in US – Section 337: 
A contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT 
provision as “necessary” in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure 
which it could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent 
with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a 
measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a 
contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, 
that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT 
provisions.119 
Put differently, a measure is not “necessary” if there is a reasonably available alternative 
measure that is either fully consistent or less inconsistent with the GATT. The Appellate Body, 
                                                 
116 FRIEDERISZICK, RŐLLER & VEROUDEN, supra note 36, at 40. 
117 See, e.g., Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, Resurrecting the Dead? The Expired Non-Actionable Subsidies and the Lingering 
Question of “Green Space,” 8 MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECONOMIC L. 2, 8 (2011) (pointing out to the fact that on 
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inefficiency, rent-seeking, and protection; when introduced have been difficult to remove; and may ultimately have 
been ineffective towards their stated aims). 
118 GATT, supra note 26, art. XX. 
119 GATT Panel Report, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 36S/345, adopted 7 November 1989, 
para. 5.26. 
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in Korea – Beef, explained that, in assessing whether an alternative measure is reasonably 
available, the important issue to consider is the extent to which the alternative measure 
“contributes to the realization of the end pursued.”120 
 In EC – Asbestos121 – the first case in which an environmental measure passed the 
necessity test – the measure at issue was a French law prohibiting the manufacture, sale, 
distribution or import of chrysotile asbestos fibres and products containing chrysotile asbestos 
fibres. Canada claimed that the prohibition violated Article III of the GATT (by discriminating 
against Canadian asbestos in favor of French substitute products) and Article XI (the import 
ban). The EC invoked a defense under Article XX(b), arguing that the prohibition was a 
necessary measure to protect human life and health. The central issue, therefore, was whether a 
“reasonably available” alternative measure existed. Canada argued that “control used of 
chrysotile-cement products” represents a “reasonable available” measure that would serve the 
same purpose.122 The Appellate Body, however, disagreed, stating that: 
In this case, the objective pursued by the measure is the preservation of human 
life and health through the elimination, or reduction, of the well-known, and life-
threatening, health risk posed by asbestos. The value pursued is both vital and 
important in the highest degree . . . In our view, France could not reasonably be 
expected to employ any alternative measure if that measure would involve a 
continuation of the very risk that the Decree seeks to “halt.” Such an alternative 
measure would, in fact, prevent France from achieving its chosen level of health 
protection.”123 
The necessity test, therefore, is aimed to ensure that GATT-inconsistent measures can only be 
justified by the appropriateness of the instrument in question to meet the public policy objective. 
                                                 
120 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 10 January 2001, para. 164. 
121 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001. 
122 Id., para. 173. 
123 Id., paras. 172, 174. 
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 The necessity test can also play an important role in assessing whether a subsidy is 
designed well enough to deliver the chosen objective. For example, let us consider the situation 
where a government, in order to promote renewable energy, grants a subsidy that includes a local 
content requirement, i.e., a subsidy prohibited under Article 3 of the SCM Agreement.124 If a 
production subsidy (i.e., an actionable subsidy, which is not prohibited) could be alternatively 
used to achieve the same result, the import substitution subsidy is not necessary, since a less 
WTO-inconsistent measure can be employed to achieve this purpose. If, on the other hand, the 
only reasonable alternative measure is an import ban (prohibited by Article XI of the GATT), it 
is possible to argue that the chosen measure is necessary since, although both measures are 
prohibited, the import substitution subsidy is less distortive than an outright ban. 
 Introducing a necessity test into the subsidy determination is crucial for distinguishing 
good subsidies from bad subsidies, in order to ensure that exceptions are only applied to 
subsidies that are indeed designed to deliver the chosen objective and which do not create 
additional unnecessary distortions. Accordingly, the necessary test found in GATT Article XX 
should be incorporated into Article 8 of the SCM Agreement. 
2. Considering the behavior of a subsidy recipient Another important question to be asked 
when assessing the effectiveness of a subsidy is whether it actually induces the recipient to 
change its behavior in such a way that the objective can be achieved. Indeed, from an efficiency 
perspective, it only makes sense to exempt a subsidy when it is capable of leading recipient firms 
to do something they would not normally do. In this way, as Professor Phedon Nicolaides points 
out, firms “can be induced to change their practices so that they facilitate the achievement of a 
particular public policy objective such as more research, training or environmental 
                                                 
124 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, art. 3.1(b). 
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protection.”125 Otherwise, a subsidy simply covers part of the costs of what firms would do 
anyway, and the subsidized activity cannot be presumed to be capable of achieving the objective. 
This kind of subsidy also distorts competition and thus reduces economic efficiency, because it 
keeps firms artificially afloat by covering costs they should be able to cover without government 
assistance.126 Economic studies show that subsidies, especially in the areas of R&D and regional 
support, may lead to a significant reduction of private investment. Likewise, subsidies granted to 
larger firms are often found less effective than those granted to small and medium enterprises.127 
 The EU system of State aid control offers valuable guidance in this regard. Under EU 
Law, a State aid must have an incentive effect. This principle was first established in the Philip 
Morris case128 in 1980. There, the Dutch government granted aid to assist cigarette manufacturer 
Philip Morris in expanding its facility in the economically depressed region of Bergen-op-Zoom. 
Both the government and Philip Morris argued that the aid merited exemption under Article 
107(3)(a) of the TFEU because it would help “promote the economic development” in the area, 
where the standard of living was “abnormally low.”129 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
agreed that the region was economically depressed, but at the same time it noted that Philip 
                                                 
125 Phedon Nicolaides, Incentive Effect: Is State Aid Necessary when Investment is Unnecessary?, 2 EUR. ST. AID 
L.Q. 230, 230 (2008). 
126 Phedon Nicolaides, The Incentive Effect of State Aid: Its Meaning, Measurement, Pitfalls and Application, 32 
WORLD COMPETITION 579, 579-80 (2009); see also Bruce Lyons, John Van Reenen, Frank Verboven & Xavier 
Vives, Commentary on EU Rescue and Restructuring Aid Guidelines, Economic Advisory Group on Competition 
Policy 1, 2-4 (2008) (Summarizing the economic literature where it was found that many successful sectors witness 
productivity growth not because all firms present in the market gain in productivity, but rather because the more 
efficient and technologically advanced firms grow at the expense of the less efficient or innovative ones. To the 
extent that this process of exit, entry and expansion is disturbed by subsidies given to ailing firms, industry-wide 
productivity improvements are likely to be slowed down.). 
127 See, e.g., Chiara Criscuolo, Ralf Martin, Henry Overman & John Van Reenen, The Causal Effects of an 
Industrial Policy, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 17842, 1-27 (2012); Xulia González, 
Jordi Jaumandreu & Consuelo Pazó, Barriers to Innovations and Subsidy Effectiveness, 36 RJE 930, 930-50 (2005); 
Holger Görg & Eric Strobl, The Effect of R&D Subsidies on Private R&D, 74/294 Economica 215, 215-34 (2007). 
128 Case 730/79, Philip Morris v. Commission, [1980] ECR 2671. 
129 Id., para. 17. 
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Morris, a healthy and profitable company, was capable of undertaking the investment on its own 
and did not require government assistance. The ECJ ruled that Member States are not allowed to 
“make payments which would improve the financial situation of the recipient undertaking 
although they were not necessary for the attainment of the objectives specified in [Article 
107(3)].”130 
 Similarly, in Peugeot-Citroën, France planned to grant €96 million aid to Peugeot-
Citroën for the development of a hybrid diesel car. The Commission’s preliminary conclusion 
was that Peugeot-Citroën, the second largest automobile manufacturer in Europe, would have 
undertaken the project anyway, even in the absence of State aid. Moreover, since similar projects 
had already been announced by other car manufacturers, the Commission doubted that a market 
failure had existed in the first place.131 As EU Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes 
explained: “The Commission strongly support the development of more environmentally-
friendly cars. However, we have to ensure that the aid is not spent on R&D that would have been 
carried out by Peugeot-Citroën in any event or which its competitors may carry out without State 
aid.”132 
 Over time, the Commission has substantially increased emphasis on an “incentive 
effect.”133 In particular, the incentive effect test became a part of the balancing test, introduced 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Commission Decision N 530/2007, Opening of formal investigation on R&D Aid to Peugeot-Citroën (France). 
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132 State aid: Commission opens in-depth inquiry into proposed French R&D aid to Peugeot-Citroën for hybrid 
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by the 2005 State Aid Action Plan.134 The completion of the State Aid Modernization135 process 
in 2014 has led to a heightened increase in the requirements on the incentive effects.136 The 
Commission has defined how the incentive effect has to be understood and measured in a 
number of recent policy documents, most notably the General Block Exemption Regulation,137 
the Guidelines on Environmental Protection,138 the Framework for Research and Innovation,139 
and the Guidelines on Regional State Aid.140 All the Guidelines have introduced a “substantive” 
incentive test. In order for a State aid to be exempted, it must be shown that (1) the beneficiary 
firm has changed its level of activity by doing something “extra,” which goes beyond its normal 
practices, and consequently corrects the market failure and improves the market outcome;141 and 
(2) without the aid the firm would not carry out this project, or it would carry it out in a restricted 
or different manner.142 
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141 Guidelines on Environmental Protection, supra note 138, para. 49 (“An incentive effect occurs when the aid 
induces the beneficiary to change its behaviour to increase the level of environmental protection or to improve the 
functioning of a secure, affordable and sustainable energy market. . . .”); Framework for Research and Innovation, 
supra note 139, para. 62 (“An incentive effect occurs where the aid changes the behaviour of an undertaking in such 
a way that it engages in additional activities. . . .”); Guidelines on regional State aid, supra note 136, para. 60 (“An 
incentive effect is present when the aid changes the behaviour of an undertaking in a way it engages in additional 
activity contributing to the development of an area. . . .”). 
142 Id. 
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 The incentive test plays an important role in ensuring that a subsidy is only granted in 
order to motivate a change in the beneficiary’s behavior, achieving a public-interest objective 
rather than simply helping a firm stay in the market. As the EU case law demonstrates, the 
incentive effect test is not met when the firm would have to carry out the activity anyway, either 
because a market forces it or the law obliges it to do so.143 Thus, an incentive test should be 
added to Article 8 of the SMC Agreement. 
3. Countervailing Duties 
In addition to subsidies themselves, measures used to counteract subsidies can also create market 
distortions and reduce welfare. Of all these remedies, CVDs represent the biggest concern from 
the welfare viewpoint. Having been designed to protect national producers from competing 
products, rather than protection competition itself, they often reduce the welfare of the importing 
country by creating additional distortions. As Professor Sykes has argued, CVD laws: 
cannot be explained or justified as a mechanism for the imposition of welfare-
enhancing duties in competitive markets competitive market. Existing law largely 
ignores the factors that would be essential to ascertain the welfare consequences 
of duties, and the central features of existing law . . . have little or no bearing on 
the welfare effects of duties in competitive settings. Thus, a net gain to the 
economy under existing law can arise only by chance.144 
To address this problem and to minimize the potential negative effects produced by CVDs, the 
use of CVDs should be restricted. 
                                                 
143 Nicolaides, supra note 125, at 235. Compare this with the provision of Article 8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement 
which only exempts the environmental subsidy granted to firms to upgrade their facilities to meet new 
environmental standards set by the government. 
144 Sykes, supra note 62, at 199. 
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a. Adding a Public Interest Requirement Countervailing duties assist a domestic producer in 
recovering from the injury caused by subsidized imports. Their effect, however, is not limited 
exclusively to domestic producers. They also affect the economy of an importing country as a 
whole. Accordingly, by imposing costs on other economic sectors and on consumers, which are 
not outweighed by the benefits to the industry receiving protection from subsidized imports, 
CVDs may result in reducing economic welfare.145 
 Indeed, the effect of CVDs cannot be viewed in isolation. First, since CVDs often target 
raw materials or intermediate goods,146 which are further used by domestic industries for 
processing purposes, the imposition of CVDs may result in an increase in production costs for 
other products. This, in turn, may impact the ability of downstream industry to compete both 
domestically and in export markets.147 Second, CVDs may negatively affect importers of the 
product concerned since they cause their costs to increase. The extent of CVD’s impact on the 
importer largely depends on the product’s share of total turnover of the product’s importers and 
profit margins, and to what extent importers are able to pass on the cost increase to their 
customers.148 Third, the imposition of CVDs generally does not benefit consumers, since prices 
will increase and the product range available to the consumer may also be reduced. Finally, 
CVDs may lead to a reduction of competition and even to a domestic producer monopoly. 
 To address these concerns, and to strike a balance between the various competing 
interests, some WTO Members have introduced a “public interest” provision, which requires the 
investigating authorities to take into account broader public interest concerns before they impose 
                                                 
145 M. C. E. J. BRONCKERS, Private Remedies Against Foreign Subsidization: A European View, in SUBSIDIES AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A EUROPEAN LAWYERS’ PERSPECTIVE 187, 192 (Jacques H.J. Bourgeous ed., 1991). 
146 See, e.g., Commission Regulation No 1092/2000 of 24 May 2000, O.J. 2000 L 124/26. 
147 WOLFGANG MUELLER, NICHOLAS KHAN & TIBOR SCHARF, EC AND WTO ANTI-DUMPING LAW 722 (2009). 
148 Adinda Sinnaeve, The “Community Interest Test” in Anti-Dumping Investigations: Time for Reform?, 2 GLOBAL 
TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 157, 165 (2007). 
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CVDs. A public interest clause is incorporated into domestic CVD laws of Argentina,149 
Brazil,150 Canada,151 China,152 EU,153 Ukraine154 and some others. For example, the EU 
developed the concept of the “Union interest,” which is established by analyzing “all the various 
interests taken as a whole, including the interests of the domestic industry and users and 
consumers.”155 The Union interest is considered a substantial element (together with subsidized 
imports, injury and causation) in each and every CVD investigation conducted in the EU.156 The 
EU investigative authorities must give consideration to the Union interest before imposing 
definitive, as well as provisional, measures.157 
 In Canada, a public interest inquiry is not a mandatory part of every CVD investigation. 
Nevertheless, after having established that subsidized imports have caused injury to the domestic 
producer, the investigative authority may initiate a public interest inquiry either on its own 
initiative or on the request of an interested party.158 During the public interest inquiry, the 
investigative authority must take into account “any factors . . . that it considers relevant.”159 
 Ukraine has essentially adopted the EU approach, with language regarding public 
interest, but with minor differences. In particular, the public interest, apart from the interest of 
                                                 
149 Decree No. 2121/94 of 30 November 1994, art. 51. 
150 Resolution No. 13 of 29 February 2012 on establishing the Technical Group for public interest assessment. 
151 Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., 1985 c. S-15, art. 45.1. 
152 Anti-Subsidy Statute of 1 January 2002, art. 34. 
153 Council Regulation 597/2009 of 11 June 2009 on protection against subsidized imports from countries not 
members of the European Community O.J. L 188/93, art. 31.1 [hereinafter Regulation]. 
154 The Law of Ukraine No. 331-XIV of 22 December 1998 on protection of the domestic producer against 
subsidized imports, lastly amended 11 August 2013, art. 35. 
155 Regulation, supra note 153, art. 31.1. 
156 Id. 
157 Id., arts. 12.1(d), 15.1. 
158 Special Import Measures Act, R.S.C., 1985 c. S-15, art. 45.1. 
159 Id., art. 45.3. 
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domestic industry and consumers, expressly includes “the assessment of the effect of subsidized 
imports on employment of population, investments of domestic industry and consumers, as well 
as international economic interests of Ukraine.”160 
 To a certain extent, a public interest clause is incorporated into the SCM Agreement. 
Under Article 19.2 (Imposition and Collection of Countervailing Duties): 
. . . it is desirable that . . . procedures should be established which would allow 
the authorities concerned to take due account of representations made by domestic 
interested parties whose interests might be adversely affected by the imposition of 
a countervailing duty.161 
As is evident from the language of the Article, however, the “public interest” inquiry in the WTO 
context is discretionary and limited to taking into consideration the interests of consumers and 
industrial users.162 As a result, many WTO Members, including the United States, have chosen 
not to introduce this factor in their domestic CVD law. 
 Although a mandatory public interest clause in the SCM Agreement has its undeniable 
merits from an efficiency viewpoint, WTO Members obviously have different opinions on this 
issue, which are reflected in their national laws. The negotiations regarding the possible 
inclusion of a mandatory public interest clause into the Anti-Dumping Agreement during the 
Doha Round can shed some light on their readiness to reconcile these differences. An initial 
proposal on public interest submitted by Brazil, Canada, China and others included a non-
inclusive list of criteria for measuring public interest.163 The proposal was strongly opposed by 
                                                 
160 The Law of Ukraine No. 331-XIV of 22 December 1998 on protection of the domestic producer against 
subsidized imports, lastly amended 11 August 2013, art. 35 (the term “consumer” is understood as the final 
consumers as well as industrial users of the product subject to the investigation). 
161 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, art. 19.2 (emphasis added). 
162 Id. n.50 (“the term “domestic interested parties” shall include consumers and industrial users of the imported 
product subject to investigation”). 
163 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Paper from Canada, Public Interest, TN/RL/GEN/85, 17 November 2005, at 
1; WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; Korea, Rep. of 
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other Members, primarily the United States, which argued that a public interest clause would 
“impinge on Members’ sovereignty” and that this discretion should be left to individual Member 
States.164 The subsequent proposals, submitted by Canada and supported by China and other 
Members, suggested including a public interest clause would only require WTO Members to 
provide in their national laws a mechanism for public interest consideration without specifying 
criteria for its measuring in the SCM Agreement.165 At this point, it is unclear whether the WTO 
Members will agree on a provision on the public interest. 
 The inclusion of a public interest test in the SCM Agreement would be a positive change. 
WTO Members need a “policy space” to tailor the public interest concept to serve the best 
interest of their economies and societies. Criteria for the test have to remain at the discretion of 
Members. This may also help Members with opposing views to reconcile their positions, since 
this approach answers the sovereignty concern expressed by some Members. However, limiting 
public interest exclusively to the interests of consumers and industrial users (as the current 
language of the SCM Agreement does) will not offer much “policy space” for Members. To 
serve this purpose, the public interest clause must take into account much broader public interest 
concerns. 
 To better assess the potential effects of CVDs, a mandatory public interest clause should 
be included in the SCM Agreement. Borrowing from the solution proposed by some WTO 
                                                                                                                                                             
Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; and 
Thailand, Further Submission on Public Interest, TN/RL/GEN/53, 1 July 2005, at 1. 
164 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from the Chairman, TN/RL/W/254, 21 April 2011, at 19. 
165 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Paper from Canada, Procedures for Adversely Affected Domestic Interested 
Parties, TN/RL/GEN/111, 21 April 2006, at 1; WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from Colombia; 
Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; Norway; Singapore; Switzerland; the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; and Thailand, Public Interest, TN/RL/W/222, 12 March 2008, at 3. 
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Members with regard to the public interest inquiry for anti-dumping investigations,166 the public 
interest provision should only require WTO Members to provide in their national laws a 
mechanism for consideration of the public interest, without specifying criteria for its assessment. 
The SCM Agreement should also define “public interest” more broadly, referring not only to the 
interests of consumers and industrial users, but also other relevant interests. 
b. Revising the Lesser Duty Rule 
1. The existing approach under SCM Agreement Article 19 Article 19 of the SCM 
Agreement provides that a CVD must never exceed “the amount of the subsidy found to 
exist.”167 It also states that it is desirable that “the duty should be less than the total amount of 
the subsidy if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic 
industry.”168 In other words, the lesser duty rule is encouraged but not mandatory: it may be 
implemented in domestic legislation at the discretion of a WTO Member. Some WTO Members, 
such as Argentina,169 Australia,170 Brazil,171 and EU172 have incorporated this provision in their 
CVD law and thus cap the level of a CVD at the level of injury to the domestic industry (i.e., the 
injury margin). Yet, at the same time, the majority of WTO Members, including the United 
                                                 
166 Id. 
167 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, art. 19.4. 
168 Id., art. 19.2 (emphasis added). 
169 Decree No. 2121/94 of 30 November 1994, art. 50. 
170 Customs Tariff (Anti-Dumping) Act of 1975, Sec. 10. 
171 Decree No. 1751 of 19 December 1995 on administrative procedures regarding the imposition of countervailing 
measures, art. 21. 
172 Regulation, supra note 153, art. 15.1. 
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States and Canada, do not apply the lesser duty rule, and impose CVDs based on the amount of 
the countervailable subsidy (i.e., the subsidy margin). 
 The current “amount of subsidy” approach, adopted by the SCM Agreement, is, to a large 
extent, the result of viewing subsidies from a trade perspective,173 focusing on market access. 
This means that the emphasis is on the protection of the relevant tariff commitments and trade 
expectations of WTO Members. It is useful to recall that the U.S. CVD law – one of the first 
national CVD laws – originally only applied to dutiable imports and no injury test was 
required.174 This suggests that, at that time, the main goal of the CVD law was to preserve the 
level of protection established by existing tariffs. Even though CVD laws have undergone 
significant changes since those nineteenth century provisions, the fact that the SCM Agreement 
caps the level of CVDs at the level of a subsidy rather than injury suggests that the primarily goal 
of imposing CVDs is not to remedy injurious effects caused a subsidy, but instead to restore the 
status quo prior to the injury or, put differently, to “re-establish” the balance of concessions 
between the parties.175 
2. The purpose of the subsidy regime and the lesser duty rule If, however, the ultimate 
purpose of the subsidy regime is to protect competition and to increase economic efficiency, as is 
proposed above,176 the main focus should be on the actual effect of a subsidy. CVDs are meant to 
remedy effects and, therefore, the level of a CVD should be limited to an amount necessary to 
                                                 
173 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text. 
174 Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (Dingley Tariff). See supra Chapter VI Section 1 for a more 
detailed discussion on the early U.S. CVD law. 
175 See, e.g., DAVID PALMETER & STANIMIR ALEXANDROV, Inducing Compliance, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 646-47 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. 
Southwick eds., 2012) (arguing that the purpose of countermeasures under WTO law is limited to restoring the 
balance of concessions and nothing else). 
176 See supra notes 15-49 and accompanying text. 
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remedy such effects (i.e., injury to the domestic producer). Likewise, downstream industry and 
consumers negatively affected by CVDs generally benefit from this limit on a CVD, because it 
reduces the burden of any resulting price increase. In this way, the lesser duty rule at least 
partially eliminates the negative effect of CVDs.177 Thus, a mandatory lesser duty rule, which 
requires the imposition of CVDs based on the level of the injury to the domestic producers, 
better serves the objective of the WTO subsidies regime. 
3. The lesser duty rule and conformity with other WTO procedures A mandatory lesser duty 
rule is also be more in line with the current WTO remedial regime. Under the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Procedures, if a responding Member fails to bring its WTO-inconsistent measure into 
compliance with its WTO obligation pursuant to the Dispute Settlement Body’s 
recommendation, a complaining party may be authorized to apply countermeasures, i.e., 
suspension of concessions or other obligations.178 To ensure that Members do not abuse their 
right to impose restrictions on trade, the level of countermeasures is subject to limitation under 
Article 22.4 of the DSU, which provides that “the level of the suspension of concessions . . . 
shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.”179 In other words, the level of 
countermeasures must be limited based on the level of harmful effects caused by a violation. 
This effect-based approach was first developed in the EC – Bananas III case,180 and has been 
                                                 
177 See, e.g., PAUL I.A. MOEN, PUBLIC INTEREST ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ANTI-DUMPING LAW: 
THE WTO, EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CANADA 5 (1998) (arguing that the lesser duty rule in the EU, as an 
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178 DSU, supra note 3, art. 22. 
179 Id., art. 22.4 (emphasis added). 
180 Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS27/ARB, 
adopted 9 April 1999. 
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followed in all cases decided under the Article 22.4 equivalence standard.181 Similarly, the 
effect-based approach is applied to safeguard measures, which are imposed unilaterally by an 
importing Member when increased imports cause serious injury to an importing Member’s 
domestic industry.182 According to Article 5.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, “[a] Member 
shall apply safeguard measures only to the extent necessary to . . . remedy serious injury and to 
facilitate adjustment.”183 
 The SCM Agreement also requires the effect-based approach with regard to 
counteracting actionable subsidies – i.e., subsidies that cause adverse effects, including injury to 
the domestic industry – by using the WTO dispute settlement system. In this case, Article 7.9 of 
the SCM Agreement requires that countermeasures be “commensurate with the degree and 
nature of the adverse effects determined to exist.”184 It is only with regard to prohibited subsidies 
that the Agreement sets forth another standard. If a subsidy is found by a WTO adjudicating 
body to be prohibited, the subsidizing Member has to “withdraw the subsidy without delay.”185 
Under Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement, if this recommendation is not implemented, “the 
DSB shall grant authorization to the complaining Member to take appropriate 
countermeasures.”186 The “appropriate countermeasures” have been interpreted to mean 
countermeasures based on the amount of a prohibited subsidy. In Brazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6), 
the Arbitrators refused to apply the traditional effect-based approach and concluded that “when 
                                                 
181 See, e.g., R. RAJESH BABU, REMEDIES UNDER THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 292-96 (2012); Thomas Sebastian, 
World Trade Organization Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 337, 350-57 (2007). 
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dealing with a prohibited subsidy, an amount of countermeasures that corresponds to the total 
amount of the subsidy is ‘appropriate.’”187 This amount-of-subsidy approach has been applied in 
all subsequent arbitrations conducted with regard to prohibited subsidies.188 Thus, the general 
rule is that countermeasures are meant to address injurious effects caused by violations of WTO 
obligations and, therefore, the level of countermeasures should be limited based on the level of 
these effects. The amount-of-subsidy approach is an exception to this rule and is only applicable 
to prohibited subsidies. 
4. Applying WTO procedures to unilateral CVD determinations Unlike challenging 
subsidies by bringing the case to the WTO adjudicating body, where procedures and standards 
for prohibited189 and actionable190 subsidies are different, the unilateral procedure of imposing 
CVDs does not distinguish between prohibited and actionable subsidies. Indeed, the only basis 
for imposing CVDs is injury to the domestic industry caused by a subsidy, irrespective of 
whether it is actionable or prohibited.191 This fundamentally differs from specifically challenging 
prohibited subsidies through the WTO dispute settlement procedure. For example, a subsidy that 
falls within the scope of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies is deemed prohibited; there is no 
need to establish injury caused by this subsidy.192 In other words, prohibited subsidies are 
prohibited per se and if a Member does not withdraw it, the countermeasures are based on the 
                                                 
187 Decision by the Arbitrators, Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft – Recourse to Arbitration by 
Brazil Under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS46/ARB, adopted 28 August 
2000, para. 3.60. 
188 Sebastian, supra note 181, at 357-62. 
189 SCM Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4 (in particular, countermeasures are based on the amount of subsidies). 
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amount of subsidy specifically, as they are supposed to induce a Member to stop the violation, 
i.e., granting a prohibited subsidy. 
 CVD investigations, on the other hand, are focused more on the effects caused by 
subsidies rather than the subsidies themselves. Even assuming that the imports are subsidized by 
a prohibited subsidy, imposing CVDs still requires establishing injury to the domestic industry 
caused by the subsidized imports. Actionable subsidies are not prohibited and can only be 
challenged when they cause injury to the domestic industry. It could be concluded, therefore, that 
imposing CVDs is meant to remedy the effect of a subsidy and nothing more. If, however, CVDs 
are intended to remedy effects on an importing country, it is illogical that the level of CVDs can 
legitimately exceed the level of effects they seek to remedy. 
5. Including a lesser duty rule in the SCM Agreement A mandatory lesser duty rule should be 
included in the SCM Agreement. Under that rule, a WTO member should be required to impose 
a duty less than the total amount of the subsidy if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove 
the injury to the domestic industry. This rule will better serve the objective of protection of 
effective competition and enhancement of economic efficiency. Likewise, the rule better aligns 
with the general logic of the current remedial regime established by the WTO. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Reforming the WTO subsidy regime is not possible without first identifying the object and 
purpose of SCM Agreement. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires that the WTO 
adjudicating bodies interpret the meaning of the terms of all WTO agreements “in the light of [an 
agreement’s] object and purpose.”1 Yet, the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement is not 
obvious. WTO adjudicating bodies have applied a “textual” method of interpretation to the SCM 
Agreement, which focuses exclusively on the wording of the treaty. 
 In order to interpret the terms of the SCM Agreement “in the light of its object and 
purpose,” that object and purpose must be more clearly defined in the Agreement.2 The SCM 
Agreement, however, does not contain any express statement of its object and purpose. As a 
result, this crucial element of the Vienna Convention’s interpretative rule is almost impossible to 
apply. This undermines the effectiveness and predictability of the WTO subsidies regime. To 
ensure that the SCM Agreement’s text is interpreted to reflect the goals clearly implied in that 
document, and to allow all its articles to be read together in a coherent and consistent manner, 
the SCM Agreement should be amended by adding a Preamble which clearly defines the object 
and purpose of the Agreement. 
                                                 
1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31. 
2 See supra Chapter VIII, Section A, subsection 1. 
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 The multilateral subsidy regime has two possible purposes: safeguarding market access 
opportunities, and preserving effective competition while increasing total welfare. An analysis of 
the text of the SCM Agreement can lead to the conclusion that the WTO subsidies regime 
considers subsidies primarily as obstacles to international trade, and thus has as its goal the 
protection of market access, relevant tariff commitments, and trade opportunities for WTO 
Members. The problem with this approach is that it does not consider the effect of a subsidy, 
either on the process of competition or on total welfare (i.e. economic efficiency). Such a focus 
only on trade factors is not helpful in distinguishing bad subsidies from good subsidies.3 
 The object and purpose of the SCM Agreement should be clearly identified as protecting 
competition in the market as a means of ensuring economic efficiency. The WTO subsidies 
regime must seek to avoid sanctioning positive effects of a subsidy enjoyed by one WTO 
Member which do not produce negative effects in the form of distortion of competition in other 
WTO Members. The main focus of the analysis should be on the actual effects of the subsidy on 
competition in the relevant market. Only those subsides that have the effect of distorting 
competition should be targeted within the framework of WTO law. 
 The SCM Agreement should be amended by adding a Preamble to read as follows: 
Members, 
Having in mind the overall objectives of the GATT 1994; 
Recognizing the need to clarify and reinforce rules for the application of the 
provisions of GATT 1994 that relate to subsidies and countervailing duties, in 
particular the provisions of Articles III:8(b), VI and XVI; 
Recognizing that Members should not use subsidies that distort competition and 
reduce economic efficiency in the markets of other Members; 
Desiring to ensure that countervailing duties and other legal actions to counteract 
subsidies themselves do not create distortion of competition; and 
                                                 
3 See supra Chapter VIII, Section A, subsection 2. 
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Recognizing that Members should not be prevented from granting subsidies to 
domestic producers in order to pursue legitimate objectives, provided that they 
comply with the relevant provisions of the GATT 1994 and other applicable WTO 
agreements; 
Hereby agree as follows: 
 The SCM Agreement should be amended in other ways as well. The most crucial of such 
amendments must bring the Agreement in line with the new Preamble’s clearly stated object and 
purpose by (1) changing the causality requirement for establishing injury to the domestic 
industry; (2) reinstating the category of non-actionable subsidies; and (3) limiting the unilateral 
use of CVDs by WTO Members: 
 (1) The current interpretation of the relevant provisions of the SCM Agreement suggests 
that subsidies causing injury to the domestic industry are subject to challenge when there is a 
causal link between the subsidized imports and the injury to the domestic industry.4 The problem 
with this approach is that the demonstrated causal link does not prove that such injury has in fact 
been caused by subsidization. This may result in permitting CVDs imposed to offset the injury 
that was not being caused by the subsidies in question. Furthermore, it creates inconsistency in 
interpretation of the “injury” standard, since an “injury to the domestic industry” claim requires 
demonstration of injury caused by subsidized imports, whereas a “serious injury” claim requires 
demonstration of trade effects caused by subsidies. To better serve the objective of protection of 
the competitive process and to reduce the current inconsistencies in the SCM Agreement, I 
propose to interpret Article 15 of the Agreement as requiring demonstration of injury to the 
domestic industry by subsidies. 
 Article 15.5 also requires that damage caused by factors other than subsidized imports not 
be attributed to subsidized imports. Following the “injury by subsidized imports” approach, 
                                                 
4 See supra Chapter VIII, Section B, subsection 1a. 
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investigating authorities analyze and exclude factors other than subsidized imports.5 As a result, 
the factors attached to the “subsidized imports” that do not result from subsidization (for 
example, better quality and design) are included on the list of factors attributed to the subsidized 
imports. This may lead to protection of less efficient domestic producers to the detriment of more 
efficient ones.6 To better serve the objective of protection of the process of competition, I 
propose to interpret the non-attribution requirement of Article 15.5 as requiring the exclusion of 
factors causing injury to the domestic industry that do not result from subsidization. 
 (2) Since 2000, when the provisions of Article 8 on non-actionable subsides expired, the 
SCM Agreement makes no distinction between subsidies that distort and subsidies that correct 
distortions, such as environmental subsidies, R&D subsidies and regional aid subsidies. By 
failing to separate subsidies producing a positive effect from subsidies producing negative effect, 
the current WTO subsidy discipline does not serve the objective of promoting economic 
efficiency and increasing total welfare. To address this problem, I recommend re-introducing the 
express exceptions for certain categories of legitimate subsidies. 
 Having analyzed three possible options for reinstating the green subsidy category 
(application of Article XX of the GATT; re-instating Article 8 of the SCM Agreement in its 
current form and introducing a new revised Article 8),7 I conclude that the most appropriate way 
is to introduce a new language of Article 8. The revised version of Article 8 will (1) expand the 
scope of exceptions from the SCM Agreement to tailor them to the needs of justification; and 
(2) include additional requirements for a subsidy to fall under the scope of this provision. 
Regarding the latter, I propose to incorporate the “necessity test” and “incentive test” into Article 
                                                 
5 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea, 
WT/DS336/AB/R, adopted 17 December 2007, para. 267. 
6 See supra Chapter VIII, Section B, subsection 1b. 
7 See supra Chapter VIII, Section B, subsection 2a. 
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8 of the SCM Agreement. Under the “necessity test,” a subsidy must be “necessary” for 
achieving a certain policy objective. That is, a measure is not “necessary” if there is a reasonably 
available alternative measure that is either fully consistent or less inconsistent with the WTO 
agreements.8 Under the “incentive test,” a subsidy must have an incentive effect. This means that 
in order for a subsidy to be exempted, it must be shown that (1) the beneficiary firm has changed 
its level of activity, going beyond its normal practices, (2) without the aid the firm would not 
carry out this project or it would carry it out in a restricted or different manner.9 Introducing 
these tests is crucial for distinguishing good subsidies from bad subsidies by ensuring that 
exceptions are only applied to subsidies that are well designed to deliver the chosen objective, 
which do not create additional unnecessary distortions and are only granted in order to motivate 
a change in the beneficiary’s behavior. 
 (3) Given that CVDs often reduce the welfare of the importing country by creating 
additional distortions, I propose certain changes that would minimize the potential negative 
effects produced by CVDs. First, to better serve the objective of enhancing economic welfare 
and to strike the balance between various competing interests, I propose that a mandatory public 
interest clause be included in Article 19.2 of the SCM Agreement. I recommend that the public 
interest clause only require WTO Members to provide in their national laws a mechanism for a 
public interest consideration without specifying criteria for its assessment. I also propose that the 
SCM Agreement defines “public interest” more broadly, referring to taking into account not only 
interests of consumers and industrial users, but also other relevant factors. Second, I propose that 
a mandatory lesser duty rule be incorporated into Article 19 of the SCM Agreement. Under the 
rule, a WTO member must be required to impose the duty less than the total amount of the 
                                                 
8 See supra Chapter VIII, Section B, subsection 2(a)(3)(a)(i). 
9 See supra Chapter VIII, Section B, subsection 2(a)(3)(a)(ii). 
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subsidy if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic industry. This 
rule will better serve the objective of protection of the effective competition and enhancement of 
economic efficiency. Likewise, the rule is more in line with the general logic of the current 
remedial regime established by the WTO.10 
                                                 
10 See supra Chapter VIII, Section B, subsection 3. 
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